The Instigator
Illegalcombatant
Pro (for)
Tied
3 Points
The Contender
Philocat
Con (against)
Tied
3 Points

God more than likely does not exist

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Voting Style: Open Point System: 7 Point
Started: 2/20/2015 Category: Religion
Updated: 1 year ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 1,180 times Debate No: 70380
Debate Rounds (5)
Comments (6)
Votes (2)

 

Illegalcombatant

Pro

The Debate

I will seek to provide argument to support the proposition that God does not exist is more likely true than false.

Con will at the minimum seek to negate Pros arguments.

Definitions

God - An omniscient, omnipotent, loving, morally good, just, supernatural, personal being.

Rules

No new arguments in the last round

First round is for acceptance only, no arguments.
Philocat

Con

I accept :)
Debate Round No. 1
Illegalcombatant

Pro

I thank PhiloCat for accepting this debate.

Definitions

God - An omniscient, omnipotent, all loving, morally good, just, supernatural, personal being.

Unnecessary suffering - suffering which is not logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.

God exists vs God does not exist

For my first argument we look at two mutually exclusive possibilities, the first where God exists (GE) and the second where God does not exist (GDNE).

GE) We live in a world where God and suffering exists. Any and all suffering only happens if and only if God permits it. Also the suffering that God permits only happens if it is logically necessary for an adequate compensating good.

GDNE) We live in a world where God does NOT exist but suffering does.

So how do we justify which world we live in ? For that we turn to occams razor which states..."Occam's razor (also written as Ockham's razor from William of Ockham (c. 1287 " 1347), and in Latin lex parsimoniae) is a principle of parsimony, economy, or succinctness used in logic and problem-solving. It states that among competing hypotheses, the hypothesis with the fewest assumptions should be selected." [1]

Take pretty much any instance of suffering. A child tortured, animals eating each other alive, an earthquake causing bricks to fall on people. Every bone broken, every rib cracked, every person blinded every spine severed can be made compatible with the claim that God exists and God allowed these things to happen.

But these things are also compatible with the claim that God does not exist, and God did not prevent these things because it does not exist.

Seeing that both hypotheses explain the absence of such a Gods action equally well Occams razor enjoins us to go with the explanation that makes the fewest assumptions ergo we should go with the God does not exist option as it makes fewer assumptions.

Divine Silence

"God answers all prayers, but sometimes his answer is 'no" - Dan Brown

This would be a good response.......................if it were actually true. People don't get a "no" answer from God. Rather people make all sorts of prayers and requests and if later on they get a positive outcome they may attribute it as answered prayer, but this on it's own is just confirmation bias.

Sam Harris argues in response to people who claim God has answerd their prayers....

"Given all that this God of yours does not accomplish in the lives of others, given the misery that is being imposed on some helpless child at this instant this kind of faith is obscene. To think in this way is a failure to reason honestly or care sufficiently about the suffering of other human beings" [2]

So once again using occams razor why the divine silence ? The non existence of such a God explains the data using less amount of assumptions compared to the existence of such a God.

We live in the best possible world ?

Consider the following argument............

1) If God exists then we live in the best possible world
2) More likely we don't live in the best possible world
C) Therefore more likely God does not exist

"According to Leibniz, the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. He outlines a simple argument for this conclusion in The Monadology, §§53-55. The argument proceeds as follows:

1) God has the idea of infinitely many universes.

2) Only one of these universes can actually exist.

3) God’s choices are subject to the principle of sufficient reason, that is, God has reason to choose one thing or another.

4) God is good.

C) Therefore, the universe that God chose to exist is the best of all possible worlds." [3]

Yes you can assume that God exists and therefore the world we live in must be the best possible world, but that is just begging the question for the existence of God in the first place and not questioning if we live in the best possible world.

So...........do we live in the best possible world ? is it reasonable to believe that we live in the best possible world ?

Once again consider the misery that is being inflicted on some child. If one just one less child was not to suffer, not to suffer being drowned, or eaten alive by a lion, or death by aids or a million other things that children suffer and die from, are we to believe this was necessary in order to achieve the best possible world by God ?

You can retreat to the mere possibility, but what about plausibility and reasonableness. Is it plausible and or reasonable too believe that we live in the best possible world ? I submit that it is not.

As such since it is more likely that we DON'T live in the best possible world ergo it is more likely that God does not exist.

Moral Paralysis

If we operate on the assumption that God exists it leads to moral paralysis. Remember if God exists then unnecessary suffering does NOT exist because any and all suffering only happens if and only if God permits it. Also the suffering that God permits only happens if it is logically necessary for an adequate compensating good.

Should we release child rapists from prison ? should we cease to prevent by force those who would rape and torture children ? informing then we are sorry, we didn't realize that the suffering they caused was a necessary condition to bring about a greater good.

"Many babies each year are born with Down's syndrome. Most of these babies, with normal paediatric care, will grow up healthy. A significant number, however, have intestinal obstructions that will kill them if they do not receive an operation. Without the operation, dehydration and infection will cause these babies to wither and die over a period of hours and days. Today this operation is relatively simple, but not long ago these babies could not be saved . . . This baby (one born in the past with this) suffers for days, then dies." [4]

Should we seek to stop any and all medical treatment to children because their suffering is necessary to bring about a greater good ? Of course we won't....................well most of us.

It only makes sense and is more consistent to combat suffering if you work on the assumption that unnecessary suffering does exist, and thus by seeking to prevent suffering you are not necessarily preventing suffering which was logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.

But this can only be the case if God does not exist.

I look forward to Cons reply

Sources

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org.........'s_razor

[2] https://www.youtube.com......

[3] http://colintemple.com...

[4] God? Debate between a Christian and an Atheist, William lane Craig and Walter Sinnott Armstrong, 2004, Oxford University Press, p84.
Philocat

Con

Thank you, Illegalcombatant.
I will start by arguing that it is at least likely that God exists. I will do so by first using a posteriori evidence to prove the existence of a supernatural being, and then I will argue a priori that God must logically have the characteristics defined in round 1.

Cosmological argument

P1: All physical entities have contingent existence
P2: The universe is a physical entity
P3: To prevent reductio ad infinitum, there must exist a non-contingent entity
P4: A non-contingent entity cannot be a physical entity
C: A non-physical (supernatural) entity exists

This forms an inductive syllogism - which is to say that the conclusion deductively follows so long as the premises are verified either inductively or deductively. As this debate is concerning likelihood, an inductive argument will suffice.

