Kalam Cosmological Argument is a firm argument for the existence of God
Debate Rounds (5)
Look forward to the debate. I will wait for you to explain why the KCA is not strong, and I will respond to your points.
Here let me paste them here:
Overall, this argument is an example of a proof by logic, where philosophers attempt to "demonstrate" god with a logical syllogism alone, devoid of any confirming evidence. Even if the premises were proven true (which has not been done), there would still be the following problems:-
Any pre-existing entity/entities that caused the universe do not have to be personal with a mind and will.
Any cause of the universe does not have to be the god of the Bible. No reason is given why biblical mythology should be taken more seriously than other bronze age mythology.
Let S1 = a state of affairs in which the Universe did not exist, and S2 = a state of affairs in which the Universe did exist.
The theist is trying to claim that the Universe began to exist, that is, there was a state in which there was God, "and then" there was a state in which there was the Universe. In other words, they want to say S1 "and then" S2. In order to do that, they must show that S1 and S2 are distinct. The possibilities are:
The Universe never began to exist
The Universe never existed
S1 and S2 follow each other in time
Some agent in S1 is the atemporal cause of S2
If we can eliminate all four examples, then there is no way to distinguish between the two states. If that is the case, then there is no "beginning" - no state at which the Universe began to exist, thus undermining the conclusion.
If we try to prove by contradiction that the Universe never began to exist, the contradiction becomes evident. By assuming the Universe began to exist, it rules out (1). The Universe exists, so that rules out (2). (3) is disproven by the fact that time is a property of the Universe, and therefore can't be applied outside of the Universe. (4) can't be true because Craig defines "atemporal causation" as follows:
To borrow an illustration from Kant, a heavy ball"s resting on a cushion is the cause of a depression in the cushion, even if the ball has been resting on the cushion from eternity past.
However, this cannot be used to distinguish between S1 and S2 because it requires cause and effect to be simultaneous. S1 and S2 cannot be simultaneous, as the Universe would exist at the same instant that it doesn't exist - a contradiction. By assuming that the Universe began to exist, we have ruled out all explanations for how it could have begun to exist. Thus, we cannot distinguish at the moment between S1 and S2 - undermining their conclusion.
There's nothing in the laws of physics which demands that the law of cause and effect be more than generalizations for interacting with the world above the quantum level.
Within quantum mechanics there seems to be real counter examples to the first premise of the argument. "Everything that begins to exist has a cause." For example, when Carbon-14 decays to Carbon-12 the radioactive decay is a perfectly random causeless event and thus though the Carbon-12 began to exist it wasn't caused to exist. Likewise, when matter and antimatter (particle-antiparticle formations) such as electron-positron creation, they can be said to have started to exist but not to have been caused to exist. While radioactive decay of particle-antiparticle formation can be predicted and serves a function, such as stabilizing the atom and equaling out the energies from two-photon interactions, there is no reason why such a thing should happen at those specific space and time coordinates. The underlying probabilities can be calculated and are extremely accurate, but alien from the classical sense of cause and effect.
Further, similar quantum considerations could have direct analogies to the Big Bang which might be causeless as well. Resolving other issues like the atemporal causality seen above as quantum phenomenon does force us to consider simultaneous instances of X and ~X, for example where X is "Schrodinger's cat is dead". Ignoring this speculative cosmology, the counter example suffices to disprove the premise (things can begin to exist without being caused) and thus demonstrate that the argument is unsound.
In Dan Barker's article Cosmological Kalamity, he writes
The curious clause "everything that begins to exist" implies that reality can be divided into two sets: items that begin to exist (BE), and those that do not (NBE). In order for this cosmological argument to work, NBE (if such a set is meaningful) cannot be empty, but more important, it must accommodate more than one item to avoid being simply a synonym for God. If God is the only object allowed in NBE, then BE is merely a mask for the Creator, and the premise "everything that begins to exist has a cause" is equivalent to "everything except God has a cause." As with the earlier failures, this puts God into the definition of the premise of the argument that is supposed to prove God"s existence, and we are back to begging the question.
In other words, the set of items that do not begin to exist must be pluralized - otherwise it is just another word for God.
I pasted this from: http://wiki.ironchariots.org... . There are more below it hthat I'd like you to address. I couldn't paste those because they were too long.
For reference, here is the Kalam Cosmological Argument.
