The Instigator
WxGeo
Pro (for)
Losing
0 Points
The Contender
wiploc
Con (against)
Winning
2 Points

A Maximally Great Being is Possible

Do you like this debate?NoYes+7
Add this debate to Google Add this debate to Delicious Add this debate to FaceBook Add this debate to Digg  
Post Voting Period
The voting period for this debate has ended.
after 2 votes the winner is...
wiploc
Voting Style: Open Point System: 7 Point
Started: 4/21/2012 Category: Philosophy
Updated: 5 years ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 4,599 times Debate No: 23030
Debate Rounds (3)
Comments (34)
Votes (2)

 

WxGeo

Pro

Most philosophers agree that if God’s existence is possible, then he must exist. That is, God's existence is necessary, which is a property. A well known and well defended argument is below where steps 2-5 are uncontroversial. The key premise is 1.



Plantinga’s Argument

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore a maximally great being exists.




Warrant: a priori for 1
A maximally great being is intuitively coherent & therefore possibly instantiated. Thus in order for the argument to fail the concept of God must be logically incoherent. But a maximally great being doesn’t seem even remotely incoherent, so we have at least prima facie warrant for thinking it’s possible that a maximally great being exists.



Warrant: a posteriori for 1

Plantinga says that if we “carefully ponder” 1, & objections to it & if we consider its connections with other propositions we accept / reject & we still find it compelling, then we’re within our rational right to accept 1.



This recommendation is a far cry from the a priori speculations decried by modal skeptics. For even if we cannot come to a priori warrant, we’re rational in accepting 1 by a posteriori warrant from successfull arguments like the;



ℵ Cosmological Argument: Metaphysically necessary being who grounds contingency
ℵ Moral Argument: Moral value locus that’s as necessary as the values which it grounds
ℵ Conceptualist argument: Omniscient, metaphysically necessary intellect grounding abstract objects.



Defining Terms

A Possible World is a Maximal Description of Reality, not planets or a universe. It's just a way reality might be. Imagine a huge conjunction

ℵ Conjunction: Propositions, p, q, r, s … Worlds, W1, W2, etc

A possible world is a conjunction which comprises every proposition or its contrary. Such a conjunction yields a maximal description of reality—nothing is left out. So by negating different conjuncts in a maximal description of reality would yeild different worlds.

W1 = p, q, r, s …

W2 = p, ¬q, r, ¬s …

W3 = ¬p, ¬q, r, s …

Only one of these worlds can be the actual world, that is a world with all true conjuncts. Possible world conjuncts must be capable of being true individually & together. For example, The prime minister is a prime number isn’t even possibly true

Saying God exists in some possible world means the proposition: God exists is true in some maximal description of reality. Thus God is ‘maximally excellent’ in every possible world: God has ‘maximal greatness.’

To have Maximal Excellence is to possess great making properties. Great making properties are things like omniscience, omnipotence, moral perfection, etc.

Maximal Greatness is possibly exemplified. But then it must exist in a maximally excellent way in every possible world, including the actual world, therefore God exists.

wiploc

Con

Hey, Geo, thanks for this discussion.

Most philosophers agree that if God’s existence is possible, then he must exist.

That is, God's existence is necessary, which is a property.

I'm dubious. Why would anyone who wasn't committed to this particular transparently-false argument make such a claim? "Most philosophers?" Hardly.

A well known and well defended argument is below where steps 2-5 are uncontroversial.

The key premise is 1.

Plantinga’s Argument

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6. Therefore a maximally great being exists.


All of those steps are controversial. Greatness is subjective, a matter of opinion. (It seems obvious to me that gods non-existent are greater than gods existent.) And "maximal" is a hedge word. Any step involving either will necessarily controversial: controversial in every possible world.

There are two ways to refute an argument. You can show errors in the reasoning, or you can show that the conclusion is wrong. I might lose readers by tackling the specific errors in Plantinga's abstruse argument. It's easier and clearer just to show that Plantinga's conclusion is wrong:

1: Possible worlds are those without logical contradictions.

2: There is no inherent contradiction in godless worlds.

3: Therefore, some godless worlds (those without contradictions like square circles) exist.

4: Therefore, no god exists in all possible worlds.

5: Therefore, no god-who-exists-in-all-possible-worlds exists in this world.

6: Therefore, no "maximally great" god exists.