P1 is known a posteriori. Every single physical entity we have ever experienced has contingent existence (which is to say that its existence is dependent on certain other entities or events). Obviously our experiential knowledge does not deductively affirm the veracity of this premise, but it does so inductively which is all that is needed for an inductive argument.

P2 is verified when we consider the definition of 'universe':

'all existing matter and space considered as a whole' (1)

Matter and space are physical entities (or lack thereof), so it does not make sense why matter considered as a whole will not be a physical entity. Therefore the universe is a physical entity.

P3 is supported by the fact that an actual infinite cannot exist - as shown by paradoxes such as the Hilbert's Hotel Paradox (2). A contingent entity would exist contingently on another contingent entity and so on. As an actual infinite cannot exist (or at least it is very unlikely that it can), the buck must stop at a certain entity. This entity must be non-contingent in order to stop the chain.

P4 logically entails from P1.

As I have verified all the premises, it logically follows that a supernatural being exists, that which created the universe. Albeit this argument does not assert this being is necessarily omnipotent, personal, loving etc.. but these characteristics are proved by my next argument for the existence of God"

Ontological Argument

P1: God = That of which nothing greater can be conceived
P2: We can either conceive of God existing only in the mind (A), or conceive of God existing in both the mind and reality (B)
P3: B > A
C1: A is a contradiction
C2: A & B are bivalent, so B is correct

This is a reductio ad absurdum argument; A's assertion regarding God (that God only exists in the mind) is absurd because we can conceive of B's assertion regarding God, which asserts a greater God. As the bivalent negation of an absurd conclusion must be true, B must be correct.
Therefore, God exists in reality as well as the mind.

What is important about this argument is that, when we conclude that 'God' exists in reality, we conclude (because of P1) that 'That of which nothing greater can be conceived' exists in reality. This being must be omnipotent, omniscient, loving, morally good and personal because these are all attributes that contribute to the greatness of a being. Thus it is absurd to accept that God exists but he does not have these attributes, because we could conceive of a greater being (that DOES have these attributes).

Using the two argument presented above, I have proved that it is it is likely that God exists. Thus I negate the resolution.

Occam's Razor

Con's first argument is based on a misunderstanding of the correct applicability of Occam's Razor. It is not, as commonly perceived, simply a matter of choosing the simpler (less assumptions made) explanation. This is only the case where neither explanation has any previous evidence for or against its veracity.

For example, we have two propositions for a given scenario:

1. A
2. B

Where A has less assumptions than B but neither has any external proof of their relative veracity.

In this case, it is prudent to use Occam's Razor to choose A because we have no prior proof to assist our choice. Yet if it turns out that there are sound arguments in favour of B, we ought to choose B regardless of the fact that it has more assumptions.

Applying this to the argument, Pro's use of Occam's Razor would be correct if we have no prior arguments for or against God's existence. However, my arguments prove that it is more likely that God exists; so it is a misapplication of Occam's Razor to pick GDNE simply because it makes less assumptions. The previous evidence supports GDE and not GDNE, and so we ought to pick GDE despite it making more assumptions.

Divine Silence

Again, the application of Occam's Razor is incorrect as explained above, because prior evidence asserts the likelihood of God existing.

In response to the more general point though, it is a common misconception about prayers that it is simply a matter of asking God for something and him just giving it to you or explaining his reasoning vocally. Instead, prayer is about focusing on one's relationship with God and becoming more spiritual just by the act of meditation. If God does answer prayers in a actual sense, then he does so by inspiring ourselves and others. As St Paul wrote:

'for it is God who is at work in you' (3)

Best possible world

Pro makes the following syllogism:

1) If God exists then we live in the best possible world
2) More likely we don't live in the best possible world
C) Therefore more likely God does not exist'

In order to refute the conclusion, I deny premise 2. I do this by using Leibniz's argument which Pro has already written.
Leibniz's argument presents the argumentation that takes the premise (God exists) to the conclusion (we live in the best possible world).
Before Pro accuses me of begging the question, I would point out that I have affirmed the premise (God exists) in my cosmological and ontological arguments, it would only be begging the question if I did not rely on other arguments. Therefore the only way that Pro can disprove that we don't live in the best possible world is if he does one of the following:

1) Refutes the premise that God exists
2) Refutes Leibniz's logic
3) Presents evidence that we definitely do not live in the best possible world.

So far, he has done none of these. Thus he has not adequately verified premise 2 and so the conclusion is negated.

Moral Paralysis

Pro opines that if all evil is necessary then we ought not to stop it.
I will respond in both the context of natural evil (caused by non-human sources) and moral evil (caused by human free-will).

Natural Evil

More often than not, natural evil is necessary because it invites us and gives us the responsibility to stop it. Pro is mistaken in believing that its necessity lies external to our own development by means of attempting to prevent it. In his example of Down's Syndrome, the necessity of it is that it engenders human compassion and medical development.

Moral Evil

Moral evil is caused by human free will. The two concepts are mutually inclusive - we cannot have one but not the other. As free will is a good thing (I commend to the voters that they accept this), then moral evil becomes necessary insofar as it allows free will to exist.
Just because moral evil is necessary, it does not mean that we ought to refrain from preventing it where we can. We can still have free will so long as each individual being has the potential to abuse it (i.e moral evil). Obviously potential moral evil will always lead to some actual moral evil, but we can still work to minimise the actual moral evil.



Sources


(1) Google: 'Define universe'
(2) http://ed.ted.com...
(3) http://biblehub.com...
Debate Round No. 2
Illegalcombatant

Pro

I thank Philocat for their opening argument.

Opening remarks

Philocat here on in referred to as Con has attempted to provide two main arguments to act as aprior justification for the existence of God as a counter to my arguments. But should these arguments be accepted as good arguments for the existence of God ? I don't think so, I shall now explain why.

Cosmological argument

As Con points out even accepting this argument only justifies a very vague notion of something super natural & non contingent existing. So even if this arguments holds up it doesn't do much for Cons position here. Never the less I have some objections.

Consider Cons first premise..."P1: All physical entities have contingent existence"

Our data here is EXTREMELY LIMITED to a very small part of the universe in a very small time frame when compared to the billions of years of the universe..........and counting. Con makes the leap here from that extremely limited sample to justify a premise about the universe everywhere, past/present/future without exception.

