The Instigator
Moelogy
Pro (for)
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The Contender
sengejuri
Con (against)
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Kalam argument is sound

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Voting Style: Open Point System: 7 Point
Started: 11/1/2017 Category: Philosophy
Updated: 2 months ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 509 times Debate No: 104720
Debate Rounds (5)
Comments (18)
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Moelogy

Pro

Resolution: Kalam Cosmological argument is sound.

Rules :
-no trolling
-no forfeits
-no semantics (tweaking definitions in the dictionary)

Rounds :
Round one - acceptance
R2) arguments
R3) Rebuttals
R4) Rebuttals
R5) Rebuttals

Definitions:

God : The necessary immaterial, spaceless, timeless and personal cause of the universe.

Universe : The contingent natural world

BOP : Pro

Notes:

1- This argument is completly compatible with both A and B theory of time since the differences between the two theories of time is purely in semantics and not in ontology. The differences between the two theories is how the describe a sequence of events. Under A theory, the events are described as in "the past" or "the present" or "future" relative to a particular observer or concious mind. While under B theory of time, the events are described as chronologically prior or posterior to other events. This does not affect the Kalam argument since all the argument must succeed in doing to be valid is established the finitude of the past (A theory) or that there is a finite sequence of events prior to today and that the events prior to this current event did not extend back chronologically forever and did have a beginning. Even Mctaggart, the godfather of the B theory of time, acknowledged that the difference is purely semantical and is in the description of the same concept. [1] Take for example, it rained in the past or yesterday (A theory) and It rained on October 28 (B theory). Both of these allude and describe the exact same event and the same concept and they have the exact same implications but they differ in how the event is described.

2- Cantor and set theory will not save you. Since Cantor dealt with Potential infinity, something which is not infinite now but in the process of becoming infinite, like counting numbers from one upwards, it is not actually infinite but is it is in the process of becoming infinite which is exactly what set theory is about. However, the history of the universe would be an actual infinite since it would be complete and infinite in the past now. It is not becoming infinite anymore. It is actually infinite and has a history of infinite events prior to the current moment.

[1] - (https://en.wikipedia.org...)
sengejuri

Con

I accept. Good luck!
Debate Round No. 1
Moelogy

Pro

Premise 1: Whatever begins to exist has a cause

Something can not come from nothing

Something can not come from nothing has been one of the first principles of metaphysics for centuries although it did go under the name of ex nihilo, nihil fit in the earlier days of philosophy. It has been argumentatively confirmed by nearly all philosophers from Descartes who proved a variant of this which he called "Nothing comes from nothing" [1] and even the most staunch atheist of all philosophers like David Hume have confirmed this principle in his quote: "But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that that anything might arise without a cause: I only maintain'd, that our Certainty of the Falsehood of that Proposition proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source." [2] It is fairly obvious why this principle has been defended by atheists and theists alike since to deny this principle would be to give up exploring serious metaphysics and would be worse than magic. Whoever denies this principle is frankly no better than 3-year-olds who think that rabbits do pop into existence from the inside of the magician's hat.



Principle of sufficient reason

R03;There are two other metaphysical principles that directly support the first premise namely the metaphysical principle of causation [3]and the principle of sufficient reason. I have decided to place the two together since they argue for the same thing. I have found that the principle of sufficient reason could be argued for more concisely and more interestingly. The principle of sufficient reason is a metaphysical principle that stipulates that everything must have a reason or cause. [4] The powerful element behind this principle is that atheists can not rationally deny it because if they deny it, they would have to propose some sort of reason of why they think that the principle is false which is exactly what the Principle of sufficient reasoning proposes so it would be the height of irrationality to deny the PSR yet admit that the PSR is true and use it in order to argue against the PSR. Such an action would be to assume that the PSR is true (when providing some reason why they think something, like the PSR, is false) and at the same time false (if the atheists deny the PSR) which violates the law of non-contradiction.

The circle would look something like this. [5]




Reductio ad absurdum


Let's assume that the proposition "Whatever begins to exist has a cause" is wrong and that "Whatever begins to exist does not have a cause" is true and that things can just begin to exist uncaused. We can already see the absurdity here because things do not just pop into existence without a cause. If the negation of the first premise was true and that things can pop into existence without a cause then why do not bikes, cars, houses, tables, paper or humans pop into existence from non-existence uncaused as we speak? Nowhere does this happen. Bikes, cars and humans do not pop into being from non-existence uncaused in private or in public.

Therefore it should be rather obvious that denying the first premise would lead to absurdities that we do not observe and since the negation of the first premise is certainly false then by the law of the excluded middle, the first premise must be true.

Some skeptics will counter this by saying that in quantum mechanics things do begin to exist uncaused as Lawrence Krauss argues but the problem is that the two examples that the skeptics provide not only do they have some sort of cause but they have at least 2 out 4 causes that Aristotle proposed.

The first example would be radioactive decay but that event has both a material cause (atom) and an efficient cause (unstable nuclei). [6]

The second example, namely, virtual particles have a material cause (Qunatum vacuum energy or zero-point energy) and an efficient cause (Quantum vacuum fluctuations). [7]

Also, another possible objection from skeptics would be that causality does not apply outside the universe but that would the taxicab fallacy. [8] Moreover, Causation is a metaphysical principle that governs all of reality whether natural or supernatural, not just a physical principle like gravity. [3]



Premise 2: The universe began to exist

By began to exist, I mean that the universe has a finite past. First let's make a distinction between potential infinites and actual infinites. Potential infinites are infinites that are forever approached but never achieved like counting numbers endlessly (you will never reach infinity, but you are approcahing it forevermore). An actual infinite is a set that is complete and actually has an infinite members right now as we speak. If the universe did not begin to exist, then the past would be infinite ... Actually infinite for that matter because before let's say November 5th, an actual infinite number of past-moments would have elapsed right now as we speak.


Actual infinites can not be formed by successive additions



P1) An actual infinite can not be formed by successive addition
P2) The past was formed by successive addition
Conclusion (1 and 2): The past can not be actually infinite

Premise 1 is true because there are no two finite numbers that you can add together and reach an infinite number. The sum of any two finite numbers is always another finite number. Imagine a bucket, no matter how many grains of sand you keep successively adding, the number of sand grains in the bucket will always be finite. However, if my opponent proposes that if you keep going froever then the grains of sands will form an infinite, my reponse would be that the grains of sands in the bucket would be a potential infinite that is forever approaching the ideal of an infinite number of sand grains but never actually forms an infinite set thus it would still be not completely and actually infinite as we speak but would be merely approaching infinity and would be still finite.

Premise 2 is true because no matter what ontology of time you adopt, time is formed by successive additions of events and moments that have elapsed one after the other. The past would be formed by the successive addition of past events overtime.

