Does God Exist?
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Debate Rounds (5)
During this debate, I will be using the term "God." Though, I will not exhaustively say "alleged" before each use, it is implied. For, I merely say, as dictionaries do, that people intend to reference an assumed creator of the universe with the term "God." My opponent, by contrast, as a believer, implies furthermore that the word has extension.
This round of debate is for acceptance of the debate and definitions. Round 2 is for initial arguments from both sides. Rounds 3 and 4 are open to rebuttals, new arguments, and clarifications. Round 5 should not have any new arguments presented in it, because it is the final round. But, clarifications and rebuttals should extend to it.
The debate settings have been set to allow for the maximum characters of 10,000. But, if 10,000 characters are limiting to thorough replies, it is permitted that a link to a publicly readable Google document is submitted instead.
God - the presently existing intelligence behind reality; or, mind that grounds reality
Exist - to have objective reality or being
I thank my opponent for the debate and wish them good luck.
Contention 1: TA Arguement
St. Thomas Aquinas's theory on Teleologic which is the ultamate causes of objects or actions in relation to their ends. This is from the 5th of Thomas Aquinas's theories explaining the existance of God. His theory is bellow.
Contention 2: Kalam Cosmological Argument
The Kalam Cosmological Argument (which I'll start refurring to as the KCA in order to save space) was created by William Lane Craig and is a simple theory that I have bellow.
(1) Everything that began to exist had a cause
(2) The universe began to exist
(3) The universe had a cause
(4) If the universe had a cause, that cause is God
(5) Therefore, God exists 
The 1st premise is true by the very laws a physics as it is a law of Conservation of Mass it shows that Matter can't be neither created nor destroyed. Meaning the Universe couldn't have been spontanously created as Big Bang opponent Flyod has stated. These things are not spontanous here. Like why doesn't the Earth suddenly expload? This is because the laws of Physics binds and restrics nothingness so we can see that for one to question the first premise would be to question regualrity.
Now let us move on to the second premise here which is backed both by scientce and philosophy. Craig agrues the Brode-Gruth-Velikum Theory that through the use of Red shift which shows that the universe is exspanding we can actually see that the universe, even if it is part of some multi-verse, still had to be created.  The philosophical side of this argument is that though many argue that the universe may be infinate the thing is that it is highly unlikely for things to exsist in an infinate chain and are thus had to have a starting finite point somwhere. Even if we look at Tyson's theory on how this universe started and that it is a multiverse we can still see that the universe, this one, had a beginning.
For the 4th Premise I will argue Monistic Idealism. Since it had a cause, the cause was transcendent meaning that it was timeless and spaceless. Only minds are from this sphere and if I can prove that God is a Mind/sphere then I win the debate.
P1 Mind is mental
P2 Nothing mental can interact with what is non-mental
C1 Nothing mind interacts with is non-mental
P3 Mind interacts with reality
C2 Reality is mental
P1: Mind is mental.
P1: IF mind is matter, THEN solipsism is impossible (exists in no possible worlds).
P2: Solipsism is possible (does exist in some possible world).
C: Mind is not matter.
Metaphysical Solipsism shows that all exists within our own minds. Though we may think there is a world out there it is all actually in our minds.  Thus a world has to exist within our own minds and there are several reasons why this is completely true. It makes perfect sense since it isn't prima facie impossible and thus must be accepted as a solid fact, not to mention that it is perfectably reasonable and a sound argement. If we can see that the mind was matter, then it would be impossible to exist appart from matter itself. Things that are Metaphysically impossible are not even imaginable. Can you imagine a Square Hexigon? No, such a thing is perposterous. We can thus see that Metaphysical solipsism is consitstant with Metaphysically possible. Here we have to apply the Indentity of Indiscernibles.
∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y.
