The Instigator
Pro (for)
1 Points
The Contender
Con (against)
13 Points

A monotheistic God does not exist

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Post Voting Period
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Voting Style: Open Point System: 7 Point
Started: 12/8/2013 Category: Religion
Updated: 2 years ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 738 times Debate No: 41890
Debate Rounds (3)
Comments (1)
Votes (3)




It is as simple as this.

1) If a God exists, then a transcendent being exists
2) A transcendent being does not exist
3) Therefore, God does not exist


You can not just say "in fact" and get away with it. You need evidence to back it up.


In Einstein's theory of general relativity and the concept of space-time, time is affected by space and gravitational fields.

Which means that at a certain limit of a gravitational field, one can manage to "transcend" time. This indeed occurs at the event horizon of a blackhole.

Whatever happens across an event horizon cannot be affected by the confines of space-time. This means that Pro's argument is fallacious - its not that God "did not have time". Its that whatever time God took was FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE TIME OF THIS DIMENSION. Also, he is non-temporal.


This derivation isn"t particularly easy, but bear with me. It"s essentially a re-phrasing of a joint work by Descartes, Godel, and Hawking.

Beginning with the unitarity of quantum probability you find the non-vanishing deism coefficient manifest.

The set of neononontological logical absolutes is provably finite, whereas the set of Descartian, or singly self referencing (once recursive), logical postulates is substantially larger. For example, permitting God to create an object so big that he can"t move it, while simultaneously noting that (being all powerful) he can certainly move it, is a statement contained within the Descartian set, and outside of standard (mortal) logic. By necessity, the more all encompassing logic is infinitely larger.

Indeed, using a Cantorian decomposition on the larger set one can clearly see the smaller set made apparent. That is to say, the restrictions of mortal absolutes form a fractal "Chopra surface" on the larger set in "absolutes space".

The quasimobius structure of absolutes space is established by the most basic mathematical inference. So, once a single point in the Descartian volume has been established, then the remainder of the set follows immediately by Godelian extension. But, keep in mind that the initial premise is based on quantum unitarity (which has been mathematically and experimentally proven), and as such, the projection hypothesis holds.

The "projection hypothesis", an inescapable result of modern quantum theory, postulates that consciousness is an integral part of the structure of the universe. Moreover, according to Alan Sokal, a PhD physics professor from New York city, ""the distinction between observer and observed; the of Euclid and the G of Newton, formerly thought to be constant and universal, are now perceived in their ineluctable historicity; and the putative observer becomes fatally de-centered, disconnected from any epistemic link to a space-time point that can no longer be defined by geometry alone." (reference)

Therefore, by psuedodyadicism, the existence of any consciousness capable of comprehending an almighty or all-encompassing system, induces (technically: "projects") a "pocket" into absolutes space, establishing an interior point, allowing for the divining of the existence of the whole of the set of Descartian absolutes. Obviously, this only strictly implies the existence of neoDescartian absolutes, but the paleoDescartian set follows immediately.

Obviously, the ratio of the q-measure of the higher postulates to the totality of absolutes space is the probability that those higher postulates hold in our universe. (This technique is common practice in most of the scientific community, but is almost unheard of in physics circles, which are mired in orthodoxy.)

But, having a higher dimensionality than the set of mortal absolutes (being circular, they have a dimension of ) implies immediately that the ratio is 1-1. I.e., an almighty consciousness capable of everything must necessarily exist. QED

Of course this only holds for our universe.
Debate Round No. 1


Ok, let us start over again.

I thank my opponent for accepting this debate.

Argument From Incoherence: Omnipotence/ Omnibevenvolence

Omnipotence ("all-powerful") entails being "all-free". This means that it is possible for God to freely chose to commit an act of evil if he wishes, thus, he commits an evil act in some possible world. For example, if raping an innocent woman without a compensating good is objectively evil, then God commits this act in some possible world due to his omnipotence and freedom. There is no contradiction in a omnipotent being freely choosing to commit an act of evil. A being who could freely chose to commit an act of evil, is more free and powerful than a being who is not free to commit an act of this nature. This doesn't mean there is a high probability he would commit this act in the actual world, this just means there exists one possible world where God commits an act of evil.

