DA Tournament: The Most Accurate Meta-Ethical Theory. Moral Realism (Pro) vs Moral Relativism (Con)
Full Resolution: "What is the most accurate meta-ethical theory. Moral Realism, or Moral Relativism
This is in fulfilment of the religious devils advocate tournament:
Moral Realism: "Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which propositions may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."[http://en.wikipedia.org...]
Moral Relativism: "Moral relativism may be any of several philosophical positions concerned with the differences in moral judgments across different people and cultures... meta-ethical moral relativism holds that in such disagreements, nobody is objectively right or wrong"[http://en.wikipedia.org...]
8,000 characters, 4 rounds, 48h.
Burden of Proof is Shared.
Round 1: Acceptance, definitions
Round 2: Opening arguments (no rebuttals)
Round 3: Arguments, rebuttals
Round 4: Arguments, rebuttals
Round 5: Rebuttals & Conclusion (no new arguments)
Best of luck Benshapiro!
I thank Benshapiro for this debate.
Affirming moral relativism.
I will put forward arguments affirming moral relativism in this round. After each argument has been put forward I'll leave it to my opponent to pick apart for the next round.
Defining moral relativism
Moral relativism is an umbrella term that encompasses many different philosophical beliefs on the subject. Fundamentally, all moral relativists would agree that moral judgements can only be judged to be 'right' or 'wrong' relative to the moral norms of whatever society you happen to be living and that moral judgements can't be proven to be objectively superior to any other.
Branches of moral relativism
[Meta-ethical] moral relativism: moral judgements are relative to different perspectives and aren't true or false in any absolute sense.
Non-realism: There is no such thing as an objective moral order that we can compare the 'right' or 'wrongness' of our moral beliefs against.
Non-cognitivism: Moral judgements don't have an inherent truth value in the same way that “sky is blue” has a truth value. There is an indivisible divide between 'fact' vs. 'values'.
Descriptive relativism: It's a fact that moral beliefs, practices, and customs vary between cultures. Some societies view gay marriage as acceptable while others don't.
Many of these definitions overlap in some ways but have subtle philosophical differences. For example, non-realism is an ontological claim (this 'is' reality) while non-cognitivism is an epistemic claim (this can't possibly be 'known' or 'verified' with reality). All branches of moral relativism subscribe to meta-ethical moral relativism.
It's also worth noting that moral relativism has a sound foundation in nihilism before starting my next section.
Nihilism: all moral values and judgements are essentially meaningless or baseless. 
Moral relativism is the most parsimonious explanation
Moral relativism converges with evolutionary theory. If we accept that life has evolved from whole taxonomic groups over large periods of time, then human morality is ultimately the product of natural selection. If human morality is the product of natural selection, morality is an emergent result of this process. If morality is emergent, then morality can't be true or false in any absolute sense and is relative depending on what species you happen to be. We know that it's immoral to eat and kill our signifcant other after mating but if we were a black widow it'd be perfectly normal. If morality is argued to be unique to human beings (1) why do animals seem to behave according to moral codes (2) why would *only humans* have a set of moral codes that describe objective features of the world to the exclusion of all other species? When weighing moral relativism against moral realism to see which is most accurate, it's important to see which theory is most supported explicilty or implicitly with evolutionary theory. The data shows that the evidence supporting evolution is simply overwhelming. Its no surprise then that 99.9% of scientists accept the theory of evolution.These evidences include but are not limited to:
Moral relativism is the only meta-ethical worldview that is parsimonious with evolutionary theory. Evolutionary theory is firmly established. Therefore moral relativism is the most acccurate meta-ethical worldview.
I am only going to affirm descriptive egoism. Descriptive egoism is the notion that people are motivated by their own desires and self-interests and results in forming their meta-ethical worldview. Our desires and self-interests are what forms our moral values. For example, if I desire life, I will place value on life. Therefore I can understand others who have this desire and this results in a shared moral code between us. Since 'desire' isn't objective, then it follows that our values are not objective. If our values are not objective, it's impossible for our moral code to be anything other than relative depending on our desires. Egoism was a tenet held by Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, who argued that the most efficient economy is a free market because supply and demand are equal since everyone seeks their own self-interests.