Now these steps are uncontroversial. They aren't tricky. They just make sense. And they prove that Plantinga's conclusion is false.

Plantinga's argument stands refuted.


But we don't have to stop there. We can use Plantinga's tricksy logic against him. We'll show that the same logic can be used to "prove" gods don't exist.

Allow me to introduce my demon, Xal-xe. (Pronounced Zal-zee.)

Xal-xe has only two properties.

1. Like Plantinga's maximally great god, Xal-xe exists in every possible world if he exists in any possible world.

2. Xal-xe is logically incompatible with gods: In worlds in which Xal-xe exists, no gods exist.

So, right away, Xal-xe is greater than Plantinga's "maximally great" god, because Xal-xe is entirely defined. He is not hedged, and is not at all subjective. Pretty "great," hey?

Now, let's apply Plantinga's logic to Xal-xe. And remember, Pro has stipulated that this screwy argument is noncontroversial. He is therefore estopped from arguing against it.

Plantinga’s Logic, as applied to Xal-ze:

1. It is possible that Xal-ze exists.

2. If it is possible that Xal-ze exists, then Xal-ze exists in some possible world.

3. If Xal-ze exists in some possible world, then Xal-ze exists in every possible world.

4. If Xal-ze exists in every possible world, then Xal-ze exists in the actual world

5. If Xal-ze exists in the actual world, then Xal-ze exists.

6. Therefore Xal-ze exists.

Great! Plantinga's logic proves that Xal-ze exists in this the real world.

And what do we know about Xal-ze? We know that no gods exist in worlds in which Xal-ze exists.

Therefore, according to Plantinga's logic—-which Pro endorses and says is uncontroversial—-no gods exist.

Now Pro is free to reverse himself, to point out the obvious errors in Plantinga's logic, so as to avoid the conclusion that gods don't exist. But, if he does so, he'll be refuting the logic on which his own argument is based. He'll be refuting himself.

A maximally great being is intuitively coherent & therefore possibly instantiated.

Nonsense. "Maximally great" is partly subjective and partly undefined. And nothing that must-exist-in-all-possible-worlds-if-it-is-to-exist-in-any can be instantiated if there are possible worlds in which it does not exist.

Plantinga says that if we “carefully ponder” 1, & objections to it & if we consider its connections with other propositions we accept / reject & we still find it compelling, then we’re within our rational right to accept 1.


No, because it's obvious nonsense. Any "logic" that proves both that god exists and that god doesn't exist is patently worthless. It weighs zero on the scales of persuasion.


we’re rational in accepting 1 [1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.] by a posteriori warrant from successfull arguments like the;


ℵ Cosmological Argument: Metaphysically necessary being who grounds contingency
ℵ Moral Argument: Moral value locus that’s as necessary as the values which it grounds
ℵ Conceptualist argument: Omniscient, metaphysically necessary intellect grounding abstract objects.


Those arguments are none of them successful. (Note that Pro hasn't made those arguments. He's merely named them. Therefore my merely pointing out that they don't work is sufficient refutation.)

Even if they were successful, they wouldn't even tend to support Plantinga's contrived maximally great god.

Pro introduced talk of possible worlds. So long as there are possible worlds which didn't begin, which don't have god-given morality, and which don't have abstract objects grounded by Plantinga's contradictory and impossible god, then these three arguments fail to support that god.

Conclusion:

- Plantinga's argument is refuted because its conclusion is false. There are possible worlds in which maximally great beings don't exist. Therefore, maximally great beings cannot exist in any world.

- Plantinga's argument is also refuted because the same logic can be used to reach the opposite conclusion. I illustrated this by repeating the same argument, but substituting Xal-xe for "maximally great being," and "proving" that no gods exist.

Vote Con.

Debate Round No. 1
WxGeo

Pro

Con's First Glance
"I'm dubious ... 'Most philosophers?' Hardly."


What an odd doubt; nearly every philosopher agrees that necessary existence is either possible or impossible. Whereas contingent existence is either probable or improbable. This is one of the principles governing all of metaphysics.


Although I must say Con's rhetorical skills are quite persuasive on a superficial level, such skill of persuasion ought to give the voter pause for how carefully to weigh the logic of his arguments themselves.


Con continues,

"All of those steps are controversial"


I'd like to know what credible philosopher considers the the premises controversial? It seems as if Con misunderstands the argument itself. How we know of greatness is subjective, but maximal greatness in every possible world is an objective property: Con has confused ontological greatness with epistemological greatness. The latter is irrelevant to the "Ontological argument."


