The Instigator
Poetaster
Pro (for)
Tied
0 Points
The Contender
wiploc
Con (against)
Tied
0 Points

Morality is Necessarily Subjective, but Non-Arbitrary

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Voting Style: Open Point System: 7 Point
Started: 4/25/2013 Category: Philosophy
Updated: 3 years ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 1,919 times Debate No: 32903
Debate Rounds (4)
Comments (5)
Votes (0)

 

Poetaster

Pro

The first round is reserved for acceptance.
To be clear, I use 'subjectivity' to mean 'concerning properties accessible only to first-person modalities of observation.'
The qualification of 'non-arbitrary' says that there exist fixed and compelling reasons to call some behaviors decidedly and concretely immoral.
wiploc

Con

I'm curious.
Debate Round No. 1
Poetaster

Pro

I share your curiosity, wiploc. I hope to provoke it further.

I claim that morality is necessarily subjective for the very simple reason that, were it any other way, moral expectations could be applied to objects and non-conscious things. This is because properties arising from objective modalities of interaction and detection do not essentially and necessarily discriminate between participating parties; the same properties are functionally available to all. Contrastingly, it is characteristic of subjective modalities that such discrimination does and must occur, ensuring that certain essential properties are only available to certain parties a priori (such as feelings, etc.).

Thus, to say that morality is objective would be to say that moral culpability belongs to the objective modality of accessibility, open and applicable to the world indiscriminately, such that inanimate objects would be under the jurisdiction of moral prescriptions. On these grounds we could, for example, hold a hurricane morally accountable for its destruction. Intuitively, this is clearly nonsense.

But to tighten this argument, we need only note that morality is both conceptually and grammatically teleological in nature (whatever its content may be). It functions in terms of intention, prescription, and end-directed behavior; these capacities do not concern properties that are functionally available to all parties indiscriminately. More specifically, inanimate objects have no such capacities.

On the basis of these thoughts, any contention that morality is objective appears absurd. I move that such contentions are absurd. A thing like intention belongs exclusively and essentially to a subjective modality of observation (a mind), and therefore so does morality.

The second part of my claim, that the content of morality is non-arbitrary, I will defend more syllogistically:

-An agent is a discrete identity. This identity contains the ability to act as that agent.
-When an agent intentionally performs an action to harm itself, it denies its identity by affirming its destruction.
-But when an agent intentionally acts, it affirms its capacities to act as an agent, and therefore its identity.
-Therefore, self-harm is a performative contradiction.
-To assert a contradiction is irrational, and to assert a perfomative contradiction is to perform the action it concerns.
-The action concerned is self-harm. Therefore self-harm is irrational.

Now consider a collection of discrete agents:

-Each such agent is a self, and to each of them, every other agent is an other.
-Therefore, each agent occupies a category of "self" and "other" when all relations between them are considered.
-For one agent to intentionally harm an "other" is for it to harm another "self". It is therefore harming an element of the category to which it also belongs.
-But if it so grants that elements of this category may be harmed, then it is volunteering itself for the same treatment, because it belongs to the same category.
-This constitutes the endorsement of self-harm, which is irrational.
-Therefore, for one agent to intentionally harm another is irrational.

Clearly this is applicable to humans in particular.

Therefore, descriptively speaking, if an agent is rational, then prima facie it will not harm another agent. In such a case, the use of prescriptive moral grammar would be moot. But in the case of agents that do not satisfy the description of being fully rational, moral grammars are the basis for compelling rational behaviors of interaction between agents.

Thus, I argue that morality, consisting of prescriptive claims about behavioral interaction, is a non-arbitrary grammatical recognition of the primitive logical structures intrinsic to agential identity, the symmetry between such agents, and so-called "sensory axioms" which preside over sensory experience necessarily. One example of such a "sensory axiom" is that of suffering; suffering may be declaratively formulated to state, "Harm is a problem". This is a primitive feature of experience which non-arbitrarily informs prescriptive grammars, of which moral grammar is a special case.

In short, because we are not fully rational agents, we need moral grammars (prescriptions, imperatives, etc.) to compel ourselves to satisfy non-arbitrary logical structures concerning ourselves as entities.

Thus stands my defense; please do have at it!
wiploc

Con

I gotta ask: Is that writing style a joke? Pseudo-schollarly obscurantist verbiage as entertainment?

I love this sentence in particular: "This is because properties arising from objective modalities of interaction and detection do not essentially and necessarily discriminate between participating parties; the same properties are functionally available to all." I propose a contest---after the voting closes---to see who can best translate that into plain English.

