The Instigator
Artifice
Pro (for)
Losing
21 Points
The Contender
Puck
Con (against)
Winning
22 Points

A duplicate of you is not you.

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Post Voting Period
The voting period for this debate has ended.
after 8 votes the winner is...
Puck
Voting Style: Open Point System: 7 Point
Started: 8/15/2009 Category: Miscellaneous
Updated: 8 years ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 3,570 times Debate No: 9226
Debate Rounds (3)
Comments (33)
Votes (8)

 

Artifice

Pro

I'd like to thank my opponent in advance for accepting this debate. May I be proved wrong, or, may teleportation never be a possible, viable technology to be used in the future (ie: may it not be invented).

Firstly, I'd like to delineate the parameters of this thought experiment and philosophical conundrum for the purpose of clarifying my position. The premises are simple:

A duplicate of you is not you. I am not arguing whether or not teleportation is possible or even feasible as a technology from an engineering or physics perspective, nor am I arguing whether I 'should' survive such a perfected technology were I to voluntarily use it to get somewhere quickly (presumably) without the hassle and wasted time.

My argument is that there is no way in which you can possibly experience life as the duplicate after having been the original - therefore, that guy over there is not me. Case in point:

If while I slept in my bed at home here on Earth, an alien being on a planet in the Andromeda Galaxy made a perfect duplicate copy of me from scratch, I would still be asleep in bed on Earth, unaware a copy of me existed on the alien's planet in that other galaxy. Nothing would have changed in my life from my point of view. I would have no connection to that version of or likeness of me, nor would he be me - as I am here, on Earth, in my bed, asleep.

If that same alien on the planet in the Andromeda galaxy used a transporter/teleporter, which scanned and mapped every particle that my body was composed of, then recorded and retrieved that information and at his end used it to construct a new version of me from different atoms without harming me in any way, I would still be asleep here on Earth and not be aware of any such activity having taken place.

If that same alien on the planet in the Andromeda galaxy used a transporter/teleporter, which scanned and mapped every particle that my body was composed of, YET DESTROYED MY BODY in the instantaneous process of the reading and mapping of my atoms via disintegration, then at his end used the mapped information to construct a new version of me from different atoms, I would be dead and gone, and a duplicate copy of me would have taken my place. I would not have actually been "transported" or "teleported" to that alien being's world.

I, the original me, would be dead even if that alien used all the original atoms I was composed of to reconstruct me.

Thus it is my belief that if a transporter like that portrayed in Star Trek, or any other Sci-Fi show you can think of, were to be invented, it would essentially kill the original versions of every person that stepped into it, replacing them with identical copies.

Would it matter? Well, that's my point. I believe it would matter as you would not be around to enjoy the experience of having travelled from A to B instantly. Teleporters and transporters as imagined in science fiction are killing machines. If they are invented, destroy them.
Puck

Con

For every property F, subject x has F if and only if subject y has F, then x is identical to y.

EveryF(Fx <-> Fy) -> x=y.

If x and y differentiate then there is at least one property that x has and y does not, or vice versa.

http://en.wikipedia.org... (Leibniz Law {LL}).

The methods of the copying are unimportant, advanced technology, magic; all give rise to the outcome of 'a perfect copy.' If we imagine person A's life as being a film, at the moment of copying, the copy is not just an image spliced from the film, the image contains all instances and processes, the entire film, up to the moment of copy. At the instant of copy, both copies are identical, both contain the same thought processes, knowledge, cellular chemistry etc. If the person at moment of copy was just prior to a sneeze, both entities after copy would sneeze.

A photo of person A represents A while not being A. That is, we can say 'this is not person A, but is a version of some recognisable properties of A.' The photo is not a copy, has few properties contingent with person A but retains elements that allow it to be clearly identified as 'this person is A.' The photo is not a copy of person A, though it can be identified as person A.

A photo of person A as a child and one as an adult do not give rise to an easily identified 'this is person A in both photos,' even though it is a photo of the same person. That is, at time t for the child's photo and time t~ for the adult, person A will have separate properties, whilst being consistent of 'this is person A.' Discrete properties at t and t~ are not incompatible with LL since properties related to time t and not being so related to t~ are compatible conditions i.e. person A holding of properties at t and t~ do not occupy the same space within the same time.

==

"My argument is that there is no way in which you can possibly experience life as the duplicate after having been the original - therefore, that guy over there is not me."

