God does not exist

Thank you for coming to tonight's debate.

Pro has the burden of proof in this debate. I will simply try to debunk his arguments, but I won't try to prove hat God exists. If I fail to refute his arguments, he wins. If I succeed in refuting his arguments, I win.

Pro gave three arguments against the existence of God, so I will try to answer each one.

I. Argument from the first law of thermodynamics

First, he made this argument, which I summarize in a syllogism:

1. If God exists, then God created the universe.
2. The universe cannot be created.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.

I take it that premise 1 is just his definition of God, so I won't dispute it. He's attempting here to debunk the existence of any creator type god, but not any god whatsoever (after all, many mythologies contain gods who do not create, so his argument doesn't address those types of gods).

He supports his second premise from the first law of thermodynamics. Since energy can neither be created nor destroyed, and the universe is made of of energy, it follows that the universe had no beginning.

There are a couple of problems with this argument. First, laws merely describe the natural world. They do not tell us what is possible or impossible; only what is actual or what the ordinary course of nature is. So there is no reason to think it isn't possible for a supernatural being to violate the laws of nature, or to cause nature to behave differently than it usually does when left to itself.

Second, if he thinks the second law of thermodynamics is just as certain as the first law of thermodynamics, he's going to run into a contradiction. If the universe has no beginning, then it has existed for an infinite amount of time. But according to the second law of thermodynamics, the entropy of the universe increases with every process. And since Pro admits that the universe is in a constant state of change, it follows that the entropy of the universe is constantly increasing. Given enough time, it will run out of usable energy. It will undergo what cosmologists refer to as "heath death," or "thermodynamic equilibrium," in which there will be no more activity of any kind. There will be no stars or life. If the universe has existed for an infinite amount of time, then it should've already reached thermodynamic equilibrium, but since it obviously hasn't, it follows that the universe had a beginning some finite time ago. That means either the second law of thermodynamics was violated or the first law of thermodynamics was violated. Since both laws describe how the physical world operates when left to itself, the fact that one or the other was violated shows that there was (or could have been) some kind of supernatural intervention. But either way, it simply can't be true that the universe had no beginning if we take the second law of thermodynamics seriously.

There are also two philosophical reasons to think the universe had a beginning.

1. An actually infinite collection cannot exist in reality.
2. A beginningless past consists of an actually infinite collection of equal intervals of time.
3. Therefore, a beginningless past cannot exist in reality.

Here's the other argument.

1. An actually infinite collection cannot be formed by successive addition.
2. The past was formed by successive addition.
3. Therefore, the past cannot be actually infinite.

Both of these arguments show that time had a beginning, and if time had a beginning, then the universe had a beginning.

So Pro's first argument against God fails. Let's look at his next argument.

II. The impossibility of a timeless being

His second argument can be summarized like this:

1. If God exists, then he is unchanging.
2. Matter and energy are constantly changing.
3. Therefore, If God exists, then God is outside of time.
4. It is not possible for anything to exist outside of time.
5. Therefore, God does not exist.

Against, his first premise is just a definition, so I won't dispute that. I also agree with his second premise. My problem is with his third and fourth premise.

The problem with the third premise is that it's possible God created the universe and entered time simultaneously with creation, in which case God does not exist outside of time.

The problem with the fourth premise is that besides being unsubstantiated (i.e. my opponent needs to give us arguments for it), it seems that some abstract entities exist timelessly. For example, the laws of logic exist timelessly. There are possible worlds in which time does not exist, and since "Time does not exist" is a true description of those worlds, then the law of non-contradiction applies to those worlds, which means the law of non-contradiction is an atemporal entity.

Since his third and fourth premise are both false, Pro's second argument against God fails. Let's look at his next argument.

III. The impossibility of an immaterial being having causal influence over the material world

1. If God is all powerful, then God can influence the universe.
2. If God is not made of matter or energy, then he cannot influence the universe.
3. Therefore, God cannot be both all powerful, and immaterial.
4. But God is defined as being all powerful and immaterial.
5. Therefore, God does not exist.