Actual infinites can not be traversed

If the past is infinite then prior to let's say "Nov. 5th", there was an infinite past to traverse in order to get to today. However, this would mean that it took an infinite amount of time to get to today. But that would mean that it would take the universe literally forever to reach today and that it would never reach today due to being stuck in infinity. Suppose a train had to run thorugh a railway of infinite length before it can reach its destination. The train would literally be stuck in infinity and would never reach its destination since he is "stuck" in eternity. Now a second analogy might be given by imagining telling somebody that you will have to jump in a pot of inifnite length in order to reach the bottom. Would you ever reach the bottom? No. You would be stuck in infinity trying to get there and would never get there. But we did get to today. Thus, the past is infinite and is finite.

Scythe revenge

Alexander Pruss formed a thought experiement to disprove an infinite past. Suppose that time had no beginning and that during each hour in the past, a grim reaper (GR) was created and set to kill you at 12pm + 1/n minutes, where 'n' is the number of the reaper.. If you are alive when a GR goes off, it will kill you instantly, but if you are already dead, it will do nothing. With this set up, there is no first GR because each GR has a GR before it. It follows that no GR can kill you because a GR would have done so first, yet you can't survive a moment past noon because GR1 would have killed you no matter what. If the past is beginningless, then the GR scenario would be possible, but since it's not possible, the past must have a beginning.

Possible objection: Zeno's paradox vs traversing an infinite

The problem with proposing Zeno's paradox as a counterargument to traversing an infinite is the fact that it is setting up apples and oranges scenario where zeno's paradox deals with the finite and the argument deals with the infinite.

Take the distance between the two walls of my room which is two meters. They can be divided into 2 (1 meters) then the second one meter can be divided into 2 half meters then the second half meter can be divided into 2 quarters and so on. [9] Now suppose, I was to cross the distance between the walls of my room, did I just traverse an infinite? Of course not. I have just traversed 2 meters (My room is not actually two meters for the readers). All Zeno's paradox shows is that you can divide a finite into a potentially infinite amount of times. Here is another example, suppose I take an apple and divide it the way I divided my room and then I proceed to eat the apple, did I just eat an infinite apple? Of course not. The problem with Zeno's paradox is that it results in a finite number of 2 [10] while if the past is infinite, it would not be finite but would be infinite by definition.

Conclusion:


Since the cause of the beginning of the nature and the universe can not also be the nature and the universe since that would be circular reasoning and would be no better from "My mother gave birth to herself", the cause of the beginning of the nature and the universe must be independent of them and outside of them meaning it would be supernatural.

Since the cause is indepnedent of the universe and its dimensions, meaning it would be spaceless and timeless and immaterial and non-physical.

There are only two types of supernatural (independent of nature), timeless, spaceless and immaterial causes which would be either a mind or an abstract object but since abstract objects like the number 7 do not cause anything then the cause must by abductive reasoning be a mind.

So in conclusion, the cause of the beginning of the universe is a supernatural, speaceless, timeless, immaterial and non-physical mind.
sengejuri

Con

Of note, Pro never clearly defined the version of the Kalam argument they are defending. But from their opening argument, I infer it to be:

P1: Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
P2: The universe began to exist.
C: Therefore, the universe has a cause which is necessarily spaceless, timeless, immaterial, and non-physical.

To show this argument is unsound, I must either attack its form, premises, or conclusion. I intend to show that P1 and P2 depend on unwarranted assumptions, and therefore the conclusion does not necessarily follow the premises, thus rendering the argument's form flawed.

== Argument ==

1. We cannot assume everything that begins to exist has a cause when discussing the universe. True, we seem to observe that everything WITHIN the natural order has a cause, but we are not justified in jumping to apply that observation to the natural order as a whole. That would be a Composition Fallacy, i.e., assuming what is true of the parts is also true of the whole. For example, it is wrong to infer that because all atoms are non-living, everything made of atoms is also non-living. Same for the universe - it is wrong to assume that because everything within the universe needs a cause, so too does the universe as a whole.

2. Pro has no basis for declaring "whatever begins to exist has a cause" as a metaphysical absolute. Yes, our observations seem to confirm that's true (at least, within the natural order.... see above), but if that's all we need to declare an absolute truth then we can also find other universal observations that contradict the Kalam argument. For example:

a) Material things are only caused by other material things (therefore, a cause cannot be immaterial)

b) Nothing is ever caused by an entity that is not, itself, within time (therefore, a cause cannot be timeless)

c) All minds are physically embodied (therefore, a mind cannot be non-physical)

Any one of these examples, arrived at through the very same method Pro uses to derive P1, refutes Pro's conclusion that the universe's cause is an immaterial, timeless, non-physical mind. So, either Pro's conclusion does not follow the premises, in which case the argument form is flawed, or Pro is committing a Special Pleading fallacy by favoring one metaphysical absolute over others that are equally valid.

3. P2 is self-refuting given the Kalam argument's conclusion of a timeless cause. The universe cannot begin to exist if time itself didn't exist before the universe (i.e., Pro's "timeless cause"). This sounds merely semantic, but let me explain:

The word "begin" is temporal by nature. Something can only begin to exist if there was a TIME where it didn't exist. It can be expressed thus: 1) X began to exist, if and only if X exists now and there was a time in the past where X did not exist. 2) There has never been a time in the past where the universe did not exist (because time itself began with the universe). 3) Therefore the universe did not "begin" to exist. P2 is linguistically meaningless unless Pro assumes there was a time before the universe existed which therefore allows the universe to "begin." But that is the very thing Pro is trying to disprove by concluding the universe's cause must be timeless. Therefore, P2 is self-refuting.

4. B Theory Time. Pro gave an incorrect characterization of B Theory time in Round 1. It certainly is a matter of ontology. B Theory time states that time doesn't actually exist - the passage of time is merely an illusion of human consciousness. Rather we live in a 4-dimensional universe of what Minkowski called "spacetime." In spacetime, moments do not pass from past to present to future, where the past is gone, the present is real, and the future is yet to come. Rather, all moments are equally real and exist simultaneously. The "present" is purely relative. For people living in 1850, they are the present and we are the future. For us, they are the past and we are the present. Time is not, therefore, a sequence of historical events but rather various points within the dimension of spacetime, like slices within a loaf of bread - no slice came "before" another slice, they all exist simultaneously within the loaf. In such a model, it is possible for the universe to exist without a cause because causes are impossible if there is no real passage of time.

