DDO Tier Tourney (Finals): This House Believes That Ontology Necessitates God's Existence!
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Resolved: This House Believes That Ontology Necessitates God's Existence!
Debate Details: This debate is the final round of the Tier Tourney hosted by Mikal. It features the Winner of the Lowest Tier against the Winner of the Middle Tier. (http://www.debate.org...)
Debate Competitors: Ajabi (http://www.debate.org...) is affirming the resolution; and FuzzyCatPotato (http://www.debate.org...) is negating the resolution.
1. The first round is for acceptance only. By accepting my opponent will be binding himself/herself to the rules, defintions, and other stipulation set herein. Any and all contentions should come in the first three rounds of debates, no new arguments in the last round.
2. The onus probandi rests entirely upon the Proposition.
3. The order of the debate allows 10, 000 characters, 72 hours to post each round, and an Open Voting where anyone above the Elo of 3, 000 may vote.
4. Any and all citations must be properly sourced, and links should be provided for easy access.
5. Any and all definitions should be taken from the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, the Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, and/or any other well reputed philosophical text, such as the Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant, or A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume.
6. The soundness of logic, sense experience, and reason is assumed.
7. No deconstruction semantics allowed.
1. God is a transcendental entity. God here is a Being who is different than Nature or the Universe, and it would not do that I universalize God. It should be clear that He is a separate entity/being/phenomenon which exists independent of any physical element.
2. Ontology is the study of Being where one tries to prove phenomenon from a completely rational perspective, starting out with nothing but the conceptualization of a Being. Hence forth Ontology is the attempt to prove the Dasein, without the use of empirical sciences, either by analysing the subject-object relationship, or by analysing the Seinstruktur.
3. To necessitate means to make necessary, in the sense emplyed by Modal Logic. As in to prove a phenomenon, such that the reasoning: not necessarily A would be counted as an absurd statement.
I wish my opponent the best of luck!
I accept. Best of luck to Pro! :P
(Sorry Ajabi, forgot to accept yesterday.)
I thank Fuzzy for accepting, I forgive him for accepting this debate before time. With that let us begin, I should note that I use some technical language, while I will define everything, I will link sources only for extra knowledge or better understanding. They are in no way necessary, and are allowed by round five.
Now to start off I would like to explain that there are three modes of existence. We will use the process of elimination in this debate to reach the logical conclusion that God exists. The first mode is of existence in reality, that is the existence of an Object in itself, so real. The second is the one most important for us, it is the mode of existence in cognition. This mode has two divisions an a priori existence, and an a posteriori existence. Since the first warrants naught but truth let us discuss only the second. For atheists it is the second that holds all the keys. Of the a posteriori second mode there are two divisions: a pure empirical idea which we define as such an idea that is gained due to sensations, or sense experience, or an impure empirical idea which is a false idea which is born from the faculty of Imagination, and is therefore an untrue idea. For any atheist all our ideas regarding God are related to the a posteriori impure cognitive idea. The third mode is in communication, and therefore that of proposition but we need not discuss it.
We should specify what we mean by an idea. Immanuel Kant defines an idea as: 'the species of representation which gives rise to metaphysical beliefs. Ideas are special concepts which arise out of our knowledge.' If this is yet unclear then let us mention Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy's definition: 'In philosophy, ideas are usually construed as mental representational images of some object.' It is then clear that ideas are representations of Objects. When we say an idea is true then we mean that the object that is represented exists as a real object, when we say an idea be false it means that the representation is illusory and the object is not real.
We break these ideas into simple and complex ideas. Simple ideas are those ideas which are irreducible and are therefore not distinguishable into parts using sensations. Complex ideas are those which may be distinguished into parts, through the method of sensations. So the idea of an apple is complex for an apple has a color, a taste, a scent and is therefore made of many distinguishable parts. Any idea of Imagination is a complex idea for what else is imagination but a machine which takes in many ideas, changes its form and presents a new idea. As Hume tells us Imagination cannot yield a simple idea for no matter how you twist and turn a simple idea you will get the same result.