Whether 1 is true or not depends on Pro's reason for thinking 2 is true. For example, if he thinks there is some logical impossibility for an immaterial being to influence the material world, then that wouldn't count against God's power since power is not the ability to engage in logical absurdity. Nobody would think that their inability to draw a square circle on a sheet of paper had anything to do with a lack of power. It's not as if you could do it if only you were more powerful. So a logical impossibility does not count against God's power.

But if he thinks 2 is true because of some physical or metaphysical limitation, then I will have to accept that 1 is true. And, in fact, I do accept that 1 is true. I just question whether it's consistent with Pro's reason for believing 2. So there may be an incoherence in Pro's argument that isn't evident because he hasn't fleshed his argument out yet.

Now let's look at that second premise. Whether Pro thinks the impossibility is logical, physical, metaphysical, or whatever, he hasn't defended this premise, and right now I see no reason to think it's true. In fact, there seems to be at least one reason to think it's false, namely that we ourselves are immaterial souls capable of having causal influence over our own brains. We know this because we are able to act with intention. That is, our mental states (e.g. our beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.) are able to have causal influence over our brains. Now, if our minds were merely emergent properties of our brains, then our minds would not have causal influence at all. The direction of causation would only go one way: brain --> mind. But since we know the direction of causation goes the other way (mind --> brain), then we know our minds are not merely emergent properties of the brain. Properties do not have causal powers; only substances do. Since the mind has causal powers, the mind is a distinct substance from the brain. The mind is an immaterial entity that has causal influence over the physical world, which disproves Pro's second premise.

I grant this 3 follows from 1 and 2, but since 2 is false, we can't really conclude that 3 is true.

Since 4 is just a definition, I won't dispute that.

So basically, Pro's third argument fails primarily because (1) has hasn't shown that the second premise is true, and (2) I have made an argument showing that the second premise is false.

Conclusion

And that's it. Pro made three arguments against the existence of God, and they all fail.

In my first post, I argued that the first law of thermodynamics (or any physical law for that matter) cannot act as a metaphysical straightjacket on reality. Laws merely describe the usual course of nature, and there is no reason to think a supernatural being couldn't violate them or produce something that nature couldn't produce on its own.

In response, Pro simply asserted that energy cannot be created or destroyed, which is just to state the first law of thermodynamics. This does not address my argument. He needs to defend his claim that it's impossible for the first law to be violated, even by a supernatural being. Otherwise, the first law does not serve as an argument against a creator God.

He also claims that "Just because the universe has always existed doesnt [sic] mean that it should have already reached a state of thermodynamic equilibrium." But I already explained why it does. It's because if the universe has no beginning, then it has existed for an infinite amount of time. He ignored that point.

He claims that the amount of matter and energy in the universe has something to do with when the universe might reach thermodynamic equilibrium. However, given an infinite amount of time, it doesn't matter. If the universe began in a state of zero entropy, it would reach thermodynamic equilibrium in a finite amount of time regardless of how much matter and energy exists. It follows that given an infinite amount of time, it will have already reached thermodynamic equilibrium. In fact, if the past is actually infinite, there is no point in the finite past in which the universe has not already reached thermodynamic equilibrium, and the reason is because at every point in the finite past, the past is already infinite.

I also gave two philosophical arguments for why time must have a beginning. Pro completely ignored both arguments. Then he went on to provide an argument for why time must NOT have a beginning. It's because either God has always existed or the universe has always existed, and either way, the past must be infinite.

But it doesn't follow that because something has always existed that it therefore must have an infinite past. It could be that God existed in a state of timelessness at the past boundary of the universe. If so, then God has always existed even though God's temporal duration is finite. The same thing cannot be said of the universe since, as Pro admits, mass and energy are in a constant state of change.

Pro previously argued that God cannot exist independently from the universe since to do so would entail that God is timeless, and it's impossible for anything to exist in a state of timelessness. I gave two responses: (1) I pointed out that Pro had not given us any reason to think timeless existence is impossible. (2) I gave the laws of logic as a counter-example, showing that something exists that is timeless, and I gave an argument for why we should think the laws of logic are timeless.

In answer to (2), Pro said that the laws of logic "only exist so long as they are used by man or any other creature." But that is not so. Square circles were impossible even before sentient creatures existed, and the reason is because square circles are violations of the law of non-contradiction. The laws of logic do not depend on us for their existence. The laws of logic are necessary truths. They exist in all possible worlds, including worlds without humans or any other creature.