Con then asserts that non-existence is somehow greater than existence. How is this claim even remotely coherent? For non-existence isn't even a property! How could "not anything" be great? It's clearly greater to exist than not. Imagine if I told you that the burrito I never had today was great..

Clarifying Maximal Greatness
God is maximally Great Being, if you can conceive of something greater, then THAT would be God. This need not be ambiguous or even epistemically known. I'm arguing for Ontological Greatness; not just a "hedge word."

Con's Alleged Refutation
Con assumes to know errors in the reasoning but hasn't offered yet any proof of such errors. But the logic is air tight then by the cannons of logic Con must show which of the premises are false; but instead what does Con do?


He begins with the conclusion.


This ought to raise suspicion for anyone who has ever taken a class in logic. Remember this. For now let's look at his argument leading to a different conclusion in which he claims isn't "tricky" ... despite its premise 2,

"There is no inherent contradiction in godless worlds"

Con revises his concept of possible worlds for the sole reason of the conclusion! This is a text book example petitio principii, or "begging the question" ... Con uses his P2 as a proposition which requires proof yet assumed without proof. What I think Con really wants to say is that a Maximally Great Being is IMpossible, that is, he wants to deny premise 1 of the Ontological Argument. But he hasn't yet. Hence Plantinga's argument isn't at all refuted.

Further, he's saying here that something contingent is not necessary; which is true, but Con has yet to show just how a maximally great being's existence is contingent, or even IMpossible. But if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world; since by definition it is greater to exist than not to exist. Remember, necessary existence is a property.

  • Maximal Greatness = IMpossible?
"Any "logic" that proves both that god exists and that god doesn't exist is patently worthless."

Misunderstood again. The argument affirms God's existence as possible, not IMpossible.
Regardless of that, Modal logic has been highly advanced and developed since Ockham & Scotus; far from worthless. See,

http://homepages.mcs.vuw.ac.nz...;

Con's Second Alleged Refutation
But notice now what I'm arguing for, A Maximally Great Being, is a far cry from Xal-xe, who cannot be maximally great in all possible worlds since that would, well, be God by a different name. Switching the names doesn't render a God's existence impossible.

Maybe Con's argument would work if Xal-ze has quasi-greatness, but that's incompatible with maximal greatness. For there are possible worlds in which God must have the power to refrain from creating Xal-ze; hence Xal-ze lacks necessary existence, which doesn't adequately parody Plantinga's argument.


I'm afraid Con has failed to point out alleged errors in Plantinga's logic. We've only seen fallacies, failed parody's and misunderstanding's of actual vs. knowable, not refutations so far.

Con's Alleged Refutation of a posteriori Warrants
Insofar as theists arguments are even possibly true, it follows God's existence is necessarily true. Yet since the a priori warrant is unfounded within Con’s intuition, whether by design or accident, one can nevertheless offer the following conceptualist argument for a posteriori warrant: consider the Conceptualist Argument,

1. Abstract objects, such as numbers & propositions, are either independently existing realities or else concepts in some mind

2. Abstract objects are not independently existing realities.

3. If abstract objects are concepts in some mind, then an omniscient, metaphysically necessary being exists.

4. Therefore, an omniscient metaphysically necessary being exists.

Premise 1 would simply require a refutation of Nominalism (view of non-existing abstract objects), which has already been accomplished and can be found,


http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org...

Premise 2 simply requires a Platonism Refutation, which has already been accomplished in the literature by showing not only how abstract objects are causally isolated, but are also irrelevant to what transpires in the world.

Premise 3 excludes abstract objects as grounded in a human mind, for there are just too many abstract objects to be grounded in anything less than an infinite mind; and since many of these objects exist necessarily, they can’t be grounded in any contingent mind.

Thus this leads us to a conclusion which supports premise 1 of the ontological argument. Surely, though, it just seems obvious that a metaphysically necessary being is the ground for abstract objects which are themselves metaphysically necessary; at least more obvious than any negation offered thus far. Hence we’re within our rational right to affirm the possibility of God, from which it follows God must exist.


