The Instigator
Pro (for)
6 Points
The Contender
Con (against)
8 Points

Roe v. Wade was a decision by the Supreme Court with no reasonable Constitutional basis

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Voting Style: Open Point System: 7 Point
Started: 12/16/2014 Category: Politics
Updated: 1 year ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 797 times Debate No: 67137
Debate Rounds (4)
Comments (7)
Votes (3)




Roe v. Wade was the most egregious case of judicial activism in American history. The Supreme Court is supposed to INTERPRET the constitution, not MAKE UP RULES FROM THIN AIR, but regrettably the justices used their exalted position as to do just that in Roe v. Wade.

I will be proving that Roe v. Wade was an egregious decision that had no constitutional basis. In other words, the decision was wrong.

Please can I have someone debate this who is willing to actually examine the majority opinion. I have done so and it is not too much to expect. If you don't it will just be that much easier for me to win.

Anyway, good luck.

One last thing:

This is not a debate about pro choice v. pro life. This a debate about Constitutional Law and should be treated accordingly.


Debate Round No. 1


The justices in Roe v. Wade based their decision off the supposed "right to privacy" that gives women the right to decide whether or not to have an abortion without state legislation interfering.

Here is the relevant portion of the 14th Amendment:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. [1]

What portion of this includes the "right to privacy"? Well, believe it or not, it's this part.

" . . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty . . ."

It's the liberty part. Apparently "liberty" includes the liberty to abort your baby.

Now, keep in mind that in cases of judicial review the Supreme Court is supposed to decide whether law(s) violate the constitution"according to what the constitution was actually intended to mean. They cannot make up their own interpretation just to get the decision they want.

Or at least they SHOULDN'T. However, that's what they did here.

Now, for the purposes of this debate, in determining whether the SC decision was valid in light of original intent, there is one vital question we must answer:

Was the right to have an abortion a "liberty" that was INTENDED to be protected by the phrase "No State shall . . . deprive any person of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law"?

It may also be considered whether the baby is entitled to life under this amendment, but we shall confine ourselves to this issue.

Now, if abortion was intended to be protected by the framers of this amendment, then we would expect to see wide support of abortion among legislators and the general public around 1868, when the 14th Amendment was adopted.

The following is taken directly from the SC's discussion of the history of abortion:

"Gradually, in the middle and late 19th century, the quickening distinction disappeared from the statutory law of most States and the degree of the offense and the penalties were increased [for abortion]."

The court then goes on to point out that by the end of the 1950's anti-abortion laws were in place in most of the US.

Does it look like legislators approved of the woman's "protected liberty" of abortion around the 1860's? Indeed, the evidence indicates that around the time of the 14th Amendment legislators were starting to crack down harder on abortions.

And what did the medical authorities at the time say?

Direct quote from Roe v. Wade:
"The anti-abortion mood prevalent in this country in the late 19th century was shared by the medical profession. Indeed, the attitude of the profession may have played a significant role in the enactment of stringent criminal abortion legislation during that period.

An AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion was appointed in May, 1857. It presented its report, 12 Trans. of the Am.Med.Assn. 778 (1859), to the Twelfth Annual Meeting. That report observed that the Committee had been appointed to investigate criminal abortion "with a view to its general suppression." It deplored abortion and its frequency and it listed three causes of "this general demoralization":

The first of these causes is a widespread popular ignorance of the true character of the crime -- a belief, even among mothers themselves, that the foetus is not alive till after the period of quickening.

The second of the agents alluded to is the fact that the profession themselves are frequently supposed careless of foetal life. . . .

The third reason of the frightful extent of this crime is found in the grave defects of our laws, both common and statute, as regards the independent and actual existence of the child before birth, as a living being. These errors, which are sufficient in most instances to prevent conviction, are based, and only based, upon mistaken and exploded medical dogmas. With strange inconsistency, the law fully acknowledges the foetus in utero and its inherent rights, for civil purposes; while personally and as criminally affected, it fails to recognize it, [p142] and to its life as yet denies all protection.