I submit this is a huge over reach by Con.

It gets worse for Con here, remember as Con defines the universe as..."'all existing matter and space considered as a whole" "

"The logical fallacies of composition and division are a pair of fallacies which are based on a confusion between what is true of the part and what is true of the whole. The fallacy of composition is an incorrect inference from what is known of the parts to asserting the same of the whole; and the fallacy of division is the reverse, from the whole to the part" [1]

As Con points out..."Every single physical entity we have ever experienced has contingent existence" And what and where exactly is this experience that Con talks about ? inside and concerning parts of the universe of course !!!

As such even if it was the case that all parts of the universe were contingent it would be fallacious to then conclude therefore the universe as a whole is contingent.

Ontological Argument

What you need to appreciate and be very keenly aware of is how the argument is trying to go from God as a conception to the conclusion that this conception of God must exist not just in the imagination but also beyond it (reality).

So first things first, just because something can be imagined doesn't mean it ACTUALLY exists. This is easy to demonstrate. Imagine a unicorn right now. Does the fact you can imagine a unicorn mean it actually exists ? of course not. I don't think anyone one the planet would disagree with this point.

Okey now what if I told you about a very special unicorn, this is the GREATEST CONCEIVABLE unicorn. Now you see it would be quite absurd if it did not exist because the greatest conceivable unicorn that only exists in the imagination isn't the GREATEST CONCEIVABLE unicorn now is it ? that's a contradiction in terms ergo the greatest conceivable unicorn exists in both mind and reality.

Does the fact that I can conceive of the greatest God/Unicorn/whatever mean it actually exists ? no ? does the fact I can claim that that conception of God/Unicorn/whatever also contains the conception of it being greater to exist in both mind and reality as opposed to just mind mean that that conception must also CORRESPOND to reality ? no.

God exists v God does not exist

Con didn't dispute the reasoning of occams razor here but rather seeks to justify the existence of God. Without such a justification this argument still stands.

Divine Silence

Con makes the point about other kinds of prayers, fair enough. That doesn't refute the argument here. Once again without a prior justification for the existence of God the arguments stands.

More likely we don't live in the best possible world

Once again Con sought to negate this argument by seeking to justify the existence of God. Without such a prior justification I maintain that the arguments stands.

I would also note Con tries to push the burden of proof here to ridiculous levels when they demand that I..."3) Presents evidence that we definitely do not live in the best possible world" You don't have to definitely prove the non existence of alien abduction or the non existence of matrix or the non existence of demons to justify these things are more likely to not exist.

To add some more weight here that more likely we don't live in the best possible world I refer once again to Sam Harris...

"9 million children die every year before they reach the age of five...That's 24 thousand a day, a thousand an hour 17 or so a minute. That means before I can get to the end of this sentence some few children likely will have died in terror and agony" [2]

Moral Paralysis

Consider where Con says. "Pro opines that if all evil is necessary then we ought not to stop it." & "In his example of Down's Syndrome, the necessity of it is that it engenders human compassion and medical development."

If child rapists did not exist then there would be no raping of children ergo it could be claimed that therefore the existence of child rapists is "necessary". But notice the difference between that kind of necessity and the more specific kind of necessity that the moral paralysis argument is based on....

Unnecessary suffering = suffering which is not logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.

And in case it wasn't obvious that also means...

Necessary suffering = suffering which is logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.

Even if we grant that the various "evils" Cons words not mine were necessary to bring about certain things this in of it's self doesn't deal with the more specific kind of suffering that the moral paralysis argument is based on.

As such I think it is still the case that It only makes sense and is more consistent to combat suffering if you work on the assumption that unnecessary suffering [suffering which is not logically necessary for an adequately compensating good] does exist, and thus by seeking to prevent suffering you are not necessarily preventing suffering which was logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.

Free will defense

Con has made claims about "moral evils" being the result (presumably) of God given free will. These are just bare assertions on their own and should be rejected until given justification. I could just as easily assert we don't have any God given free will, you know one bare assertion is as good as another.

For example if it is pointed out some child is raped and tortured and has a limb cut off in the context of arguing against "God" you can bet that the free will defense will by employed. I don't think the free will defense is the powerful counter that some people think it is. Consider the assumptions that have to be accepted in order to make this God given free will to work.

1) God makes a decision to value the free will of the child rapist to rape the child over the well being of the child.

2) God allows the will of the child rapist to rape the child over the will of the child not to be raped.

3) God allows the will of the child rapist to rape while not allowing other wills (eg the will of a child who has a limb hack off to be restored)

Again you can retreat to the logical possible here, but plausible ? nope.

It is possible for God to create a world with free will & no moral evil

Also consider where Con says..."We can still have free will so long as each individual being has the potential to abuse it "

It's possible to live in a world of God given free will to commit moral evil yet to live in a world where no such moral evil takes place cause everyone although having the POTENTIAL to commit such moral evils chooses not too. As such in any sense of the word it is NOT necessary for moral evil to exist in order to have God given free will.

The God as defined could create such a world, yet we don't live in that world. Why ? cause more likely such a God does not exist.

I look forward to Cons reply.

Sources

[1] http://rationalwiki.org...

[2] https://www.youtube.com...
Philocat

Con

Thanks IllegalCombatant!


Cosmological Argument

Pro begins by attacking the veracity of P1. Supposedly it is too tenuous a step to move from:

'Every physical entity we have experienced is contingent'
to
'Every physical entity is contingent'.

Prima facie, this seems a dubious jump in logic. However, given our knowledge of particle physics, it is actually a perfectly reasonable conclusion.
Basically, it has been scientifically proven that there are 18 fundamental particles (1), and that everything in the universe is composed of these particles. In other words, every single physical entity is a particular combination of quantities of these fundamental particles. The implications of this is that entities we observe here on earth are composed of the very same particles as everything else in the universe, so therefore it is not an unreasonable logical jump to extrapolate our conclusions about physical entities we have experienced, to make conclusions about all physical entities.

To summarise, because everything in the universe is made of the same particles (evidence being spectroscopic readings of starlight), we can observe the particles here on earth in order to make scientific deductions regarding what happens throughout the universe.

Pro goes on to assert that I commit the fallacy of composition. Yet this is false. My logic was as follows:

P1) All physical entities are contingent
P2) The universe is a physical entity
C) The universe is contingent

Nowhere here do I commit the fallacy of composition. I do not prove that the universe is contingent by appealing to the contingency of its parts, I prove the universe is contingent by appealing to the fact that the universe is a physical entity, having already established that all physical entities are contingent.