Resolution:

Pro has undertaken to prove that Morality is Necessarily Subjective but Non-Arbitrary. That's all one claim. That is, he must prove each of three things:

1. Morality is non-arbitrary,
2. Morality is subjective, and
3. the subjectiveness of morality is necessary, as opposed to just possible.

Burden of Proof:

Pro has the burden of proof. I don't have to prove any of those to be false. Pro has to prove that all three are true.

Apology:

Pro doesn't identify as male or female. Puts me to the guess. I'll use the male pronoun, with apologies if I guessed wrong.

A Weakness: "Subjectivity"

I didn't accept this debate out of a belief that Pro was wrong. I accepted it because I wanted to find out what he was talking about. There was a risk, then, that I would have to concede after reading Pro's argument. But, luckily for me, his argument turns out to be flawed.

Pro wrote, "to say that morality is objective would be to say that ... inanimate objects would be under the jurisdiction of moral prescriptions."

In other words, morality is subjective because it doesn't apply to rocks. Since morality applies only to people (Pro is saying) then morality must be subjective.

There are two Problems with that.

First, according to Kant, "ought implies can." [1] This means that every moral rule that says "ought" implicitly includes an "if you can." "Honor your father and mother," can therefore be read as, "Honor your father and mother if you can." Thus, since rocks cannot honor their parents, they are in compliance. Considered this way, moral rules apply to rocks every bit as well as to people.

This alone is fatal to Pro's argument.

Second, and to my mind more important: Pro invents an eccentric and nonstandard test of subjectivity. By Pro's logic, the law of gravity would be subjective if it affected only people. That's not the real test.

In normal usage, opinions and emotions are subjective, but facts are objective. Thus, the law of gravity is objective not because of what it affects, but because it is true regardless of how you feel about it.

Let's apply this to a moral rule. Let us stipulate that there is a moral rule against TBFF (torturing babies for fun). Is this subjective because the object of the rule (babies) are people? No, it is objective if TBFF is wrong even if you like doing it.

Pro has undertaken to prove that moral rules are necessarily subjective. This means he must prove that no moral rule can be objective. That's a tall order.


---

[1] Wikipedia. "Ought implies can."
Debate Round No. 2
Poetaster

Pro

On review, I must admit that my initial argument was written in a
selfish, obscure, and masturbatory style which I regret and which Con rightly
criticizes. I want to clean up several points, but not before
first thanking Con for accepting this debate and, perhaps, for ribbing me out of my pedantry.

First, while morality concerns things like sensations (suffering, etc.),
and intentions (e.g. to do harm), neither of these causally participate in the
outside world as sensations or intentions.

That is to say, a cup is not brought to my lips directly by my intention to
lift it there, but by the lifting itself. Its being lifted, so far as the cup
is concerned, is fully accounted for without invoking this private notion that
I have of “intention”. The lifting operates in the external world as the
act of lifting; intention doesn't act in the external world as intention.

This is really what informs the distinction that I've tried to make
between the objective and subjective: intention and sensation are part of a
private causality that does not function out in the world in the form that it
appears to the privileged parties with access to it. Conscious beings are these
privileged parties. Because morality concerns things like sensation and
intention, morality is bound up with this private causality, and therefore is
subjective in the way that I've described.

Taking Con’s example of gravity, I would point out that gravity does not
behave according to a form of private causality. Gravity operates causally out
in the world, like the immediate action of lifting the cup. Mechanically
speaking, it explains everything that it accomplishes. The things that
morality accomplishes aren't explained by the behaviors it motivates: the outside world
isn't causally influenced by the relief of suffering as the relief of
suffering, but rather by the behaviors that are performed in the process.

Morally speaking, these behaviors as behaviors alone don't explain everything they accomplish;
suffering and its relief are needed to furnish this account.
This is the distinction I'm attempting to make between subjective and objective mechanisms,
and thus why morality is subjective.

In this fine specimen of foggy prose, which Con found duly amusing:
This is because properties arising from objective
modalities of interaction and detection do not essentially and necessarily
discriminate between participating parties; the same properties are
functionally available to all,"
I meant to say that objective mechanisms are accessible to the analysis of third
parties. Because all separate participants are third parties with respect to
each other in the external world, I was trying to express that objective
mechanisms are those which are available to the analysis of these parties.