Id. at 776. The Committee then offered, and the Association adopted, resolutions protesting "against such unwarrantable destruction of human life," calling upon state legislatures to revise their abortion laws, and requesting the cooperation of state medical societies "in pressing the subject." Id. at 28, 78.

In 1871, a long and vivid report was submitted by the Committee on Criminal Abortion. It ended with the observation,

We had to deal with human life. In a matter of less importance, we could entertain no compromise. An honest judge on the bench would call things by their proper names. We could do no less.

22 Trans. of the Am.Med.Assn. 268 (1871). It proffered resolutions, adopted by the Association, id. at 38-39, recommending, among other things, that it

be unlawful and unprofessional for any physician to induce abortion or premature labor without the concurrent opinion of at least one respectable consulting physician, and then always with a view to the safety of the child -- if that be possible,

and calling

the attention of the clergy of all denominations to the perverted views of morality entertained by a large class of females -- aye, and men also, on this important question.""

It seems that the legislators listened to the AMA, as the previous account of laws indicated. The court itself says very clearly, "The anti-abortion mood prevalent in this country in the late 19th century."

The evidence is clear. In 1859 the AMA was indignantly supporting the suppression of "criminal abortion." From before that time until the 1950's public opinion, represented by the laws enacted by legislators, was steadily mounting against abortion.

It should be obvious that any claim that the drafters of the 14th Amendment intended "liberty" to include the "liberty to abort your child" is preposterous. We may safely say such a possibility of graphic misinterpretation did not even enter their minds. If it had, they would surely have clarified the point, as no one in their day and age could have otherwise guessed their meaning! It was only through the Court's unprecedented act of judicial activism was this unjust decision arrived at.

Over to you, Con.


You can find Roe v. Wade online here: It is long, but be assured the portions I qutoed are there.


I'll start with constitutional interpretation. Pro argues for some version of originalism, asking whether the right to abortion has some basis in the Constitution's "original intent." But that isn't the only or best theory of constitutional interpretation. In fact, most judges, lawyers, and academics don't follow an originalist approach.

I argue for a nonoriginalist theory of interpretation, which focuses on the principles underlying the constitutional text rather than the specific intent of the framers. Thus, for example, the 8th Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments" is judged by contemporary application of these concepts, not by how people living in 1791 would have applied those concepts and principles. In 1791, public flogging was acceptable; today it's cruel and unusual punishment and therefore unconstitutional.

The constitutional text does not change without Article V amendment. But the conditions surrounding the text are always changing; new problems are discovered and new forms of social conflict are generated. As a result, new questions constantly arise over how to apply the Constitution in new contexts. Originalism doesn't help solve these questions because its "original intent" doesn't speak to them.

As a dramatic example of the above point, consider the most esteemed judicial opinion in American history, Brown v. Board of Education. Holding that racial segregation in schools was unconstitutional, Brown is indisputably nonoriginalist. If the 14th amendment had been thought, in 1868, to forbid racial segregation of schools, it would not have been ratified. On originalist grounds, Brown was decided incorrectly. But on nonoriginalist grounds, the decision followed from the principle of equality that underlies the 14th amendment.

From a nonoriginalist perspective, Roe v. Wade clearly has a reasonable constitutional basis. Two principles underlie the 14th Amendment: liberty and equality. Criminalization of abortion limits both. That fact alone is enough to prove that Roe v. Wade has a reasonable constitutional basis.

Liberty. When the state bans abortion, it effectively forces some women to become mothers or to give up sexual intercourse (because contraception is not always effective). Thus, banning abortion limits women's liberty by denying them the liberty to choose whether to become mothers. This poses a significant burden on women's liberty, because becoming a parent imposes a number of obligations, including years of child care.

Equality. Men don't have any special obligation to surrender their bodies to bear children. Criminalization of abortion thus limits women's equality by forcing them to surrender their bodies to bear children, even when it would endanger their life and their health. Indeed, women forced to become a parent may have to commit years of child care (beyond the 9 months of pregnancy), and for many women, increased social and economic dependence on men. That places women in an unequal position in relation to men, who don't have any special obligations to bear children or become parents.