To conclude, Pro's rebuttals have not successfully refuted my argument.

Ontological Argument

Pro voices the ages-old response to the ontological argument that it can be applied to any nonsensical object (unicorns, in this example). Like so:

P1: Unicorn = A unicorn of which no greater unicorn can be conceived
P2: We can either conceive of a unicorn existing only in the mind (A), or conceive of a unicorn existing in both the mind and reality (B)
P3: B > A
C1: A is a contradiction
C2: A & B are bivalent, so B is correct

Yet this argument does not work. This is because P2 is false; we cannot conceive of 'a unicorn of which no greater unicorn can be conceived' and so it cannot exist in the mind. The reason we cannot conceive of this is because we can always conceive of a greater unicorn - a pointier horn or a shinier coat. As Anselm put it, objects apart from God have no 'intrinsic maximum'.
Therefore, the argument does not work with physical objects such as unicorns, pizzas or chairs because no matter how great a unicorn we conceive of, we can always conceive of a better one because unicorns have no 'intrinsic maximum'. Therefore we cannot conceive of P1 in the mind and so P2 fails, so the conclusion fails.

This does not apply to God because he does have an intrinsic maximum - namely the qualities that have already been defined. And therefore we can conceive of him.

To conclude, the argument does not work with physical objects yet it does work with God, so it cannot be simply disregarded as sophistry by virtue of the fact that maximally great physical objects do not exist.

GDE vs GDNE/
Divine Silence

Myself and Pro are in agreement here - the veracity of these arguments is dependent on the veracity of the cosmological argument and the ontological argument. As I have showed them to be sound arguments, the applications of Occam's Razor continue to be un-sound.

Best possible world?

Again, Pro's argument rests on the presumption that the cosmological and ontological arguments are invalid. As I have shown them to be valid, my arguments that we do indeed live in the best possible world continue to be valid.

Pro accuses me of shifting the burden of proof to 'ridiculous levels'. He says this in response to my option that Pro must '[Present] evidence that we definitely do not live in the best possible world'. Pro states that the burden of proof is on myself to prove that we do live in the best possible world, and not on him.
I agree with this, but remember that I have already fulfilled my burden of proof by using a sound argument to prove that God exists, and therefore we do live in the best possible world. Pro cannot complain about having to disprove that we live in the best possible world when I have already proved that we do.
The reason I shifted the burden of proof onto Pro is because one can only negate a valid argument if they provide actual proof of its negation, in this case this 'proof of its negation' would have to be proof that we do not live in the best possible world.

Pro goes on to commit the 'appeal to emotion' fallacy (2) by providing statistics about children dying. I will remind voters that such statistics only serve to conjure up an emotional impulse - they do not provide valid backing to a rational and logical argument. Whilst such evidence may have some weight in the absence of logical arguments for or against the proposition that we live in the best possible world, I have provided a logical argument that we do indeed live in the best possible world. Therefore we should not let emotional bias stand in the way of logic.

Moral Paralysis

Pro's arguments here are based on a semantic misunderstanding. Let us look at the definition of necessary suffering:

'Necessary suffering = suffering which is logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.'

Pro assumes that this definition univocally entails that, in order for suffering to be necessary, it must be necessary in every manifestation. What I mean by this is that the suffering inflicted by a rapist would have to be adequately compensated by a greater good that is specific to that particular scenario. For example, in order for the suffering of a particular rape to be necessary, it would have to be logically necessary in that particular rape in order to allow a greater good.

However, this need not be the case. Suffering can be necessary by virtue of it, as a concept, causing a greater good by its existence when compared to the lack of it.
For example, child rape as a concept must exist if we are to have free will (which is the adequately compensating good). Considering that we have the physical capacity to rape a child, to conceptually prevent child rape from existing it would involve an infringement on our free will to choose how we act.

Therefore, the moral paralysis argument does not stand up to scrutiny, since it is possible to acknowledge the conceptual necessity of certain ‘evils’ and yet seek to prevent them where we can, since prevention of an event’s manifestation does not remove the concept of that event

Pro goes on to claim that my assertion that we have a God-given free-will is a ‘bare assertion’. It would be a bare assertion if I had not previously proven God’s existence, but as I have already done so, it is reasonable to assert that our free-will is God-given once we acknowledge that God exists.

He then goes on and makes three attempted rebuttals of the free-will defence, yet they are all based on a flawed understanding of free will. It is not simply a matter of:

1.‘Person wills X’
2. ‘X occurs’

For example, it would not be free will for a child to will not to be raped. Free will is a matter of potential – when making a decision, free will is the autonomy involved when deciding what one will do or not do.

Finally, Pro states that we can have free will but no moral evil. Yet this is clearly misguided. If we could not physically commit moral evil then we wouldn’t have free will. Free will is the choice between A and B, it cannot therefore be the case that B cannot occur.


Debate Round No. 3
Illegalcombatant

Pro

Source correction

In round 1 the quote by Sam Harris that started with "Given all that this God of yours does not accomplish.." did not go to the correct link. As such the round 1 source [2] should be...

https://www.youtube.com...

Opening Remarks for round 3

I thank Con for their spirited reply.

I still maintain that Con does not have a good prior justification for the existence of God and as such where God was used as a defeater for some of my arguments those arguments still stand.

Cosmological argument

Consider what Theoretical Physicist Michio Kaku says concerning dark matter....

"What is dark matter that makes up 23% of the universe ? no one knows." [1]

I cite this as a direct refutation of Cons claim that all things (at least in our universe) are made up of the 18 particles cited and thus the arguments built of this are unsound.

I previously made the charge that Cons commits the composition fallacy, going from parts of the universe to determine the whole.

Cons as a matter of necessity, can only get evidence from the parts and within the universe we find ourselves in (obviously).
So Con makes the leap from that, to the conclusion that therefore the universe as a whole is contingent with the premise that all matter is contingent as the middle man.

Con has gone from the "part" to the "whole (albeit in a more indirect way) and thus commits the composition fallacy.

The universe did not begin to exist

Consider the Kalam Cosmological argument...........

1.0. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2.0. The universe began to exist.
3.0. Therefore, the universe has a cause. [2]

Now it may seem like I am making Cons case for them, but bare with me I am going some where with this.