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause
I will respond to the objections in order.
WHY A PERSONAL BEING?
Well we know that the cause of the universe is a personal being through the laws of deduction. This is because the cause of the universe has to be an uncaused, timeless (and therefore changeless), immaterial, and changeless. The only two possibilities that fit this criteria are either abstract objects, or an unembodied mind or conscience. And because abstract objects cannot cause anything, the cause of the universe has to be an unembodied mind - which by definition has to be personal.
WHY THE GOD OF THE BIBLE?
The simple fact here is that the Kalam Cosmological Argument doesn't even ATTEMPT to prove the God of the Bible!
Rather, it comes to the conclusion of a monotheistic religion - i.e Christianity, Islam or Judaism. To prove the God of the Bible would require other (such as the Historical) arguments.
I really do not get this objection, and I would appreciate it if pro would elaborate on it.
So the main objection here is to do with quantum mechanics. But there is a big issue here.
The objection he has to the first premise is that the laws of cause and effect do not apply quantum mechanics And therefore not everything has a cause.
However, I think the objector will find that when scientists say that quantum events are 'uncaused', That is not at all what they mean. After all, it is absolutely logically impossible for ANYTHING to exist with no previous cause. Rather, the cause is defined as a non-material cause. These so called uncaused events are usually due to Fluctuations in the quantum vacuum which is NOT nothing! As for the fluctuations themselves, they will have come into existence at the time of the beginning of the universe (so the cause of the fluctuations will have been they cause of the universe). The cause of these quantum events have a cause and so nothing has been achieved by bringing uncaused quantum events into the argument.
In the case of radioactive decay, it is actually caused by these fluctuations. Even so, Carbon-12 is made of the same particles as Carbon-14 and so nothing has really 'come into existence' - 2 neutrons have decayed from C-14 to form C-12. Not to mention the decay is actually very constant over time, which is how Carbon-dating is calculated.
To give an analogy, If someone chopped my arm off, nothing new will have come into existence!
But for the sake of argument, Let's say we grant the objection. Still, it would nevertheless be worthless, as we could then re-arrange the KCA to state the following:
1) If the universe began to exist, then the universe has a cause of its beginning. (established before)
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause of its beginning
This argument does not include quantum events and so the so called 'uncaused' quantum events are redundant.
To address Dan Barker's argument, I will refer you directly to William Lane Craig's response, from http://www.reasonablefaith.org...
If this really is Barker"s argument, then he needs to go back to the drawing board. The first premiss of the kalam cosmological argument is
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
The statement you quote doesn"t say anything about the requirement that things that begin to exist need to have a cause. So the statements aren"t synonymous. If you substitute Barker"s (alleged ) premiss for (1), then the kalam cosmological argument becomes patently invalid. For from Barker"s premiss and
2. The universe began to exist.
it wouldn"t follow that
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
So it"s obvious that the proposed substitute has a different meaning than (1).
In fact, Barker"s (alleged) premiss is just an application of the Law of Excluded Middle: (A or not-A). Everything either has a beginning or does not have a beginning. How could this logically necessary truth be question-begging? I suppose it could be if you were trying to prove the Law itself, but that is obviously not the aim.
Now as for the claim that if God is the sole member of the class of things that don"t begin to exist, then "everything that doesn"t begin to exist" becomes synonymous with "God," this is just a confusion of meaning and reference. If God is the only member of the class of beginningless things, than the two expressions have the same referent, that is to say, they pick out the same object. But that in no way shows that the two expressions have the same meaning. If they did, then in knowing one statement to be true, you would know the other to be true as well, which is obviously not the case.
Finally, it seems to me that (pseudo-)Barker is taking his substitute premiss to be an existential statement. He seems to think that it commits us to the existence of beings that begin to exist and to God, which, he thinks, begs the question of God"s existence. This is to fail to understand his own premiss. The "there are" at most commits us to the existence of classes (or as he puts it, categories). But the class of things that are beginningless could be empty. So there"s no commitment to God"s existence. In any case, if there were such a commitment, adding another member to that class wouldn"t make the premiss any less question-begging, since you"d still be presupposing God"s existence.
I think the "there are" in his premiss is just a rhetorical device. The premiss should be understood as the claim that "Everything either has a beginning or it does not." That is what is called a universally quantified statement, and as such it makes no existential commitments.