Irrelevant as to the experiences any one of the copies has. Remember the resolution is: "A duplicate of you is not you." The duplicate is identical in all aspects to the original, including all prior thought instances. It does not matter who experiences what scenario, the copy and the original would both act in the exact same manner. Much like the child will not currently have the same experiences as their later self; experiences at time t and t~ are not self sufficient clauses of discerning a self from themselves.

"If while I slept in my bed at home here on Earth, an alien being on a planet in the Andromeda Galaxy made a perfect duplicate copy of me from scratch, I would still be asleep in bed on Earth, unaware a copy of me existed on the alien's planet in that other galaxy. Nothing would have changed in my life from my point of view. I would have no connection to that version of or likeness of me, nor would he be me - as I am here, on Earth, in my bed, asleep."

A child has no connection with their future self, no instance of recognition at a future self, for example, 20 years in the future, no instances of thought, action or process from their present state to any future state, yet they are still the same person. Not having the same experiences at time t and t~ is not a sufficient clause.

"If that same alien on the planet in the Andromeda galaxy used a transporter/teleporter, which scanned and mapped every particle that my body was composed of, then recorded and retrieved that information and at his end used it to construct a new version of me from different atoms without harming me in any way, I would still be asleep here on Earth and not be aware of any such activity having taken place."

It is analogous to stating every time cell division occurs within your body, you become an instant non-you because the you prior to that instance of cell division had no capacity to know all future instances of what occurs to you.

"If that same alien on the planet in the Andromeda galaxy used a transporter/teleporter, which scanned and mapped every particle that my body was composed of, YET DESTROYED MY BODY in the instantaneous process of the reading and mapping of my atoms via disintegration, then at his end used the mapped information to construct a new version of me from different atoms, I would be dead and gone, and a duplicate copy of me would have taken my place."

You do not however answer what exactly, is not you about a perfect representation of you. If there is no instance of differentiation, what is different?

"I, the original me, would be dead even if that alien used all the original atoms I was composed of to reconstruct me."

Even worse now; the same atoms, in a perfect instance of you, are not you? How exactly?
Debate Round No. 1
Artifice

Pro

Welcome and thanks to my new opponent for meeting the challenge of this debate. Simply choosing to take a side on this problem, one way or the other, is a difficult task, yet I believe not an insurmountable one. May the most persuasive and convincing argument win.

The equation my opponent provided (Leibniz Law) I believe has been improperly applied to this particular philosophical problem. LL may prove logically sound in the world of abstract numbers, but it falls flat in the real world of three dimensional complex entities. I shall demonstrate why...

"For every property F, subject x has F if and only if subject y has F, then x is identical to y."

Then after the equation...

" If x and y differentiate then there is at least one property that x has and y does not, or vice versa."

A problem arises though when discussing two distinctly separate yet seemingly identical individual persons in geographical space. Person x has a completely different set of environment variables; photons, air molecules, point of view, sensory inputs, mental activity, etc., and is, as a whole, an completely independent compositional set and instance unto himself, than person y, by virtue of there being two distinct and separate bodies in two separate locations.

Mathematically, I'm sure Leibniz does not mean 1 and 1 = 1 when his law claims x = y. This does not mean x IS y.
Given ‘1 and 1' Leibniz must actually mean, 1 and 1 = 11, or put another way, A and A = 2A, when discussing his perfectly identical x and y.

This is an important distinction that must be taken into account when discussing ‘sameness' beyond the simplicity of numerical quantity. My opponent uses the word "same" in a parallel context as the word ‘identical' is used in the equation above. ‘Same' is often mistakenly used in place of what is actually meant – ‘similar'.

There are two possible senses of what can be meant by ‘sameness'...

1) Two identical persons, x and y, APPEAR to be separate individuals, yet truly are not. They are exactly the ‘same' person, LITERALLY. Thus, if I were to stab person x, person y would experience a stab wound in exactly the same spot and way in which I stabbed x. If x died, y would also die at exactly the same time, same blood flow, screams, etc. [It would be as if you were cross-eyed and visually saw 2 identical people when in fact there was really only one person in front of you, who happened to appear in two separate locations.]
2) Two identical persons, x and y, ARE separate individuals. Thus if I were to stab x, y would not be stabbed. Thus, x might very well die, and y would remain alive, unaffected.

I will call these ‘sameness 1' (the absolute sense) and ‘sameness 2' (the similar sense), as I will use them to illustrate later the inherent problem of my opponent's argument and position.