Now, I realize that "subjective" is often used as a byword for
"dependent on opinion, and able to vary along with it", so Con is
right to point out that I interpret subjectivity differently. But in so
differing, my description of subjectivity doesn't exclude Con’s description of it.
It’s just that Con focuses on the arbitrary elements of subjectivity, such as opinion and preference.
But my claim, as Con also notes, is to be taken as a whole: that morality is
subjective and non-arbitrary. Con does consider this as a whole in the beginning, but seems to neglect the
2nd component later on in response to my treatment of subjectivity.

So when Con says, “Let us stipulate that there is a moral rule against TBFF
(torturing babies for fun). Is this subjective because the object of the rule (babies) are people? No, it is
objective if TBFF is wrong even if you like doing it,”
what he is emphasizing is precisely satisfied by the condition of
non-arbitrarity that I've advanced. Despite the admitted unclearness of my initial argument, the part in which I
argued deductively that harming others is irrational was given pretty cleanly.

For morality to be non-arbitrary is for it to not vary with preference/opinion. The fact
that harming others is irrational provides exactly this stability. So I advance that TBFF
is non-arbitrarily & actually wrong, but that this wrongness is subjective because
the data which qualify babies as morally eligible beings aren't accessible to
third party analysis.

So far as the external world itself is concerned, smashing a
rock is no different from smashing a face, while we are the privileged
audience to our own ability to suffer and be harmed. We know that a face
importantly differs from a rock, but only because we have privileged access to the data
which informs this knowledge.

It is true that when I draw this line between rocks and people, it seems I draw one between people also.

One may then ask: How can we know which things are eligible for moral treatment when we can’t directly
verify the presence of consciousness by third party analysis?

This, however, is a question that leads to the hard problem of
consciousness, which really has philosophy by the throat more than anything
else. It's one of the most (possibly the most) intimidating, elusive, and
nebulous problems in all of modern science and philosophy. Thomas Huxley, the famous 19th
century naturalist, opined, “that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as the result of
irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of the
Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.”[1]

The philosopher David Chalmers, who has done much to articulate our perplexity on this matter, adds:
“Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.” [2] (It seems Chalmers uses 'objective' in the same way I am using it.)

The relevance of this is that a solution to the hard problem of consciousness
(whatever that may look like) would very likely render the
current distinctions between subjective and objective obsolete. Therefore, if I
want to show that morality is necessarily subjective, then I must show that the things which qualify beings for moral
treatment are just as necessarily subjective. This would force me to
claim that the hard problem of consciousness is insoluble, for the following
reasons:

-If we could account for and
understand how physical processing actively gives rise to consciousness, this
would likely eliminate a categorical distinction between function and sensation (e.g.
sound waves vs. loudness; action vs. desire).

-Because of this lost distinction, morality would explain everything that it accomplishes purely
in terms of external function, much like gravity. We would have to acknowledge that the
“outside world” is causally influenced by the relief of suffering as the relief of suffering, rather than simply by the
behaviors which relieve suffering.

The point is that I don’t want to claim the hard problem to be impossible
to solve; I couldn’t defend that claim and I’m not sure it’s true (though the
hard problem seems damn hard). Because I don’t want to make this claim, I must
issue a restricted concession to Con on the point that morality is necessarily
subjective.

I concede that the data which qualifies moral beings may not necessarily
be privileged knowledge which is inaccessible to third party analysis, but that
it may only circumstantially be so.
In short, I concede that morality may only be circumstantially subjective.
Con was right to say that my position was a tall order, and that is ultimately
because the hard problem was implicit in my resolution.

However, I wholly maintain my argument that moral rules are non-arbitrary.
Con glossed over these and did not address them. They are clean deductions, and they still stand as I see them.

In summary:

-Morality is subjective
because it is explained by privileged access to "private" data.

-Morality is non-arbitrary
because it is irrational to harm others.


I really do appreciate the opportunity to argue this out, so you have my thanks, Con.



[1] The Harder Problem of
Consciousness, Block

[2] Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, Chalmers

wiploc

Con

The Resolution:

Pro has undertaken to prove three things:

1. Morality is non-arbitrary,
2. Morality is subjective, and
3. the subjectiveness of morality is necessary, as opposed to just possible.

Pro has the burden of proof. He has to prove all three, not just some.

1. Morality is non-arbitrary:

My defense here is the simple demurer: Pro has not demonstrated that morality is non-arbitrary.

Since I can't figure out what he's trying to say, I cannot offer more detailed criticism. But I'm probably not alone. Any readers who don't understand Pro's argument should vote for Con.