Consider what it means for something to BEGIN to exist. This debate would be claimed to exist but not only that, that it BEGAN to exist, cause we recognize that it exists but also there was a TIME PRIOR when it did not exist. This can be formulated as such...

X beings to exist if and only if X exists and there was a time prior where X did not exist

Absent the universe there is no "time" therefore there was no time prior when the universe did not exist, thus the universe did not begin to exist.

Also notice that Con uses scientific evidence which is under pinned by a scientific conception of causation (eg particle physics) to justify their argument. But the scientific conception of causality can't be applied outside of space and time . With the universe as a whole not needing a cause that is to say it is not contingent, this directly refutes Cons argument which rests upon the premise of the universe being a contingent entity.

Ontological Argument

Presumably Cons argument here is about a non physical God, who among other things is a person, ergo a non physical person. So why can't we have a non physical unicorn or any other so called non physical thing ? Because Con says so ?

Recall where I argued that just because you can imagine something exists doesn't mean it does exist. Con does not dispute this point.

To put it more directly the conception of the greatest conceivable being that exists in both mind and reality is it's self a conception and thus like all conceptions does not necessarily correspond to reality.

Consider how Con replied to my greatest conceivable unicorn...."This is because P2 is false; we cannot conceive of 'a unicorn of which no greater unicorn can be conceived' and so it cannot exist in the mind."

But can the greatest conceivable being exist in the mind ? Thomas Aquinas didn't think so..."He (Aquinas) suggested that people cannot know the nature of God and, therefore, cannot conceive of God in the way Anselm proposed. The ontological argument would be meaningful only to someone who understands the essence of God completely. Aquinas reasoned that, as only God can completely know His essence, only He could use the argument. His rejection of the ontological argument caused other Catholic theologians to also reject the argument" [3]

Divine Silence

Same deal, without justification of the existence of God as a prior the argument stands.

More likely we don't live in the best possible world

Without a prior justification for the existence of God I maintain the argument stands.

Con says..."Pro states that the burden of proof is on myself to prove that we do live in the best possible world, and not on him."

No, absent any defeaters (like prior justification for Gods existence) all I have to do is justify that it is more likely we don't live in the best possible world. I make no such demand and I wonder why you would think that I have ?

Con charges an emotional fallacy. Okey, take away the emotion and the FACTS are still the same.

Recall all the things that have being bought up and could be bought up. Animals eating each other alive, earth quakes, aids, poverty, slow and painful deaths and once again I repeat Sam Harris (rough) stats and state of the world...

"9 million children die every year before they reach the age of five...That's 24 thousand a day, a thousand an hour 17 or so a minute. That means before I can get to the end of this sentence some few children likely will have died in terror and agony"

Consider the following two options...

1) We live in the best possible world
2) We don't live in the best possible world

My modest proposition here is just that it is more likely we don't live in the best possible world. Not claiming that with 100% certainty just that it is more likely. And if all the things that have being mentioned in this debate isn't in Cons view or anyone else a sufficient justification for this modest proposition then what would ?

Moral Paralysis

Remember here I have defined Unnecessary suffering = suffering which is not logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.

Recall at the core of my argument is..."It only makes sense and is more consistent to combat suffering if you work on the assumption that unnecessary suffering does exist, and thus by seeking to prevent suffering you are not necessarily preventing suffering which was logically necessary for an adequately compensating good."

Again what exactly is Cons refutation here ? That we need to have actual child rape to persevere the alleged greater good of the concept of child rape ? WHAT ?

Free will defense

Recall how I argued the implausibility of the God given free will defense in an example of a child raped who gets a limb hacked off. And what you need to accept as true to make it work those being.........

1) God makes a decision to value the free will of the child rapist to rape the child over the well being of the child.

2) God allows the will of the child rapist to rape the child over the will of the child not to be raped.

3) God allows the will of the child rapist to rape while not allowing other wills (eg the will of a child who has a limb hack off to be restored)

Consider where Con says..."Free will is a matter of potential"

Yes that is one of my points here. You have to accept as true God allows some potentials eg a person to rape a child yet denies other potentials like the child not to be raped among other things or have a limb restored.

It is possible for God to create a world with free will & no moral evil

Con claims that God can't create such a world as to do so would require God to impose physical limitations that would violate God given free will.

God could create a world free of moral evil yet the people in it do not commit such acts. NOT because God stops them and/or imposes physical limitations to stop such moral evil acts, but because they CHOOSE not too.

I even cited Cons own remarks here..."We can still have free will so long as each individual being has the potential to abuse it "

The argument remains untouched.

I look forward to Cons reply.

Sources

[1] https://www.youtube.com...

[2] The Blackwell Companion Guide to Natural Theology, edited by William Lane Craig

[3] http://en.wikipedia.org...

Philocat

Con

Thanks for your arguments, Pro! :)

Cosmological Argument

Firstly, I will show that the existence of dark matter does not refute P1.

To recall, P1 stated that:

'All physical entities have contingent existence'

The only way that this premise could be refuted by the existence of dark matter is if dark matter is not shown to be contingent. I argue that dark matter is not exempt from having contingent existence. Besides, as contingent existence is the norm in terms of existence, if no conclusive evidence is presented either way then we ought to conclude (applying Occam's Razor) that dark matter is contingent, for contingent existence makes less assumptions than non-contingent existence.

There are two principle candidates for dark matter (1):

1. Weakly Interacting Massive Particles (WIMPs): Just after the Big Bang, countless particles and antiparticles were created and then annihilated, however, particles such as neutrinos are 'weakly-interacting' so they were not all annihilated. When the universe expanded, the residue from these annihilated neutrinos is, coincidentally, just the right mass to explain the disparity of mass that dark matter is posited for. (2)

2. Axions - These particles are small, uncharged and relatively inert (3). These properties are consistent with the hypothetical properties of dark matter.

WIMPs are contingent because they are formed from neutrinos - hence their existence is dependent on the prior existence of neutrinos. Therefore WIMPs have contingent existence and so, if dark matter is made up of WIMPs, the veracity of P1 is not refuted by the existence of dark matter.

Axions were created abundantly after the Big Bang (4), so they are contingent on the prior existence of certain events proceding after the Big Bang.

To summarise, dark matter does not refute P1 - the premise therefore stands.


Pro goes on to commit the straw-man fallacy not once, but twice. Instead of refuting my arguments, he misconstrues my argument and instead refutes what he mistakenly thought I was originally arguing!