The 14th amendment's underlying principles -- liberty and equality -- provide a reasonable constitutional basis for Roe v. Wade's holding -- that there is a constitutional right to abortion. Furthermore, even in the absence of Roe v. Wade, most states today would still protect some kind of right to abortion. According to public opinion polls, less than twelve states would outlaw abortion. That suggests most of the public now regards abortion as a basic right among the guarantees of citizenship. This is further evidence that under a nonoriginalist interpretation of the Constitution, Roe v. Wade was decided correctly.

Given the widespread support for nonoriginalism -- including most judges, lawyers, and academics -- nonoriginalist interpretation provides at the very least a "reasonable constitutional basis" for Supreme Court decisions, including Roe v. Wade. Pro cannot win this debate unless he can show that nonoriginalism does not offer a "reasonable constitutional basis" for Supreme Court decisions. That's nearly an impossible task, given the widespread support that nonoriginalism receives. The standard here is "reasonableness," and a theory of constitutional interpretation with as much support as nonoriginalism is certainly reasonable as a way to interpret the Constitution.

That said, even from an originalist perspective, Roe v. Wade has a reasonable constitutional basis. Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right to abortion, many rights are implied via original intent. For example, the right to privacy has been inferred on the basis of multiple provisions in the Constitution. Pro does not argue against the right to privacy, so there is no debate (as far as I understand) that original intent can encompass implied rights.

There is at least some evidence that the drafters of the 14th amendment had a right to abortion in mind. The common law made abortion a crime after quickening, but not before. Quickening is the point where a fetus's movements could be felt by a pregnant womann, usually between the fourth and fifth month (kinda like a functional equivalent to viability, the modern test for when women still have a right to abortion).

Pro argues that the 14th amendment did not include a right to abortion because the American Medical Association did not support abortion in 1868. But the AMA's opinion has nothing to do with the "original intent" behind the 14th amendment. Pro offers no evidence that the framers or adopters of the 14th amendment sought to enact a principle that would alter common law views about abortion. Nor does Pro offer any evidence that the framer and adopters supported the criminalization of abortion.

Furthermore, Pro doesn't mention that most abortion statutes passed at the time -- including the Texas statute at issue in Roe v. Wade, enacted in 1854 -- criminalized abortions performed on women but did not punish women who self-aborted. In other words, the point of abortion laws in the 19th century seems to have been about protecting women from botched abortions by incompetent doctors; the right to abortion was still partially protected by allowing women to self-abort. Given the advances in medical science and the competency of doctors, the concern over botched abortions in the 19th century is no longer a pressing concern. This fact easily explains the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade in relation to these abortion laws.

To conclude, nonoriginalism's focus on the principles underlying the 14th amendment offers a reasonable constitutional basis for Roe v. Wade. I win the debate on that point alone. But even from an originalist perspective, Roe v. Wade has some support -- it rests on the common law tradition, which is the background against which the drafters of the Constitution always operate. Without explicit evidence that the drafters sought to alter the common law, the Constitution must be interpreted in light of the common law and the text's underlying principles of liberty and equality.
Debate Round No. 2


Thank you, Con.

First, Con argues that original intent isn't the best way to interpret the Constitution. Con believes in nonoriginalism, where the focus is placed on the principles, rather than the specific intent, of the framers.

I would argue that originalism is in fact the only "fair" way to interpret the constitution under the American system of government. Suppose that a judge has no consistent method of interpretation. He or she just gets some emotional feeling about who should win or lose and then interprets the Constitution to guide the decision toward that outcome. This (lack of) method would be obviously unjust.

Keeping that in mind, let's consider how a "living constitution," "progressive justice," or other nonoriginal method of interpretation would work. What is meant is not that we should amend the Constitution; obviously Article V, as my opponent pointed out, allows for that. Neither does nonoriginalism mean that we should apply the original words to new fact patterns. Instead, what is usually meant is that we should apply the original words to create entirely new principles of constitutional law.

Under the American system of government, democracy is held in high esteem. Some argue that originalism places too much emphasis on the past and too little emphasis on progress and the present. But, although it would truly be undemocratic to have a law that could never be changed, that is obviously not the case with our Constitution. The 14th Amendment was put in place to do just that: override portions of the constitution that were now deemed intolerable.