Con has clearly not understood this concept. This is even more evident from how he talks about 'Possible World' semantics,

"So long as there are possible worlds which didn't begin, which don't have god-given morality, and which don't have abstract objects grounded by Plantinga's contradictory and impossible god, then these three arguments fail to support that god"

A possible world, it will be remembered, isn't a universe, it's just a set of conjuncts which maximally describe the way a reality might be. For example, there is a possible world in which I ate breakfast today.

Now when you read his claim^ again, you'll see how Con has miserably confused possible world semantics. For there could BE a possible world in which the universe didn't begin, but that would indeed BE a possible world, still with necessary abstractions. Con has obviously confused material worlds with possible worlds when he attempts to refute a posteriori support for premise 1 of the Ontological Argument.

Con's Conclusion

"Plantinga's argument is refuted because its conclusion is false."

In order to refute a logically airtight argument, in which the conclusion necessarily and logically follows from the premises, you don't start by refuting the conclusion. You must show which of the premises are false. This is a rule of logic. Con is therefore going contrary to the cannons of logic in order to negate the argument. This ought to show the voter just what lengths this Con is willing to go in order to deny the existence of a metaphysically necessary being. You don't have to agree with the conclusion, or even like it, but if the premesis are true and valid then the conclusion necessarily follows.

Conclusion
The Ontological argument stands irrefuted. If Con is to actually refute the argument, he must obey the rules of logic and attack the premises first and not just assume there are "errors" in them. He talks about being a tricky argument, yet there seems to me nothing more trickier than giving the voters an impression that you can show the premises to be false by attacking the conclusion first; this goes against all we know of logic.
wiploc

Con

Pro's First Equivocation:

Pro claimed that most philosophers believe "God" is necessary. When I pointed out that that's hardly likely, Pro changed his claim to, "necessary existence is either possible or impossible," which is not the same claim at all. It's nothing like the same claim. And Pro calls my doubt "odd," even though I never doubted his new claim.

If my doubt of his old claim was odd, he wouldn't have had to retrench. He could have defended the old claim instead of changing it.

-

Greatness is Subjective:

Pro argued for a maximally great being. I pointed out that greatness is subjective. Pro answers that maximal greatness is ontologically objective. But can that be? Greatness is a value. Value requires a valuer, an opinion. Opinions are always subjective. Greatness, then, is in the eye of the beholder.

Some people may like gods who torture people endlessly in Hellfire. I am against torture. So I prefer gods of Hellfire to be nonexistent. To me, when it comes to gods of Hellfire, nonexistence is greatness.

Pro makes some noise about nonexistence not being a "property," but Hellfire is still bad.

-

Pro's Big Objection: I Pointed Out That He's Wrong.

He doesn't like my pointing out that he got the wrong answer.

That's funny. If I had a wrong answer, I'd want to know about it.

But Pro acts like I'm somehow cheating by revealing that his conclusion is in error.

He wants me to start with his first premise, and work my way thru his argument, showing where he went astray. He says I can't know if he's wrong unless I do that.

Does that make sense? Can we know an argument is wrong by looking at the answer? Let's consider examples:

If a math teacher sees "2+2=5" on a student paper, does he need to know how the student got that answer? Or can he know that the student made some error, since the answer is wrong?

If you try to sell an engineer the plans for your perpetual motion machine, does he need to examine your calculations, or can he tell you that he knows you made a mistake somewhere, since, obviously, your conclusion is false?

If a car won't start, do you have to look under the hood to know there's a problem?

No, Pro is just wrong. He said, "you don't start by refuting the conclusion. You must show which of the premises are false. This is a rule of logic."

That's not true. Pro made it up. There is no such rule.

Consider this example, from http://www.math.toronto.edu...

[Okay, never mind. The superscripts won't show up here. But if you follow the link, you'll find a brief and entertaining argument that appears to show that 1 equals 2. Worth looking at even if maximally great gods bore you.]

The conclusion is 1=2. We all know that's wrong. We know a mistake was made, even if we don't know the nature of the mistake.

Let's look at Pro's argument again.

Plantinga’s Argument

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore a maximally great being exists.


I used the same logic to "prove" that gods don't exist.

I define Xal-xe (pronounced Zal-zee) as being

a. logically incompatible with gods (no gods exist in worlds in which Xal-xe exists).

b. Necessary. (If Xal-xe exists in any possible world, then he exists in all possible worlds.)