Pro has to prove his case, and he cannot prove his case through incomprehensibility.

If he does not prove this part of his case, in addition to the other parts, the votes should go to Con.

2. Morality is subjective:

Most people probably won't read a debate that doesn't make obvious sense. I've read it over and over since I'm a participant. I still don't get what he's saying.

If you have read this debate, and don't understand Pro's case, then he has failed to communicate. He has failed to prove what he has to prove. You should vote for Con.

On this second point, I did grasp some of what Pro was saying. He said that morality is subjective because it doesn't apply to rocks.

I raised two objections to that:

a) If we accept that "ought implies can," then morality applies to rocks as well as to people.

b) Pro used a weird meaning of "subjective," his own private incomprehensible usage. He did not prove or even try to prove that morality is subjective in any normal sense of the word. Since he did not define "subjective" when setting up the debate, he may not resort to his private idiosyncratic and inexplicable usage. He must prove that morality is subjective in the normal sense of the word.

Pro responds to the latter point. I believe that this is the operative language: "I meant to say that objective mechanisms are accessible to the analysis of third parties."

Well, I'm a utilitarian. For me, morality is accessible to third parties. Deontological morality is also analysed by third parties. Pro hasn't mentioned what kind of morality he favors. Something secret and inexplicable, apparently, not subect to analysis by third parties. That's fine for him, but it doesn't prove his case. There are plenty of kinds of morality that are subject to much rational discussion every day. Pro hasn't refuted any of these moralities, nor even tried to.

And his time for introducing new arguments is over. He can't introduce a new argument in the final round of the debate.

Therefore, Pro has effectively dropped this point (along with the other two), which he had to prove (along with the other two) in order to prevail.

3. the subjectiveness of morality is necessary, as opposed to just possible:

Since I can't make out Pro's arguments, I cannot swear that he hasn't addressed this issue. To say that morality is necessarily subjective is to say that there is no possible world in which morality is objective. As near as I can tell, Pro hasn't addressed this issue.

If you can't tell whether Pro has addressed this issue, or if you think he addressed it but didn't find him persuasive, then Pro has failed to meet his burden of proof, and you should vote for Con.

Conclusion:

The resolution is a complex statement. Pro has to carry all three issues to carry this debate.

If he has not been lucid and persuasive on all three issues, you should vote for Con.

Next round is the final round. If Pro has to introduce new arguments in order to prevail, your vote still belongs with Con


Notes:

Please extend my arguments.

I confessed my utilitarianism in order to use it as an example. I'm not trying to prove that utilitarianism is correct in this debate. I'm merely illustrating that Pro has not refuted all moralities in which allow for third party analysis.










Debate Round No. 3
Poetaster

Pro

Con seems to believe that I’m intentionally engineering an
unclear argument to “win”. He charges me with semantic trickery. He assumes bad
faith of me in doing so. I have no pretense to “win” by wordy exhaustion.

His attempt to stylistically contrast his argument with mine
by brute repetition of language does nothing to deal with my arguments.

I addressed his counter that rocks are morally eligible
beings because they comply with “ought implies can”.

I addressed this counter in saying, “So far as the external world itself is concerned, smashing
a rock is no different from smashing a face”
, meaning that in order to
distinguish between these two cases, subjectivity must be invoked.

One of those two actions result in suffering and harm:
smashing a rock does not lead to suffering or harm for the rock; smashing a
person’s face does lead to harm and
suffering for that that person. Therefore, the first case is not a moral
scenario; the second case is a moral scenario.

Con points out that rocks are in compliance with “ought
implies can”, but my point is that rocks don’t qualify to be treated as morally eligible things
because they can’t suffer or be harmed.

If morality were objective, then it would be independent of
experience. But morality requires experience, described in subjective terms, in
order to make any sense. It requires that suffering and harm be invoked in
order to account for what it does.

If we eliminate subjectivity from our account, then the
distinction between rocks and people is eliminated also, and morality must
either apply to both rocks and people, or to neither of them.

None of this is new material. I presented this in the
previous round. I’m simply revisiting it because Con flatly denies that I
addressed it in the first place.

Con says that since I “did not define ‘subjective’ when setting up the debate”, I can’t “resort to
[a] private idiosyncratic and inexplicable usage” of that word. This is just
false. In the very first round, I said:

“To be clear, I use [subjective] to mean concerning properties accessible only to
first-person modalities of observation.