If there are more objections I would appreciate it if Pro laid them out in the next round
Kalam also equivocates on the first premise when it refers to everything that "begins to exist". Presumably this premise is referring to everything around us on this planet--everything in your house, everything on the streets, everything we see in the cosmos. However all of these things did not "begin to exist" in the same sense theists are claiming the universe "began to exist" (creation ex nihilo). According to the laws of thermodynamics, matter can neither be created nor destroyed, and everything we are familiar with is a actually reconfiguration of preexisting matter than has been around for billions of years. The atoms that comprise people, places, and planets do not "come into existence" in the same sense Kalam is claiming the universe came into existence (matter appearing from a previous state of non-being/non-existence). Rather they have always existed in some form, and the objects we see around us are merely the latest rearrangements of those atoms. So in speaking of the universe requiring a "cause" for it's existence, Kalam is not referring to it as you would an automobile, which is being "caused" by a group of laborers rearranging physical matter into the form of a car, or mountains being "caused" by the shifting of tectonic plates (also made of atoms which have been around since the big bang), but of something being caused by creation ex nihilo, which is not at all the type of creation we are familiar with in every other circumstance. Kalam therefore is using a word game and the fallacy of equivocation on the phrase "begins to exist" to try and draw a parallel between wildly different things.
In summary: Kalam proponents believe God made the universe exist ex nihilo. But everything around us only "begins to exist" in a trivial sense, as rearrangements of preexisting, uncreated stuff. Since the universe is literally the only example of something truly "beginning to exist" from a previous state of nothingness, this means there is a sample set of one in this category, leaving no inductive support for the premise that "whatever begins to exist (ex nihilo) has a cause".
Once the argument is reformulated to take into account the hidden premises, it looks like this:
1. Every rearrangement of pre-existing matter has a cause. (supported by every observation, ever.)
2. The universe began to exist from absolute nonexistence, NOT from a rearrangement of pre-existing matter.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.
In other words:
1. Every X has a cause.
2. The universe Y.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.
As you can see, once the equivocation is made plain, the argument is invalid.
Additionally, while the term "universe" is commonly understood to mean "the sum of everything that exists," Kalam represents an attempt to establish the existence of something outside the universe. This is conceivable only in the case of a non-standard definition (which presumably involves some kind of distinction between a physical universe and some other realm external to it). In this case, the first premise becomes even more tenuous; how can one assert that everything that begins to exist has a cause when one believes in the existence of a realm outside of our universe with properties unlike anything we can discover through mere observation? A commonsense version of causality is not applicable here...meaning we now have a problem defining "cause" in this context!
There is a further type of equivocation on the phrase "begins to exist". Premise 1 refers to things that begin to exist within time. In other words, there was a time when a thing did not exist, followed by a time when it existed. This is not the case with the universe, since time is part of the universe. The universe is a finite age (13.8 billion years), and because time did not come into existence until after the inflation began, there is literally NO TIME at which the universe did not exist. It has existed at every point in time. Rephrasing the argument to accurately include this information, we get something like this:
Let X = "a thing which began to exist a finite time ago after a point when it did not exist"
Let Y = "a thing which has existed for a finite time, but which exists at every point in time"
1. Everything that is X has a cause for it's existence.
2. The Universe is Y.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause for it's existence.
Once again, equivocation is at play. Premise 1 and 2 are comparing apples and oranges. The universe has existed at every moment in time and did not begin to exist in the same way that every object in P1 began to exist, so the argument is invalid.
The kalam argument seems to have been worded specifically to address the refutation of the cosmological argument, as it made the qualification that only things that begin have causes. The kalam arguer will simply state that God didn't begin, and so no regress occurs and no Creator of God is necessary.
However, this is a form of special pleading on the part of the theist. As Richard Dawkins put it, the cosmological argument makes "the entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress." Whether we qualify the first premise to exclude non-beginning things (as the kalam argument does) or not (as the cosmological does), the essential question is why it is more logically defensible to claim that for the rule that everything must have a cause, an exception is made for God but not for the natural universe as a whole? Why does god not begin? It appears to be a wholly arbitrary choice.
