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The Contender
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People should be allowed to wear what they want.

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Voting Style: Open Point System: 7 Point
Started: 2/6/2017 Category: Society
Updated: 1 year ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 625 times Debate No: 99641
Debate Rounds (3)
Comments (2)
Votes (1)




during the last year we have assisted an increase of anxiety over muslim dressing. this anxiety is probably justified by the surge in muslim refugees. some countries like France ruled that the face covering should be banned. in my opinion the battle over the veil is making it harder to muslim to assimilate. i support the idea that people should be allowed to wear what they want.


The veil that you describe for Muslim women is called either a niqab or a burka, depending on the style of the facial covering. In a Muslim country that is ruled by Sharia Law, it is fine for women to cover themselves up. But if Muslim women travel to a country that is not governed by Sharia Law, then they are subject to the laws of that country.

There are many reasons why a country may have certain laws regarding dress codes. If a photo is required for a passport, driver license, school ID, etc., then obviously a woman can't have her face covered. Her face has to be shown so that she can be identified. If she has contact with law enforcement for any reason, they have to be able to identify her.

This is not limited to Muslim women though, as the original argument was "people should be allowed to wear what they want." The inference of that statement would give people the freedom to not wear anything at all, if they so choose. Do you really want grown men walking around a playground naked, exposing themselves to children?

There are laws in place for a reason, and people should abide by them.
Debate Round No. 1