My proof then will rely on the process of elimination keeping in our modality of existence. I will attempt to show that the idea of God could not have come as an impure a posteriori idea, nor is it an idea of sense experience, and so, seeing no other form of existence, or any other faculty of the mind, I conclude that the idea of God is not false. I will use the law of the extended middle (third law of thought) that I will show the negation to be absurd and therefore prove God's existence. By showing that the idea of God could not have existed any other way.
I should have liked to write out the argument in formal logic, but debate.org is not kind to such things and replaces everything with commas...so I will only post it in a valid premise-conclusion format:
1. The idea of God exists in cognition, independent of experience.
2. If an idea of cognition which exists independent of experience exists, it is either false or necessarily true.
3. If an idea of cognition which exists independent of experience is false then it is imaginative.
4, The idea of God cannot be imagined.
5. Ergo: the idea of God is necessarily true.
I shall now go on to defend each individual premise.
Defense of Premise 1:
> I believe this is fairly obvious, we know we have an idea of God, for how else would the word God have any meaning for us? As for this belief not to be purely empirical that we can say simply because we cannot feel God. Ex ve termini God is transcendent of time, space, and number, and since the sensation depends on these three, it follows we cannot feel God. This premise means there has been no impression of God.
> If it is said that the idea of God has been given to one by parents, family members, or books then an easy rebuttal could ask the question of where the first person came up with the idea of God. The only answer an atheist can give is that the idea of God was imagined, on this we shall give our thoughts soon.
Defense of Premise 2:
> This needs no proof other than that I quote the Third Law of Thought. The Law of the Extended Middle states that if I can disprove the negation, then the above my conclusion is correct. I should note while I express this in propositions, the argument itself is Ontological, insofar as it deals with the nature of ideas.
> In any case what third option could there be? Either an idea is true and the object it refers to is real, or the idea is false, and the object it refers to does not exist. Please do not mistake ideas for being propositions.
Defense of Premise 3:
> I say this confident that the mind has no other faculty which would yield false ideas. The ideas of sensations are true, and in any case we have currently ruled out. The faculty of reason provides but correct ideas, so the only faculty that can yield false ideas is the faculty of imagination. If my opponent knows of any other faculty, then let him so mention it.
Defense of Premise 4:
> We must remember that Imagination can only yield complex ideas, we know this for the imagination takes simple ideas from sensations and combines them. Since it is sensation that allows combination, the reversal, or distinction is also through sensation.
> My first argument is that the idea of God is a simple idea. Remember we are talking about the being of God. Can you divide the idea of God into any sensation? Can you tell me the tast of God? Or (remember we are talking only about the idea of the Being of God) the color? One cannot because the idea of God is a simple idea. And we can see ex vi termini that imagination cannot come up with simple ideas, and thereofore just as two elements however mixed together cannot create but a compound, imagination cannot create the idea of the Being of God. We have therefore proved our premise. The idea of God could not be an imagined idea.
> The other proof regarding our premise is this that the idea of God is an a priori construct. Which mean that God is above space, time and number. We attribute to God atemporality, aspaciality and hence call Him omnipotent and omniscient. All our sense ideas are a posteriori ideas. No a posteriori idea can be combined in any form to create an a priori idea. For an a posteriori idea can be combined only to form similar ideas. The idea of state, and the idea of perfection can be combined to form the idea of a perfect state. We cannot however do that with a priori ideas such as God. There is another proof of this statement. We can imagine a perfect state, but even now if we consider or try to look at the finer points in the idea of God we cannot. The idea of God is hidden and no amount of thinking upon it reveals anything such as color or taste as an idea of the perfect state would. While we can imagine the idea of a perfect state, we cannot pretend to imagine the idea of God or God in our minds, other than attributing to him an a poteriori form (Morgan Freeman). We then need to realize that we cannot think of God as an a priori substance. The simple reason is because God transcends the human faculty of reason, and can therefore not be thought off.
It is here that I now boldly claim that I have indeed shown that Ontology necessitates God's existence. Remember it is not that Ontology is unconcerned with physicality, so Physics has been called the Ontology of the Universe. So long as I do not appeal to any experience to prove God i.e. I have felt God and so God exists this proof is Ontological. I once more note that all the terms are sufficiently defined in this passage. If however one wants advanced reading, a better knowledge then I suggest reading through the first 6 pages of the Treatise, and the Introduction of the Critique. I have also linked a longer essay that I sent to Prof. Peter J. King if anyone wants extra knowledge, and a deeper explanation of the argument. The terms are there explained in a lengthier way and the modalities of existence are explained better. (https://docs.google.com......)
Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Logic
A Treatise of Human Nature, Of Ideas, Their Composition, Connexion, and Abstraction
Ibidium, Section 3, Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination
I wrote this in a bit of a hurry, having just gotten home from school.
2P0: "I forgive him for accepting ... before time."
Before the existence of time? That's fast.
2P1: Ajabi's ontological argument
2P1.1: "[T]here are three modes of existence. .... [F]irst is ... existence in reality[.] ... [S]econd is ... existence in cognition. This ... has two divisions ... a priori ... and ... a posteriori[.] ... [L]et us discuss only .... a posteriori [of which] ... there are two divisions: a pure empirical idea ... gained due to ... sense experience, or an impure empirical idea ... from ... Imagination, and ... therefore ... untrue. [T]hird ... is in communication ... need not discuss[.]"
1: While via Rule 6 we are assuming the "soundness of ... sense experience, and reason" in this debate, I'd like to note in reality that humans are biased  and can be tricked , making the assumed "truth" of human reason rather questionable. Further, ideas gained from imagination are not necessarily untrue, because a bad process of obtaining ideas does not mean that obtained ideas are bad . Further, it's effectively impossible to know when one is imagining , making differentiation of imagination and reality impossible. But let's imagine that humans aren't paranoid, biased, and treeless primates and continue the debate.
2P1.2: "[I]deas are representations of Objects. When ... an idea is true ... the object ... represented exists ... when ... false ... the object is not real. .... Simple ideas ... are ... not distinguishable into parts using sensations. Complex ideas ... may be[.]"
1: I accept these definitions.
2P1.3: "Any idea of Imagination is ... complex ... for ... imagination ... takes in many ideas, changes its form and presents a new idea. ... Imagination cannot yield a simple idea for no matter how you twist and turn a simple idea you will get the same result."
1: This doesn't make sense. Can imagination yield simple ideas? Imagine the color "green", and nothing else. Can imagination yield new ideas? Ponder the computer you're reading this on. Can imagination yield simple and new ideas? Consider the ideas of space-time, relativity, electromagnetic radiation, electricity, and atoms. Can you touch, taste, smell, hear, or see an atom? Consider the ideas of zero, of negative numbers, and of imaginary numbers. What does Pi taste like? Is zero hot or cold? Is i sharp or dull? According to my opponent's definition of a simple idea, these are simple ideas, because these ideas cannot be broken down by sensation.
2P1.4: "I ... use the law of the extended [sic] middle ... show the negation to be absurd and therefore prove God's existence."
1: In the context of the truth or falsity of Ajabi's God's existence, the Law of the Excluded Middle  seems reasonably justified.
2P1.5: "Defense of Premise 1: [The idea of God exists in cognition, independent of experience.] ... [W]e ... have an idea of God, for how else would the word God have any meaning[?] .... Ex ve [sic] termini God is transcendent of time, space, and number, and ... it follows we cannot feel God. .... If it is said that the idea of God has been given to one by parents, family members, or books then an easy rebuttal could ask the question of where the first person came up with the idea of God. The only answer ... is that ... God was imagined[.]"
1: It's very plausible that the various human "deities" arose from human paranoia  and desire to have an explanation for everything . Why do clouds send down lightning? Because Zeus is angry. Better sacrifice a goat, before he sends down more! Ajabi's a-temporal, a-physical, a-numerable God is what happens when you start with Zeus, realize that parts of the "Zeus explanation" aren't necessary, cut them out, keep cutting as science progresses, and soon realize that nothing is left, but still want to believe in a God.
2: Consider also that people have always wanted to have power over others. What better way to solidify the hierarchy than to claim that you have a supernatural sponsor, who will put down any opposition? The Aztecs did it, the Incas did it, Romans did it, the Egyptians did it, the Indians did it, the Chinese did it. Why couldn't the leaders of early nomadic societies?