This sounds like science fiction but it's not. It is actually extremely consistent with Einstein's proven and widely accepted Theory of Special and General Relativity. We know through tireless scientific testing that the speed of light is constant [1]. Therefore, as objects travel closer to the speed of light, given that speed = distance/time, time therefore passes slower relative to an observer at rest. This phenomenon is known as Time Dilation. Since time therefore is subjective, indeed, "relative," this is strong evidence that time is merely a property of the universe just like gravity. If true, and Relativity seems to confirm it is, then that absolutely confirms time is subjective thus confirming B Theory.

The Kalam argument is not compatible with B Theory, since in B Theory causality is meaningless and unnecessary.

== Conclusion ==

P1 is a Composition Fallacy and requires us to accept Pro's metaphysical absolute based on Special Pleading.

P2 cannot be true if Pro is arguing that time never existed before the universe, as their conclusion of a timeless cause suggests.

The Kalam's Conclusion does not necessarily follow given the failures of the two premises. Even so, the relativity of time is strong evidence in favor of B Theory, which is incompatible with the Kalam Argument.

[1] https://www.youtube.com...
Debate Round No. 2
Moelogy

Pro

Rebuttals


Attacking conclusions

Con notes that you can disprove this argument by attacking its conclusions. But that's not possible. Under deductive reasoning, you can only attack either the premises or validity (form). The conclusion logically follows.

Whatever begins to exist has a cause only within this universe and composition fallacy

There are multipe problems with con's first rebuttal. It's utter red herring. I gave two deductive proofs of the first premise based on a priori definition of nothing and based on principles of philosophy like the PSR. My third argument was based on inductive reasoning. NONE of my arguments are reasoning by composition. So again this rebuttal is not apt and is beyond irrelevant since in none of my arguments did I use reasoning by composition rather I used deductive reasoning twice and inductive reasoning once. Composition fallacy are applicable to specific situations (Take for example, if every brick of the wall is yellow then the wall will be yellow.) However, inductive reasoning is the basis behind science [1], so if Con objects to inductive reasoning, he is really just objecting to the foundations of science. Inductive reasoning (like let's say the second law of thermodynamics) can make judgements about the parts (closed systems within this universe will run out of entropy [2]) and the whole (The universe itself will run out of entropy [3a]). Reasoning by composition can not but that is irrelevant since that is simply not what I did. The law of causlaity in science which is based on inductive reasoning also supports the first premise. [3b]





On the metaphysics of causation


Con notes that I have no grounds to conclude that the first premise is metaphysical but I advise him to go re-read the opening arguments in the second round and I do have grounds to conclude that causation is metpahysical. [4]


On the properties of the first cause

"Material things are only caused by other material things (therefore, a cause cannot be immaterial)"

This begins with a rejection of the supernatural. You are arguing against the supernatural by a priori dismissing the supernatural (in which immaterial things can cause material things) and thus you have assumed what you are trying to argue. This is a classic example of the circular reasoning fallacy. You ultimately can not say that material things can ONLY be caused by other material things since you do not know whether or not the supernatural exists so you simply can not assume that the supernatural does not exist and that immaterial entities can not cause the material since making that assumption then declaring that material can only be caused by the material is to be assuming your conclusion and would result in a fallacy of circular reasoning.



Nothing is ever caused by an entity that is not, itself, within time


That's patently false. For example, suppose that there was one frame of reality without any passage of time. Now suppose in this singular frame, there are no preceeding nor following frames of reality. In this frame of reality, there are two elements namely a human standing in the sand. The human in this example would be timelessly causing the footprints in the sand. Or suppose the same scenario with a lit candle. The candle would be timelessly causing a flame. Time is not a property of causality. Or imagine the same scenario but with a chandlier and a roof. The roof would be timelessly holding up the chandlier. I can go on and on.


"All minds are physically embodied (therefore, a mind cannot be non-physical)"

How do you know?

"Any one of these examples, arrived at through the very same method Pro uses to derive P1"

You did not use any deductive or inductive proof though.


Semantics on time


"The word "begin" is temporal by nature. Something can only begin to exist if there was a TIME where it didn't exist."

I would like to remind Con that this is my argument and I get to define what I am arguing for. Recall that I explicitly defined "began to exist" as having a finite past. Con is not allowed to go in and change the definitions of the terms of my argument then claim that it is unwarranted premise. Imagine this scenario, suppose Con is a christian and I am a Muslim. I claim that the bible has evolved overtime where evolved means "the text has changed overtime". To which Con responds : "There is no way the bible could have evolved overtime since the bible is not a natural orgnaism capable of changing its genome over successive generations". You see the problem? He went into my argument and re-defined what I mean by "began to exist" even though I was clear as day when I said that began to exist means has a finite past and then Con claimed that the premise was unwarranted.


B-theory

Even with Con's incorrect charactericization between A and B theory, he has not demonstrated why B theory is incompatible with Kalam.

Relativity and B theory

Con claims that light is constant everywhere but right off the gate, this is false. [5] and He claims that Relativity proves eternalism but this has been disputed. [6] It has even been argued that special relativity refutes eternalism. [7]

"If true, and Relativity seem
s to confirm it is, then that absolutely confirms time is subjective thus confirming B Theory."

Actually this is the view of presentism as well that time is subjective and is relative and specific to a certain observer or human conciousness and relative to their "past, present or future" since to people living 2000 years ago, Nov. 11 2017 would be future relative to them and to us, Nov. 11 2017 is relative to us. Actually still according to Con's example, passage of time is still true and time still does ellapse and therefore the arguments given for the finitude of the past still succeed.

What B theory actually says

As a B-theorist myself, I believe that which "ontology" of time you adopt is irrelvant to the Kalam. If time is as Con describes it then just think about this. Imagine how many scientific principles would absolutely crumble such as Newton's third law of action and reaction, law of causality in science, etc. If Eternalism is as Con describes it then When some unpleasant experience is behind us, we feel glad that it is over. But if Eternalism is correct, there is no such property as being over or no longer happening now or if there is no present where you have a toothache and future where you go to a dentist and get your tooth fixed then under eternalism, your teeth already fixed even before you go to the doctor since there is no "future" where you are at the doctor. Suppose another example with Con's misconceived view of B theory. If there is no passage of time and the present, future and past are just illusions since there is no passage of time, that means that there will not come a time in the future where I am dead (since the future/ the "yet to come" is an illusion) or that time will not pass to a certain moment when I am dead (since there is no passage of time) and that would mean that since there is no future with potency for certain events and all events have happened right now since there is no future or passage of time where things will change (recall that passage of time is an illusion). That would mean two things: I am currently dead since there is no future moment where I can die (since all time is equally real and there is no such thing as passage of time and there is no such thing as a moment prior where I am alive and no future moment where I die) or that I am immortal since there is no future moment where I can die. However, that is ridicolous and is not what B-theory claims.