Plantinga’s Logic, as applied to Xal-xe:

1. It is possible that Xal-xe exists.

2. If it is possible that Xal-xe exists, then Xal-xe exists in some possible world.

3. If Xal-xe exists in some possible world, then Xal-xe exists in every possible world.

4. If Xal-xe exists in every possible world, then Xal-xe exists in the actual world

5. If Xal-xe exists in the actual world, then Xal-xe exists.

6. Therefore Xal-xe exists.

And, therefore, since we know (by definition) that gods don't exist if Xal-xe does, then we know that no gods exist.

So Pro's logic proves both X and not-X. It proves both that god exists and that god doesn't exist.

We know then, even if we don't look under the hood, that Pro's argument is bad, flawed, erroneous, unsound.

It leads to logically conflicting conclusions; we know it is wrong.

It doesn't prove anything; it is worthless; it weighs nothing in the scales of persuasion.

-

Xal-xe Is God?

Pro says I don't get to define Xal-xe as "maximally great in all possible worlds," because that would make him god.

First, I never did that. I pointed out that "maximal greatness" is subjective and undefined. I never defined Xal-xe as maximally great.

Second, even if Xal-xe were a god, he wouldn't be Pro's or Plantinga's god. Xal-xe is logically incompatible with Pro's and Plantinga's gods. (Xal-xe is neither forgiving nor just; he is neither omnipotent nor unable to defeat iron chariots; he is neither omnipresent nor dependent for transportation on columns of flame. Xal-xe doesn't mind doubt and disobedience, so, in Xal-xe's worlds, there is no such thing as sin.) So, fantasizing that Xal-xe is a god doesn't help Pro's case at all.

-

Cosmological, Moral, and Conceptualist arguments:

In round one, Pro named three arguments, and claimed they showed the existence of Plantinga's maximally great god.

I pointed out that they do not.

Even if the cosmological argument worked—-which it does not—-it wouldn't prove or tend to prove Pro's maximally great being. There are possible worlds that never began. They can't have creator gods. Pro's god does not exist in those possible worlds. The cosmological argument does not prove or tend to prove that the gods of all created worlds are the same god. It doesn't even purport to do so.

The cosmological argument, therefore, is not relevant to Pro's case.

The moral and conceptualist arguments are equally irrelevant. Even if morals required gods, they wouldn't require the same god in all worlds that had morals, let alone all possible worlds. And if concepts required gods, they wouldn't require the same god in all possible worlds.

None of these arguments supports or tends to support a maximally great god.

-

Summing Up:

Pro's logic is flawed. His argument fails. Pro purports to prove that that a maximally great god exists, but the same logic is equally good at proving that gods do not exist.

Any argument that proves both X and not-X is worthless. It proves nothing. It fails utterly.

Pro fields three other arguments in support of a maximally great god. But they do not support such a god. They do not address that topic. They are about another subject altogether. Proving that one world had a creator god would—-even if the argument worked, which it doesn't—-would not tend to prove that all worlds have creator gods, or that all worlds had the same creator god, or that any alleged greatness of such creator gods would be maximal. The other two arguments (moral and conceptualist) fail to address the topic of this debate for the same reason that the cosmological argument fails to.

-

Concluding:

The logic of Pro's main argument is bad: It proves that there are no gods as readily as it proves that there is a god. Therefore, it is bad, wrong, totally unpersuasive.

Pro's three supplementary arguments have nothing to do with maximally great gods. They are not relevant to this debate.

Pro has the burden of proof, but he has failed to prove anything.

Vote Con.

Debate Round No. 2
WxGeo

Pro

WxGeo forfeited this round.
wiploc

Con

Given Pro's inability to post, I will thank the readers for both of us, and add only:

Vote Con.


Debate Round No. 3
34 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 10 records.
Posted by wiploc 4 years ago
wiploc
===continued===

A possible world is one with no contradictions. No square circles. No married bachelors.

A godless (or MGBless) world is not a contradiction. Therefore, godless worlds are possible. They are possible worlds.

No god can exist in all possible worlds since some possible worlds are godless. Since some possible worlds are godless, and since an MGB would have to exist in all possible worlds in order to exist in any possible worlds, it follows that MGBs do not exist in any possible world.

The MGB, then, is impossible.
Posted by wiploc 4 years ago
wiploc
Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
: : "A maximally great being is intuitively coherent & therefore possibly instantiated."
: This only gets you epistemic possibility at best, not modal possibility.

Thank you for making that distinction. I hadn't thought of it that way.