This is reflected by showing that these things are distinguished by some differential, but in the case of, let's say clones for the sake of arguing, is just a replication of it's own molecules. This is centered on the basis that all things have an individualistic characteristic and in the case of God it is the existance of it's own mind and it's consciencousness that shows this. I shall give an example bellow.
There are 3 Sphere, Sphere A, B, and C
Each have the same qualities.
Each of these Spheres exist in world 1.
Sphere A exists in World 2, but Sphere B and C cannot due to their likeness characteristics. 
We can see that this is a logically coherrant case and thus is sound. We can also see that due to the theory of Truely Large Numbers that there is a great chance that this world is that of a Solipsism one as many studies have shown. (but that's for another debate)
P2: Seperate Substances cannot interact
I will now debunk substance and property dualism for this to be true.
This is best cleverly sumed up by the phrase "Mind over Matter" where they argue that there's escentially two distinct things: Mind and Matter.  Though the key question here is if the mind is seperate from matter than how does the mind and the brain interact? We would have to see in order for the consciousness and matter to interact there would have to be some sort of interaction. (See image bellow) The trap here is that since there is a linkage here we can see that there cannot be two seperate things since they would have to be interlinked. Thus the theory here is false.
So you may concede to the above dualism, but then you might say, alrighty, if that is true then the mind must be a property of the brain. Though if this was true then it would lead to epiphenomenalism and that there would be no free will since everything that we do would have been created by some reaction in the Physical aspect.
Though this is completely false as this leads to an interesting contradiction of itself. Say I weigh 180 lbs (not my actual weight, but it's an example), the property of me would be 180 lbs. Now tell me, have you ever gone outside or to the zoo and seen 180lbs? No something that weighs that, but the 180 lbs by itself? Thus we can blatently see that it is an abstract that exists only as a property. It can only exist as a property of something else.
If we remember my Solipsism argument from earlier we can see that the mind can exist by itself and thus it cannot be a property like the 180 lbs as the mind isn't a property thus it wouldn't be consevable much like the 180 lbs.
P3: Mind interacts with reality.
This almost seems like it's the most obvious here, so I'll try to not spend a whole great deal of time here. We can take many examples, but let's take pain for the greatest example here. I get hit in the head with a foul ball at a baseball game. Outside of the fact that I would probably have been KO'd we can see that the mind affects what I feel. I would feel a massive amount of pain and if it was great enough then I would lose consciousness and the mind would go dormant to protect itself and me as a person.
Thus the reality is mental and God has no choice but to exist.
My sources shall be located in this cancelled debate link throughout the debate in order to save room. (http://www.debate.org...)
To exist is to have objective reality or being. Often times, when the topic is "God," people respond as though existence is a question of "conceivability." Existence is not a matter of who can conceive of a god with sufficient checks and balances to account for the things we observe; instead, existence should be the realization of the concise answer to the question "what is god's objective reality or being?" But, modern religions have conditioned people to think that the usual standards for proving matters true ought not apply for topics like "God," "heaven," "sin," etc. In fact, faith is taught by them to be more virtuous if one persists to deem religious topics true during the absence of fulfilling usual standards of truth. And so, it might seem commonplace and unnoteworthy that no answer is given to the question "what is God's objective reality or being." But, it should be noteworthy if we are not applying special standards of truth for this topic; and, it should be noteworthy because every other subject that actually exists has an answer for the question of what their objective reality or being is.
When statements are true, further conclusions can be reliably made considering them. When statements are false, further conclusions made while considering them have to be reimagined, revised, or simply abandoned as untenable positions. It is purported as true that a God exists. Let's explore whether that conclusion has more in common with statements that are true or false by attempting to build a reliable further conclusion considering it. The further conclusion that when we look into outer space we should find the development of planets, stars, and solar systems in a way that suggests deliberate organization is an unreliable conclusion. While it is a reasonable further conclusion to expect to find deliberate organization for planets, stars, and solar systems to follow from the theory that a god exist presently who creates such things, we find that we have to reimagine, revise, or abandon the theory due to the facts of observations. For instance, the development of a star from a protostar is a very inefficient process that takes between 100,000 to 100 million years. After all that time, the protostar might not even become a star; it might become a brown dwarf instead, dependent on whether its core becomes hot enough to fuse hydrogen.