My opponent claims that, "...the methods of copying are unimportant, as all give rise to a perfect copy...". He is correct – the methods of copying are not the intended focus of my point in using the three mischievous alien scenarios. The results of each scenario and what DOES NOT happen consistently in each case is what is worth noting;

In scenario A and B I do not go anywhere. I am unaffected, oblivious to what the alien is doing on his planet. After the alien's having created a duplicate copy of me on his planet, I am still on Earth, in bed, asleep.
In scenario C however, I am killed, and then a duplicate of me is created on his planet. So a question is begged... How is it that because duplicates are made of me that I should have to go anywhere?

Regardless of the method used to copy?

I clearly die in scenario C. I don't die in scenario's A and B. Yet in NONE of them do I actually go anywhere (except in C where I am disintegrated/killed).

Now, if I truly were the same person (sameness 1) as my duplicate, and the alien decided to stab the duplicate to death, technically I should die also, here on Earth (see my explanations on sameness earlier on).
Yet this clearly cannot be the case since we couldn't experience two separate locations simultaneously as if we were both the same body. I can only be here, OR there - not in both places at once. So ‘sameness 2' must apply here; we are two separate and distinct individuals each with our own independent lives and processes, though very similar. Thus, if I am not the same (sameness 1) as my duplicate, I can die, and he will survive without me, and vice versa – ergo, I am not him.

My opponent continues on using 3 different analogues, ranging from confusing and dubious, to irrelevant, in order to refute my over all argument. I'm unclear what my opponent means by "...person A's life as being a film...". Do you mean a motion picture film? Regardless, this analogy does not address the problem of a copy being a separate and distinct entity from its original, yet not having ever been the original. An original can never experience being the copy as I have illustrated, even though he may, for all intents and purposes, SEEM like he's "the same" person, he cannot ever be. Which in turn infers that I can never BECOME him, or experience life from his point of view - or that I can magically bounce from being the original to suddenly being the duplicate.

As for the photo analogue, an image on the photo can be described as ‘representing' the actual living person, in 2 dimensions, who posed for it. The image is identifiable as person A. Yet that image was not something like a voodoo picture that you could stick a pin into resulting in person A bleeding. If it were, the photo could be described as perhaps, ‘having his sameness (1)' but in 2 dimensions on a piece of photo paper.

None of my opponent's points written after each of my alien scenarios makes any actual reference to the relevant point intended in those scenarios, nor explains clearly my opponent's rationale overall.

In summation, for the purposes of clarity and concision, I shall itemize each point of MY rationale for MY argument.

1) Leibniz's Law fails to address properly the nature of two separate seemingly identical objects as having innate difference due to their separateness in geographical space. Sameness being physically impossible, it stands to reason that both objects though appearing identical, are not in fact the same singular thing.

2) Given each alien scenario as example, duplication never results in the original person actually travelling anywhere (except with destruction of the original body, ie; death) or experiencing the point of view of the duplicate. The original of necessity always stays the original, likewise the duplicate stays the duplicate.

3) Thus original can never experience the point of view of the duplicate, or vice versa. The duplicate is essentially a perfect clone with uploaded memories yet no actual experiential past.

My position still stands. A duplicate of me is not me. If I die, my duplicate will take my place, and I will be dead.

I am looking forward to my opponent's rebuttal in the hopes that he can clarify his position. I believe his challenge is two fold; he must show how a duplicate of me is the original me without being "the same" in the sense I have pointed out to him (which is clearly impossible physically), and he must demonstrate how I have experienced a 'transference' of position and point of view, from the original to becoming the duplicate.

It would be satisfying also if my opponent can show me the errors in my reasoning also.
Puck

Con

"A problem arises though when discussing two distinctly separate yet seemingly identical individual persons in geographical space. Person x has a completely different set of environment variables; photons, air molecules, point of view, sensory inputs, mental activity, etc., and is, as a whole, an completely independent compositional set and instance unto himself, than person y, by virtue of there being two distinct and separate bodies in two separate locations."

Irrelevant as to whether the clone is you; there is nothing prohibiting two instances of self ipso facto by cloning technology itself, which you specifically stated prior is not up for debate - nonetheless the majority of properties you list are relative to, and not properties of, I am now currently relative to my chair, I step forward, I am now distinctly different relative to the chair from prior to the step, I am however not a separate person. Mental status is also irrelevant, the clone is contained of all the thought instances prior to the cloning, and as such contains all the same concepts and thought hierarchy as the other - each entity would act the same.

"Mathematically, I'm sure Leibniz does not mean 1 and 1 = 1 when his law claims x = y. This does not mean x IS y."

The Principle if Discernibles relates to what constitutes uniqueness, your resolution is about whether multiple extensions of the self are discernible, and thus far saying my clone is not me because it is a clone is begging the question. You have yet to detail differentiation of identity.