2P1.6: "Defense of Premise 2: [If an idea of cognition which exists independent of experience exists, it is either false or necessarily true.]"
1: Because of Rule 6, I accept Premise 2. Absent Rule 6, Premise 2 is incorrect.
2P1.7: "Defense of Premise 3: [If an idea of cognition which exists independent of experience is false then it is imaginative.]"
1: Because of Rule 6, I accept Premise 3. Absent Rule 6, Premise 2 is incorrect.
2P1.8: "Defense of Premise 4: [The idea of God cannot be imagined.] ... Imagination can only yield complex ideas[.]"
1: See 2P1.3.1. Imagination can yield simple ideas.
2P1.9: "[T]he idea of God is a simple idea. .... Can you divide the idea of God into any sensation? Can you tell me the tast [sic] of God? Or ... the color? ... [T]he idea of God is a simple idea ... and thereofore [sic] ... imagination cannot create the idea of ... God."
1: See 2P1.3.1. Imagination can yield simple ideas.
2: Since Ajabi's God is a lack of sensation, it is impossible to divide Ajabi's God based on sensation. However, it is possible to divide Ajabi's God on its multiple lacks of sensation. Ajabi's God is a-temporal, a-physical, and a-numerable. It is possible to imagine an temporal, a-physical, a-numerable God, or a physical one, or a numerable one, or some combination thereof. And this certainly would have some impact on sensation -- a physical God feels very different from a a-physical God. Hence, Ajabi's God doesn't fit the definition of a "simple" idea.
2P1.10: "[T]he idea of God is an a priori construct. ... God is above space, time and number ... and ... call Him omnipotent and omniscient. All our sense ideas are a posteriori ideas. No a posteriori idea can be combined in any form to create an a priori idea. For an a posteriori idea can be combined only to form similar ideas. .... The idea of God is hidden and no amount of thinking ... reveals anything[.] .... God transcends the human faculty of reason, and can therefore not be thought off [sic]."
1: An a priori construct is something that is proven to be true without sense experience being involved . It is dubious to me that anything can be proven a priori, because everything humans do is fundamentally based on sense experience. For example, a case can be made that "logic" is based in human experience, rather than objective truths, and so all of logic is fundamentally experiential. Because of Rule 6, I won't make that case, and will accept God as a priori IF Ajabi can prove this proof.
2: That said, the proof doesn't hold up. Imagination can explain where humans got the idea of God.
3: And, if imagination didn't come up with God, where did we get the idea from, Ajabi? Clearly God must have interacted with the universe in some way, which would make some part of that God physical, temporal, and numerable.
2P1.11: "I now boldly claim that I have indeed shown that Ontology necessitates God's existence.
2P1.1: I agree that humans can be biased, as in humans could have prejudices, I do not see how this is relevant to our debate. For unless my opponent is insinuating that humans are always biased and flawed I see no point of this argument. The rule 6 was taken from Fuzzy's own debate format, so I do not see why he would oppose it. Also that is why we have logic, and reason, to lead us to proper conclusions. Since reason possess the concept of necessity it is universal, thus displaying its own soundness. My argument appeals to reason, and so each person, following the arguments will reach the same conclusion, if they do not there is either a flaw in my logic, or their understanding. Hence this debate.
I never said that all ideas of the imagination are untrue, I stated that all false ideas are ideas which are imagined. For this I provide a proof in my original argument regarding how there is no other faculty of the mind, and only imagination can yield incorrect ideas. To elucidate this I present this Venn Diagram:
I think I should also bring into question Fuzzy's sources, and how he uses them. It is not enough that he states his claims like: 'its impossible to know when one is dreaming' and provide a source. He must give us the reason, and the logic behind it. He cannot expect us to go through his reading assignment. Also his source is one which should not be given much credence anyways.