In answer to (1), Pro said that because we can ask, "When did it exist?" about anything, that everything must exist in time. But that simply doesn't follow. The ability to ask a question doesn't mean there is necessarily an answer. For example, I can ask, "How much does the color blue weigh?" but that doesn't mean there's an answer to the question. It doesn't mean that blueness has a weight.

Pro asserted in his opening that if God is immaterial, then he cannot have causal influence over the world, which means he isn't all powerful, which means an all powerful God does not exist. I gave two responses: (1) I pointed out that Pro had not given us any reason to think that an immaterial being cannot interact in the physical world. (2) I made an argument for why we should believe that immaterial beings CAN have causal interaction in the world. Minds have causal interaction over the brain.

In response to (1), Pro argued that to cause anything in the physical world to move, one must add energy to it. But if God is not made of energy, then God cannot add energy to any physical object, and therefore cannot cause it to move.

There are at least a couple of ways God could cause physical objects to move, even if he is not made of energy. First, God could create energy ex-nihilo at the moment of causation. Second, God could use energy that already exists in the physical world to cause motion. Either way, it is certainly not impossible for an immaterial being to have causal influence in the natural world.

In response to (2), Pro attempted to equate the mind with the brain and argue that they are the same thing. But I have argued that they are not the same thing by noting that the mind has causal influence over the brain. Pro ignored that argument.

But there are many other arguments for why the mind and the brain are not the same thing. The most obvious reason is because of the indiscernibility of identicals (an expansion on the law of identity). According to the indiscernibility of identicals, if A and B are the same thing, then whatever property A has, B also has, and vice versa. A and B have every property in common because they are the same entity.

The the mind and the brain do not share every property in common. For example, everything about the physical brain is open to third person observation, but nothing about the mind is open to third person observation. The content of the mind is only open to first person observation. Also, the mind has intentionality. Thoughts can be ABOUT something. But the brain isn't about anything. One can have a mental perception of a green sweater that is perfectly clear in one's mind when dreaming, but nothing in the brain is green. So the mind and the brain are not the same thing.

So far, Pro hasn't given any sound arguments against the existence of God. His burden of proof, therefore, has not been met.

I look forward to conclusions and wish Pro luck.

I want to thank the reader for following us this far. If you have taken the time to read this much, then please vote so that your time will not have been in vain. :-)

I also want to thank Narmak for putting so much effort into this debate.

Originally, Pro made three arguments against the existence of God. In the last round, he added a fourth. I'm going to deal with the fourth argument first.

IV. Argument from logical impossibility

1. If an all powerful God exists, then he can create square circles.
2. Square circles cannot be created.
3. Therefore, an all powerful God does not exist.

The first premise is false. Theologians define omnipotence as the ability to do all things logically possible, so it does not include the ability to engage in logical absurdity.

Suppose we insist that an all powerful God could engage in logical absurdity. Then the second premise would be false since an all powerful God could create square circles. Either way, this argument fails.

I. The argument from the first law of thermodynamics.

If you'll recall, I responded to this argument in two ways--by showing that the first law of thermodynamics does not act as a metaphysical straight jacket on reality, and by giving three arguments for why the universe had a beginning.

A. Can the first law be violated?

Pro continues to ignore my argument and merely assert that the first law cannot be violated. But this time, he compares violating the first law with creating a square circle. Apparently, he thinks the first law is a logical law or that violating it entails a logical contradiction. But the first law is a physical law, not a logical law, so his argument is fallacious.

B. Argument from the second law of thermodynamics

I explained why the second law of thermodynamics entails that the universe had a beginning. Pro's response is woefully inadequate. He thinks that interchangeability of matter and energy explains why the universe hasn't reached thermodynamic equilibrium yet. But that observation is irrelevant. As I said before, even if the universe begins with zero entropy, it will reach equilibrium in a finite amount of time, regardless of how much matter and energy there is. It follows inescapably, that given an infinite amount of time, it will have already reached equilibrium, and that given a beginnnigless universe, there is no point in the finite past in which it will not have already reached equilibrium.