Descriptive relativism holds as fact that moral beliefs vary from society to society. This is obvious. Some societies view cows as sacred, others don't. Some societies accept gay marriage, other's dont. In Yemen child marriage is permissible but in other societies it isn't. Moral values are factually different across socities. This more accurately aligns with moral relativism as the true meta-ethical worldview. The logic behind this is that if there are moral differences between societies it undermines the claim that there are 'objective' moral facts and shows goes to show that morality in one society is no superior to morality in another.
There's no coherent alternative to moral relativism
Coherent: (of an argument, theory, or policy) logical and consistent.
Since moral relativism is ultimately built upon a nihilist foundation, the only alternative to moral relativism is moral realism. There are good reasons to affirm that moral relativism is the only coherent explanation compared to the alternative.
If one were to argue that there are 'moral facts' they must be able to validate those facts apart from their personal bias of their desires and self-interests. If there is something is 'factual' or an 'objective feature' of the world it exists apart from human opinion. Descriptive egoism holds that it is impossible to verify the truth of 'it's wrong to lie' in the same way one could verify the truth in the claim 'bacteria is microscopic' because there's no verifiable 'truth value' in moral claims. Value judgements can never logically be equated with factual statements. Thus, there's an individisible divide between our personal moral values as a construct of subjective desire vs. objective moral facts.
“Ethnocentrism is the tendency to believe that one's ethnic or
cultural group is centrally important, and that all other groups are
measured in relation to one's own.” 
This means that our notions of 'right' and 'wrong' are thought to be matter-of-fact but are irreparably conditioned by our culture, customs, and social norms. Here's something that illustrates that point:
“The historian Herodotus tells the story of how the Persian king
Darius asked some Greeks at his court if there was any price for which
they would be willing to eat their dead father’s bodies the way the
Callatiae did. The Greeks said nothing could induce them to do this.
Darius then asked some Callatiae who were present if they would ever
consider burning their fathers’ bodies, as was the custom among
Greeks. The Callatiae were horrified at the suggestion. Herodotus
sees this story as vindicating the poet Pindar’s dictum that “custom
is lord of all”; people’s beliefs and practices are shaped by custom,
and they typically assume that their own ways are the best."” 
I believe that this illustrates my point perfectly. I'll leave you with a quote from Nietzsche:
“ There are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretations of phenomena.” -Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil, 108).
I'll provide my rebuttals then attack my opponent's case.
"Moral nihilism is explicitly different to moral relativism"
I spent a mere 5 sentences touching on moral nihilism last round so this part of my case was insignificant. I'm not affirming nihilism. I said: "Moral relativism is a viewpoint that has a logical foundation in existential nihilism". If there's no ultimate meaning, purpose, or reason for existence as existential nihilism posits, this lays a *logical foundation* for morality to have relative - rather than factual - truth value. There aren't any intrinsic ends with moral relativism or moral nihilism and both are anti-realism views with a fact-value gap problem. Nihilism doesn't allow subjective truth values while relativism does but I acknowledge their differences.
Moral sense is an incorrigable state
1. If evolution is true, then mathematics is emergent & relative
My opponent's logic is the same as my argument was, but the scenarios used aren't analogous.
Ethnocentrism is the tendency to think that *your own* cultural or ethnic group is centrally important while all other cultures are measured in relation to it. This explains why moral realists make claims condemning other societies for not acting in accordance with their own moral propositions. Such condemnations were made by Midieval Christianity or during the Spanish Inquisition as part of their ethnocultural moral realist philosophy.
Moral sense theory
My opponent introduces moral sense theory without telling us what "moral sense theory" even is. He says that we would expect strongly general moral statements if we have moral sense. He hasn't shown that this is an 'objective' moral sense that allows us to express propositions that refer to objective features of the world. Human beings have an instinctual need for survival by having enough shelter, water, food, protection, etc., so strongly general moral statements are to be expected of a species that shares all of the same needs. Others that harm this chance of survival in any way can be expected to be quarantined or punished in some fashion. Thus, my opponent's argument that we have moral sense doesn't show it to be objective in any way.
Grounding moral truths
My opponent says that there doesn't need to be a God to ground moral realism, only that a concept of God does. But this is incoherent. If there is no moral authority, such as God, that enforces moral law, what we "ought" to do is neither objective nor binding. Moral realism couldn't express any objective features of the world. The same is true for utilitarianism. Under what obligation are people to obey a utilitarianist view of morality? No obligation. Therefore it cannot be grounded in a utilitarian view either.