When something is intelligently created, there is often a thrifty management of time, process, or energy. Usually, more than one of those three can be found during the intelligent creation of something. But, when all three are missing, the assumed creator should not be said to be intelligent, and really should not be said to be involved in the process. During the creation of planets, stars, and solar systems all three qualities are missing.
Well, let's consider another further conclusion and see whether it reliably follows: The Abrahamic Religions say that a god is powerful enough to prevent acts of harm. But, the facts of observations show that god is inactive in that regard. Rather than say, "God isn't anywhere," which would explain his inactivity, the faithful revise their theory by saying, "God is a great defender of free will; he'd rather people have free will than to prevent acts of harm by utilizing his power." My point is that believing god has such power is an unreliable conclusion, hence the reimagining of the position. So, I ask my opponent to tell us any reliable conclusion that he believes follows from the alleged true proposition that a god exists, thereby showing that it has something in common with true statements.
The theory of evolution tells us a process by which diverse life can come about without a god. Savvy god believers have said, "Evolution and God are not mutually exclusive," which is another way to say that they can conceive of a god who uses evolution as his means to create things. But, as I explained in my initial paragraph, conceptualization is not the proper domain to explore in a discussion about an alleged entity's existence. It is also not my task to disprove every tweaked conception of god; instead, it is the believers' task to show that what they believe is more than a concept -- that it is a matter of fact. Evolution occurs. It is a matter of fact. A God who uses evolution is a convenient conceptual claim.
One standard to deem matters true is direct confirmation. There are other standards, such as an assessment of the ability to confirm if time and money were invested. Faith is another, and more risky, standard to deem matters true. But, here, I'll focus on the direct confirmation standard: To prove a matter is true, with that standard, one must first distinguish the subject, and then show that the subject is as stated. To prove a matter is false, the first step is the same -- distinguish the subject, then show that the subject is altogether other than what was stated. When a subject doesn't exist, no one can do the first step for this standard, distinguish it, to even move to either of the second parts. Such is our predicament for the standard of direct confirmation when the subject is "God." And so, another indicator of God's likely nonexistence is our inability to execute this standard, though we know the steps to do so. But, if my opponent knows how to distinguish the subject "God" so that we can move to the other steps of showing that he is as some state about him, or to show that he is not as some state about him, then I will attentively listen to my opponent explain how.
For this round I shall place my last contention of my case. My opponent may feel free to continue to expand their case or they can begin their rebuttals. Due to the restriction on time I am only adding one argument, so I'll have to appologize for such a short round.
The Modal Ontological Argument
Dating as far back as the Saint Anslem, as this argument has been honnored by philosphers on every side of the spectrum. I shall be definding the version of this argument that was made popular by Alvin Plantinga. His model uses the S5 model and thus is immune to the popular arguments against that philospher Kant has made and hence making Kant's argument void. I shall also argue another point made famous by William Criag: The Argument is bellow.
1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists. 
Here we can see that we can already see that on face value that it is possible that God exists. Due to this small plausability we can see that at any slight chance proves that there is a God in some reality and hence this reality. In order for Con to disprove God he must show that it is impossible in every possible circumstance. Now as we look at the premise 1 and 2 we can see that God can exist which leads me into my S5 argument.
S5: If possibly necessarily P, then necessarily P 
This would mean if a MGB is possible then it exists in at least one possible world. Under this model it would have to exist in all possible worlds qua maximally great especially since MG entails absolute exsistance. Since this world is part of a string of possible worlds then God has no choice, but to exist in this world. Under this, since God is the MGB then he is automatically the omnipotent being that my opponent is denying.