2P1.3: One should never give arguments from example, they are always weak and their logic has to be inferred. In any case Fuzzy does not dispute the logic I provide, he just provides counter-examples, or argues reducto ad absurdum. Now lets consider the idea of an atom. When we imagine an atom, do we not give it a shape, a color? Those are two properties, therefore making it a complex idea. My logic is sound that what does Imagination do? It takes ideas and shifts them, combines them and transforms them. Since the logic is present, I need not go through every example for my opponent could easily provide one hundred examples, and machine-gun me. No, I have applied it to the atom, reiterated my argument and will now apply it to the color green. You gain the color green from your senses, not from Imagination. Now try and imagine a new color, not a different shade mind you, tell me of a new color. You can't. The same as you cannot imagine Quantum Mechanics. Also Pie tastes amazing. :P On a serious note Pi is not an object, it is a concept of abstraction. Which means it exists a priori, in fact this is the same to all Mathematics. Again though, if my opponent cannot provide any counter reasoning, my point stands.
2P1.5: It is again not enough to say this. If deities were created from human paranoia, then the paranoia would have activated the faculty of imagination. This faculty however has already been debunked in relation to producing the idea of God. If my opponent wishes to make this argument again, please let him explain it further and not just state a premise. You see its simple, where did the idea of Zeus come from? Only if the idea of God existed a priori, could this idea be applies (improperly) a posteriori and a form of God would be created for human ease (Morgan Freeman).
2P1.8 Imagination cannot yield simple ideas. Just as any form of reaction will not yield the same element by the same element. No matter how much Argon you mix with Argon, you will just get more Argon. Similarly if you add Sodium to Chlorine, you will get Sodium Chloride, you will not get Lawrencium or any other element. Similarly Imagination is a faculty which takes pure empirical ideas (elements) and combines them together in a variety of ways to form new ideas, however these ideas, since they are the combination of ideas cannot be simple themselves. My opponent never gives any proper reasoning to the contrary.
2P1.9: I swear to God I have no idea what Fuzzy means here. There are plenty of rounds, so I will wait for some clarification on this point because right now I do not get this contention. It seems rather muddle-headed.
2P1.10: In the first part of his argument Fuzzy appeals to sense experience being the only form of verification. This is called Logical Positivism and is debunked in the philosophical community. Since my opponent brought up this point, it is his responsibility to prove Logical Positivism before he attacks reason. Especially since Rule 6 forbids him to do this, a rule taken from Fuzzy's own rule system in the same debate.
In the second part of the argument he once more discusses imagination, please refer to my original argument and contentions above for I feel I have answered this appropriately.
Since it is a priori, it is innate. It is found in the human mind before experience, you are born with it. I do not feel it necessary but dialectic idealistic logic can be used to postulate a soul due to a priori knowledge.
2P1.11: Ja Ja. Hai hai hai Mein Gott.
1: Humans are flawed, we agree. However, I accept that logic is *perfect* in this debate. Hence, the sources are just for readers if they want to know more and are irrelevant in the debate.
2: Imagination *can* think of new, simple ideas, as the examples I provided show. If, when we imagine them, we impose extra concepts onto them, that is because we imagine them incorrectly.
2.1: The concept of space-time (space and time are actually one entity, the "fabric" on which everything else exists) cannot be broken down into sensations. It cannot be touched, tasted, touched, seen, heard, or otherwise experienced. Space-time has only one quality: space-time. It is a simple idea.
2.2: The concept(s) of relativity (space-time exists and can be distorted, light travels at a constant maximum speed, relative motion affects observations) cannot be broken down into sensations. It cannot be touched, tasted, touched, seen, heard, or otherwise experienced. Relativity has no physical qualities, other than perhaps time dilation.
2.3: The concept of any specific wavelength of electromagnetism cannot be broken down into sensations. Visible electromagnetism is merely light; infrared electromagnetism is merely heat. Where do multiple sensations come in?
2.4: Atoms probably can be broken down. Let us consider, instead, quarks. Quarks exist at 1 infinitely small point, and cannot be sensed by humans themselves whatsoever.
2.5: Abstract numbers. Pro states that they exist a priori, but provides no evidence that this is true. If abstract numbers existed a priori (they are innate to human knowledge), why didn't humans develop them for many years? Clearly someone came up with the idea and pursued it.