The true conflict is not between past and present. The real issue is: Should today's judges be allowed to change the law written by yesterday's legislators? After all, judges are not allowed, under the Constitution, to change it or to make laws. Their sole duty, as regards judicial review, is that of interpretation. If they use nonoriginalism, deciding not based upon original intent but upon what they think should and should not be the law, then they are usurping their position.

Concerning Brown v. Board of Education, this is from the decision:

"[D]oes segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does. ...

"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system." ...

We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."

The judges did not make up their own meaning. The framers of the 14th Amendment intended blacks and whites to have equal protection, and the judges realized allowing segregation was affecting "colored" children negatively, leading to a system that was far from "equal." This case is miles away from Roe. Anyway, if Brown has no Constitutional basis (which is not the case) then that is another issue for another debate.

Con says: "As a result, new questions constantly arise over how to apply the Constitution in new contexts. Originalism doesn't help solve these questions because its "original intent" doesn't speak to them."

So instead our judges should make up a new meaning that does "speak to them"? They should ignore the original meaning and fabricate one more relevant? Such a system would clearly be unjust, placing a vast amount of power in the hands of nine appointed -not elected- judges who will occupy their positions until death. The framers of the Constitution would be most indignant to realize that such an unjust position was given so much backing, that so many educated Americans would advocate allowing judges to decide their own meanings.

EVEN WITH ORIGINAL INTENT: Con argues that implied rights can be included in the Constitution. I would agree that that is possible.

Now, to Con's reasons why the right to abortion might be an implied right:

Common law made abortion a crime after quickening but not before.
What does common law have to do with anything? The only relevant period is that surrounding the drafting and ratification of the 14th Amendment. Common law had many far weirder and unjust practices harkening back to medieval traditions. For example, all men 14 and over had to be trained in using the longbow, under common law. The idea of "quickening" being the time when the baby's soul comes into existence was the cause of that particular weird law, and I am sure there were plenty of sexist common laws. Plainly put, common law is to the Constitution as a flashlight is to a lighthouse. Besides, arguing that the 14th Amendment makes abortion a liberty after quickening but not before is a dramatic case of nonoriginalist interpretation, as I can hardly think the composers put that much thought into it without making their intentions clearer. The main focus at the time was on segregation, not abortion.

Pro didn't provide proof the actual adopters did not intend a right to abortion.
The legislatures that passed the 14th Amendment, as I pointed out earlier, in most cases had already or would pass anti-abortion laws. As a result, I hardly think abortion even entered their minds. The AMA's testimony is good evidence that the scientific world regarded the fetus to be a person who should be protected.

Abortion laws were to protect women from botched abortions.
A little thought debunks this one. Self-abortion is much more dangerous than abortion done by a doctor. As botched abortions are even more common when done by the woman herself than when done by an untrained doctor, it seems improbable this was the case, given the AMA's lobbying and the medical push for protection of the fetus. More likely, perhaps, is the theory that the legislators' main goal was to combat doctors specializing and charging for abortions. This is not indicative of a carelessness about self-abortion but rather of a tight focus upon the illegality of the commercialization of abortion. I have seen no sources backing up Con's claim, so I cannot be sure about the exact reasoning.

Original intent is the only just, democratic, and constitutional means to interpret the constitution. Under original intent, there is no constitutional basis for Roe v. Wade's preclusion of state prohibition of even 1st-trimester abortions, and absolutely no basis for the "right to abortion."


This debate is not about the "best" theory of constitutional interpretation. This debate is about whether Roe v. Wade has a "reasonable" Constitutional basis. The standard here is reasonableness. So while I think nonoriginalism is better than originalism, that point isn't necessary to my argument. As long as nonoriginalism produces reasonable interpretations of the Constitution, I win this debate. Pro's arguments that nonoriginalism isn't reasonable fail for two key reasons:

1. Pro mischaracterizes nonoriginalism.

Nonoriginalism recognizes that the constitutional text is often phrased at such a high level of generality that originalist interpretation alone simply cannot answer many difficult questions of constitutional law. Thus, judges must figure out how the original principles underlying the constitutional text -- things like liberty and equality -- apply in cases where there was no "original intent" (unforeseen circumstances), cases where there were multiple (conflicting) "original intents," and cases where the text's underlying principles conflict with the "original intent."