But it doesn't get you either type of possibility. If we stipulate that an MGB---if it were to exist in any possible world--- would exist in every possible world, then we know for a fact that it doesn't exist in any possible world.

: : "Thus in order for the argument to fail the concept of God must be logically incoherent."

: Switching burden of proof. In order for the argument to succeed the concept of God being impossible
: must be shown to be impossible itself. Have you showed that God is not impossible?

: : " But a maximally great being doesn"t seem even remotely incoherent"

: This does not mean you have proved it isn't. If something is epistemically possible, then it means
: that the thing could be possible, or it might be impossible, we just do not know. To say something is
: possible in modal terms, is to make the positive claim that the thing is not impossible. You cannot
: just appeal to ignorance and say that because you do not know of any reasons why God is
: impossible, we can conclude he is possible. In reality, you you have to rule out things which would
: make God impossible.
:
: Theists like to pull the old bait and switch. They will get you admit that God is possible epistemically
: without proving his is possibly in modal terms, and then act like God is proven. Sorry, but no theist
: has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that God is not impossible.

What you say is true, but it is still letting him off too lightly. We may not have the burden to prove that MGBs are impossible, but it's easy. And it's fun. And there's no reason to leave the theists thinking their silly argument may hold water.

===continued===
Posted by Rational_Thinker9119 4 years ago
Rational_Thinker9119
"A maximally great being is intuitively coherent & therefore possibly instantiated."

This only gets you epistemic possibility at best, not modal possibility.

"Thus in order for the argument to fail the concept of God must be logically incoherent."

Switching burden of proof. In order for the argument to succeed the concept of God being impossible must be shown to be impossible itself. Have you showed that God is not impossible?

" But a maximally great being doesn"t seem even remotely incoherent"

This does not mean you have proved it isn't. If something is epistemically possible, then it means that the thing could be possible, or it might be impossible, we just do not know. To say something is possible in modal terms, is to make the positive claim that the thing is not impossible. You cannot just appeal to ignorance and say that because you do not know of any reasons why God is impossible, we can conclude he is possible. In reality, you you have to rule out things which would make God impossible.

Theists like to pull the old bait and switch. They will get you admit that God is possible epistemically without proving his is possibly in modal terms, and then act like God is proven. Sorry, but no theist has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that God is not impossible.
Posted by stubs 4 years ago
stubs
Wiploc is lucky WxGeo didnt post or else you woulda lost this debate haha
Posted by Sathiest 5 years ago
Sathiest
It is a possibility, and the founding of those who are Diests, but the possibility of a 'humane' or non-sadistic Maximally seems far less likely to me.
Posted by Reason_Alliance 5 years ago
Reason_Alliance
I't seems you don't adequately deal with

1) the conceptualist argument
2) proving a syllogism wrong by denying the conclusion

You're going against the cannons of logic wiploc! I'll gladly take up both WxGeo's and Ontos' mantle against your profoundly unsound logic. I wonder if I'll be deleted to?
Posted by Reason_Alliance 5 years ago
Reason_Alliance
When will you post a forum to this so I can interact?
Posted by Reason_Alliance 5 years ago
Reason_Alliance
Declined? Mmhmm... thought so.
Posted by unitedandy 5 years ago
unitedandy
I should say as well that there were apparently other complaints well before mine.
2 votes have been placed for this debate. Showing 1 through 2 records.
Vote Placed by 16kadams 5 years ago
16kadams
WxGeowiplocTied
Agreed with before the debate:--Vote Checkmark0 points
Agreed with after the debate:--Vote Checkmark0 points
Who had better conduct:-Vote Checkmark-1 point
Had better spelling and grammar:--Vote Checkmark1 point
Made more convincing arguments:--Vote Checkmark3 points
Used the most reliable sources:--Vote Checkmark2 points
Total points awarded:01 
Reasons for voting decision: FF
Vote Placed by 1dustpelt 5 years ago
1dustpelt
WxGeowiplocTied
Agreed with before the debate:--Vote Checkmark0 points
Agreed with after the debate:--Vote Checkmark0 points
Who had better conduct:-Vote Checkmark-1 point
Had better spelling and grammar:--Vote Checkmark1 point
Made more convincing arguments:--Vote Checkmark3 points
Used the most reliable sources:--Vote Checkmark2 points
Total points awarded:01 
Reasons for voting decision: ff