" 'Same' is often mistakenly used in place of what is actually meant 'similar'."

Straw man: - adjective 1. identical with what is about to be or has just been mentioned

My arguments were quite clear about usage not being "similar" but identical.

"There are two possible senses of what can be meant by 'sameness'..."

There is only one relelvant usage, the one I used.

"In scenario C however, I am killed, and then a duplicate of me is created on his planet. So a question is begged... How is it that because duplicates are made of me that I should have to go anywhere?"

Your original presence is arbitrary as to whether the clone is you - identical to you - and you have yet to sufficiently argue as to why and how it would differentiate apart from relative conditions like location - which are not inherent properties of either.

"I clearly die in scenario C. I don't die in scenario's A and B. Yet in NONE of them do I actually go anywhere (except in C where I am disintegrated/killed)."

Still irrelevant. You act in X manner, your clone will act in X manner, you will think in Y fashion, your clone will think in Y fashion, you are composed of Z particles your clone is composed of Z. Your clone is you, its location is irrelevant as to it's *identity* which does not differentiate from yours.

"Now, if I truly were the same person (sameness 1) as my duplicate, and the alien decided to stab the duplicate to death, technically I should die also, here on Earth (see my explanations on sameness earlier on)."

You are confusing identity with causality.

"My opponent continues on using 3 different analogues, ranging from confusing and dubious, to irrelevant, in order to refute my over all argument. I'm unclear what my opponent means by "...person A's life as being a film...". Do you mean a motion picture film? Regardless, this analogy does not address the problem of a copy being a separate and distinct entity from its original, yet not having ever been the original."

You already addressed it when agreeing with me the nature of the clone is exact. Not an imprint of just that moment of time, but the totality of all instances of the person prior.

"An original can never experience being the copy as I have illustrated, even though he may, for all intents and purposes, SEEM like he's "the same" person, he cannot ever be."

Again, unneeded. The child at t will never have the experiences of t~ at t. Likewise, different experience at cloning.

"As for the photo analogue, an image on the photo can be described as 'representing' the actual living person, in 2 dimensions, who posed for it. The image is identifiable as person A. Yet that image was not something like a voodoo picture that you could stick a pin into resulting in person A bleeding. If it were, the photo could be described as perhaps, 'having his sameness (1)' but in 2 dimensions on a piece of photo paper."

Ignoratio elenchi. I never stated the photo was a perfect copy, specifically the opposite.

"None of my opponent's points written after each of my alien scenarios makes any actual reference to the relevant point intended in those scenarios, nor explains clearly my opponent's rationale overall."

Ignoring arguments does not make them not there, though it is useful for your purposes I guess. You did not and still have not shown adequate differentiation of identity, and the scenarios you proposed result in absurdities.
Debate Round No. 2
Artifice

Pro

It seems my opponent does not wish to clarify/further explain his position. There are many cases where, rather than demonstrate WHY his claims are correct and mine are faulty, he rather just ‘states'. The assumption is that we should agree without further elaboration. I think not.

My opponent claims that separateness and alternate location are irrelevant to whether the clone is me. He claims nothing prohibits two instances of self, via the technology which I specifically stated are not up for debate. He is correct – the technology is not up for debate; it is assumed to be possible and exists. Duplication is possible. I've never denied this.

He addresses my relative list of properties yet takes them out of context. Two separate though identical persons will experience a distinctly different and separate set of experiences because of those separate properties, both externally and internally. To elaborate:
If I place person x on the right side of person y, he will breath different air, see different light, and, if person x turns to look at person y, he will have to turn his head left, but person y will then have to turn his head right... which is not possible if each is the "same person" acting "the same way". They may appear identical externally to anyone watching, yet upon deeper examination, they are actually quite distinct and must of necessity be considered different people.
My opponent attempts to illustrate why he are not a different person by comparing himself relative, in two separate locations, to a chair, claiming he is thus not a separate person, as if walking physically from A to B beside a chair were comparable to an original and duplicate person opposite one another.

He then remarks that mental status is irrelevant; the clone containing all prior thought instances prior to cloning. He states each would act EXACTLY the same. He is wrong of course, because as I've described above each person would experience uniquely their respective set of variables externally and internally, differently. Also, that a duplicate set of neurons were created doesn't change the fact that they were just created at that instant and were never involved in the history of actually forming via biological growth and phenotypic experience – indeed, every atom, the entire set making up the duplicate, did not participate in the development and growth of the original body, in the way the authentic person's atoms and molecules did. I will address this point again later.