Contrary to Pro's claim,the nonoriginalism I argue for doesn't create "new principles of constitutional law." Nonoriginalism simply gives greater weight to the text's "underlying principles" than the text's "original intent." As I explained with the "cruel and unusual punishments" example, the principles remain the same; what changes is how those principles are applied, based on new contexts. In 1750, flogging was acceptable. Today, it's not. In 1850, abortions were harmful to women. Today, they aren't. That's how nonoriginalism operates -- it applies the text's underlying principles to new contexts.

2. Pro mischaracterizes Brown v. Board of Education.

Pro says Brown is consistent with the original intent of the 14th Amendment. Unfortunately, this is simply not true. Even in the fractured discipline of constitutional law, there is an overwhelming consensus that Brown is inconsistent with the original intent of the 14th Amendment. [1] The same Congress that ratified the 14th Amendment also voted for segregated schools in the District of Columbia only a couple years earlier, and voted to continue funding segregated schools after the 14th Amendment was passed. Even Robert Bork, one of originalism's biggest supporters, has agreed that Brown cannot be defended on originalist grounds: “[t]he inescapable fact is that those who ratified the [14th] amendment did not think it outlawed segregated education or segregation in any aspect of life.” [2]

Ironically, Pro justifies Brown on nonoriginalist grounds without realizing that's what he's doing. Pro states: "The judges did not make up their own meaning. The framers of the 14th Amendment intended blacks and whites to have equal protection, and the judges realized allowing segregation was affecting 'colored' children negatively, leading to a system that was far from 'equal.'"

What Pro does in the above quote is apply the "underlying principle" of "equality" to the problem of segregation. But the drafters, as I explained above, believed segregation was allowed by the 14th Amendment. The underlying principle of the constitutional text -- equality -- is inconsistent with the "original intent" of allowing segregated schools. In that situation, where "original intent" is inconsistent with the text's underlying principles, what should judges do? Apply the "original intent" or the "underlying principles"?Originalists say we should apply the "original intent," whereas nonoriginalists say we should apply the "underlying principle." The result in Brown suggests nonoriginalism produces better results.

So at the very least, given the result in Brown, a nonoriginalist approach is a "reasonable" and "fair" way to interpret the Constitution. It doesn't give judges unlimited freedom, as Pro incorrectly says. It simply gives greater weight to the Constitution's principles than the "original intent" of the drafters.

I'll assume Pro concedes Roe v. Wade is justified on nonoriginalist grounds.


Pro says he's seen no sources backing up my claim that abortion statutes didn't ban all abortions. I turn Pro's attention to Roe v. Wade, which discusses the fact that all abortion statutes -- including the Texas statute at issue in Roe -- did not ban all abortions. Specifically, self-abortions were generally allowed.

Pro says "[t]he AMA's testimony is good evidence that the scientific world regarded the fetus to be a person who should be protected." But what the scientific world thinks about whether a fetus is a person has nothing to do with whether a fetus is a legal person, within the meaning of the Constitution. Given the fact that self-abortions were allowed by all the abortion statutes when the 14th Amendment was adopted, there is "good evidence" that Congress did not think the fetus deserved protection as a legal "person." Furthermore, declaring fetuses to be legal persons with rights, as Pro seems to suggest, would create absurd results that could not have been intended by the drafters. Fetuses would have to become dependents for tax and estate purposes, be counted in official census-taking, and be subject to many other laws affecting "persons."

Pro says abortion statutes were probably designed to "combat doctors specializing and charging for abortions" and are indicative of a "tight focus upon the illegality of the commercialization of abortion." I'll agree to that, as it's similar to the argument made in Roe v. Wade. What Pro admits here is that the abortion statutes were designed to protect against harm to women, not to protect the fetus. This is the key distinction underlying the abortion statutes that Pro cites as evidence of "original intent." Roe v. Wade discusses these statutes, noting that times have changed since they were enacted. Abortions are much safer and cheaper. The harms to women from abortion aren't as great as they were in 1850. Given that change in circumstances, the balancing test applies differently. That's the holding in Roe v. Wade.