Morality existing as a cogent concept
"Moral" is a cogent concept because societies have defined what those truths are. It makes no difference if the truth of it is objective or not. "Amoral" is just the negation of whatever is being considered as a truth proposition. We have shared ideas of what it means to be moral vs. amoral but humanity shares the same instinctual tendencies so common morality is to be expected.
Pro makes the mistake in thinking that moral disputes are resolvable based on moral content. Humanitarian crimes are settled on whichever country holds the most power. Countries that commit 'humanitarian crimes' would just as equally enforce their own interests on another country if they had enough power to do so. The weaker country would then be seen as the ones committing 'humanitarian crimes'. It's all based on perspective and is easily explained via ethnocentrism.
Moreover, essentialism has ties to metaphysics, where an object’s essence comes before it’s existence. Take a bottle for example, a bottle has an end (it stores liquid), which is its design purpose, moreover there is the process of designing it, manufacturing it, where all the molecules of its material composition came from etc. All of these compose any object’s essence, it in summary is an attribute by which something is itself, and without it, it isn’t. Thus to deny anything’s essence is to deny the law of identity (A=A), which is absurd.
Once the essence is place, only then is it made actual, and thus possesses existence. This also has strong ties with the Artistotelian laws of causality, where any action has a material cause, efficient cause, formal cause and a final cause. All four of these causes are required for anything to happen, or to be made actual. Materials are required to build the object, a carpenter (efficient cause) is required to do the action, and a design, or image (formal cause) is required to give form, and a final cause is the direction, or purpose.
Thus, my postulate is that all things have an essence, and all actions have a final cause. We have good reasons to believe both are true. For the latter for example, all actions within the physical world are directed towards their effects. For example, pressing the boil button on your kettle invariably leads to boiling water, this is repeatable over and over. It is metaphysically possible for the button on your kettle to lead to vastly different results, such as the water freexing, or vanishing, or venting through the kettle walls, etc. Instead, we find that the effects are directed to a conclusion (final causality). The world works specifically and determinably. This is telos, which is included within a creation’s essence.
Argument for Biological Telos
I will give the formulation, then the justification:
P1) All inanimate things that possess telos, does with external purpose
P2) Human biology is an inanimate thing that possess telos
C) Human biology possesses telos with external purpose
Defence of P1
This can be justified as follows:
"every unconscious teleology, every case of something being for something without awareness of what it"s for, is dependent on some conscious teleology, on some mind which is aware what that thing is for"
All non-intelligent things so things blindly. It is one thing to see, but another to look. It is one thing to hear, and another to listen. For an object to possess telos, or a directed “end”, then it clearly follows that it does so at the direction of something with intentionality. If intentionality is present, then de facto, external purpose is present as well.
Defence of P2
This literally could not be any more obvious. The heart contracts, to fulfil a final cause, or “end” for circulating blood around the body. The kidney’s filter blood for the end of removing toxins. Our lung’s inhale and exhale in order to provide oxygen to the rest of the body, etc. etc. etc. Essentially all parts of the human body are fulfilling ends of their own, and thus possess telos. They aren’t just being directed to random ends either, but very specific ends directed at maintaining the body’s overall health.
This leads to the conclusion that existential nihilism is quite frankly, false. Thus Cpon’s alleged foundation in existential nihilism crashes. Moreover, it lends significant strength to moral realism, since more objective facts regarding values, purpose and ultimate truths are apparent.
Evolution cannot say anything about morality except how we experience and bias certain stimuli
Con again doesn’t draw the distinction between morality evolving, and ability to perceive morality is evolving. Again, the data fits both hypothesis equally here. Light doesn’t “evolve”, our ability to see light evolves. Con isn’t going to get anywhere with his evolution arguments here.
Con missed the point with my argument from math. In fact Con affirms himself that math is not emergent by arguing it isn’t ontological. Thus Con defeats himself on this point! Pro makes some irrelevant points regarding contingence on the exisxtance of human beings… it’s simply irrelevant to my reducio argument. Thus, if math is not emergent, then either my P1 must be false (which is predicated on Con’s line of reasoning, thus that is false too) or evolution is false. I will allow Con to take his pick of which noose to hang himself from.
I never made the claim that evolution is the source of objective morals though, thus evolution is rather irrelevant to my moral realism case. It is Con that is claiming that evolution gives rise to morals. Thus is falls foul of the is/ought problem. Con commit’s a tu quoque fallacy here (by accusing me of the same problem) which even if valid doesn’t escape the fact that is still undermines his case.