2.6: These are arguments by example. That said, they are justified. Pro states that imagination categorically cannot create new simple ideas. If this is proven incorrect, this proves Pro's proof incorrect. And, pulling a tu quoque, Pro uses examples to illustrate Pro's points, too. (See 2P1.8)
3: "God-couldn't-be-a-product-of-paranoia" holds true only if imagination is the source of the idea of God, imagination cannot create simple ideas, and God is simple. Alternatives:
1: All beings, through evolution, assign an actor to every action, making all sentient beings actually believe that a god exists without ever having imagined it. In other words, people are programmed to be religious and paranoid, rather than actually imagining God.
2: God was never imagined as a simple idea, but a progressively simpler idea. People started with YHWH, a very complex god, and started stripping back layers of comlexity - "now that we know why it rains, I guess we don't need YHWH there anymore" until eventually someone reached 0 layers. This is entirely possible to imagine. Think of an apple. Now remove the color, the taste, the shape, etc. Now, you have a void, identical to Ajabi's God.
4: Ajabi's God has multiple concepts that are related to sensation. If an object is physical, then its gravitation can be felt, its reflections/absorptions of light can be seen, you can lick it if you want, sound bounces off of it, etc. If an object is temporal, then it either affects or is affected by time, and this effects how it is percieved. If an object is numerable, then it possible to count it in some way. All of these concepts and negations thereof affect sensation; therefore, it is possible to divide up Ajabi's God into sensations and lacks thereof, and thus Ajabi's God is not, in fact, simple.
1: Ah, it was just that that might have caused some confusion. We then move on with the sound assumption that logic, and reason are perfect entities.
2: I feel my opponent's arguments are misguided. Allow me to start by explaining why Imagination can only yield complex ideas, and then I shall give a general reasoning against my opponent. I have given this analysis before, but let us explain it once more. What then is Imagination? It is the faculty of creating new ideas from combination.
With the exception of a priori ideas (which are by nature a priori therefore transcendent of the mind in any case) all ideas are empirical. That means that these ideas come from the faculty of sensation: the five senses. This means that all ideas that are combined in imagination are sensory ideas. Now since the combination of these ideas are of sensory ideas, the links made are of different sensory ideas being combined. Now these sensory ideas are in themselves simple of course. For any idea of sensation will only have that one sensation. An eye will not give you a sound. So the combination of these ideas in using different links of sensation: therefore to break them apart, to distinguish them, we would also be using sensation. This is why complex ideas are those which can be broken into parts by division by sensation. Now since any idea which is imagined, if the answer be simple it would result in the same thing. The idea of a particular noise will be that particular noise, but if I combine it with airmax yelling at me, it is an imaginative idea. Only then, therefore would it be imaginative, and such an idea is of course complex for all intents and purposes.
It is not enough that my opponent give examples. Also Fuzzy kind of assumes that these are simple ideas, and that these ideas are imaginative. These ideas are not imaginative. If Fuzzy wishes to show me that these ideas are simple, and that they are imaginative he must first, like me with God, disprove the other options. The concept of Space-Time is a priori not imaginative. Similarly if we take the physical approach then the concept of Space-Time is one of deduction by reason, and of empirical sciences. We experimentally tested Relativity, then used reason to conclude Space-Time. Also Space-Time is not a false construct, therefore it is not even imagined. Also let us take Space-Time, can you truly picture space-time? You cannot, you may be able to picture a Reimannian graph and that dimensional image but that would have different colors, shapes and would be complex. In any case it won't be space-time it would be your image of space-time. That all besides the point Space-Time is not imagined, for how can it be when it is deduced from reason and science?
I won't delve into atoms or abstract numbers (whether they are a priori) because my opponent has the burden, since he brought them up as a counter example, to prove that they were not deduced from reason, or empirical sciences. Also since they are not false constructs, imagination may not be the best faculty to appeal to. I have won this, because the next is a last round, and if my opponent gives new arguments in support for this he would break the debate rules. I personally believed that we gained the idea of an atom after Rutherford did experimental tests, and then deduced that the electrons must revolve around atom. Never knew we randomly made the idea from imagination...
3: Not at all. That is all I want to say here, for even if through evolution would state that we attribute a cause to everything we would be happy to call that cause our parents. There is no good reason why we would come to the conclusion of a God, for we cannot have come to the conclusion of God. If we had the idea of God we could imagine Him in a variety of ways, but we could not in any case come up with the original idea. That is what my argument asserts, we could only do so (if the idea of God is false) through Imagination, and we have ruled that faculty out. The other conclusion is that we used reason, in which case the idea of God would be true, and indeed God is a necessary entity.