I thank my opponeet to have accepted this challenge. I really expected more valid argumentations supporting his contrary point of view. First of all i would like to specify that my phrase " people should be allowed what the want" obviously regards clothes worn according to specific religious prescriptions. But looking more in deep, the problem is more complicated and not simply exhausted by superficial consideration. First of all i feel to invite my opponent to better understand the significance of wearing the veil. The meanings of the vail are more complicted. Veil practices may be experienced as liberating or oppressive bu different women in the same society depending on variables such as religiuos commitments, socio economic ckass, age, race, ethnicity and the particularities of living in a multicultural society. Not all knows that muslim women choose to wear the veil as an expression of their religiuos commitment to Allah and for the benefits and advantages which come from wearing it, as well as a sense of protection from the male gaze. But for this first round just let me explain some basical concepts my opponent missed at all. go back to the born of prejudice about the veil.
Since 9/11 Western media sources have developed a visual shorthand for representing Islam. The most common stereotype is that of the veiled woman, a figure that ambivalently straddles both ideals of multicultural inclusivity and the threat of radicalization as context demands. In this usage of the veiled woman as a loaded symbol, western media are continuing an Orientalist history in its representation of Islam, such that Muslim women"s" voices are still being silenced. In this paper, I hope to break this stereotype apart by highlighting the diverse political and cultural contexts in which Muslim women think about the veil, such that the image of the anonymous veiled woman can no longer be read as shorthand for Islam.
It is important to state at the outset that the Quran does not thoroughly prescribe how women ought to dress. In one passage, direction is given to observe certain modesties but what is particularly noticeable about this passage is that it is addressed to both men and women.
Tell the believing men to lower their gaze and be modest. That is purer for them. Lo! Allah is aware of what they do. And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and be modest, and to display of their adornment only that which is apparent, and to draw their veils over their bosoms, and not to reveal their adornment save to their own husbands or fathers or husbands' fathers, or their sons or their husbands' sons, or their brothers or their brothers' sons or sisters' sons, or their women, or their slaves, or male attendants who lack vigour [sic], or children who know naught of women's nakedness. And let them not stamp their feet so as to reveal what they hide of their adornment. And turn unto Allah together, O believers, in order that ye may succeed.
Despite how little the holy book states on the subject of veiling, the woman"s veil has drawn people's attention throughout history and is still widely debated today. The veil or head covering comes in many forms, and individuals from both within and outside the religion have interpreted it in many ways. The culturally diverse practices of veiling lend specific meaning to both how a woman"s dress is read by her immediate community (identification) but also to how a woman chooses to dress (identity). A woman may wear a simple covering of the head with a colorful, black, or sheer cloth known as a hijab. In western countries, the hijab is the main veil that is worn whereas in Iran the chador is prescribed by law under the Islamic Republic. In Afghanistan, particularly under the Taliban, a woman may wear a full face, head, and body covering called the burqa. In Saudi Arabia, a woman commonly will wear a covering with a veil across the face, revealing only her eyes. This is called the niqab. (Petersen). Despite this cultural variance of veiling, and despite diverse interpretations of veiling (whether spiritual, cultural or political), women"s covering in general has in western media often been reduced to symbolize the perceived "wrongs of Islam." Even though Muslim men also follow a dress code, it is women"s veiling that has been the subject of contested debate (Awadalla). Where the Arab man's dress signifies an oppressor or seducer, the women's dress is read as a symbol of the oppressed. By focusing on women"s oppression, the West legitimizes its "war on terror" as one bringing liberation to Muslim women (See Chapter 3).
To fully understand how the veil as symbol has come to be loaded with negative connotations in the West, it is necessary to briefly chart the history of Orientalist representation. The scholar Edward Said, from Columbia University, used the term Orientalism to denote the constructed lens through which the West sought to know (and thereby dominate) the East. Prior to Said"s influential book (1978), Orientalism referred to a painterly movement in which the East was romanticized by Euro-American artists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Said"s work shows how the West consistently produced an image of the East as its inverse: where the West was enlightened, the Orient was barbaric; where the West was civilized, the Orient was primitive; where the West was rational, the East was beset by passion. This constructed view or "othering" of the Orient was then used to justify the West"s imperial conquest of North Africa, the Middle East and Asia. This Orientalist lens is still evident today in popular discourse in that people of the East are seen as different and more dangerous than the people of the West. Orientalism then is not assigned to the past, but continues today in people"s preconceived notions about people from the Arab world and what it means to be Muslim.
According to Said, a defining moment in Orientalism was Napoleon"s conquest of Egypt. This moment is important to recognize because it created the common notion that the Orient was both different and inferior to the West. When he conquered Egypt, he not only brought in the massive fighting armies, but an army of scientists. These scientists were employed to document how the Arabs functioned for European understanding, indicating that they were not considered the same as people of the West. The underlying power structure implemented by the West created a dynamic where the West was seen to be "discovering" the Arab country. The Arabs became something foreign, examined as a new species and to be experimented with. Thus western colonialisation was an ideological conquest as well as the imperial one.