Let's take Con's meat loaf analogy. In Con's meat loaf analogy, suppose you exist on the third meatloaf and you have 3 meatloafs ahead of you. You would describe the 2 meatloafs behind you as past and the three infront of you as future and the "seat of reality" as the present. Now that's A theory where events are ordered "Past, present and future" relative to a specific observer. Now according to B-theory, the sequence of events is not described relative to any observer, the meatloafs are all equally real. There is no "seat of reality". The events are merely described as events that ellapse before or after relative, not to any observer, but relative to other meat loafs or other events in the same sequence. In B-theory, there is an ellapse of time where the only major difference with A theory is that events are described in position relative to other events rather than the past, present or future of anyone. That's what we mean by saying that B-theory is tenseless. It is has no "tense" meaning there is no past, present or future. Under B theory, events are not described through the temporal prespective of any one observer. With that in mind, B-theory is absolutely compatible with Kalam and I would even argue that it meakes Kalam easier to explain. [8]

sengejuri

Con

== Rebuttal ==

1. Attacking Conclusions: Pro slightly misread what I wrote in Round 2. I said I was going to attack the conclusion by showing that "the conclusion does not necessarily follow the premises." This is completely valid, since a deductive argument is one where the conclusion must follow given the premises. If I can show the conclusion does not necessarily follow, I win.

2. Composition Fallacy: I fail to see how this is a Red Herring. Let's examine Pro's example of "if every brick of the wall is yellow then the wall will be yellow" and replace the bricks and walls with causes and universes. Pro's example now reads "if every thing of the universe has a cause, then the universe will have a cause." It's the same thing and it's clearly a fallacy. Pro is taking a property of everything within the universe and applying that property to the universe as a whole - this is pretty much exactly the definition of a Composition Fallacy. Pro says Composition Fallacies only apply to specific situations... is the beginning of the universe not a specific enough situation?

My opponent protests and insists that they are using deductive reasoning. But merely saying your reasoning is deductive doesn't make it true, no matter how insistent you are. I maintain that the Kalama Argument is not deductive because the conclusion is reached through a Composition Fallacy and therefore does not necessarily follow the premises.

On top of that, Pro accuses me of objecting to induction and the foundations of science. This is a strange accusation given that later on Pro seems to support assuming the supernatural exists (quite an unscientific assumption indeed). But more on that later. For now, suffice it to say that I have no problem with induction, per say, but you cannot use inductive reasoning to support a deductive argument. The two are antithetical. Since the Kalama Argument is, by my opponent's own admission, deductive, then any inductive reasoning is fully null and void.

3. Metaphysics of Causation: I fully understand the arguments laid out by Pro in Round 2. My point was merely that if induction is all we need to conclude a metaphysical absolute, then there are other absolutes we can conclude as well that destroy the Kalam Argument. To affirm otherwise is Special Pleading.

4. Pro attempts to show why the other metaphysical absolutes I mentioned cannot be equally valid compared to "Everything that begins has a cause." I'll address them one by one:

Material things are only caused by material things: In what must be the strangest rebuttal I've ever heard, Pro says this is invalid because it assumes the supernatural does not exist. Well......... of course it does. If Pro thinks rejecting inductive reasoning destroys the basis of science, then this certainly takes the cake. If we could just assume the supernatural exists, then there's no need for scientific inquiry whatsoever! Such an assumption would be, as Pro so eloquently put it in Round 1, "worse than magic." Using Pro's' very own laws of induction, we have no reason to believe that something material can come from something immaterial, therefore the Kalama Argument fails.

Nothing is ever caused by an entity that is not itself within time: Again, very strange rebuttal here. Pro asks us to imagine a reality without the passage of time, thereby allowing for timeless causes. But this would destroy the Kalam Argument! The Kalam Argument needs the passage of time to work, because only when time passes can something "begin to exist" as Pro's premise 2 states. So again we see Special Pleading - does time pass or does it not? Pro can't have it both ways. Furthermore, the idea of an "eternal cause" goes against Pro's concept in Round 2 of the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite. If a cause spans infinity then one would never arrive at the affect.

All minds are physically embodied: Pro merely asks "how do you know?" For that, I would point them to induction, the foundation of science, remember? We universally observe every mind to be physically embodied. If universal observation is enough to deduce that everything that begins to exist has a cause, then it is also enough to deduce that every mind is physically embodied, which destroys the Kalam Argument.

I'm not trying to use deductive or inductive proof, I'm exposing Pro's Special Pleading fallacy. If Pro wants to use universal observation to declare metaphysical absolutes, then we can use the same method to arrive at all kinds of absolutes that render the Kalam Argument impossible.

5. Semantics on Time: All my opponent does here is merely call foul. You can define things all you want, but you don't get to complain when those definitions are attacked or questioned. Sure, "began to exist" refers to a finite past, but that assumes the past is finite, specifically, it assumes an A Theory of time. But we cannot assume A Theory time is true, at least not without a fight. I am not challenging that "began to exist" works when the past is finite - that is quite true. But if the past is NOT finite, i.e., B Theory time is true and we live within spacetime, as proposed by Einstein and Minkowski's interpretation of Relativity, then things do not begin to exist and the Kalama Argument is wrong.

I don't have time to give a detailed rebuttal of Pro's points on B Theory time, but suffice it to say they are woefully mistaken. I will go more into detail in the next round.

So far, I believe Pro's case falls short.
Debate Round No. 3
Moelogy

Pro

Apologies but I will have to respond early due to a lack of time over the next three days.


1. Attacking conclusions


" I intend to show that P1 and P2 depend on unwarranted assumptions, and therefore the conclusion does not necessarily follow the premises"

This is what you originally wrote which is false. Even if the premises were disproved that would not mean that the argument is not valid. A valid argument is one where the deductive structure permits the conclusion to follow from the premises. So An invalid argument would be

(1) Socrates is Greek
(2) Greek is a language
Conclusion : Socrates is a language.

The above argument is invalid because the premises do not logically flow into the conclusion due to the fallacy of equivocation yet the argument is sound because each of those premises are true that Socrates is ethnically a Greek and that there is also a language called Greek.


A sound argument is one where the premises are more plausibly true than their negation so even showing the premises to be false does not meant that the argument is not logically deductively valid. You would be attacking soundness of the argument not the validity of the argument.

2. Composition fallacy

"Let's examine Pro's example of "if every brick of the wall is yellow then the wall will be yellow" and replace the bricks and walls with causes and universes."