We do not have a void, we have the Being-in-itself. You see if you remove every such thing from an apple you reach nothingness, you cannot comprehend that nothingness. You can of course comprehend my God, otherwise the word God would be meaningless in itself. Take the example of the word: 'paani'. It is quite meaningless to you, now what if I told you that it is Urdu for 'water'. Now it becomes meaningful because you have an idea of it. Similarly since the idea of God is coherent for us (this is my premise 1) the idea of God exists.
4: My God is transcendent of sensation. He is ex ve termini beyond sensation, even if He can be sensed that is besides the point. For it is not what He is in the First Mode, rather the Second Mode. Of our idea of Him in cognition, He is most definitely simple.
I rest my case, proudly asserting that I have indeed shown Ontology necessitates God's existence!
Thanks for reading, readers!
One thing before the real arguments:
"My opponent keeps to one ... contention: that imagination can yield simple ideas. .... [M]y opponent ... stable advocacy. ... [H]e must now continue only with this point."
I've held to three contentions throughout the entire debate. 1st, that imagination can yield simple ideas (arguments 2P1.3, then 2). 2nd, that the idea of god need not have come from pure imagination alone (2P1.5, then 3). 3rd, that Ajabi's God is not simple, and, if simple, there's no explanation for how we got the idea (2P1.9, then 4). Hence, it's not "new" to use these arguments again.
2: "[A]ll ideas are empirical. .... [A]ny idea of sensation will only have ... one sensation. .... Now since any idea which is imagined, if the answer be simple it would result in the same thing. .... Fuzzy ... assumes ... these are simple ideas, and ... imaginative. These ideas are not imaginative. .... Space-Time is not imagined, for how can it be when it is deduced from reason and science? I won't delve into atoms or abstract numbers .... because my opponent has the burden, since he brought them up as a counter example, to prove that they were not deduced from reason, or empirical sciences. .... I have won this, because the next is a last round, and if my opponent gives new arguments in support for this he would break the debate rules. I personally believed that we gained the idea of an atom after Rutherford did experimental tests, and then deduced that the electrons must revolve around atom."
1: Scientists have concluded that these concepts are true because they lined up with the data. However, in order to ever have a concept to line up with the data, they needed to imagine the idea first. For example, Rutherford probably didn't say "Huh. A gold plate sent alpha radiation everywhere. I deduce that the atom must be composed of a proton core and an electron cloud!" To think that science makes results this clear is ridiculous. Rutherford probably said, "Huh. A gold plate sent alpha radiation everywhere. I wonder why? Let me think of some potential ways to explain this. [imagination commences] Ah, the atom must be composed of a proton core and an electron cloud!" At some point, Rutherford had to imagine the idea of what the atom was shaped like.
2: Even if the atom isn't simple, this process stays true for other concepts. Spacetime has only one quality, spacetime. It's basically impossible to know what spactime *feels* like. Thus, even though the imagination of what it would act like might be based on empirics, its actual qualities can only be imagined. While it was ultimately proven through science, it had to have been imagined in order to have been tested. The same holds true for effectively all discoveries, many of which fit the definition of having no qualities that can be differentiated between via sensation.
3: Real numbers can, perhaps, up to a point, be seen as a result of empirical observations. The ideas of 1, 2, 3, 10, 100, can all be seen in the world around us. (If you need proof, just gather up 100 rocks. This is what math is based on.) Now think of the number 10^1000. There aren't nearly 10^1000 atoms in the universe. This number can ONLY be imagined. And yet it is simple. It has one quality: number. And yet we have imagined 10^1000. Clearly, new, simple, ideas can be imagined.
4: Unreal numbers cannot realistically be seen as the result of empirical observations. I dare you to gather up `0; rocks. It's not possible -- `0; has enough (endless, actually) digits that we cannot realistically gather enough atoms to represent it. It's unreasonable to believe that `0; is a result of purely empirical concepts. Or consider i. First, gather up a negative rock. Then, take its square root. Neither of these is possible. Yet, through the powers of imagination (for math itself is just conceptualization) we have come up with these numbers.