The lens through which the West views the veil today can be traced back to nineteenth century orientalism. Within Orientalist representations, the veil conjures both eroticism and oppression. When countries were first colonized, the Arabian orient was seen as mysterious and alluring, and this was translated by the image of the mysterious yet alluring veiled women (Yegenoglu 39). The veil was understood as a device that kept women apart from men (like purdah and harem), but the desire to penetrate this secretive space of women became a common colonial fantasy, mirroring the larger colonial project to take control of land and resources. The sight of the veiled women evoked erotic fantasies by Western males and drew on their desire for domination. While the seclusion of the women from the public sphere created in the colonizer"s mind an erotic invitation, this desire was entangled with the idea of freeing these women from their backward culture. The reading of the veil as a symbol of oppression originated in writings that depicted Muslim culture as inferior and backwards. Between 1800 and 1950, an estimated 60,000 books were produced about the Arab orient in the West. The purpose of these books was to show colonized Muslims as underdeveloped and in desperate need of "help" from the West. These writings depicted Muslim women as imprisoned by barbaric Arab males, trapped in polygamous marriages, or forced to cover their bodies with the veil . This reading of the veil as a symbol of oppression served to show how Muslim women were entrapped by a violent patriarchy, and their only way out was through the help and intervention of the West. The colonizers not only thought they were the ones that could save the women, but also believed that they could take over societies through the conquering of women. Women in this sense become the key to owning the society.To understand more fully this movement between desire and control, it may be helpful to look to examine a particular example of colonial representation of oriental women. During the French colonial rule of Algeria, a series of postcards depicting Algerian women in an erotic light were printed to send home. These postcards allude to the deeper subconscious force of orientalism. Representations of the political dynamics of colonialism surround these postcards. The photographer"s project is representative of the colonizers", and the female can be read as a metaphor of the terrain to be surveyed and colonized. The woman is sexualized through the photograph, becoming someone who is waiting to be seen. The woman is made to be seen as inviting the Western man to ravish her. This is often affected using the veil that both conceals and reveals the woman"s body, eroticizing and fetishizing her cultural differences.
When colonized countries sought their freedom from colonial rule, the colonizer"s romance soured and the veil came to be interpreted less as an invitation and more as a symbol of oppression and/or rejection of Western values. Since the countries were no longer places of mystery, neither was the veil. "The post-colonial imagery has been far less concerned with unveiling than with maximizing the social, cultural and political distance between the 'West' and 'Islam' and conveying a sense of threat through an inversion which emphasizes the most complete forms of female covering, a hyperveiling" .
The veil became a way to differentiate the West from Islam. Whereas in postcolonial discourse the veil was taken up as a visual marker of resisting Western imperialism, in neocolonial discourse the veil once again became the marker of the backwardness of the East, and was coupled again by the desire for its removal. However, this time the desire to unveil was not erotically charged desire. Instead, neocolonial discourse equates women"s liberation with a ripping off the veil. Problematically, though, for many Muslim women the veil provides the very means to being freed from being cast as a sexual object. This is where the argument of choice has become an important topic within discussions of the veil . Freedom of choice and religion are often the loudest proclamations made within Western society. Yet, when discussing the veil, it is a common, almost naturalized, reaction, for Westerners to assume a woman wearing the veil is being forced to do so. It is this reaction that enacts what we can call a modern orientalism. "Orientalism is a way of thinking that assumes there is an absolute difference between East and West. According to this logic, the West is seen as rational, developed, human, and superior. In contrast to the East, which is defined as it"s opposite, irrational, underdeveloped, barbaric and inferior." (Professor Alsutany)
One of the strongest examples of contemporary orientalism can be seen in media portrayals of Islam. After 9/11, Muslims were stereotyped as threatening terrorists, but this stereotype was not new to 2001 but rather reborn. Media coverage of Iran"s Islamic Revolution had already planted this stereotype of the violent Muslim aggressor in modern America. The power of this stereotype is such that the photograph above of veiled women with blank faces and machine guns would lead many Americans to think that these women are militant radicals. Yet, this picture is actually of the Iranian police force, which has recently allowed women to join their ranks, and thereby would be more accurately interpreted as a depiction of women gaining status within their society.
Given the orientalist reading of the veil, it has become
"commonsense" in the west that veiled women are oppressed
(Hoodfar 8). When political conflicts between the Western and
Islamic world erupt, the images that start to appear of Muslim
women are fabricated to bring forth maximum emotional
reaction from the common person (Lewis). Often, these are of
anonymous, veiled women who are denied cultural and/or geographic or even domestic context. They are represented as dark phantoms or sinister totems, silently encroaching upon secular society. For example, during the headscarf controversy in France, the images that were presented alongside news articles would show a woman in a full chador actually located in Iran. This image is the most dramatized image of a Muslim woman, and is perceived to be most threatening to the French Republic (Lewis). Meanwhile, the woman pictured is not even from France, where in fact the majority of Muslim women wear the hijab rather than chador or niqab.
In this way, orientalism is strategically used as a lens through which the media seek to invoke certain emotions, especially when there is a political crisis. The following chapters will further demonstrate how the image of the veiled woman is repeatedly used within media to signify a threat and/or obstacle to liberal democracy even though local attitudes to veiling in Iran, France, USA, and Canada vary greatly..
Through the decompression of the meanings that have been overloaded onto the veil, a deeper understanding of the veil may be reached. Through acknowledging the colonial readings of the veil and charting the different political agendas in representations of the veil, this paper seeks to show that these imposed readings often have little bearing on Muslim women"s personal choice to wear the veil which for many is often as much an item of fashion as it is of faith. In so doing this paper seeks to score, what Emma Tarlo has called "the polyphonic resonance" of the veil.