A statement is a priori = one can see that it is true using pure reason and given an understanding of the meanings of the words in it. We don’t need empirical evidence to know that it’s true. A priori statements seem to be true necessarily.
A statement is a posteriori = our evidence for its truth is empirical, or based on data that we receive via sense experience.
1. God, by definition, is the greatest possible being.
2. A being that does not exist in the real world is less great than a being that exists necessarily, or in all possible worlds.
3. Suppose that God (the greatest possible being) does not exist in the real world.
4. If the greatest possible being does not exist in the real world, then He is not as great as the possible being who is just like him but who does exist in the real world.
5. But the greatest possible being can’t be less great than some other possible being. To say that “the being than which none greater is possible is a being than which a greater is possible” is to say something that’s necessarily false, because self-contradictory.
6. The supposition in 3 is false. God does exist in the real world. And he exists not contingently, but necessarily, or in all possible worlds. It is impossible for God not to exist. 
Here we can see that Point 6 is completely true. If we had a maximumly great being of some sort we could see that even if we took him out of our universe that there would still be a Maximumly Great Being. Thus we can simplify to see that when combined with the S5 argument of the Ontoligcal argument that God is Possible in All worlds and because of this we can see that it's a posteriori for God to Exist and arguing otherwise is futile. Continuing we can see that even if God didn't exist, the continuation would still lead to an all powerful Being. No matter what occurs, there will always be an omnipotent God.
1. Oppy, Graham (8 February 1996; substantive revision 15 July 2011). "Ontological Arguments". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
2. Marenbon, M., Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction, Routledge, 2006, p. 128.
3. Anselm, St., Anselm's Basic Writings, translated by S.W. Deane, 2nd Ed. (La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Co., 1962
"1. If teleology exists, then an ordering intellect exists.
2. Teleology exists.
3. Therefore, an ordering intellect exists."
Teleology is another word with likely intentional references only, without extension. It's "the doctrine that things in nature have been endowed with purpose -- have been created with end goals."
When something is created with a purpose, observing that something fulfill its purpose is no indicator of its creator existing presently. We can observe calculators, televisions, and automobiles fulfill what they were created to do. But, their pioneer creators have since died. So, the conclusion labeled 3., "Therefore, an ordering intellect exists," does not follow even if teleology could be identified in nature instead of simply interpreted.
"Metaphysical Solipsism shows that all exists within our own minds. Though we may think there is a world out there it is all actually in our minds."
We know what it is to do something ourselves, and we know when we aren't doing something ourselves deliberately. When I open my eyes, the surroundings make impressions upon my mind. That suggests to me, strongly, that the surroundings are something other than me. I did not construct the impressions, and I know what it is to construct something. To say as my opponent is saying, that what we come to think about the world has origins in our minds, is to disregard all that happens to us that is not of our selection, nor of our crafting, and is to inaccurately say of those things that "we may think there is a world out there it is all actually in our minds."
Our experiences of the world are human skewed. That is, our vision is not like a dog's vision, with the exception of people with red-green color blindness. We can taste sugar in foods, unlike cats. And so, our experiences of reality aren't quite like what those animals experience. But, solipsism goes further than claiming a human skew to experiences; solipsism claims personal exclusivity even to the extent of doubting the existence of separate conscious minds.
"P1: If mind is matter, then solipsism is impossible (exists in no possible worlds). P2: Solipsism is possible (does exist in some possible world)."
Solipsism is the belief that one's own existence is the only thing that is real or that can be known. Since we are debating the existence of God, my opponent really should not be a solipsist; because, in addition to knowing that his self exists, my opponent claims to know the affirmative of what we are debating. It is unclear how my opponent believes solipsism can be world dependant. For, if any other planet had only one occupant, and that one occupant were ignorant of all the life here on earth, solipsism might seem real to him, but, his ignorance would not make real his having the only conscious mind; it would simply seem that way to him. So, how does a world-dependant solipsism change in any factual way all the life that exists here on earth?