But that is simply not my line of reasoning though. I am NOT arguing that because everything in this universe from galaxies to atoms has a cause then the universe itself has a cause. That would be fallacious. You are constructing a strawman and then attacking it. The kalam cosmological argument does NOT read "Because all of the parts of the universe have a cause for their beginning, then universe itself as a whole has a cause for its beginning". The first premise is that "whatever begins to exist has a cause" which is confirmed by inductive reasoning once and deductive reasoning twice. I have never used reasoning by composition. Again for the second time, I am not arguing that because every single entity in this universe has a cause of its beginning then the universe itself has a beginning that has a cause. I am arguing that whatever begins to exist has a cause because that is true inductively and deductively. (scroll down)



"Pro is taking a property of everything within the universe and applying that property to the universe as a whole"

Nowhere did I do that. My first proof is based on an a priori definition of nothing, the second on the principle of sufficient reasoning and the third on a reductio ad absurdum. Again for the third time, I am not using reasoning by composition. For example, saying that humans (the whole) are invisible because atoms (parts) that make up humans are also invisible would be an example of the fallacy of composition. I have NOT argued that because every single entity in the universe from galaxies to babies has a cause of their beginning so the universe has a cause of their beginning rather the reasons I gave are these.

(1) A priori definition of nothing

(2) Principle of sufficient reason

(3) Reductio ad absurdum

Which one of these three reasons says "every single part within the universe has a cause so the universe as a whole itself has a cause"?


Con's objection was literally featured on Craig's top ten worst objections to the Kalam argument. [1]

"but you cannot use inductive reasoning to support a deductive argument. .... Since the Kalama Argument is, by my opponent's own admission, deductive, then any inductive reasoning is fully null and void."


I have not asserted that the Kalam is a solely deductive argument. It has a deductive FORM but that does not mean that I can not use both deductive and inductive evidence. Con just asserts without evidence that you can not use inductive reasoning to support a deductive argument. Thankfully, even if Con's bare assertion is true, then his point is moot since I use inductive evidence not to support the conclusion but to support the premises within the argument. Con also confuses the difference between inductive and deductive. Deductive reasoning is when you use a general rule to make conclusions and inductive reasoning is when you use patterns and examples to infer a general rule. So I can use inductive reasoning to make general rules from patterns and then use those general rules from inductive evidence to make a conclusion such as "whatever begins to exist has a cause". According to Con, Science is fully null and void since Science uses inductive reasoning to support deductive arguments. [2]


3. Metaphysics of causation

"My point was merely that if induction is all we need to conclude a metaphysical absolute"

Yes. That's why I provided two deductive proofs as well that Con has not even addressed.

"then there are other absolutes we can conclude as well that destroy the Kalam Argument."

This simply is not true. None of Con's examples seem to succeed.


4. Examples of metaphysics

Even if Con's examples succeed, they still lack the multiple lines of deductive evidence that my first premise has.


Material things are only caused by other material things: Con seems to think that it is ok to exclude the supernatural but that is simply not true. Con's example would not work metaphysically since Con does not know whether or not the supernatural exists or not. So Con's example can not assume whether the supernatural exists or not since Con can not prove it and since Con does not know whether or not the supernatural exists then his example is not metaphysically true. The supernatural could exist ... we do not know. By induction, we have a lot of experience with the supernatural. [3] So this example crumbles since we do have inductive exeprience with the supernatural where material effects like adam and eve are made by immaterial causes like God. And if the supernatural exists then Con's example is demolished. However, to simply assume that the supernatural does not exist in order to dismiss the kalam argument (which establishes the supernatural) as false would be fallacious. Now a problem arises. Con's objection is circular reasoning since Con begins by assuming that the supernatural does not exist (as he did in this example) in order to prove that the supernatural does not exist (rejecting the conclusion of the Kalam cosmological argument)

Nothing is ever caused by an entity that is not itself within time: My illustration with the human timelssly causing footprints in the sand was merely to show that you can have timeless causation and not to form an analogy to the creation of the big bang. This is yet again an example of a strawman. The example of the sand and man illustration was for a specific point (to demonstrate timeless causation) which Con then misrepresented to use in other areas (as with saying that my analogy was for defeating the passage of time) thus Con's practice of misusing what I intended by an analogy is a strawman. Con notes that this example would destroy Kalam since Kalam needs the passage of time. However, I used this timeless illustration merely to show that timeless causation is possible. I did not in any way claim that this timeless reality is representative of our reality. Con puts a dichotomy for me asking "does time pass or not" The answer is yes. In our reality time passes and things can begin to exist. However, my illustration was to show that timeless causation is possible not to analogize this illustration to our reality.

All Minds are physically embodied: For all we know is that all minds are immaterial and are not physical according to some philosophies of the mind. [4] Moreover, we have no inductive experience of physical minds. Can you point me to at least one example where the mind is physical? There is not a single example I can think of where the "mind" contains mass and occupies a certain volume like let's say 10 metres wide and 20 metres long so by induction Con's example is false since all of our experiences with the mind are immaterial.


"f Pro wants to use universal observation to declare metaphysical absolutes, then we can use the same method to arrive at all kinds of absolutes that render the Kalam Argument impossible."

I have not used inductive reasoning alone. I have used two deductive proofs of the first premise. All of Con's examples fail.


5. Semantics on time

"All my opponent does here is merely call foul. You can define things all you want, but you don't get to complain when those definitions are attacked or questioned."

However, Con is not allowed to go in and change the definition of one of my premises then just declare that my argument is unwarranted. Recall the bible example where I would present manuscript evidence to show that the bible's textual integrity and textual content has "evolved" overtime where evolved means changed overtime. Now Imagine if Con goes into my definitions, changes them completely and changes the definition of evolved into changes in genome over successive generations and then declares that my evidence (manuscripts) does not prove my point with their new definition of evolved as a natural organism over successive generations and then declare that my argument that the textual integrity of the bible has "evolved" is unwarranted since there is no evidence that the bible's genome evolved overtime. Such a practice would be incredibly ridicolous. Yet that is exactly what Con attempts to do.

"Sure, "began to exist" refers to a finite past, but that assumes the past is finite, specifically, it assumes an A Theory of time."

Absolutely false. The past could still be finite under B theory [5] so Con's point is completely false.

"I am not challenging that "began to exist" works when the past is finite - that is quite true."

Con virtually conceeds this point at this line by agreeing that "begins to exist" could be defined as having a finite past and thus he agrees with me that this is a valid definition thus he conceeds in print that there is conflict over defintions.
sengejuri

Con

I'll start with a discussion of B Theory time and then return to rebuttals.

== B Theory ==

Amazingly, Pro admits to embracing B Theory time in Round 3 ("As a B-theorist myself..."). By admitting this, Pro has essentially conceded the debate, since the Kalam Argument is not at all compatible with B Theory time. In fact, Pro cited Dr. William Lane Craig in Round 4, one of the Kalam Argument's chief defenders. Dr. Craig himself has stated, "On a B Theory of time, noting really ever comes into existence. . . On the B Theory it seems to me that the premise 'whatever comes into being has a cause,' that would still be true, but nothing comes into being so the universe didn't begin to exist in that sense." [1] So Dr. Craig himself admits that, on B Theory time, Premise 2 of the Kalam is false and therefore the argument falls apart. So it is quite strange when Pro says "B-theory is absolutely compatible with Kalam and I would even argue that it makes Kalam easier to explain." I would challenge Pro to please explain Kalam assuming a B-Theory, given that Dr. Craig himself disagrees.