Now, an omnibenevolent being commits an act of evil in no possible world. If an omnibenevolent God committed an act of evil in some possible world, this would render the being not omnibenevolent, because a being who committed an act of evil in no possible world, would be perfectly moral, and more morally good than a being who did commit an act of evil in some possible world.

There cannot both be a possible world where God commits an act of evil, and no possible world where God commits an act of evil. Thus, the idea of God is incoherent and he cannot logically exist. There cannot be a being who is both omnipotent and omnibenevolent.

Paul Draper's Argument From Evil (Gratuitous Suffering)

Paul Draper's article "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists" [1] involves a highly sophisticated argument supporting Naturalism over Theism. I am going to run down the basics of this argument. Basically, our knowledge of the biological utility of pain and pleasure is extremely troubling for Theism, but this is exactly what we would expect if Naturalism was true. Thus, this argument demonstrates the probable disconfirmation of Theism.

First, we are going to analize two different hypotheses:

(T) The hypothesis of theism

(HI) The hypothesis of indifference

According to T, the universe was created by God, the same God defined in my opening round.

According to HI, neither nature nor the condition of sentient beings here on this planet is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions on the part of personal being(s).

HI is completely consistent with metaphysical Naturalism, but it is not compatible with the existence of supernatural personal beings. There are certain observations (O) we have made regarding the nature of human/ animal pain and suffering that are severely less probable on T than they are on HI.

This could be described as:

Pr(O|T) < Pr(O|HI)

Pr (O|T), which equates to "the probability of our observations about suffering given theism" is much lower than the Pr (O|HI), which equates to"the probability of our observations about suffering given the hypothesis of indifference."

**The Biological Utility Of Pain**

If one lives a sanitized lifestyle (which I'm sure all of us on DDO do), then it's not hard to fail to acknowledge the grim cruelty in the nature of the world. Hearing the squeal of a pig as his throat gets slit for example, would definitely wake you up to this. Draper"s argument here isn't like most PoEs, it predicates itself particularly on a problem arising from the biological utility of pain. This is basically, the pain of the type experienced by the pig as its throat is slit.

Draper states:

"A system (S) is goal-directed, just in case for some property or characteristic (G) that S exhibits, environmental changes are such that (i) if no compensating changes occurred in S then S would no longer G; and (ii) if compensating changes occurred in S, then S would continue to G or would repeat G."

Biological utility itself, refers to sub components of a biological system (Xs) which are biologically useful if (i) they causally contribute to a biological goal and (ii) their contribution is not accidental.

Now the key to understanding this argument is that pain and pleasure are biologically useful, in (S), which is a goal-directed system. Pleasure helps us to come forward to biologically useful things and pain helps us detract from biologically damaging things. People who can't feel pain for example, damage themselves often (a condition known as congenital analgesia)[2].

It is also true to say that not all pain and pleasure is biologically useful. Sometimes it is biologically gratuitous. For example, the pain felt by the squealing pig was biologically gratuitous because although pain may often help organisms avoid bad situation, it did not help on this occasion, yet the pig still felt the pain. Something similar can be said about the pleasure experienced by a heroin addict, it didn't help him biologically, but he still felt the pleasure.

Now, O (observations) can be split in three ways:

O1. Observations of moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that is biologically useful.

O2. Observations of sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that is biologically useful.

O3. Observations of sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that is not known to be biologically useful (and likely to be biologically gratuitous).

This means our original equation, can be restated as:

Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) < Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI)

Now, God as a morally perfect being, would need to have some moral reason for allowing moral agents, such as human beings, to experience pain. A biological reason for allowing pain would clearly not be enough. Of course, the problem for T is self-evident. Even if pain could be somehow morally justified it is also clearly observed to be biologically useful. This, obviously makes more sense if there is not a personal being (HI) than on Theism (T), regardless if the theist posits some hidden reason or not. I would add that God could and would have not included this biological utility of pain, and this would not hinder with any free will (a being who is responsible for less suffering, while maintaining our free will, would be more benevolent). A hidden reason for the allowance of what seems to be gratuitous pain, may possibly raise the probability for T, but the point is, not enough to disconfirm the probable truth of HI. I would even add, that positing this "reason" appeals to the Law of Parsimony less, thus lowering the likelihood of T by definition.