Regardless, I have sufficiently refuted my opponents claim that each entity would act the same, simply because if placed side by side they demonstrably must act and behave differently – it would be physically impossible not to.
On a side note, it is interesting to observe how people generally do not refer to photocopies, carbon copies, photographs from source negatives, painted reproductions, even manufactured, mass-produced products as being "the same" items as their originals or other copies (only in lazy ways as matters of convenience) – yet in this example of original and duplicate people, the two persons in question must somehow be "the same" person.

He claims I am begging the question by claiming my clone is not me because it is a clone. However, I would ask him to point out where I have stated that claim alone without a contextual background example and follow-up explanation. He ignores or misunderstands my example of how Leibniz's Law does not take the two distinct notions of sameness into account. It is even described in wikipedia below under ‘qualitative versus numerical identity'; http://en.wikipedia.org...(philosophy)

The equation is either inadequate itself, or has been inadequately and insufficiently applied by him to this problem. Simply throwing out an equation without a follow-up explanation of how and why it relates to the problems in question is insufficient in debate.

He takes something else I said out of context when accusing me of holding up a strawman just for explaining how the word "same" is overused and mistakenly assumed to mean "absolutely the same" as opposed to "quite similar".
He further claims there is only one relevant usage of the word same – his. I beg to differ. I have shown how "same" can imply X and Y is actually one letter representing two; that X = Y can be understood as meaning X is equal to Y in quantity, OR, that X IS Y; thus X is not a separate thing from Y. If my opponent can't grasp this distinction then I fail to understand how I can proceed with this debate, as this is a critical and crucial point to understand.
Identical twins are not the same person.

Next, my opponent argues that my original's presence is arbitrary as to whether the clone is me. Yet he has avoided the question I want him to answer; "How is it that because duplicates are made of me that I should have to go anywhere?"

"Sameness" is either absolute, or it is not. If it is not, then my duplicate need not be me no matter how perfect the number, type, and arrangement of atoms... he remains a copy. My opponent claims that location is not an inherent property, yet I disagree once again – only one person can be in one specific location at one time. A location is a specific signature; evidence of an object's existence in time and space – the parameters of its mass cannot be occupied simultaneously by another object.

Later, my opponent claims I confuse identity with causality, when I demonstrate absolute sameness by suggesting that the alien stabbing my duplicate must also stab me. I believe the confusion my opponent perceives is his own. If both I and my duplicate are "the same", causality must logically carry between both persons though they APPEAR separate.

My opponent next advances I have agreed with him that the nature of the clone is exact – I have not used those words at all that I recall, but please do point them out to me if I have. You go on to claim that the totality of all instances prior are exact, yet I have already pointed out that precision of duplication isn't the issue – all atoms could be duplicated in quantity, type, and arrangement, yet this will not necessitate my changing my point of view, location, body, etc. If the atoms used to make the copy have not got the same history as the atoms making up the original, and the copy's atoms are all brought together artificially in an instant to appear like they have a history like the original's atoms, then they are imposters – as is the duplicate if he believes he has had the same history as the original.

I cannot understand my opponent's analogue with the child and t~ or t, or whatever, and how it relates to the problems I've provided. Unless he explains I will have to leave that to our audience to decipher.

My opponent says he never stated the photo was a perfect copy – neither did I. I wish he wouldn't take my points out of context.

Lastly, my opponent implies I have ignored his arguments. I simply do not understand some of his analogues and how they apply to what was established early on. I invited my opponent to explain – he chose not to.
In summation my position thus far:

1) The inadequacy of Leibniz's law
2) The two distinct senses of sameness
3) The impossibility of two persons being "the same" person
4) That one need not go anywhere if duplicated elsewhere
5) That location is inseparable from identity/uniqueness when speaking of existence
6) That one person can die leaving the other not dead
7) That both persons have independent, unique behaviour just as much because of location as separateness
8) That perfect duplication of quantity, type, and arrangement of atoms does not make sameness
9) That the history of duplicate atoms does not equate to the ‘original's' history of atoms

I have demonstrated reasonable doubt that my copy is not me. Please vote PRO. I wish to express my thanks to my opponent for a challenging debate.
Puck

Con

"It seems my opponent does not wish to clarify/further explain his position. There are many cases where, rather than demonstrate WHY his claims are correct and mine are faulty, he rather just 'states'. The assumption is that we should agree without further elaboration. I think not."

Typing my argument out in the entirety in a distinct manner from prior, just for your preference, is absurd. I addressed what specific instances you noted.