“This is how a society such as Nazi Germany was able to function without internally succumbing to supposed objective evils.”
Egoism is literally the most self-contradictory moral framework one could possibly propose, since everyone inherently have contradicting self-interests, and there is simply no way to resolve these conflicts because neither can be right according to Con’s arguments. Thus, conflicts are unresolvable. The very fact that they are and the fact that it is clearly not within society’s self-interest to adopt a Nazi regime which allegedly seeks to maximise self-interest, is a black and white demonstration of its internal inconsistency.
Out of space, and I need to sleep. Will defend my case in closing.
Pro spends 50% of his round 4 argument on Nihilism again. In the process he gave up precious space to:
(1) Put forth any new positive arguments affirming moral realism
(2) Respond to my round 3 rebuttals on:
Grounding moral truths
Morality existing as a cogent concept
Per round 1 rules, R4 was his last chance to put forth new arguments affirming moral realism.
Pro gives a lengthy explanation of 'Biological Telos' in order to rebut 'existential nihilism'. I feel the need to reciprocate a lengthy rebuttal to this although I don't want to because it's almost irrelevant. His argument for 'Biological Telos' is Thomas Aquinas' fifth way "Argument from design" for an intelligent designer. The only reason I mentioned existential nihilism in the first place is because a universe devoid of any ultimate meaning, purpose, or reason for existence lays a *logical foundation* for a moral relativistic worldview. I didn't say that existential nihilism must be *necessarily true* in order for relativistic morality to be true.
Desim: "belief in a God who created the world but has since remained indifferent to it."
Deism is an explanation for relativistic morality AND fits Pro's argument for biological telos. IF a Desitic God created the universe, he is merely the designer and not the basis for any ultimate human purpose, values, or truth since God has remained indifferent since creating the world. Since moral realism only concerns itself with ultimate human purpose, values, and truth, a God of complete indifference is totally incompatible with moral realism. Morality only concerns itself with how we "ought" to act via "good" and "bad" but it's impossible for morality to be objective and grounded in a moral authority that doesn't give a crap.
The "argument from design" is unsupportive of his affirmation that "ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world " it just lays down some logical framework.. But even this fails, as the world could've been designed by God without objective human moral values! Thus, this just becomes a possibility for Pro's case and becomes a very weak argument.
In addition, in an existential nihilist worldview, natural selection acts on small variations over long periods of time to give the appearance of design without any God being necessary for seemingly apparent design. I'll expand on this point more if my opponent wants but its been beaten to death.
Moral Sense Theory
My opponent still has not defined what 'Moral Sense Theory' is. Unless he's just formulated his own theory on what it means to have 'moral sense'? Possibly he's not defending it as a "Theory" anymore as he presented it in round 1? My opponent's case for moral sense suffers a huge problem. He never argued that 'moral sense' is homogenous. A serial killer can have the 'moral sense' to see it as his moral duty to kill people. If two people have conflicting 'moral sense' how does this in any way support his claim that "ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world"? A serial killer senses that the proposition "killing is good" is true while another person senses the proposition "killing is bad" is true but according to moral realism only one person can be right! If ethical propositions refer to objective features of the world they can't both be simulatenously true due to the law of non-contradiction. If pro is just arguing that human beings have a "moral sense" this supports moral realism just as equally as it supports moral relativism.
Perception of morality evolving vs. morality itself evolving.
Pro points out the distinction between 'morality' evolving and our 'ability to perceive' morality evolving. Pro likens our ability to 'perceive' morality with our ability to perceive light. It's not the light itself that becomes more evolved, just our ability to perceive it improves with more advanced visual acuity. This analogy fails because there are animals with higher visual acuity that can perceive light better than the human eye can. Following this logic, there should be some animals with higher moral acuity that have a more accurate description of ethical propositions than human beings do.
Argument from math vs. evolution
Again, my opponent's logic is the same as my argument was but the scenarios aren't analogous. Mathematics doesn't have an 'ontological' existence in reality meaning that 'numbers' don't actually exist (you won't find the number 5 under a rock) but mathematics isn't 'emergent' per se. Mathematics is the abstraction of real objects by higher functioning intelligent beings. This means that mathematics has an objective basis because real objects can be abstracted, but this absraction is only possible with the presence of intelligent beings. This is why mathematics is contingent on the existence of human beings. Evolution was ongoing before any human beings actually existed and have an objective, empirical presence in reality. Further, morality doesn't have any *real object presence to be abtracted from like mathematics does*. Pro never rebuts my point that morality has a pre-cursory emergence from animals, nor does he ever dispute that if evolution is true then moral relativism is true, so my point stands.