Possible Objections to Draper's Argument

Richard Swinburne, a prominent Theistic philosopher, argued that non-moral pain is required if human beings are to have genuine freedom over serious moral issues. This seems to be an objection to Draper's argument that may have merrit. Does Swinburne's argument however, undermine Draper's argument at all? I think not much at all, it at all. There are three crucial problems with it.

This does not explain the need for pain of which we have no knowledge of.
This does not explain the mass volume and magnitude of non-moral pain.
Several theists, like Eleanore Stump have actually argued that God could let us know how our decisions lead to mass suffering, without letting us know of his existence. Stump proposes that God could send us message-laden dreams that do not compel us to believe in his existence.
Another possible objection is that if God exists, he would have a vast amount of knowledge about good and evil and how they are related that humans that we do not have. This is where everything connects. For while it might be true that God has a reason for O, we have no antecedent reason to expect O to obtain. Regardless, (HI) already accounts for O, making it more likely anyway.


I have established the likely non-existence of God with my two arguments.





I appreciate this topic and I look forward to debating this with my opponent. As an important reminder to my opponent, merely citing the website at the bottom of your round is not a proper sourcing of content when many sections of text in your argument are verbatim. I"ve followed Luke at for quite some time; please be judicious and avoid plagiarism by quoting him specifically when you make use of his exact phrases.

In regards to the arguments presented, you"ll perhaps notice that they suffer from some pretty significant weaknesses even without yet delving into the details of them. Perhaps you"ve noticed already, as I have, that my opponent"s second argument (argument from gratuitous evil) ignores the definition (ii) of which it intends to refute. But let"s start from the beginning.

RE: Argument From Incoherence: Omnipotence/ Omnibenevolence

This argument is a nonstarter for at least one very distinct reason: omnibenevolence and omnipotence do not entail what he thinks it does. He claims, "This means that it is possible for God to freely chose to commit an act of evil if he wishes, thus, he commits an evil act in some possible world." First, we can see that this assumes (ii) to be wrong from the onset, inasmuch as it assumes that God is bound by some supra-divine standard of Good and is not himself the author of it. Secondly, his very first sentence entails that this very next is false. He says, "Omnipotence ("all-powerful") entails being "all-free"." Being "all-free," as it were, entails that he is not bound by any limitation (definitionally true); committing an act of evil implies that God is bound by a moral metric for which he is presumably not the author, which is a limitation. Thus, my opponent"s first and second sentences are incoherent and suffer from the very criticism he wishes to levy. Just as a scale exists outside of its own measurements, insomuch as it cannot weigh itself, so God exists as not something to be measured, but as the very object by which we measure. In fact, logic dictates that the creator of the universe not only has the right but has the capability of setting the standards for his creation. The verity of this claim is confirmed every day when a programmer creates his own gaming "universe." It would be intellectually insane to assume that a programmer ought to be bound by his own programming. As the quip goes, "His game, His rules."

Thus, though omnipotence and omnibenevolence may by incoherent, we certainly cannot deduce as much from the argument presented by my opponent.

RE: Paul Draper's Argument From Evil (Gratuitous Suffering)

This argument fails for a great number of reasons, not least of which is the fact it begs the question from the beginning. My opponent began his first round with the definition (ii) of God, which states, "The divine author of moral authority. " But if this were truly the case, then the argument from evil could never begin! It would be a true nonstarter, for it is only a problem if evil exists wholly apart from God"s authorial handiwork, wherein we can actually claim evil to be a standalone concept. But if the definition of good and evil are bound inexorably to God, then we cannot call actions evil unless we presuppose that God exists. Draper and my opponent have called certain actions evil (gratuitous suffering) apart from God and have thus begged the question. For all we know, God may very well enjoy the needless suffering of animals of every sort"hominid and otherwise. Moreover, if God is the author of moral authority, we have no basis for thinking it a contradiction with his omnibenevolence. So far as I can tell, my opponent is assuming a CHRISTIAN God, wherein we have at least some basis for determining the CONTENT of morality. But that is not what this debate presumes; it presumes to be able to show that an omniexcellent God who is the author of moral authority is unlikely based upon probabilistic arguments that have literally no epistemic scope. And by this I intend to mean that we have literally NO idea whether suffering of any magnitude is evil or whether God very much likes it"we have no access to his mind and thus have no idea what sort of morality he has in fact authored and how it may or may not correspond with our own dim visions of it.