"My opponent claims that separateness and alternate location are irrelevant to whether the clone is me. He claims nothing prohibits two instances of self, via the technology which I specifically stated are not up for debate. He is correct - the technology is not up for debate; it is assumed to be possible and exists. Duplication is possible. I've never denied this."

Great, thanks for conceding. We can now discard all your relative properties arguments, and go back to discussing what actually differentiates the two entities. At copy they are exact; at different locations they are exact duplicates. They do not distinguish.

"He addresses my relative list of properties yet takes them out of context. Two separate though identical persons will experience a distinctly different and separate set of experiences because of those separate properties, both externally and internally."

If there are separate properties internally, they are not copies, not duplicates, and the resolution is moot. If you wish to argue, is a duplicate possible in X scenario then you should of made that the debate. All you are stating is, the duplicate is not a duplicate and therefore it's not a duplicate.

"If I place person x on the right side of person y, he will breath different air, see different light, and, if person x turns to look at person y, he will have to turn his head left, but person y will then have to turn his head right... which is not possible if each is the "same person" acting "the same way"."

Straw man. Obviously you don't occupy the same space at t. Entity A will act in the same manner when presented with a specific set of stimuli as would entity B if presented with the identical stimuli, because they are exact copies, exact in all manner of constituent parts, including thought.

"They may appear identical externally to anyone watching, yet upon deeper examination, they are actually quite distinct and must of necessity be considered different people."

Fallacy, No true Scotsman - attempting to define a duplicate as not being exact is poor.

"A to B beside a chair were comparable to an original and duplicate person opposite one another."

No; comparable to relative positions making both entities distinct.

"each person would experience uniquely their respective set of variables externally and internally, differently. Also, that a duplicate set of neurons were created doesn't change the fact that they were just created at that instant and were never involved in the history of actually forming via biological growth and phenotypic experience - indeed, every atom, the entire set making up the duplicate, did not participate in the development and growth of the original body, in the way the authentic person's atoms and molecules did. I will address this point again later."

Again fallacy, No true Scotsman. An exact duplicate, not restricted by technology, if being exact, even if not using the same material of entity A to entity B, would by necessity require those same constituent components of A to be present in B to constitute as a duplicate. This is what I addressed in R1 with the film vs. splice analogy, which you agreed to with the technology not being an issue stance. As a philosophical puzzle, this is not unique and the scenario not limited by current science.

"Regardless, I have sufficiently refuted my opponents claim that each entity would act the same, simply because if placed side by side they demonstrably must act and behave differently - it would be physically impossible not to."

Again, irrelevant, if entity A was asked to do X, then removed, entity B placed there then asked to do X, the outcomes would not differ. Their identity is the same, regardless of their positions at t.

"He claims I am begging the question by claiming my clone is not me because it is a clone..."

Your argument leads exactly to that statement, not in place of. The error you refer to relates to relative properties in relation to other objects and does not in the slightest address the entities' identity being distinct.

"The equation is either inadequate itself, or has been inadequately and insufficiently applied by him to this problem."

You misread it and extract incorrectly. The error is elsewhere.

"He takes something else I said out of context when accusing me of holding up a strawman just for explaining how the word "same" is overused and mistakenly assumed to mean "absolutely the same" as opposed to "quite similar"."

No; you argued what my usage of same was.

"He further claims there is only one relevant usage of the word same his. I beg to differ."

Attempting to change my argument, by defining the words I use differently to how I use them, is a straw man argument. My usage, the definition I use in my sentences, is the only relevant usage in my arguments.

"Identical twins are not the same person."

Great; that wasn't up for debate though and twins are not analogous to this scenario.

"How is it that because duplicates are made of me that I should have to go anywhere?"

What? I never stated you should.

""Sameness" is either absolute, or it is not."

Same is a synonym for identical.

"If it is not, then my duplicate need not be me no matter how perfect the number, type, and arrangement of atoms... he remains a copy."

But not a duplicate. A poor copy is not a duplicate. An almost copy is not a duplicate. A 'we almost got it this time, boss,' is not a duplicate.

"If both I and my duplicate are "the same", causality must logically carry between both persons though they APPEAR separate."

No. If you were occupying the same space at t, then it would occur. Identical position is not needed for both entities to be exact. Causality will address whichever one the knife stabbed - it has nothing to do whether entity A or B differentiate.

"My opponent next advances I have agreed with him that the nature of the clone is exact - I have not used those words at all that I recall, but please do point them out to me if I have."

duplicate
-noun 1.a copy exactly like an original.

Resolution: "A duplicate of you is not you."

The fact this as a thought experiment and not a scientific "is this possible" makes it exact.

"then they are imposters - as is the duplicate if he believes he has had the same history as the original."