Firstly, Pro appears to believe my argument uses something similar to the following logic:

P: Everything in the universe is contingent
C: Ergo, the universe is contingent

But I simply do not do this! My logic was as follows:

P1: All physical entities are contingent
P2: The universe is a physical entity
C: The universe is contingent

This logic is categorically and irrefutably sound; there is no room for accusations of fallacy because the logic is entirely deductive. I am bemused why Pro believes I make the fallacy of composition, as such a fallacy requires a jump in logic - yet there is no such jump anywhere within the above argument!

Secondly, Pro creates a giant straw man by presenting the Kalam Cosmological Argument and going on to refute it. I have no idea why he does this - it does not refute any of my points because I never use the Kalam Cosmological argument in the first place.
One cannot refute argument A by presenting argument B and then only proceeding to refute argument B. If Pro's rebuttals do actually address my argument, then he should not have needed to bring another argument onto the scene.

Ontological Argument

Pro questions why we cannot use a non-physical unicorn or other miscellaneous non-physical object, considering we use a non-physical person (in the form of God). The reason we cannot do this is because a person's ontology transcends their physical properties - the greatness of a person can be considered without considering their physical presence. In contrast, a unicorn, table or banana is ontologically bounded to its physical properties; a unicorn is only a unicorn if it has the form of a horse with a pointed horn - without such properties we would have no grounds to call it a unicorn. Thus a non-physical unicorn is tautological.

Pro goes on to state that his argument that 'just because you can imagine something exists doesn't mean it does exist.' goes undisputed.
The reason I did not deign to respond to it is because it is another straw-man fallacy. It is a gross oversimplification of the ontological argument to state that it is simply a matter of imagining something into existence.

Finally, Pro disputes the premise that we can conceive of God. Yet this is quite an odd sentiment, as the very fact that we are debating God surely entails that we can conceive of him?

Consider the definition of 'conceive':

'to form a notion or idea of' (5)

Note that this does not presuppose a complete idea of the very essence of God, all that is required is some notion or idea of God.

Therefore, both my cosmological and ontological arguments remain sound. This is significant considering their veracity determines the veracity of many of Pro's arguments.

Divine Silence

I can't help thinking that this argument can only be resolved once we agree that my above two arguments are sound. However, I doubt that Pro will do so. As of yet, this argument remains unsound because it depends on the false premise that my two arguments are false.

Best Possible world

Firstly I would add that this argument continues to be unsound for the same reasons as the 'divine silence' argument is.

Pro disputes my criticism that Sam Harris's quote commits the emotional fallacy. He instead invites me to look at the facts instead.
Yet the problem with this is that the reason that one can move from the facts (statistics regarding infant mortality) to the conclusion (that this is not the best possible world), is if one appeals to emotion. This is because we have no logical basis for asserting the properties of the best possible world.

Pro has two options, that we either do or we do not live in the best possible world. Without any prior evidence for or against God's existence, instances of infant mortality would inductively lead us to conclude that the latter is the case. However, we have got prior evidence for God's existence (my two arguments), so using Leibniz's syllogism we can use reason to conclude that it is actually the former that is the case.

Moral Paralysis

There appears to be a misunderstanding of my rebuttal, I do not claim that 'that we need to have actual child rape to persevere the alleged greater good of the concept of child rape'. Let me reiterate in simpler terms:

1. Free will is a greater good.
2. The ability to rape a child is a consequence of free will
Ergo, the ability to rape a child is necessary for a greater good.

This does not mean that we ought to not prevent child rape, but the existence of the intrinsic capability to commit such an act is necessary for the adequately compensating good (free will).

Free Will Defence

Again, Pro does not understand what free will actually entails. As I said before, free will is not a matter of:

1. Person Y wishes X
2. X occurs

One actually has to have the ability to manifest their desires. So it is not free will for a child to simply wish not to be raped and the rape stops. No, free will is more like this:

1. Person Y can do X or Z
2. Y autonomously chooses to do X or Z

So to summarise, free will is only relevant to situations where a decision can be made. A rapist can decide to rape a child, but a child cannot decide to not be raped because the child does not the ability to actualise their desires.

Free will & No Moral Evil?

Pro continues this argument, but gives no reason how it could possibly work. He postulates that people could simply choose not to commit evil acts.

The fault in this argument is this: for what reason would everyone choose to not commit evil?
The only way that God could guarantee that everyone would choose good would be to somehow create them so they could not choose to do anything other than good. Yet this infringes free will.



To conclude, both my arguments remain unrefuted, and, hence or otherwise, Pro's arguments are unsuccessful.

(1) http://cdms.berkeley.edu...
(2) Ibid.
(3) http://en.wikipedia.org...
(4) http://iopscience.iop.org...
(5) http://dictionary.reference.com...
Debate Round No. 4
Illegalcombatant

Pro

I thank Con for their reply.

Cosmological argument

Recall Cons first premise here that states..."P1: All physical entities have contingent existence"

Recall how Con sought to justify this absolute premise from an extrapolation of the 18 particles and their contingency and thus claimed everything physical is contingent.

Consider where Con claims..."The only way that this premise could be refuted by the existence of dark matter is if dark matter is not shown to be contingent."

Let's be clear, it's Cons premise, he/she had the burden to justify it.

Con in light of his 18 particles argument falling apart when confronted with the existence of dark matter and the unknown of what it is made up from and thus can't claim with confidence that everything in the universe is made up of those 18 particles.

As such Con changes track and now claims "norm" of the universe and occams razor to justify this absolute premise. This is back peddling by Con and once again a huge overreach to justify an absolute without exception premise.

Con stills denies the fallacy of composition. Remember my objection here is that Con commits this is an INDIRECT way.

Consider Cons logic here as stated by them with my further details...

P1: All physical entities are contingent (based on and only on what is true of the "parts" of the universe)
P2: The universe (as a whole) is a physical entity
C: The universe (as a whole) is contingent

Con states the premise 1) but wants you to forget exactly how he got that premise in the first place.

The universe (as a whole) did not begin to exist, need not have a cause/be contingent

Con need not defend Kalam, but they do have to defend against the counter argument that applies to their cosmoloigcal argument. Con failed to do so.

Recall how argued and formulated what it means for something to begin to exist as......"X beings to exist if and only if X exists and there was a time prior where X did not exist"

Also recall that I made the point that absent the universe there is no time and thus no "before" when the universe did not exist and thus the universe did not begin to exist.