So logical calculations like the following: Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) < Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI), are really quite meaningless, as they depend upon information for which we have no access. In philosophy, we call scenarios like this inscrutable, inasmuch as they are impossible to know because they exist outside of our epistemological access.

Needed Clarity

I don"t intend to believe that it is easy to be clear with so few words. But I would very much like to be as clear as possible on these points, as I think a careful reader will recognize that they are damning to my opponent"s argument.
The first argument is weak enough and I think needs no more time. The second, being more complicated, may need some clarification. First, we must recognize that there is nothing inherent in my opponent"s definitions of (i) and (ii) in round 1 that give us the impression that we would know the content of the morality that God authored and whether or not it corresponds with our own impressions. Further, the observation of our own finiteness and cognitive shortcomings coalesced with our acknowledgement of God's omni-excellence gives us very good reasons for believing God's mind and reasons are completely foreign to us - inasmuch as we have no good reasons for knowing what he would and would not do. This means that PR(O1 & O2 & O3|T) may be incredibly high, because it may very well be the case that God enjoys gratuitous suffering and, by virtue of his moral authority, has rendered it Good. Thus, it could be that my opponent"s formula: Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) < Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI) is actually Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) >> Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI). Even worse, the two formulas juxtaposed have not yet been shown to be in contradiction! That means that both indifference and theism (as defined) can be true! It may very well be the case that it is good to God that he not care about the wellbeing of any of the living organisms that came about after his creation of the universe. Since the formula can go in either direction by virtue of our inability to epistemologically access crucial and necessary information, it is only fair to conclude that the probability is inscrutable. By deeming the probability as inscrutable, my opponent has failed to show that God"s existence is unlikely based upon his arguments. Probablistic arguments of this nature simply fail by nature of assuming to know too much. Our epistemic range is finite and we cannot intend to make sound arguments in areas of infinite magnitude.

Definition of formula:

PR(O1 & O2 & O3|T)
Translation: The probability of our three respective observations of pain suffering on theism.
Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI)
Translation: The probability of our three respective observations of pain suffering on the hypothesis of indifference.

Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) < Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI)
Translation: The probability of our three respective observations of pain and suffering on theism is less than the probability of our three respective observations of pain and suffering being true on the hypothesis of indifference.

Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) > Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI)
Translation: The probability of our three respective observations of pain and suffering being true on theism is greater than the probability of our three respective observations of pain and suffering being true on the hypothesis of indifference.
Debate Round No. 2


I have officially been convinced! I am no longer an Atheist!

Vote Con!


Vote for Con! Sadly, this ends in a concession.

Also, out of curiosity, do you have any alternate accounts here?
Debate Round No. 3
1 comment has been posted on this debate.
Posted by philochristos 2 years ago
Alan Sokal! LOL I knew this was a "fashionable nonsense" kind of thing.
3 votes have been placed for this debate. Showing 1 through 3 records.
Vote Placed by TrueScotsman 2 years ago
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Total points awarded:03 
Reasons for voting decision: Pro conceded, and also dropped his initial argument which was clearly built off of a logical fallacy. Con did a great job and pointing out the flaws in his opponent's argument as well as even noting a possible plagiarism on Pro's part. Since this was noted, I did not award conduct to Pro for concession.
Vote Placed by KingDebater 2 years ago
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Reasons for voting decision: Conduct to Pro because he conceded, arguments to Con because pro conceded.
Vote Placed by TheAmazingAtheist1 2 years ago
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Reasons for voting decision: Concession