Irrelevant as both entities are exact. Who is the original does not matter in determining if they have a distinct identity.

"I cannot understand my opponent's analogue with the child and t~ or t"

Guess there's nothing to address then. Since you never argued the child and adult are separate people, different experiences at a point in time do not sufficiently constitute differentiation.

"My opponent says he never stated the photo was a perfect copy - neither did I. I wish he wouldn't take my points out of context."

I never inferred you had; you specifically made an argument regarding the photo as if I had however.

==
Debate Round No. 3
33 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 10 records.
Posted by tBoonePickens 7 years ago
tBoonePickens
Odd-
"depends on consciousness, not on substance" does nothing for a person that experiences amnesia. By your reasoning, they would be different persons.
Posted by Puck 7 years ago
Puck
Problem is, it is not just memories - it is the entire 'set' of an individual - what you experience in awareness of a 'self' is not the whole of what constitutes a philosophical clone - which is the entire sum totality of a person.
Posted by Odd 7 years ago
Odd
My concern is over a more philosophical standpoint, regarding the term of 'Self'. The term 'Self' is also synonymous with the term "Consciousness and Personal Identity'. My belief is that your 'Self' is exactly that, yours. Despite the theology of identical clones as illustrated throughout this debate and the hypothetical regarding perfect duplicates coexisting simultaneously; I find myself in favor of Artifice. Regardless of the memories being exactly the same or the experiences that are triggered thereon, the clone/duplicate is still in terms of personal identity- different. It has even been plucked from the Sciences on the theory of Time-Travel not actually being the traveling through Time. Theoretically, one cannot coexist at the same time as themselves in the same Universe or Dimension. Looking into Quantum Mechanics and some of the lower-tiered Astrology studies, the logic behind a 'Multi-Verse' comes to play. Time Travel would in essence be moving through Multiple alternate Universes on a scale of differed Dimensions. In this way despite yourself and the 'you' from the past having met, this 'you' from the past is actually a separate entity that had experienced the same things as you UNTIL having met you, creating a new time-line and ruling on any temporal paradox.

To go backwards for a moment, I will quote Locke:

According to Locke, personal identity (the self) "depends on consciousness, not on substance" nor on the soul. We are the same person to the extent that we are conscious of our past and future thoughts and actions in the same way as we are conscious of our present thoughts and actions. If consciousness is this "thought" which "that goes along with the substance ... which makes the same person", then personal identity is only founded on the repeated act of consciousness: "This may show us wherein personal identity consists: not in the identity of substance, but... in the identity of consciousness".
Posted by Puck 7 years ago
Puck
lol @ vote monitoring
Posted by tBoonePickens 7 years ago
tBoonePickens
Thanks! Yeah maybe we will. Swamped with work now but will keep in mind.
Posted by Artifice 7 years ago
Artifice
tBoone,
You're correct when saying that "the duplicate is separated by time and space, and that there are no simultaneously existing entities". Yet there need not be two at the same time. In this case there are two separate entities at two separate times (and likely two separate locations no matter how seemingly exact they appear). As for your PC, I'm not MERELY implying that just because you take it apart and put it back together, that it is a different PC - it IS a different PC. You can purchase a new car off the assembley line, drive it home, take it apart piece by piece then put it back together, and it will seem very much like the original car you purchased fresh off the assembley line, but it will now be a distinctly different car - one whose depreciation began the moment you claimed ownership, stepped inside and turned the ignition key. It cannot ever be the car it was back when the last coat of paint was sprayed on it.

The body, being a vastly complex biological system, can handle the occasional dying, reproducing cell, exchange of gases, molecules, nutrients, and the excretion of waste, etc, while also via inheritance passing on cellular information, memories, traits, etc. That's what I mean by a person at one instant gradually changing into another person. Parts of you are dying and being born continually as long as the overall human being doesn't get destroyed in one fell swoop. Then disintegration via decomposition happens... and death is permanent - even if you create a clone in the hopes that you can revive the person he was before death.
I think the camp that believes in teleportation actually really wants to believe that it is possible - that if they step in they can step out in another place and go about their business as if they just stepped off a train or elevator. However, I think that's wishful thinking.