This was the second line I typed. Con
accepted this debate after reading this definition. He therefore accepted the
definition, and decided to oppose my claim that morality was subjective by that
definition.

He now denies that I defined "subjectivity" from the outset. This calls into question how closely Con
is really paying attention. Perhaps the reader should take care, then, in
heeding Con’s charge that I am peddling sheer obscurantism.

I defined “subjective” from the outset.

Con has also extended his claim that my use of subjectivity/objectivity
is illegitimate because it’s eccentric or “non-standard.”

I’ve provided an example in which a leading philosopher
(Chalmers) uses objectivity/subjectivity as I do.

Namely, when Chalmers says that a “rich inner life” produced
by physical processes seems “objectively unreasonable”, it does not make sense
to interpret this to mean “consciousness seems like it should be able to not be
so, if one prefers it to not be so”, which how Con has used “subjective”.

Rather, it makes more sense if taken to mean: “Given that
the brain is a bodily organ, all of its data seems like it should be available
to an external analysis by other parties. That it yet produces data which
defies this expectation (i.e. consciousness) seems unreasonable.”

This is the way in which I use “subjective” and it, in fact,
makes sense of everything else Chalmers says.

Applying Con’s use to Chalmers makes his work read like a
Mad Lib.

So my use of “subjectivity” is not an abnormal, shadowy
thing. That Con requires me to use a non-philosophical and colloquial usage of
a word in a philosophical argument is unreasonable.

Con also flatly denies that I showed morality to be non-arbitrary.
This is also untrue. I demonstrated deductively
that harming others is irrational. What is irrational and rational is
non-arbitrary. Since morality concerns itself with harm done unto others, morality
has the same non-arbitrary nature. This is perhaps the strongest argument that
I’ve given. Here it is again, verbatim:

-An agent is a discrete identity. This identity contains the ability to act as
that agent.
-When an agent intentionally performs an action to harm itself, it denies its
identity by affirming its destruction.
-But when an agent intentionally acts, it affirms its capacities to act as an
agent, and therefore its identity.
-Therefore, self-harm is a performative contradiction.
-To assert a contradiction is irrational, and to assert a performative
contradiction is to perform the action it concerns.
-The action concerned is self-harm. Therefore self-harm is irrational.

Now consider a collection of discrete agents:

-Each such agent is a self, and to each of them, every other agent is an other.
-Therefore, each agent occupies a category of "self" and
"other" when all relations between them are considered.
-For one agent to intentionally harm an "other" is for it to harm
another "self". It is therefore harming an element of the category to
which it also belongs.
-But if it so grants that elements of this category may be harmed, then it is
volunteering itself for the same treatment, because it belongs to the same
category.
-This constitutes the endorsement of self-harm, which is irrational.
-Therefore, for one agent to intentionally harm another is irrational.

End proof.

This is not incomprehensible obscurantism; it is deductive
reasoning. This was given in the very beginning, yet Con simply denies its existence. I have cleanly proven this part of the case. Con’s charge that I have disingenuously cloaked my argument with evasive rhetoric is false.

However, I did have to weaken my position on the point that
morality is necessarily subjective.

I conceded to Con that I couldn’t prove morality to be subjective in all possible worlds.

So out of the three things contained in the resolution:

1. Morality
is non-arbitrary,

2. Morality is subjective, and

3. The subjectiveness of morality is necessary, as opposed to just possible.

I’ve successfully defended the first two of these, and conceded the third. This is not a global
failure to uphold the resolution; I've successfully defended it in far
greater proportion than I've had to weaken it. I can still say with good conscience
that readers should vote Pro.

Importantly, I didn't concede the third point to Con because of any counter-argument Con had
made. Con simply noted that my resolution was “a tall order”.

I, in fact, argued myself into the concession by noting that the hard problem of consciousness
forced me to do so.

I have met the burden of proof, and satisfied my role in this debate. Con has claimed that I
have failed to communicate, but I am simply saying what people like Erwin Schrödinger
noted 70 years ago:

"While the stuff from which our world picture is built
is yielded exclusively from the sense organs as organs [that is, agents] of the
mind, …the conscious mind itself remains a stranger within that construct, it
has no living space in it, you can spot it nowhere in space...To learn that it
[the personality of a human being] cannot really be found there [in the
interior of a human body] is so amazing that it meets with doubts and
hesitation, we are very loath to admit it.” [1]

He is noting, as I have repeatedly, that consciousness and its contents behave according to this private causality
that does not act in the world as it appears to its audience (us).