If God not having a beginning is not a problem for Craig and other defenders of this argument, why is it a problem for the natural universe? To answer this, we must look at a further problem. This problem concerns the definition of god used in both arguments. A theologian might reply this counter argument and insist that the decision is not arbitrary, and that god must be allowed to have these attributes that the kalam argument seems to imply. He may say that the argument is an attempt to show the need for there to be a God that has the attributes that we cannot find in the universe. He might say that because we know that everything in the universe needs a cause and that the idea of infinite time is nonsense, there must be this being with these unique attributes. That is, there must be this being that does not begin, has no creator, and is thus able to create the universe. But this is just a bald assertion. The lack of human imagination when it comes to solving mysteries at the boundaries of current knowledge is not a good reason to invoke a hypothetical entity with mysterious powers that enable it to be immune from paradoxes.
The God hypothesis is not only unnecessary, it is not parsimonious. In order to explain something apparently designed and which cannot create itself, a being is conjured into existence which would require even more unlikely explanation.
The kalam argument attempts to circumvent the problem of infinite regress but steps right into the problem of special pleading so is no better off.
"Rather they have always existed in some form, and the objects we see around us are merely the latest rearrangements of those atoms"
This must be my favorite bad-objection, as it is simply obscene. Are you saying that I existed before I was conceived? If so, where was I and why don't I know about it? Where was I in the 1400's?
Just because the stuff that a thing is made of has always existed, DOES NOT MEAN the thing itself has always existed. Moreover, in order to assert this, you must also assert 'Mereological Nihilism' - that is, there are no 'composite objects', and everything that exists does not exist in itself - but just fundamental particles arranged in particular ways to make a form of the object. So what the Mereological Nihilist is asserting is that there really are no tables, or palm trees, or fish, or people. And this is simply absurd, as what the objector is actually asserting is that he himself doesn't actually exist. So why should we trust him when he says anything? Why should we even respond if he does not exist? If he is just a re-arrangement of matter?
But the real point is that even if we grant the objector the argument, these things need a cause to even be in existence. So the underlining problem for the objector is that everything that exists within the universe (ie matter) was not around before the universe existed (considering the universe is finite), and therefore will need a cause and so he has not escaped the premise 'whatever begins to exist has a cause'
The objector then 'reformulates' the Kalam to include their objection. But the correct reformulation would be this:
1) If fundamental particals arranged universe-wise begin to exist, they have a cause.
-this is established by the finite universe
2) The fundamental particals arranged universe-wise began to exist
3) Therefore the fundamental particals arranged universe-wise have a cause
At which point, the rest of the Kalam would Follow.
He also seems to assert that premise 1 applies to everything inside of the universe but not outside of it. Again, I refer to my new premises. Everything that the universe is composed of began to exist. Therefore they had a cause. And because the cause CANNOT exist inside of the universe, it HAS to exist OUTSIDE of the universe. This uses the laws of deduction, and so I'm not sure what is trying to be achieved here.
The second objection here is a strange one, which doesn't really achieve anything. If Con could rephrase this argument, it would be easier to respond to, because it is simply terrible, and seems to show a grave misunderstanding of theology.
Am I right in saying that the objection here is that because there was no 'time' before the universe existed, therefore the universe does not have a cause? Because the universe would still begin to exist.
This seems to be the old 'contingent vs necessary' dilemma. Put simply, by definition God must be necessary. We can bring in the Ontological argument for this.
I have to say that I am surprised at the weakness of these arguments; they all seem to be severely misguided in terms of Philosophy, Science and Theology.
Additionally, i think that there is a very wrong assumption in some of these arguments - that the Kalam is somehow trying to 'prove' Christianity. But this is severely misguided - the Kalam seeks to do nothing of the sort! Rather, it proves that the universe must have a cause, and that cause is an unembodied mind or conscience. Nothing else.
Remember that pretty much all of these 'objections' have been answered already by the pioneer of this argument, Dr William Lane Craig; and can be found at http://www.reasonablefaith.org...
In the construction of a house, there may be twenty people involved. There may be a large amount and wide variety of materials. There must be an appropriate location, and a diverse set of conditions that allowed the entire process to take place. Yet, the first premise would have us believe that all of this comprises just one "cause." This fails even on the most basic intuitive level, and even when it involves an object with which we are intimately familiar. Discussing something as foreign to our intuitions as the beginning of time would seem to compound the problem further.