You don't get to move the goalposts after the game has started. If you wanted to debate a specific theme within that context, then you should have specified that in the beginning. So let's steer the debate back to your original statement of "People should be allowed to wear what they want." Oh, and your wall of text was very difficult to read.

You are defending your position from the aspects of Sharia Law. I already stated that in a country where Sharia Law governs, it is fine for a woman to wear a veil. But in countries that are not governed by Sharia Law, Muslims traveling to those countries are subject to the laws of that country. As I have already pointed out, the veil prevents proper identification for whatever reason(s). Moving beyond this point as it was previously discussed.

You talked about women being covered up in order to be modest, so that men would not ravish her or have lustful thoughts. Are Arab men really that weak willed? Can they not control themselves? Or is it that Muslim men don't trust their women?

Western/European women wear bikinis (or less) on the beaches but I don't see the men raping every female that is sunbathing. As a matter of fact, very rarely do you hear of that happening. Countless times I have gone to the beach and not once have I ever witnessed a woman being raped because she was wearing a bikini. Men can look but not touch. It's called having morals and knowing that rape is wrong, therefore you don't act impulsively. You control yourself. Besides, the women are looking just as hard as the men. It's eye candy!

Lastly, you say it is the woman's choice whether or not to wear the veil. When faced with being killed for refusing to wear it, it's not much of a choice, now is it?



And to show that the veil concept is male chauvinistic in nature, and is merely another attempt to control Muslim women and make them inferior to Muslim men:
Debate Round No. 2