Also recall where I said..."Con uses scientific evidence which is under pinned by a scientific conception of causation (eg particle physics) to justify their argument. But the scientific conception of causality can't be applied outside of space and time ."

Con did not dispute any of those points.

As such the universe as a whole not needing a cause that is to say it is not contingent. This directly refutes Cons premise that the universe is a contingent entity and thus refutes their cosmological argument which relied on that premise.

Ontological Argument

Definition GCB = Greatest Conceivable Being

In reference to the counter argument I bought up made by Thomas Aquinas Con responds..."Finally, Pro disputes the premise that we can conceive of God. Yet this is quite an odd sentiment, as the very fact that we are debating God surely entails that we can conceive of him?" & "Note that this does not presuppose a complete idea of the very essence of God, all that is required is some notion or idea of God."

I submit such an admission from Con breaks their own argument here. Remember Cons argument was all about going from the GCB that exists in mind as being the one and the same as the one that exists in reality.

A non physical thing has no physical properties to "transcend" in the first place. This applies to God, the non physical unicorn and any other miscellaneous non-physical things. As such this is not a refutation of such a unicorn and as such the argument is still shown absurd.

Notice how Con just asserts what can or can't be non physical. And this is the problem with this kind of defense of this particular ontological argument. Quite simply the game is rigged.....in the GCB favor of course. No matter what counter example you bring to show the absurdity of the argument, eg greatest conceivable unicorn a new rule that exempts GCB can always be made.

You can play this game forever, as such this is another reason to reject this particular ontological argument by Con and how Con has defended it in light of Reductio ad absurdum [1] bought against it.

With all that said my number one objection (but not the only one) from the start has being and still is..."To put it more directly the conception of the greatest conceivable being that exists in both mind and reality is it's self a conception and thus like all conceptions does not necessarily correspond to reality.""

God exists vs God does not exist

Recall the argument here that in light of Gods inaction that occams razor enjoins us to go with the least amount of assumptions, that being God does not exist.

There is no disagreement between Con and myself here concerning the application of occams razor in principle. It just that Con claims their arguments justify the existence of God as a prior, I claim in light of my objections and counters they do not.

Divine Silence

Consider where Con claims..."Without any prior evidence for or against God's existence, instances of infant mortality would inductively lead us to conclude that the latter is the case. However, we have got prior evidence for God's existence "

Works for me, well the first bit. I just don't think you have being able to show a good argument for the existence of God in light of my objections and counters.

Moral Paralysis

I don't think Cons reply works here. I will explain in more detail under the heading God could create a world with free will and no moral evil.

Free will defense

Con claims that free will is both the desire and the ability to actualize that desire. That's fine, I can work with that, cause my argument is still the same.

You have to believe that God (among other things) has given free will to the child rapist (to actualize child rape) but not given free will to the child not to be raped (cause they can't actualize it)

My argument still the same here, logically possible ? sure, plausible.........nah.

It is possible for God to create a world with free will & no moral evil

Consider Cons counter here..."Pro continues this argument, but gives no reason how it could possibly work"

Short answer, cause it has not being shown to be impossible ergo it is possible.

I would also note that Con is in no position to try and argue against this possibility that just because something has not being shown to work it should be rejected as a possibility, not only would that be an argument from ignorance it would be a double standard by Con since their arguments depend on a whole list of certain possibilities which are never shown how to work. (God gives free will, God is the cause/contingency of the universe as a whole, God exists as a non physical person, etc etc)

Cons questions..."The fault in this argument is this: for what reason would everyone choose to not commit evil?"

Because they choose not too, you know with that alleged God given free will.

This also refutes Cons objection that actual child rape is necessary to achieve the greater good of God given free will in reply to the moral paralysis argument. As such the moral paralysis argument still stands.

As such the fact we don't live in such a world absent moral evil (cons words not mine) is more likely cause God (as defined) does not exist.

Closing remarks.

I thank Philocat for participating in this debate and hope if anything the reader is more enlightened and has considered things that they had not thought about before or perhaps in a different way.

I ask to consider the vote going to Pro.

I would remind Con as agreed, there are to be no new arguments in the final round presented.

Sources

[1] http://rationalwiki.org...
Philocat

Con

I will only refute Pro's statements in this final round, as it would be unfair to start new arguments.

Cosmological argument

I admit that I made an oversight by claiming that everything is made up of 18 fundamental particles. I knew that dark matter existed but I forgot to include it in. Just because Con has caught me out on this mistake it does not mean that my initial point is false.

Pointing out that dark matter exists is a red herring. It is like myself claiming that;

'all computer components are inorganic because they are all inorganic hard drives and inorganic monitors'

Of course there are other computer components other than hard drives and monitors, but pointing this out and claiming that;

'inorganic graphics cards are also computer components'

does not refute my initial point that all computer components are inorganic. The only way that this initial point could be refuted is by the postulation of an organic component.

To summarise, I have supported my claim that everything is contingent by showing that dark matter is also contingent. The only way Pro could have refuted my proof of P1 is if he argued that there is sufficient reason to suppose that physical entities that are non-contingent exist. Yet he has not done so.

I would also highlight that this debate is pertaining to the probability of God, so an inductive argument with inductive premises is still sound. Of course I cannot deductively prove that every physical thing is contingent, but I have asserted that it is highly probable that this is the case.

Again, Pro insists I commit the fallacy of composition. Yet I maintain that it is logically impossible for a deductively valid argument to be logically fallacious, as there is no room for a fallacy to hide.
What Pro does here is simply point out that P1 is about parts and P2 is about the whole. Yet discussion of parts and wholes within a logical framework does not entail that the fallacy of composition has been committed. I would have been guilty of using this fallacy if P2 is the conclusion to P1. Yet this is not the case. P1 and P2 are veridically independent; whereas the fallacy of composition requires veridically dependent assertions.

Pro returns to defend his use of the Kalam argument. I do not need to refute it because it remains a straw-man. Yet I will humour the argument to show that the conclusions he draws from it are invalid.

Firstly, he states that:

'X beings to exist if and only if X exists and there was a time prior where X did not exist'

Yet if one considers the definition of 'begin':

'come into being or have its starting point at a certain time' (1)

This does not entail a time prior to X, all it entails is a specific point in time at which X came into being. This time could be t=0.