However, even if we grant that each "thing" in the universe has exactly one cause, and that postulating an uncaused cause is sufficient to explain the origin of all things, it still would not follow that there could be only one uncaused cause. There could be several such influences working in concert, as polytheists would have us believe. There could be millions of uncaused causes that began separately but whose creations have since intermingled to form the universe we have now. In short, it isn't clear why anyone should suggest "a cause" rather than an unknown number of them - unless, of course, one's goal is to support an ideology that claims a singular creator for other reasons.
Fallacy of Composition
In the first premise, Craig declares "everything that begins requires a cause," and goes on to place the universe at the same logical level as its contents.
In an article titled Cosmological Kalamity, Dan Barker writes:
The first premise refers to every "thing," and the second premise treats the "universe as if it were a member of the set of "things." But since a set should not be considered a member of itself, the cosmological argument is comparing apples and oranges.
See Russell's paradox for issues that arise from allowing a set to be a member of itself. Also see the Fallacy of composition for issues with properties of all of the parts being true for the whole. Describing the way physical objects within the universe behave relies on induction and physical laws, neither of which apply in the absence of a spacetime universe. Everything we are familiar with is an object within a set (the universe). It is a fallacy of composition to assert that the properties of things we are familiar with (objects within the set) are also properties of the set as a whole (the universe). Example: "Each part of an airplane has the property of being unable to fly. Therefore the airplane has the property of being unable to fly." The conclusion doesn't follow because the only way to determine whether the airplane has the property of being able to fly or not would be to get outside the plane (set) and then make observations. Unfortunately we are stuck inside the universe, so any conclusions we can draw about individual components of the universe (within the set) do not necessarily apply to the set as a whole.
The Cosmological argument does not prove that the cause was a supernatural cause, rather than a natural one. More nature (and natural processes) plausibly exist beyond our current ability to perceive.
See also: Which god?
Although some other variation of the Kalām argument or Cosmological argument may be internally consistent even if all the terms given are agreed upon by all parties concerned, the argument actually makes no effort to demonstrate anything tangible in nature regarding the manifestation of a God. An example analogous to the Kalām argument would be a geometry proof on some type of polygon. Even though the entire table of proofs is totally internally consistent, it does not demonstrate that the actual polygon exists in nature. An exhaustive effort to prove all the angles of a triangle will always add up to 180 degrees says nothing about whether or not triangles exist.
Even if you accept Kalām, it does not distinguish between a timeless multiverse, a timeless deity, or any other timeless process that might give rise to a universe.
Again, I will refer you to Dr Craig's response, from http://www.reasonablefaith.org...
"I must confess that I've never felt the force of this objection. It reminds me of the objection to the teleological argument that it only proves a Designer of the cosmos and not necessarily a Creator. If people really thought there were a Designer of the universe, they would be wide-eyed and open-mouthed at the prospect, not complaining that he might not also be its Creator. Similarly, in this case to complain that we don't know on the basis of the kalam cosmological argument whether the personal Creator of the universe is unique or not seems an utter triviality in comparison to what the argument does prove. Someone who is looking for truth will find here, not a shortcoming of the argument, but an incentive for further inquiry.
If one could prove that the cause of the universe's origin is omnipotent, then I think that one could successfully run an argument for the uniqueness of the cause on the grounds that a plurality of omnipotent beings is impossible. But it's not clear to me that a cause of the universe must be omnipotent. Perhaps there is an argument here from "creatio ex nihilo" Duns Scotus argued that since there is an infinite distance between being and non-being, it would require infinite power to create the universe from nothing. He could argue that it is not possible to have greater power than the power to create ex nihilo. I find this argument appealing but am not entirely convinced. So this is an area for further exploration.
The kalam argument is clearly not consistent with there being a group of deities cavorting with one another prior to the world's creation, since the argument takes us back to a changeless state which is, I think, timeless. To imagine a group of timeless, unembodied minds somehow acting wholly in concert to create the world brings one awfully close to the doctrine of the Trinity. A Trinitarian (or Unitarian) concept of God seems much more plausible than polytheism's many gods all independently existing timelessly and acting in concert to create the universe.
That being said, it seems to me that the proponent of the kalam argument will justifiably appeal to Ockham's Razor: one should not multiply causes beyond necessity. One is justified in positing only such causes as are necessary to explain the effect. In the case of the universe's origin, only one ultra-mundane Personal Creator is needed, so it would be gratuitous to postulate more.