Because our objective accounts of the world only deal with “public”
causality, our subjectivity remains “a stranger” to that account. It is not to
be found within it, for its content cannot be analyzed by external parties; it
consists of this “private causality”.

My points are not bizarre and arcane; this quote of Schrödinger
came from a popular science lecture in 40’s. If I have failed to communicate,
then so has one of the greatest scientists of all time.

I have substantially defended the resolution and can say
with good conscience that readers should vote Pro.

---
[1] Mind and Matter, Schrödinger

wiploc

Con

Con seems to believe that I’m intentionally engineering an unclear argument to “win”. He charges me with semantic trickery. He assumes bad faith of me in doing so.

Not so. In another thread, I suggested a tactic for dealing with bad faith of that sort. And I linked to here, where I demonstrate that technique. So it's understandable that Pro should assume I think him guilty of bad faith. But I don't. I think he suffers from an obscurantist writing style, but not from bad faith.

I apologize for giving Pro the impression that I thought him guilty of bad faith.

I addressed his counter that rocks are morally eligible

beings because they comply with “ought implies can”.

I addressed this counter in saying, “So far as the external world itself is concerned, smashing
a rock is no different from smashing a face”
, meaning that in order to

distinguish between these two cases, subjectivity must be invoked.

Torturing babies for fun is wrong regardless of how you feel about it. That rule is objective. You don't have to believe it's wrong for it to be wrong. You can "invoke subjectivity" all day long, by saying that the babies' suffering is subjective---but that doesn't make the rule subjective. It doesn't make morality subjective.

Con points out that rocks are in compliance with “ought
implies can”, but my point is that rocks don’t qualify to be treated as morally eligible things
because they can’t suffer or be harmed.

Once again, I don't see his point. Morality has to do with the choices of free moral agents. It is morally acceptable to smash rocks, because rocks don't suffer. And you don't get to smash babies, because babies do suffer. The baby's suffering may be, in a sense, subjective, but that doesn't make the rule subjective.

This calls into question how closely Con is really paying attention. Perhaps the reader should take care, then, in heeding Con’s charge that I am peddling sheer obscurantism.

I think we'll have darned few readers. How many will wade thru Pro's fog of words.

However, I did have to weaken my position on the point that morality is necessarily subjective.

I conceded to Con that I couldn’t prove morality to be subjective in all possible worlds.

So out of the three things contained in the resolution:

1. Morality
is non-arbitrary,

2. Morality is subjective, and

3. The subjectiveness of morality is necessary, as opposed to just possible.

I’ve successfully defended the first two of these, and conceded the third. This is not a global
failure to uphold the resolution; I've successfully defended it in far
greater proportion than I've had to weaken it. I can still say with good conscience
that readers should vote Pro.

The resolution is, "Morality is Necessarily Subjective, but Non-Arbitrary." Pro now concedes that that isn't true. At best, morality is possibly subective, not necessarily subjective.


Since Pro concedes that the resolution is false, the votes should go to Con.

Debate Round No. 4
5 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 5 records.
Posted by Poetaster 3 years ago
Poetaster
Good show, wiploc, good show. The final chapter is for you to write.
I know you are an experienced debater, so I enjoyed facing off with you. (This was my first debate here).
I like your terse style, and I've learned from you.
Interestingly, my first formulation of the resolution was: "Morality is Subjective, but Non-Arbitrary",
before I then strengthened it in the belief that I could handle the stronger version.
Of course, the part that I added (that morality was *necessarily* subjective) was the very part I had to later concede to you.
Now I know what kind of morality I can better defend.
Anyway, it's been a pleasure, so thanks.

(As an afterthought, perhaps you could vote Pro? <wink>)
Posted by Poetaster 3 years ago
Poetaster
No worries, I sensed that. Your opening statement became increasingly funnier to me as I reviewed my 1st arg. in prep for rnd3.
It (my arg.) just sounded more and more like an example of bad writing. Oh well, I'm better at extemporizing; the more time I'm given, the more inbred my locutions become.
Posted by wiploc 3 years ago
wiploc
That was a handsome apology. Be assured that my joshing was meant in a good-natured way.
Posted by Poetaster 3 years ago
Poetaster
Or, I should say, in round 3. (No arguments were posted in round 1).
Posted by Poetaster 3 years ago
Poetaster
I am sorry for the lack of clarity; I wrote this while exhausted. The more tired I am, the more pseudo-scholarly I become. I promise pure English in round two.
No votes have been placed for this debate.