Pro seems to get B Theory generally correct by describing it as "tenseless" in that there is no favored "seat of reality" but rather, events merely sequence relative to each other. But my opponent is mistaken by still thinking, quote, "passage of time is still true and time still does elapse..." No, it doesn't. Sequencing of events does not mean time is elapsing. If you place 10 coins in a line, the first coin indeed comes before the last coin in the sequence, but that doesn't mean the first coin EXISTS before the last coin - they both still exist simultaneously and eternally, albeit within a structured sequence. As another example, think of a ruler - the first inch comes before the last inch, but the ruler doesn't COME INTO BEING at the first inch - all inches exist simultaneously within the ruler. Pro magically makes the jump to saying this makes it compatible with Kalam without really explaining why. Once again, I fail to see the connection. This is impossible - there can be no temporal beginnings if there is no "seat of reality" as Pro put it against which time passes. Therefore, Premise 1 and 2 are mistaken and the conclusion does not follow.

Special and General Relativity confirm this is true. In Round 3, Pro says "Con claims that light is constant everywhere but right off the gate, this is false. [5] and He claims that Relativity proves eternalism but this has been disputed. [6] It has even been argued that special relativity refutes eternalism. [7]." But Pro never actually explains why these claims are false, they mere cite sources. You can't make an argument in the footnotes. You have to present the arguments/rebuttals yourself. Until Pro actually articulates why they think these universally accepted scientific facts are false, my arguments still stand.

Going back to Pro's meatloaf analogy, Pro is only confirming Relativity! Pro says, "The events are merely described as events that elapse before or after relative, not to any observer, but relative to other meat loafs or other events in the same sequence." This is exactly what Relativity says, and Relativity has been proven true in every single repeated experiment for the last 100 years. So Pro has not at all rebutted my points here.

In sum, since Pro has admitted to being a B-Theorist, and since I have demonstrated that the Kalam Argument is incompatible with B Theory, my opponent now has a lot of explaining to do....

== Rebuttlas ==

1) Attacking Conclusion - ok, here Pro has a point. I got carried away and began attacking the VALIDITY of the Kalam Argument rather than its SOUNDNESS. So even though I have still shown the Kalam to be invalid, that is not the premise of this debate, so I will move on. However, I still have plenty of ammunition to show why the Kalam is unsound, as I will detail below.

2) Composition Fallacy - here Pro and I are going to have to agree to disagree. I still see a glaring Composition Fallacy. There is almost no difference between saying "Because all of the parts of the universe have a cause for their beginning, then universe itself as a whole has a cause for its beginning" (which Pro admits IS a Composition Fallacy) and saying "P1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause. P2: The universe began to exist. C: The universe has a cause" They are virtually the same, the words are just arranged a bit differently. We'll let the voters decide on this one.

3) A priori definition of nothing, PSR, and Reductio ad absurdum - I agree with Pro's A priori definition of nothing. It doesn't matter if B Theory is true. As far as PSR, I also agree, and the causeless REASON for the universe is simple - the universe exists tenselessly in spacetime, as predicted by Einstein/Minkowski. So I am not in violation of the PSR. As far as Reductio ad absurdum, Pro is again assuming an A-Theory of time, namely nothing actually "pops" into existence, everything just exists tenselessly. Furthermore, Pro is committing a taxicab fallacy themselves. If a skeptic cannot say that causality does not apply outside the universe, and that "causation is a metaphysical principle that governs all of reality whether natural or supernatural," then Pro has just contradicted themselves, because if causation DOES apply outside the universe to both natural and supernatural, then Pro must provide an explanation for what caused their supernatural, spaceless, timeless, immaterial mind.

I have no problems with my opponent's description of the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite, scythe revenge, etc... But all these examples assume an A-Theory of time. I have already showed why this is problematic.

4) Metaphysical Absolutes - Pro continues to ask us to accept their Special Pleading Fallacies. Let's detail one by one.

Material things from material things: All Pro says here is "The supernatural could exist ... we do not know." This is ridiculous. If it is acceptable for my opponent to say this, then why can't I just say "things could exist causelessly ... we do not know."? Then Pro tries to shift the burden of proof saying, "Con can not prove it and since Con does not know whether or not the supernatural exists then his example is not metaphysically true." This is blatant goalpost shifting. My opponent very clearly wrote in Round 1 that the BOP is with Pro, so if they are going to propose the supernatural exists then they are going to need to provide proof. Pro's "proof" of supernatural experiences with people can be explained by a host of other reasons - hallucination, visions, dreams, lies, tricks of the eye, etc... Anecdotal experience is by no means proof.

Nothing is ever caused by something not itself in time - Here Pro insists that "I did not in any way claim that this timeless reality is representative of our reality." So then why should we accept it, if even Pro admits it's probably not true? Also, Pro did not address my point on the contradiction of a timeless cause violating the principle of traversing an actual infinite - if a cause lasts forever then we will never see the effect. In other places in the debate (like advocating the supernatural), Pro is very comfortable using inductive evidence to infer conclusions. I'm using the same method here - we inductively see that ALL causes are within time, so why can we not infer that a cause cannot be timeless? This is a lose-lose for Pro, because either we must reject induction whole-sale or a cause cannot be timeless.

All minds are physically embodied - I don't really understand Pro's rebuttal here. They ask "can you point me to at least one example where the mind is physical?" Well, what I actually said is all minds are physically EMBODIED - so yes, I can. The minds of humans, squirrels, fish, zebras... all in bodies. Can you give me at least one example where a mind is NOT physically embodied? Also, minds are physical. All a mind is is a sequence of synapses, chemicals, hormones, and organic matter interacting to form emotions and perceptions and instincts.

5) Semantics on Time - Pro is misreading what I'm saying. I'm saying I agree with what they wrote about time if we assume A Theory is true. But once again, we cannot do that. The phrase "began to exist" is meaningless if we live within B Theory, and Pro has not given us enough evidence to reject that possibility. I'm not playing with definitions, I'm rejecting false assumptions.