Beyond that, one should remember that ours is a cumulative case for theism, and the uniqueness of God is given by other arguments in one's case, such as the Leibnizian argument from contingency, the moral argument, and the ontological argument. Moreover, we have good grounds for believing Jesus of Nazareth's radical claim to be the decisive revelation of God, and Jesus taught monotheism: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one.""
In summary, the KCA argues for an omnipotent creator of the universe which by definition is only one being. It also falls under Occam's Razor, where only one creator is necessary and any more is gratuitous.
FALLACY OF COMPOSITION?
The Fallacy of Composition is the fallacy of reasoning that because every part of a 'thing' has a certain property, therefore the whole 'thing' has that same property.
So you can understand my skepticism with this. The Kalam Cosmological argument AT NO POINT argues that because everything inside the universe has a cause, therefore the universe has a cause. Obviously that would be entirely fallacious! But the simple fact is, the KCA doesn't even argue this.
Here are the reasons why we believe the first premise:
1) Something cannot come from nothing.
2) If something can come from nothing, then it becomes inexplicable why everything and anything comes into being from nothing.
3) Common experience and scientific evidence confirm premise 1. This is always verified and never falsified, and an appeal to INDUCTIVE reasoning.
So I think we can conclude that this is a straw-man point, and at no point do we, in the KCA, committ the fallacy of composition.
Well what can I say, this is just a terrible point.
At the end of the Kalam Cosmological Argument, we state that there can only be two possible causes of the universe - abstract objects and an unembodied mind or conscience. Remember why? It can only be these two because this cause, bringing both time and space into existence, has to be TIMELESS, IMMATERIAL and CHANGELESS. By definition, Nature (Defined as 'The Phenomina of the Physical World Collectively) is NONE OF THESE THINGS! So how can it cause the universe?! This is elementary!
Again, the Kalam has no intention of trying to prove 'Which God'. It merely gives a number of qualities - timelessness, immateriality and changelessness. This is due to the laws of deduction.
In other words, the KCA establishes a form of monotheism, and seeks to do nothing else.
In summary, I hope you have realised that all of these objections are filled to the brim with elementary errors. None of them achieve anything whatsoever in terms of challenging the KCA.
If you need any further clarification, I'll refer you again to http://www.reasonablefaith.org...
There are two fundamental points which are wrong here: "The theist is trying to claim that the Universe began to exist, that is, there was a state in which there was God, "and then" there was a state in which there was the Universe"
However, many theists adhere to a simultaneous creation; (formulated in the 12-13 century) that is, God and his creation existed simultaneously with each other.
Then, in an attempt to discredit this,it says 'The Universe would exist at the same instant that it doesn't exist - a contradiction'.
Really? So are they saying simultaneous causal relations are impossible? Why can't the cause and effect exist at the same time in an asymmetric dependency relation? Let me give an analogy from Dr. Craig: For example, a heavy chandelier hanging on a chain from the ceiling. The ceiling and chain hold up the chandelier; the chandelier and chain don't support the ceiling!
In addition, why couldn't one timeless entity - say, a number - depend timelessly for its existence on another timeless entity. Why is that impossible? Why couldn't God timelessly sustain a number in existence? That would clearly be an asymmetric causal relation. Why is that impossible?
There also seems to be a fundamental flaw in this argument - In the end, all causation is simultaneous. Imagine A is the cause, and B is the effect. If A were to vanish before the time at which B is produced, would B nevertheless come into being? Surely not! But if time is continuous, then no matter how close to B's appearance A's disappearance takes place, there will always be an interval of time between A's disappearance and B's appearance. But then why or how B came into being when it does seems utterly mysterious, for there is no cause at that moment to produce it.
So as you can see, this is a very bad argument and to assert it would be to assert that NOTHING can cause ANYTHING.
Overall I hope I have commicated to you the absurdity of these arguments. Because it is blatantly obvious that no-one in their sane mind can deny premise 1 - that 'everything that begins to exist has a cause'. The fundamental rule in Metaphysics is 'Out of nothing, nothing comes'. And it is equally obvious that no-one can deny premise 2 - that 'the universe began to exist', - an infinite universe is absurd and to assert otherwise would go against both philosophical and scientific laws. So the conclusion logically follows.
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