As far as the approach of the International Human Rights Law standards is concerned, the debates on the wearing of headscarf by Muslim women in Europe could be analysed from the following three-fold dimension of rights, namely; freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom from discrimination and the right to education and work.
Despite persistent controversies, the core of freedom of religion is not disputed. It is largely explicit from the text of the major international human rights instruments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 spoke of the "advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and beliefR23;. Indeed, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is considered a fundamental human right. As noted by the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religious Belief 1981 religion or belief, for anyone who professes either, is one of the fundamental elements of his life. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 is probably the most widely accepted text, with 155 states parties as of 1 April 2006. It provides;
"1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions."
In addition, under the Article 9(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), it was mentioned that;
"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes...freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance."24
The European Court of Human Rights has consistently stated that this right of freedom of religion is at the core of a democratic society, claiming that, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned.
The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been won over the centuries, depends on itR23;. The second part of Article 9 protects the freedom to "manifestR23; ones religion or belief "in public or in private, alone or with othersR23;. The manifestation may include "worship, teaching, practice or observanceR23;. Indeed, having mentioned previously that the wearing of headscarf constitutes an observance of Muslim women to the duty that is mandatory for them, wearing of headscarf should therefore be deemed as a form of manifestation of religion. Any act that could hinder the right to manifest the religion as prescribed in Article 9(1) of the ECHR could amount to the violation of peopleR23;s right to freedom of religion. The fact that there are some Muslim women who failed to properly observe such obligation cannot form a basis to conclude that the wearing of headscarf is not compulsory in Islam. It was the people to be blamed for not complying with the rule and not the rule itself. The justification whether the wearing of headscarf in Islam is a form of religious manifestation should therefore be made on the Islamic perspectives but not on the Muslim practices. In Vereniging v Netherlands, the European Commission of Human Rights stated "Article 9 primarily protects the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds....[i]n addition it protects acts which are intimately linked to these attitudes such as acts of worship or devotion which are aspects of the practice of the religion or belief in a recognised formR23;. Indeed, in Mannousakis v Greece, the Court held that the right of manifestation of belief excludes the discretion of states to determine "whether religious beliefs or the means used to express them are legitimateR23;.
On the other hand, the subsequent article i.e. Article 9(2) of the ECHR has drawn up some limitations to the right to manifest religion. The Article states; "[f]reedom to manifest oneR23;s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals or for the protection of rights and freedoms of othersR23;. Indeed, the right enshrined in Article 9 is so fundamental that the limitations in Article 9(2) are even narrower than those relating to the freedom of expression, association and assembly contained in the ECHR. The European Court has consistently stated that there must be a narrow construction of these limitations together with a broad interpretation of the freedoms guaranteed. Any restrictions on freedoms must be "construed strictlyR23; and can be justified only by "convincing and compelling reasonsR23;. Hence, if a state were to ban the headscarf, it should firstly determine whether such ban is "prescribed by lawR23; or "necessaryR23; insofar as to protect "the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals or for the protection of rights and freedoms of othersR23;. Despite being an individual right, not a group one, the Article 9(1) makes it clear that the freedom of religion has a community dimension, viz, "either alone or in community with othersR23;. It was the state that will have the margin of appreciation and power to make national assessment on deciding whether to limit the extent of a religious manifestation.
Additionally, there have issues of the religious manifestation could also fall under the protection of freedom of expression provided in Article 10 of the ECHR. Consider the case of Leyla Saihin v. Turkey where Ms. Sahin argued that the ban on the Islamic headscarf by Turkish government in higher education was an "unjustified interference with her right to freedom of religionR23; and "her right to manifest her religionR23;, under Article 9 of the ECHR. The Court, however, perceived the wearing of hijab or headscarf for Muslim women as "not a direct expression of the religion concernedR23;, but rather as a mere-religiously motivated act which could not be protected under Article 9. The wearing of the headscarf was thus seen to be a form of "manifestation of conscience or thoughtR23;, rather than a "manifestation of religionR23;. Although the judgment was also been challenged as a violation of Article 10R23;s freedom of expression, the Court maintained its judgment, stating that the impugned measures were justifiable for their legitimate aims; to protect the rights and freedom of others and public order, "to uphold the principle of secularism and to ensure the neutrality nature of Turkish universities. Hence, a conclusion could be drawn from this issue is the rights to religious manifestation provided in Article 9 are divided into two clusters, namely; the "manifestation of religion or beliefR23; and the "manifestation of thought and conscienceR23;.
This has much to do with the distinction between "religion or beliefR23; and "thought or conscienceR23;, in that manifestation of thought or conscience may fall within the freedom of expression under Article 10. This is the manifestation of thought or conscience is always treated as "merely an idea dictated from religious beliefR23;, rather than an "obligation or direct devotion of the religion concernedR23; which should be protected unconditionally. Nevertheless, it is fundamental to remember that, to a Muslim woman, the wearing of the headscarf is not merely a personal display of faith - it is an obligation imposed by her religion. Proponents of the ban claim that the headscarf cannot be tolerated in a secular state educational system because the mere fact of wearing it amounts to proselytism. Yet for those who wear it, it is simply a matter of personal obedience to God. It is also imperative to remember that even if evidence is adduced to show that the headscarf amounts to proselytism - this is not a legitimate reason under international human rights law to ban it from being worn. In fact, such a manifestation of oneR23;s religion would be protected under ECHR provisions relating to freedom of expression. Article 10 of the ECHR provides that this right includes, "freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interferenceR23;. This right is often considered the cornerstone of personal freedom and is vigorously upheld. Indeed, the Court has stated that it "constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every manR23; and applies to the freedom to express an opinion, even when it might "offend, shock or disturbR23;. In reality, this is the same freedom of expression advocated by European countries which criticise states such as Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan for their human rights standards. Human rights law is not specific to culture or country - it exists precisely to contradict every form of state oppression - whether it is in the name of religion or secularism.
A further argument being made to support the ban is that childrenR23;sR23; autonomy is being overridden by parents and communities who are coercing them into wearing the headscarf. However, once again, there is little evidence to support this and even if this is the case - it is impossible to justify replacing parental control over a childR23;s actions with state control over the dress of individuals of an entire section of the community. Indeed, the idea of human rights is based on the notion that for each individual there is an area of personal liberty immune from state invasion. In recognition of this principle, Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR (1952) (to which France, Germany and Belgium are signatories) states, no person shall be denied the right to education...the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictionsR23;. This is one example of the intention of international legislation to endorse the right of parents to protect children against the use of educational institutions by the state for ideological indoctrination of its own ideas. It seems that while the apparently proselytising nature of the headscarf is being criticised by state authorities, the same authorities are also engaging in their own form of proselytism by banning religious symbols - that of furthering their own secular agenda. This has particularly serious consequences if we remember that it is precisely in the human mind that attitudes and prejudices take form. By imposing the fictional absence of religion in schools that exist within a multi-faith society, it is arguable that the Government is simply promoting the development of uniform intolerant attitudes within young minds.
Under the ECHR, the limitations on freedom under Article 9(2) are subject to Article 14 which, among other things, provides that the Convention rights "shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.R23; The European Court has stated that discrimination on the basis of certain grounds, such as race and sex, is particularly serious and has stated that "very weighty reasonsR23; would have to be advanced before such treatment could be regarded as compatible with the Convention. A ban on the headscarf, turban and kippa is unfairly discriminatory towards particular ethnic groups - namely Jews, Sikhs and generally Muslims from a particular racial group. Furthermore, in Germany, the ban is only applicable to the headscarf and specifically excludes Jewish and other religious symbols - a clear instance of religious discrimination.
Although Germany has purported to justify this on the grounds of the Christian nature of the country, it is unlikely that the European Court will consider GermanyR23;s margin of appreciation in interpreting the ECHR wide enough to allow such flagrant discrimination. Furthermore, a ban on the headscarf would clearly affect women for whom this religious dress is considered mandatory under Islam. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 1979, to which France, Germany and Belgium are signatories, provides that the term "discrimination against womenR23; shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women...on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms...R23;. Article 2, on the other hand, places an obligation on states to "condemn discrimination against women in all its formsR23; and "to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women...R23;.
The fundamental issue behind the headscarf debates in Europe lies in the failure of majority of European people and governments to properly understand the obligatory nature of wearing headscarf from the Islamic perspectives. Some have made justification that headscarf is not a religious manifestation based on the diverse type of practices relating to wearing of headscarf by Muslim in Europe which are inherent in various cultural backgrounds from different Muslim communities. Such practices, however, might not necessarily conform to the rightful Islamic principles. Islam has made it clear about the requirements on covering the aurah for Muslim women, and thus the dress being worn by them should aim to meet such requirements and not to reduce or add something which is beyond what is required for them. Apart from the prescribed requirements, other additional "thingR23;, for example niqab cannot be considered as something compulsory under Islamic rules or syariah as discussed before, i.e. due to the conflicting views among the Muslim scholars. Hence the ban on niqab could be justifiable based on its non-compulsory nature under syariah and the states may have the role and margin of appreciation to decide on whether such dress consistence with its democratic identity. Nevertheless, the ban cannot be extended to the wearing of headscarf as the headscarf is part of the dresses that will meet the requirements on dress code of Muslim women. As such, the compulsory nature of headscarf should be made clear in the first place to avoid any possible violation of the right to religious manifestation protected in the virtue of the freedom of religion. Additionally, the States must implement measures under CEDAW to abolish all discriminatory laws and ensure the effective protection of women against discrimination.
Freedom of religion constitutes the core principle of a democratic society. As such, a democratic country that denies this right from being enjoyed by its people could be deemed as undemocratic. Islamic headscarf, being a manifestation of the freedom of religion, has indeed ignited a recurring dilemma among various European countries on whether to accept it as part of their multicultural diversities or a mark of separation which is not compatible with their democratic societies. Even though the discussion about headscarf was seen by some, including Muslims, as something trivial and less important, it should be viewed as a paramount element of a religious manifestation. Despite the fact that there are a significant number of Muslim women out there who chose not to comply with the headscarf obligation, this does not mean the wearing of headscarf has no basis in Islam. The acts and behaviour of Muslim cannot be a basis in justifying the Islamic principles. Having analysed the headscarf from the perspectives of Islam and the International Human Rights standards, this article believes that the wearing of headscarf should not be banned as it is an observance to the religion, simply like worship, and the claim that wearing headscarf could contribute public disorder or social dissention is totally unjustifiable and unacceptable.