Hence Pro fails to show that the universe could not have begun to exist.

Pro goes on to claim that my argument rests upon the scientific conception of causation, and hence is invalid because science cannot be applied outside the universe. Yet this claim is not correct, I do not rely on scientific causation but on logical conceptions of causation. Logic transcends physical reality and so it can transcend the universe.

Hence Pro's use of the KCA is both a straw man and invalid.

Ontological argument

Pro opines that I contradict myself because the argument rests upon the conceptual equivalence of the God existing in the mind and the God existing both in the mind and in reality. However, this is not the case because X can exist only in the mind even if that mind cannot know the entire essence of X. For example, if I imagine a ghost then a ghost exists in my mind, I do not need to understand the entire metaphysical essence of the ghost should it exist in reality.

My opponent states that a non-physical being has no physical properties to transcend. I'm not sure what he means by this, as that is the very definition of a non-physical being; that which has no physical properties.
Returning to my original point, a non-physical unicorn is tautological because a unicorn is wholly defined by its physical properties - there are no grounds to call a non-physical unicorn a unicorn at all! Yet a person with a mind is defined by both its physical and metaphysical properties. It is not tautological to postulate a non-physical person. I don't just assert what can and can't be non-physical; logically speaking, anything which has non-physical properties can be non-physical.

Furthermore, qualifying the argument does not render it unsound. The very process of defending an argument includes qualifying the veracity of its premises and logic.

Therefore, the ontological argument remains unrefuted.

GDE/GDNE/Divine Silence

As my cosmological and ontological arguments have shown to remain sound despite numerous attacks by Pro, these three of Pro's arguments are not valid.

Moral Paralysis / Free Will defence

Pro continues to misunderstand what free will actually is. It is not granted on a situational basis upon the merit of the parties. God is not sitting up on a cloud and throwing down doses of free-will.

No, free-will is a concept that gives us autonomy in situations where one can choose what to do. If I can do either X or Y, then free-will allows me to choose X or Y autonomously, yet if I can only do X, I can only choose X because I can do nothing else. Free-will cannot create alternate choices ex nihilio; it only applies to preexisting choices.

So in the example, a child can only choose X (be raped) because X is the only choice. It is the only choice because adults are physically stronger than children. This disparity in strength is not intrinsically bad and can mostly be good so God would not be justified in making everyone equally strong just in order to prevent instances of rape.

Free will & no moral evil?

Pro is hoisted by his own petard here. Literally the line above this argument states:

'My argument still the same here, logically possible ? sure, plausible.........nah.'

Yet three lines below he states:

'cause it has not being shown to be impossible ergo it is possible. '

One minute he denies the significance of proving possibility and the next he claims that it is significant enough to support his whole argument.

Ultimately, it may conceivably be possible that everyone simply chooses to do good, but it is not plausible in the slightest.

I am still at odds with the very possibility that it could be ensured that every single autonomous person throughout all of history does not make the wrong choice. Not ever. Of course it is possible but it is so improbable that it does not pertain to a debate regarding likelihood.

As I have said before, the only way that it could be plausibly ensured that everyone chooses to do good is to implement some mechanism that ensures that this is the case. Yet this would still infringe on free will.

Finally, I would like to highlight that all my arguments are based on plausible principles - it is only at Pro's insistence that they are actually implausible possibilities.

Closing statements

I thank UndeniableReality for such a riveting intellectual debate. He has proved a worthy opponent.

Nevertheless, his rebuttals do not succeed in refuting either my cosmological argument or my ontological argument. Hence prior likelihood of God's existence is established. This prior likelihood renders most of Pro's arguments invalid.
His best argument is the moral paralysis argument, yet I have shown why free-will necessitates the existence of moral evil whilst acknowledging that it is still worthy to prevent its manifestation.




(1) Google: 'Define begin'
Debate Round No. 5
6 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 6 records.
Posted by bluesteel 1 year ago
bluesteel
=====================================================================
>Reported vote: ClashnBoom // Moderator action: Removed<

3 points to Con (arguments), {RFD = Reasons for voting decision: I was convinced by con's arguments.}

[*Reason for removal*] You can't just repeat the point category ("Con had more convincing arguments"). This argument fails to explain *why* Con's arguments were more convincing.
======================================================================
Posted by ClashnBoom 1 year ago
ClashnBoom
My RFD con had a detailed argument I especially like the part about Occam's Razor.
Posted by Maddie98 2 years ago
Maddie98
@maddy_v_r
Wikipedia can be used as a source if it's information correlates with information on other sites you have found. Often teachers don't allow the use of Wikipedia because people can edit the article if they have an account (but often wrong information is corrected), and because it is the easiest source to find. Teachers like to make us dig extensively into research for sources that are not commercial websites so that the information we find has a lower chance of being false. Wikipedia is often a reliable source in some cases though, as long as other information on reliable websites agree with the information that it provides. :)
Posted by lovelyy_roses562 2 years ago
lovelyy_roses562
Why would you use youtube as a source?
Posted by maddy_v_r 2 years ago
maddy_v_r
Why would you use wiki as a source?
Posted by 18Karl 2 years ago
18Karl
You don't on balance factual debates. "1+1=2" Either yes, or no. I think what you mean is that it is more likely that God does not exist
2 votes have been placed for this debate. Showing 1 through 2 records.
Vote Placed by Varrack 1 year ago
Varrack
IllegalcombatantPhilocatTied
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Reasons for voting decision: Excellent debate. Pro centered his case around suffering and divine silence, while Con used the cosmological and ontological arguments as his contention. Con showed that free will is necessary for evil to exist and that natural evil allows for altruistic actions. Pro seemed to drop his divine silence argument w/o elaborating on it after Con's rebuttal. Pro also seemed to misrepresent Con's cosmological case by confusing physical entity contingence with universal contingence. Pro argued that unicorns can be applied to God's position but Con showed how unicorns can be greater thought, while God can't be. Pro used a couple noticeable fallicies which hurt his case some, and Con's rebuttals seemed to sufficiently overturn Pro's objections. While the debate was close, Con had a slight edge which ultimately shone through. Great job to both debaters.
Vote Placed by MrJosh 1 year ago
MrJosh
IllegalcombatantPhilocatTied
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Total points awarded:30 
Reasons for voting decision: PRO easily dismantled all of CON's arguments, and in light of their failure, the "Divine Silence" argument is enough to deny the specific definition of God being debated here.