I too have enjoyed our conversation. Maybe one day we can have an actual, "official" debate... or was this a debate in disguise? ;-)
Posted by tBoonePickens 7 years ago
tBoonePickens
Artifice,

You say: "My problem lay in the disintegration/destruction of the original - once that pattern is destroyed, anything you construct or re-construct after that, using the original atoms or not, becomes a duplicate and of necessity, a separate entity from the original."
The reconstructed pattern/combination is separated by time & space but there are no simultaneously existing entities; there is always only one. Also, the individual is reconstructed using the same atoms and is indistinguishable from the original and thus it is the original. If this is not so then you are implying that if I take my PC apart in one room (Mobo, cpu, fan, ps, cards, etc.), take the parts to another room, and then reassemble it, it is not the same PC. That clearly isn't so.

You say "...however, there is a substrate/biological construct there to keep the mechanics running while these gradual and minute changes occur..."
I don't know what you mean by this but I would think that a good transporter design would take this into account. Not to mention, that if it happens quickly enough then it wouldn't make a difference as it could happen in between these "changes."

Now when you say (paraphrasing) that we are not the same person we were say years minutes ago, then I agree that this is so. However, this can be taken to an extreme where one could say the same is true for every instance in time. Anyways, good conversation.
Posted by Artifice 7 years ago
Artifice
Personally, I see the problem not being the interchangability of atoms - one carbon atom is theoretically interchangable with another, one oxygen atom likewise, etc, (though again I have strong doubts about this because of the impossibility of sameness I address about two identical though separate objects being the same object - its not like there is only one carbon atom existing in the universe and all others are the same atom). So that would seem to imply that whether original or not, as long as one used an "seemingly identical" atomic set/composition in an seemingly identical combination, you could feasibily have a "perfect" duplicate...
My problem lay in the disintegration/destruction of the original - once that pattern is destroyed, anything you construct or re-construct after that, using the original atoms or not, becomes a duplicate and of necessity, a separate entity from the original; seemingly identical in likeness, but never the original pattern/combination that existed prior in that time and space. Once the original is destroyed, the person is gone - he is not going to be brought back from oblivion just because you rebuild his atomic pattern seemingly perfectly, as the original person cannot jump over that vast chasm called death/non-existence. Every seven years your parts are more or less replaced - however, there is a substrate/biological construct there to keep the mechanics running while these gradual and minute changes occur - the person you were seven years ago is dead, no longer exists. The person you are today is gradually fading out of existence, yet is being replaced graduallly by someone else. That process is not an instantaneous destruction/disintegration in the blink of an eye like a teleporters process. If my opponent was trying to say that he is not the child he once was - he most certainly is correct there - that child is dead, and he is a distinctly different entity.
Posted by tBoonePickens 7 years ago
tBoonePickens
Artifice,

I did grasp your points and I agree with you that "it is impossible for two objects to exist separately and simultaneous be 'the same' object."

The Star Trek type of teleportation is not pure science fiction; although it was fabricated for budgetary reasons, it is not without science behind it. "In August 2008, physicist Michio Kaku predicted in Discovery Channel Magazine that a teleportation device similar to those in Star Trek would be invented within 100 years" (Wiki.) While I do not agree with the time scale of the prediction, there is a reasonable possibility that it can happen.

I think the reason transporters from ST were brought up is because they use the same atoms that you were built from originally. So, this would mean that the reassembled person is still the original. Do you agree?

I think that the problem arises when the transporter destructively "reads" your "parts" and then reassembles "equivalent" parts elsewhere: is the new you the same as the old you? Keep in mind that approximately every 7 years your body has a completely new set of "parts". Wouldn't that be the same thing as above?

Look forward to hearing from you.
Posted by Artifice 7 years ago
Artifice
TBoonePickens, I suspect you may have not understood, or missed my point entirely with regard to 'Sameness', in the debate.

It is impossible for two objects to exist separately and simultaneous be "the same" object. Following this logical absurdity to its logical conclusion, whatever stimulus one applies to one of two objects, the other must experience also. Two objects cannot co-exist in the universe like that without some severe distortion of physical laws taking place. Having illustrated this absolutism, it becomes quite clear that no matter how similar one object can be made in the likness of another, each object must be distinct and autonomous entities; separate and unique. The only time a duplicate was actually "the same" as its original was PRIOR to reading - making this non-conundrum a moot point.

One needn't believe in a soul to grasp my point. As for your other examples, I couldn't comment. I haven't seen 6th Day, but will see if I can rent it from somewhere. In Star Trek, if I'm not mistaken, Bones McCoy mentions something about atoms being spread throught the universe and reassembled... or some such thing. Star Trek is science FICTION. Gene Roddenberry has said (I believe) that the reason they introduced a "transporter" into the show was for budget reasons, and was a simple, cost-effective plot device to get from A to B quickly and effectively. I don't see any reason not to suspect they didn't put that much investment of thought into how it actually must work.
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