Pro also suggests that we live in an oscillating universe, which explains why the universe hasn't reached equilibrium. But that argument is fallacious for two reasons. First, because we live in an open universe, not an oscillating universe, which is evident in the fact that the expansion of the universe is speeding up rather than slowing down.

Second, oscillating models suffer from the effects of the second law of thermodynamics as well and cannot be infinite in the past.

C. The impossibility of an actual infinite.

Pro has ignored this argument throughout this debate.

D. The impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition.

Pro has ignored this argument throughout the debate. Both this argument and the one before it prove that the universe had a beginning, which disproves one of the premises in his first argument against the existence of God.

II. The impossibility of a timeless being.

Pro attempted to defend his premise that a timeless being cannot exist by saying that one can ask the question of any being, "When did it exist?" If there is a timeless being, then there is no answer to the question.

I said the mere fact that you can answer a question doesn't have any ontological implications. The fact that I can ask, "When did God exist?" no more implies that God exists in time than asking, "How much does blue weigh" implies that the color blue has weight.

Pro admits that blue has no weight, but then contradicted himself, saying, "There is no question that doesn't [sic] have an answer."

I claimed that since the laws of logic can and do exist in a state of timelessness that timeless existence is possibity. Pro gave up trying to refute that point, so this argument stands unrefuted.

Since Pro has failed to show why a timeless being is impossible, his second argument against God fails.

III. The impossibility of an immaterial being having causal influence over the material world.

Pro claimed that since God is not made up of energy, he cannot impart energy on the physical world so as to have causal influence in it. I gave two ways that God could have causal influence in the physical world even though he's not made of energy, and I also gave two reasons to think the mind is an immaterial entity that has causal influence over the brain.

A. God is not made of energy.

I gave two responses:

1. God could create energy.

Pro said this would violate the first law of thermodynamics. I already responded above.

2. God could use energy that already exists.

Pro ignored this argument.

B. The argument for an immaterial mind from intentional action.

Pro concedes that metal states influence behavior but insists that mental state are brain states. He says that "our brains can WEIGH decisions…" I responded with the indiscernibility of identicals:

C. The argument from the indiscernibility of identicals.

If there is any property not shared between our brains and our minds, then our minds are not our brains.

Pro says diseases can cause people to act differently and that "according to con this would be impossible seeing as the brain and mind are not the same thing." But he is mistaken. I do not say that is impossible. Rather, I explain it by saying that there is causal interaction between the mind and the brain. The fact that parasites in the brain affect our mental states only shows causation between the two, not that they are the same thing.

Pro says that although he can create a game in which a character makes choices, that doesn't mean the computer has a mind distinct from the hardware. This analogy fails because computers do not have minds at all, and they don't have volition.

I pointed out that the brain is open to third person observation, but the mind is only open to first person observation. Pro responded by saying the brain is "extremely complicated" and that for all we know, the mind may be open to third person observation. But all one need do to see that this is false is to reflect on the subjective nature of perception to realize that this is impossible. Emotion can only be apprehended in the first person because it's a subjective experience.

I also pointed out that one can have a perception (such as a green sweater) in the mind, while there is no such perception in the brain (i.e. there is no green sweater in the brain). Pro's response suffers from irrelevance. He says that the statement makes no sense and that we can only dream of things that we have experienced. That has nothing to do with my argument. Since a mental state can have the property of greenness even though the brain does not have the property of greenness shows that the mind is not the brain.

In substance dualism, the direction of causation goes both ways. The brain has causal influence over the mind, which is what enables us to see. Our minds have causal influence over the brain, which allows us to act intentionally. None of these causal interactions are the brain and the mind the same thing.

Since the mind is an immaterial substance that has causal influence over the material brain, Pro's third argument against God fails.

Conclusion

As I pointed out in the first round, the burden of proof was on Pro to show that God does not exist. Pro gave four arguments against the existence of God. I answered each one, showing that he has failed to carry the burden of proof. There were a few of my arguments that Pro never responded to. Over all, I think it's clear that Pro's arguments have failed to show that God does not exist.

Thank you for coming to tonight's debate, and please vote.

And thank you, Narmak, for an engaging debate on an interesting topic.