"P1: Mind is mental
P2: Nothing mental can interact with what is non-mental
C1: Nothing mind interacts with is non-mental
P3: Mind interacts with reality
C2: Reality is mental"
The only nouns that can be identified in the above argument are "mind" and "reality." So, my opponent has not yet connected the term "God" in a formal premise to what he is saying about mind and reality. Whenever he connects the term, it is important to note that the premises and conclusions, thus far, do not form a valid argument. So, he would be connecting it to an invalid argument. P2 says "Nothing mental can interact with what is non-mental." But, I'm sure my opponent knows that actions proceed from our thoughts. So, through the medium of the bodies which house them, mental things interact with non-mental things. There is also a dual nature to mental things; as we think, there is synchronous electrical activity in our brains. We know that electricity is measurable. I call the synchronous activity in our brains "our thoughts noticed in a different way" than the privileged way each of us notices our personal thoughts -- a way that perceives meaning during such activity. Would my opponent call the synchronous activity in our brains "our thoughts noticed in a different way," as well? I don't know. He seems to speak of mental things, strictly, as our noticing of them as thoughts or ideas. But, if he would agree that the measurable activity in our brains are our thoughts noticed in a different way, than the way that perceives meaning during it, then he understands that mental things have a non-mental nature as well.
So, that I am not mistaken for advocating two strictly isolated things, one mental and the other non-mental,. I'm saying that in addition to "mental" being a term that can be accurately applied to our thoughts, "measureable," "electrical," and "physical" can be accurately applied to our thoughts, as well. In the previous section, my opponent promoted the phrase a "maximally great being." Well, words don't apply by simply imagining possible worlds; words apply when they are descriptive of the actual state of some affairs. My opponent would need to show that the phrase accurately applies to some existent being rather than a conceptual one in some conceptual world.
"1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world."
I'm not sure what my opponent believes the word "possible" means. But it usually means something feasible, within the realms of what's able. "Possible" never describes anything outside of the realm of physics. And since, he is purporting a miraculous nature for God, with words like "omnipotent" and "maximally great" he would have to establish that the terms accurately apply to some existent being.
"(1) Everything that began to exist had a cause
(2) The universe began to exist
(3) The universe had a cause
(4) If the universe had a cause, that cause is God"
It is more accurate to say "the universe began to expand." The Big Bang Theory does not say that "from a state where no matter existed the universe began"; instead, the Big Bang Theory purports that "from a state of hot, highly condensed, matter, the universe began to expand." So, the phrase "the universe began to exist" can be misleading, because the phrase sounds as though we are talking about a beginning ex nihilo for matter, when really we are speaking about the expansion of the universe from a more condensed state. Allow me to specify two definitions for the word "universe." The first definition is "all matter and all energy, collectively, no matter any particular arrangement." The second definition is "the collection of existent planets, galaxies, stars, solar systems, etc. as a whole." The second definition seems to imply the words "as we know it" behind the word "universe." Whereas, the first definition could refer to even the state of matter and energy before the expansion, as what the universe was at that time.
(3) Says "the universe had a cause." The word "cause" does not necessarily mean "an intentional agent." After the previous paragraph, hopefully it is more apparent that "cause" only has to entail that which started this expansion. That means that a cause was less like a skillful and complicated architect and was more like conditions sufficient to cause the expansion.
Another legitimate and public meaning for the word "cause" is "a natural and unguided process." But, supporters of the Kalam Cosmological Argument prefer that people overlook that fact, because they need the "intentional agent" meaning for cause in order for their argument to work. If I asked "what causes it to rain?" hopefully the educated among us would not say "an intentional agent." And so, it is well established, then, that "cause" is not always synonymous with "an intentional agent." Therefore, when we look at (4) which says, "if the universe had a cause, that cause is God," we know that does not follow with necessity as my opponent presents that it does, due to the other meanings for cause.
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