Evolution being a basis for morality
Pro says "I never made the claim that evolution is the source of objective morals though, thus evolution is rather irrelevant to my moral realism case". Per his round 3 argument he said "[evolution] can only hope to support moral realism since evolution is objective, and it deals with what 'is', thus evolution is insufficient to get to an 'ought' (c.f. is/ought problem)". So it appears that pro is contradicting himself somewhat here. His problem was comparing the objective basis of moral realism to the objective basis of evolution so it was not a tu quoque fallacy.
We can see morality in animals and 'morality' appears to act as a form of 'social cohesion' resulting in greater survival of a species so morality certainly has a basis in evolution.
Pro ignores my repeated explanation of 'egoism' being a central tenet of modern economic theory. My opponent says that 'egoism' poses a self-contradictory moral framework because conflicts can't be resolved if everyone acts in their self-interests. But the opposite is actually true: everyone acting in their own self-interests results in a harmonious and highly efficient society. This is the "invisible hand" free market efficiency via Egoism that Adam Smith talked about. If everyone seeks their own self-interests, this reliance on others to achieve those interests results in a net benefit for everyone and only affirms egoism. Altruism is the exception rather than the rule. Furthermore, most forms of altruism have some reciprocal effect resulting in the propagation of life.
Since my opponent didn't respond to this I'll add more arguments.
The ancient Greeks thought infanticide was permissible, we don't. 18th
century Hindu villagers in India supported the practice of suttee, while we condemn it.
It's morally acceptable to kill newborn females in China, in the US it isn't. Genital mutilation is acceptable in African nations, in others it isn't.
Never responded to this either. More examples:
The US getting involved in setting up democracy in the Middle East. European Imperialism overtaking colonies in Africa and the America's and imposing their culture. In Academia, courses focusing on their own country's history to the exclusion of all others. Nazi Germany believing that their race was the "master race."
This argument is an inductive inference to the best explanation. I made this explicit enough in my opening. Con attempts to shoehorn evolution in as an explanation (yet again), yet there are two problems with this:
Evolving Morality vs Evolving Perception of Morality
Con again misses the point of my rebuttal:
1. If math has ontological existence, then it is not emergent
Thanks for the debate Envisage, it's been fun.
This debate will be won on one thing: Is moral realism or moral relativism the most accurate meta-ethical theory? Let's go back to the core issues. Lots of off-topic discussions went on that was irrelevant in affirming the resolution.
First, I'll attack pro's case. Let's see if he upheld his BoP to show that 'ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world that are true independent of opinion.'
Argument from Telos (design).
Problem #1, the argument from design doesn't affirm moral realism. Problem #2, deism is fully compatible with the teological argument. Pro says “telos would rule deism as impossible”. If Deism is true, it's fully possible that the universe was designed by God and had been left alone without getting involved in moral affairs.
“All the teleological argument does is simply state the existence of a natural phenomenon, in the case of a phenomenon such as the universe, when its complexity is considered, the argument may indicate that it X was designed by an intelligent being.”
Pro started with 4 major arguments for moral realism:
(1) Grounding moral truths
(2) Moral sense theory
(3) Functional realism
(4) Categorical argument
(1) Grounding moral truths:
Entirely dropped after my R3 rebuttal. Moral realism is left foundationless.
(2) Moral sense theory
Pro leaves “Moral Sense Theory” undefined. He said things like 'moral sense is the best inference to how people behave'. 'Altruism shows no evolutionary benefit' and 'We have innate feelings/intuitions about right and wrong'. What purpose do any of those points make if they're just supporting an undefined concept? What exactly is Moral Sense Theory arguing for? Recall my round 4 questions: If two people have conflicting 'moral sense' how does this in any way support his claim that "ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world"? Per last round I said it was a “huge problem” that he “never argued that 'moral sense' is homogenous.” He also never addressed my contention that moral realist propositions would be true/false independent of whatever 'moral sense' we may have about it. The argument ultimately falls apart in an abyss of confusion over what “moral sense theory” meant.