3: [E]ven if through evolution would state that we attribute a cause to everything we would be happy to call that cause our parents. There is no good reason why we would come to the conclusion of a God, for we cannot have come to the conclusion of God. .... The other conclusion is that we used reason, in which case the idea of God would be true, and indeed God is a necessary entity. .... You see if you remove every such thing from an apple you reach nothingness, you cannot comprehend that nothingness. You can of course comprehend my God, otherwise the word God would be meaningless in itself."
1: Ajabi has still not told us from where we got the idea of a non physical, non temporal, non numerable God from. Even if it exists, how would we know about its existence? It cannot interact with the universe whatsoever. So what started this idea? While it's possible that someone sat down and thought through a proof like Ajabi, I consider this rather unlikely. Who tries to prove the existence of a completely irrelevant entity, starting with prior bias? I consider it much more likely that people who already believed in a physical god realized that their beliefs were somewhat untenable and abandoned those untenable parts. Strip away an Abrahamic God's physical interactions, his temporeality, his numerability, and what are you left with? Ajabi's God. And yet this process is entirely imaginable. Imagine a box. Remove the physical matter from the box. Now you have a metaphysical box. Remove the temporeality from the box. Now you have a metaphysical box, that has always existed and is unaffected by the passage of time. Remove the numerability from the box. Now you have "a" metaphysical box, that cannot be precisely pinned down to having a number and that has always existed and is unaffected by the passage of time. This box is identical to Ajabi's God, and is yet imagineable. Huh -- imagine that.
2: As an alternative to the above, Ajabi claims that my box is unimagineable while his God is imagineable. This is ultimately contradictory. If you can't imagine something with no physical qualities, then neither is possible to imagine. If you can, then both are. Ajabi attempts to justify this contradiction by stating that, clearly, the word of God has meaning to us, while an absolute void would not. This does not logically follow. Living in modern society, it is impossible to not get an idea of what (other people, anyways) believe God to be. The word God gets connotations, meanings, that we apply whenever we hear or see it. Ajabi must prove that his God is imagineable, while a void is not, which has not been achieved.
3: Consider also the use that an unsensable God would have for an authority figure. You don't need proof for this God -- it's beyond our comprehension, moves in mysterious ways, and yet still controls your entire lives. Praise Sithrak or die!
4: Ajabi does not sufficiently respond to my God-thru-evolution point. Ajabi states that, if you think "Huh. I wonder what started everything," you would conclude, "Clearly, my parents." This is irrelevant to evolution. A mind can believe blatantly false ideas (see my points on schizophrenia above), and evolution can make that happen. If it is evolutionarily advantageous to believe that something caused the universe, evolution will find a way to make you believe that, regardless of the truth.
4: "My God is ... ex ve [sic] termini beyond sensation, even if He can be sensed that is besides the point. .... Of our idea of Him in cognition, He is most definitely simple."
1: Ajabi's God is not a simple idea. A simple idea has only one quality that can be differentiated using the senses. A complex idea has multiple qualities that can be differentiated using the senses. Ajabi's God is not physical, it is not temporal, and it is not numerable. If it was any of these, it would be possible to sense that. Each of these is a separate, differentiatable quality. Imagine a non physical entity. No matter, perhaps, but you can still say "that is a singular being affected by time". Your ability to feel time's passage and your ability to number objects can differentiate this quality. If Ajabi's God was merely "not physical", then it would be simple. However, Ajabi's God has multiple qualities that can be distinguished uses the senses. Because that is the given definition for complex in this debate, we
Ajabi has the burden to prove beyond doubt that his God exists. Ajabi's sole reason to believe that this is true is that we have an idea of a non-physical, non-temporal, and non-numerable God, that this makes Ajabi's God simple, and that imagination cannot imagine simple concepts. I have attempted to prove that imagination can imagine simple concepts, that imagination is unnecessary to have developed this concept, and that Ajabi's God is not simple. If any of my objections stand, or even have the possibility of validity, then Ajabi has not fulfilled his burden. Because Ajabi has not sufficiently answered all of my objections, the burden is not fulfilled.
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