[1] https://www.youtube.com...
Debate Round No. 4
Moelogy

Pro

B theory

Craig and B theory

Con cites William Lane Craig as "proof" that the Kalam is incompatible with B theory. But so what? That does not mean anything. This debate is not about what other people believe. It is ultimately about who has better evidence. Citing a philosopher's bare assertion rather than the evidence he uses commits the appeal to authority fallacy. [2] However, Craig in recent years has changed his mind and he agrees with a questioner that even if B theory is true then Kalam based on the beginning of the universe is not a salient issue. [3]

"So the universe did not begin to exist IN THAT SENSE"

Craig believes that the universe did not begin to exist in the sense of coming into being. (3:42). However, recall that by began to exist, I mean having a finite past.

B theory's ontology

Con asserts that there is no passage of time under B theory. But that is a mere assertion. Sean Carroll explains here [4] how the arrow of time is a real and objective phenomonen within physics and uses it to explain entropy so ultimately even if Con's mischaracterization of B theory is correct then B theory is false. Luckily, B theory does not hold such. Most B-theorists hold that motion overtime is an effect only to the viewer however B theory also hold that a tenseless, relational account of the passage of time that is based on tenseless, temporal relations is real. [5] B theory also hold that there is an objective arrow and passage of time. [5]

Ruler analogy

Con provides a ruler analogy to explain B theory which is accurate however, it is self-defeating. In Con's analogy the ruler represents the sequence of events. However, what is in dispute is not whether or not all events/inches are equally real but rather whether this sequence of events extends in the earlier direction forever or whether it is finite in the earlier direction. If the ruler is finite in the earlier direction or has a finite number of inches which I have proved in my opening round that Con has not responded to yet then the universe began to exist and thus the second premise of the Kalam is confirmed.

GR and SR

Con claims that I made an argument in the footnotes. That's false. I linked to an experiment where the speed of light was calculated in the same vacuum over and over again by recording the time it took the photons to traverse the distance between point A and point B and every single trial was through the same vacuum. The experiment conlcudes that the speed of light varies in a vacuum by microns given the same time holding all other factors constant. [6] Since a key assumption of GR theory is that light is constant and we have shown experimentally that the speed of light is not constant and varies even though the exact same conditions are held constant then con's characterization of GR and its support for B theory is experimentally wrong. Here is the experiment. [6]

I find it rather hypocritical of Con to criticize for linking a source that lays why the speed of light is not constant yet that is exactly what he does in the second round by asserting that GR is confirmed by "countless experiementation" and then linking a youtube video.


Relativity's conclusion

Con claims that what relativity "exactly says" is that "The events are merely described as events that elapse before or after relative, not to any observer, but relative to other meat loafs or other events in the same sequence." but that is as wrong as anything can be. Relativity's conclusion is that space and time are related, interdependent and are the exact same thing called spacetime, in that you can not have space without time and time without space. [7]

Fallacy of composition

Con's objection here was nothing but a strawman. A fallacy of composition is claiming that a whole has a property because the parts have that property so claiming that the ocean (whole) is naked to the invisible eye because the atoms that compose the ocean are invisible to the naked eye is an example of the fallacy of composition.


My reasons for believing the first premise are these:

1- A priori definition of nothing

2- Reductio Ad absurdum

3- Principle of sufficient reasoning


Which one of the above three reasons says "the universe is made up of parts that have a cause of their beginning so the universe itself has a cause of its beginning". Which one of the above reasons says that? Con's objection is to an argument I did not make.


PSR

"As far as PSR, I also agree, and the causeless REASON for the universe is simple - the universe exists tenselessly in spacetime"

This would only be true if the universe never began to exist but I have proved the second premise to be true thus there must be a cause for the Beginning of the universe. If the universe began to exist, then it must have a cause or reason for its beginning by the principle of sufficient reasoning. "Nothing" is not a cause since you would bearguing that "the universe's beginning had a cause and it is no thing and no cause" and that is as wrong as saying that nobody is somebody or that nowhere is somewhere.


Reductio ad absurdum

"As far as Reductio ad absurdum, Pro is again assuming an A-Theory of time, namely nothing actually "pops" into existence, everything just exists tenselessly."

That's false. If the negation of the first premise is true then we should observe it. Namely we should observe objects have a beginning/a finite past and be uncaused. But we do not observe bikes, tables or frogs begin to exist uncaused. By "begin to exist" I mean to exist in a finite number of events in the earlier than direction.


"because if causation DOES apply outside the universe to both natural and supernatural, then Pro must provide an explanation for what caused their supernatural, spaceless, timeless, immaterial mind."

The first premise argues that whatever begins to exist has a cause. God did not begin to exist and the sufficient reason for his existence is the necessity of his own nature same way numbers exist, nobody caused the number 3 to exist, it can't not exist, it exists out of necessity of its own nature. By contrast, the universe began to exist so it is contingent. Taxicab fallacy would be when a rule applies to an entity but you make a special pleading for this single entity to be exempt from the rule even though the rule applies to it however this rule does not even apply to God since God does not begin to exist. The universe can not be "timeless" because of relativity that Con was defending earlier. Space and time are connected. They are literally the exact same fabric. [7] So ultimately taking out time dimension would be to also take out the space dimension because space and time are literally the exact same thing - spacetime fabric. [7] So ultimately if you have no space and no time then there can not be any matter since matter by definition must have volume and volume is the amount of space that an object takes up and if there is no space, there is no space to contain the volume hence no matter either.

"But all these examples assume an A-Theory of time."


That's patently false. Alexander Pruss came up with most of these examples including the grim reaper paradox. [8] He is a B-theorist [9] so these arguments obviously do not assume an A-theory.

Material things

Con notes that I can not invoke the supernatural, however, recall that this discussion is about induction and we have plenty of inductive experience with the supernatural. [10] The reason we can not argue that things could begin to exist without a beginning is because it is disconfirmed by our inductive reaosning. If a book begins to exist, it has an author. If a baby begins to exist, it has parents. If a building begin to exist, it has builders.

Not itself within time

I do not admit that the scenario is probably not possible or that the scenario is false but rather I use this illustration to show that timeless causality is possible. I do not believe that reality is timeless neither did I claim that the illustration is representative of reality. I believe that time does exist. However, the illustration of the man timelessly causing footprints is to show that timeless causation is real.

" if a cause lasts forever then we will never see the effect."

That's one of the reasons why I give that the cause must be personal. Recall the human on the shore example timelessly causing the footprints. Since the man has a personal mind, he can decide to then create spacetime and then go and create a temporal effect like let's say a sandcastle. Similarily if God existed timelessly chronologically prior to the universe then he can easily decide to create time and space and the universe since he is a personal mind capable of doing decisions same way a man timelssly sitting down can decide to produce a temporal effect like standing up. However, by contrast if the cause is not a personal mind then it should create an eternal universe once all the sufficient requisites are there. For example, if the temperature (cause) is 100 degrees celsius from an eternity-past then the water should be boiling (effect) from an eternity-past.