(3) Functional realism
Functional realism argues that moral disputes are resolvable because moral truths exist. Pro supports this by focusing his case on foreign countries that the US gets involved in to resolve moral disputes. I said that the reason that the US becomes involved in foreign affairs is not over 'moral content' it's about asserting the country's values as the more powerful country. History is replete with examples of countries imposing their values on the weaker country. I showed a great many of them with my ethnocentrism arguments. His only rebuttal to this in the final round was that it's still “outside of the immediate interest of the countries involved”. Interest is what leads to involvement so this is just incoherent.
(4) Categorical argument
This argument states that if all actions are inherently 'amoral' then a concept of 'moral' wouldn't exist. He assumes this premise: “If “morality” is a coherent concept then moral realism is true “. I already answered this in R3 under the header “morality existing as a cogent concept”. (In R4 pro skipped this along with my rebuttals on descriptive relativism, ethnocentrism, grounding moral truths, morality existing as a cogent concept, and functional realism.) “"Moral" is a cogent concept because societies have defined what those truths are. It makes no difference if the truth of it is objective or not. "Amoral" is just the negation of whatever is being considered as a truth proposition. We have shared ideas of what it means to be moral vs. amoral because humanity shares the same instinctual tendencies so common morality is to be expected. “
My opponent offers rebuttals no longer than a couple sentences for my major points on ethnocentrism, egoism, and descriptive relativism.
Ethnocentrism: I explained that ethnocentrism shows us that: “[r1] our notions of 'right' and 'wrong' are thought to be matter-of-fact but are irreparably conditioned by our culture, customs, and social norms” but perfectly explains societies that condemned other societies using moral realist claims but in retrospect were actually using relativist claims that are easily describable by ethnocentrism.
Egoism: He says that Nazi society was at odds with the Nazi Regime for moral reasons. In round 3 I said Nazi germany was able to function internally without succumbing to supposed objective evils. History shows us that outside forces are what defeated the Nazi regime, not Nazi society imploding on itself for moral reasons. For his second contention, modern economic theory posits that egoism is responsible for the most efficient free market economies so “good enough” is false.
My opponent just dismisses my numerous examples of descriptive relativism. Remember that Descriptive relativism just holds as fact that moral beliefs vary from society to society. My examples have shown exactly that. The trend is that societies vary greatly on moral beliefs. Remember, if there are moral differences between societies it undermines the claim that there are 'objective' moral facts.
I'll address the more off-topic/irrelevant arguments here then conclude why moral relativism is the most accurate meta-ethical theory.
Math vs evolution
Con says that if math is contingent on human beings, math would be subjective. This is not true. Mathematics is the abstraction of real objects. Anything abstract requires a mind to conceptualize. Real objects have an objective basis. Therefore, mathematics is contingent on higher functioning minds.
Since his first premise is false (it's not relative) and he provided no other arguments attacking my formulation, mine remains standing.
Evolution as a basis for morality
I pointed out that morality has been shown in animals (great apes, chimpanzees) and has been observed to aid in social cohesion. Pro never rebutted my points on this. Morality appears fit whatever role it has in a large group and this explains the relativist component.
Evolving morality vs. perception
Aside from this being mostly off-topic, pro focuses on extracting a point I made for conveying a logical concept and wants me to answer it literally. His questions on the literal point are just irrelevant because I wasn't affirming it. Morality is a construct – so whatever is being constructed, like music, literature, or art, has no objective basis either.
I've largely affirmed my position through rebutting pro's arguments but I'll summarize them here again briefly.
Moral relativism means that 'right' and 'wrong' are relative to the moral norms of society and aren't objectively superior to any other society. I've shown that moral relativism converges with evolutionary theory because simplistic forms of morality have been observed to emerge from animals.
Egoism shows us that we are motivated by our own self-interests. Modern economic theory is based on it. Our desires and self-interests form our values. Our values result in a shared moral code with others. Since 'desire' is inherently subjective, egoism only affirms moral relativism.
Descriptive relativism drives home this point. We can observe numerous examples of societies that share different moral codes than us. It goes to show that morality is a construct of shared values that depends on perspective and nothing more. This perspective is described by ethnocentrism where we believe our culture is the standard on which other culture's values are measured against.
Moral relativism is the only coherent meta-ethical system. Our desires and values aren't representative of objective features of the world that could exist independent of our opinion about it. That would be absurd.
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