Sheesh, another wall of text.

I noticed you did not have any rebuttals from round 2, so I guess you agree with my points.

In round 3, you moved the goal posts again. We have gone from talking about facial veils to head scarfs. The latter do not necessarily cover the face.

With all the international laws and standards that you quoted, you failed to realize that #3 supports my claims from previous rounds: "3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others." The need to identify a woman wearing a veil, will trump her religious rights posed by international law.

The rest of your wall of text post talks about wearing the head scarf (the debate was about the veil) as a religious obligation. You failed to address my point in round 2 where I stated that women have been killed for refusing to wear it. That is not an obligation, duty or choice. That is an ultimatum, with the penalty for noncompliance being death.

I have clearly made the case as to why women may have to remove their veils when traveling to other countries. I have demonstrated why people can't just "wear what they want,"as it could cause public alarm (naked man in the park). You failed to address any of my points in round 2. Lastly, you kept moving the goal posts and changing the debate topic midstream.
Debate Round No. 3
2 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 2 records.
Posted by Taniaptania 1 year ago
There are several reasons, in my opinion, for which ban the burqa and 'wrong.
1) Banning the veil is the best way to segregate women.
It is certainly true that many are forced to wear by fathers or husbands, but that does not authorize the state to perpetuate the same violence forcing you to remove it.
If a country does not agree with the veil, many will be forced to stay home, preventing them a participation in social life resulting in inability to integrate.
2) For many such a ban Muslim and Muslims increases the sense of exclusion, and possibly resentment and radicalization, the inability to express their religious beliefs and their own principles.
3) It is an anti-feminist stance.
Despite there are social pressures in the choice to wear the veil, the majority of women today are veiled it makes for a free individual choice. Deny freedom to choose on their own bodies is a decision that goes against the right to self-determination of women.
Posted by Andrea75 1 year ago
i thank my opponent to have accepted this challenge. the topic i tried to argue about is very difficult.
there is actually no consent between different countries ruled by different laws. from my point of view the main aim is to get a rule that respects the freedom and doesn't respond to the prejudices.
1 votes has been placed for this debate.
Vote Placed by RonPaulConservative 1 year ago
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Total points awarded:03 
Reasons for voting decision: Pro argued that people should be able to wear burkas if they want- con argued that burkas make it impossible to identify someone, and that restricting people from wearing them is justifiable.