Minds

Con asks me to prove a mind not physically embodied. Some Jellyfish [11] have a mind that is capable of making choices and responding to stimuli without actually having any place say a brain nor a nervous system to embody this mind. The mind definetly uses the physical body of the jellyfish yet it is not contained anywhere in the jellyfish.

" All a mind is is a sequence of synapses, chemicals, hormones, and organic matter interacting to form emotions and perceptions and instincts."

False. Hydranencephaly [12] is a condition where there is no brain, no hormones and no synapses yet the people still live and have concious decision-making capacities and thinking capacities yet still no brain, no hormones, no synapses. So again, Con's bare unevidenced assertion is false.

Time defintion

Began to exist works with B theory if it means that the object has existed for a finite number of equally real events in the earlier than direction.
sengejuri

Con

Good job to Pro!

I am a sheep in wolf's clothing - I actually support the Kalam Argument. I have debated quite a bit in favor of it.

I was using this debate as practice, throwing what I think are the most clever protests against the Kalam I've heard to see how Pro would respond. I tried to be as tough as possible, maybe even a little belligerent :)

Since this is the last round and Pro will not have an opportunity to respond, there is no point in me whipping up further rebuttals.

Thanks for the fun debate and the exposure to new material.
Debate Round No. 5
18 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 10 records.
Posted by Moelogy 2 months ago
Moelogy
The sources below are for round 5.
Posted by Moelogy 2 months ago
Moelogy
[2] - https://www.logicallyfallacious.com...

[3] - (https://www.reasonablefaith.org...) "if one adopts a tenseless or B-Theory of time, according to which all moments of time are equally real and temporal becoming is an illusion of human consciousness, then the kalam cosmological argument based upon the beginning of the universe is not the salient issue...'" Craig agrees

[4] - (https://www.youtube.com...)

[5] - (http://www.oxfordscholarship.com...)

[6] - (https://arxiv.org...) + (https://www.sciencenews.org...)

[7] - (https://spaceplace.nasa.gov...)

[8] - (http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.ca...)

[9] - (http://alexanderpruss.com...)

[10] - (http://www.pewresearch.org...) + (http://www.pewresearch.org...)

[11] - (https://www.scienceabc.com...)

[12] - (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov...)
Posted by Magnatrix 2 months ago
Magnatrix
Thanks
Posted by Moelogy 2 months ago
Moelogy
"The problem is that the beginning of the universe is not a reassembly of already existing things. If you define beginning to exist in this way, it would mean that all that builds up the universe was prior already existent and was just reassembled to build the universe."

I did not define "beginning to exist" like that. Rather I defined beginning to exist as having a finite past. The universe has a finite past and so does the baby or the twin towers or myself.
Posted by tfroitz1 2 months ago
tfroitz1
The problem is that the beginning of the universe is not a reassembly of already existing things. If you define beginning to exist in this way, it would mean that all that builds up the universe was prior already existent and was just reassembled to build the universe. If you are arguing for a real beginning of existence were something comes out of nothing, it is a profoundly different case. Such a case were the parts, which are reassembled to the beginning thing, begin to exist is actually not observed because all contained in the universe is already at least at the base of energy. Therefore you can't claim that this isn't possible ex nihilo because you have no evidence or observation to attest for it.
Posted by Moelogy 2 months ago
Moelogy
@magnatrix

>Where did I say that the mind is contingent on the brain?

Here "that the brain that which houses our mind does run on ions, and the Biochemical reactions between (nerve)cells need electrons to work."
Posted by Moelogy 2 months ago
Moelogy
@tfroitz1 "You seemingly have misunderstood me. What you are describing isn't actually anything beginning to exist, but rather the reassembly of matter. The building of the twin towers didn't bring the matter of which they consist into existence, but rather reassembled parts"

Yes, that's prrcisely the point. Again. Just because the matter of which something is made possibly did not begin to exist does not mean that the thing itself did not begin to exist. For example, a baby's matter has existed all the way back to the jurassic period however that does not mean that the baby itself has existed during the jurassic period. The matter out of which the twin tower was made has existed forever that does not mean that the twin tower itself has existed forever. The twin towers for exmaple did not exist duribg the jurassic period or during columbus' meeting with the indians.

Wlc talks about this objection here (https://youtu.be...)
Posted by tfroitz1 2 months ago
tfroitz1
You seemingly have misunderstood me. What you are describing isn't actually anything beginning to exist, but rather the reassembly of matter. The building of the twin towers didn't bring the matter of which they consist into existence, but rather reassembled parts. For all processes we can go to smaller parts, which were resembled until we come to the universe itself (with which energy was build), which, if you presume that it began to exist (I sadly can't elaborate on that right now, but look at the work and assessment of people like Dr Sean Carroll or Allan Gough, who are a leading cosmologist and think the universe most likely hadn't a beginning), is the only thing we know of that began to exist. Therefore I would like to know what according to you actually began to exist aside from the universe.
Posted by Magnatrix 2 months ago
Magnatrix
I learned a great deal because of this discussion.Thank you though I may still be in opposition because of certain psychological aspects of being human I still have one question before (I literally leave to a place with no network connection)i leave. Where did I say a mind is contingent on having a brain? This will help me formulate better arguments in the future based on the subject.
Posted by Moelogy 2 months ago
Moelogy
@Magntrix

I will give a short reply as I am at the dentist rn.

"The minds of jellyfish are also physical they employ nerves too to think and feel."

You said that the minds are contingent on brains. Jellyfish have conciousness and the mind yet they have no brains. In fact, some species of jellyfish (https://www.scienceabc.com...) have no nervous system whatsoever yet they have conciousness and a mind.

"Though no I will not prove to you that minds are contingent on brains."

Your point is over.

"Your first characteristic fails because we live in a universe where to "things" are the same therefore no two minds think alike and vice versa with(in how they're made thus affecting minds) brains. Because of that qualia is of the material realm."

That's not even close to what Qualia is.

"For the second characteristic I'll just qoute Wiki article -"Some anti-intentionalism, such as that of Ned Block, is based on the argument that phenomenal conscious experience or qualia is also a vital component of consciousness, and that it is not intentional. (The latter claim is itself disputed by Michael Tye.)[19]". That about sums up why I think the second one is wrong by nature."

The first problem is that you quoted a wiki article. Second problem is that you quoted somebody saying that Qualia is not intentional. That's great but that does not answer anything at all. Qualia aside, why do we have intenionality, something matter does not have, if we are purely matter?

"Also the last one doesn't need a mind to have it happen. Say we had a robot programmed to randomly pick one out of three choices."

The robot does not have freewill. Read Searle's Chinese box argument here. (https://plato.stanford.edu...). Ultimately all the mechanisms in question fall back on determinstic factors.

Morever, you have to show that we are programmed.
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