To clarify, Roe v. Wade held that there is a right to abortion, but that right must be balanced against a compelling government interest. This explains why abortion statutes were constitution in 1850 but not today -- in 1850, women needed protection from doctors -- today, they no longer need protection from doctors. What Pro admits, and it's a huge concession, is that the abortion statutes were not designed to protect the fetus -- they were designed to protect women. That's why abortion statutes didn't prevent all types of abortion, and it's also why these abortion statutes allowed self-abortions.

Pro says the common law is irrelevant. This isn't important to the debate, but I'll address it since I have space. The common law is judge-made law, which changes and evolves over time. Judges create new exceptions, overrule old laws that no longer apply, and create new laws, as conditions change. Contracts, tort, and property laws do not exist in statutes; they only exist in the common law. So, a law from medieval times in England is irrelevant to the application of the American common law in the 1800s.

The common law at a specific time is relevant to understanding what the drafters of the constitutional text intended because the drafters were all steeped in the common law and intended the common law to apply. The Constitution itself was created to mirror the common law, evolving over time so as to meet and respond to new contexts.

[1] Alexander Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1; Alfred Alvins, De Facto and De Jure School Segregation, 38 Miss. L.J. 179; Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781; Raoul Berger, Government By Judiciary 117-33, 241- 45; 1 Bernard Schwartz, Statutory History of the United States 660; Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 12-13.
[2] Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America, 75 -76.
Debate Round No. 3


james14 forfeited this round.


It seems Pro has forfeited. Please vote Con.
Debate Round No. 4
7 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 7 records.
Posted by james14 1 year ago
I looked at the majority opinion again and it is actually quite long. So don't feel you have to read the whole thing. I had it shortened in a textbook, which was helpful.
Posted by warren42 1 year ago
@bennett91 Sorry, I know it existed, my intention was how it was not as advanced as it is today, and was therefore not as widespread. It's not like it was as common of a practice as is today.

On top of that, the right to privacy isn't specific to abortions. That's the point I was making was that the Constitution was non-specific to abortion. It has to be stretched in order to apply.
Posted by Ragnar 1 year ago
Pro: Is your case assuming the rejection of constitutional amendments?
Posted by Bennett91 1 year ago
@warren: just a quick fact check, abortion has always existed, even before the constitution.

Also it does have constitutional basis, the penumbra right to privacy as cited by the supreme court (solong as it is in the first trimester).
Posted by YYW 1 year ago
Hmmm.... I might take this.
Posted by phiLockeraptor 1 year ago
What do you mean by "examine majority opinion"?
Posted by warren42 1 year ago
Abortions didn't exist in the time of the Constitution, they were interpreting it as it applies to the modern world. Their job is to exacerbate it and cross-apply to current times. So even though it had no Constitutional basis, it was completely within their power. I feel like this will be a major point of contention throughout the debate, but based off the wording of the resolution, flows to the affirmative side.
3 votes have been placed for this debate. Showing 1 through 3 records.
Vote Placed by warren42 1 year ago
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Reasons for voting decision: Pro did a better job in my opinion, and won the debate despite the forfeit of the final round. However, I give Con conduct since they debated all the rounds while Pro did not. S&G was good for both, and sources were also good. (Con, it's easier for you and voters if you just copy and paste the url rather than the formal style!) I feel that the Con equality argument was much of their constructive, but find it poorly constructed. Just because women naturally have to bear children doesn't make it the government's job to change that? It's how nature works, and in my opinion, this is an example of "gender equality" gone too far. This is making it the government's responsibility to alter nature. There are better ways to argue equality in this context.
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Reasons for voting decision: Forfeiture
Vote Placed by Skynet 1 year ago
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Reasons for voting decision: The nuts and bolts of how Nonoriginalist interp. works is really just interpreting the document in a way to get the desired outcome based on popular demand, as both said. I'm making this a tie because of Pro's FF and Con's late use of sources, and I agree with Pro, though there are some important questions Con raised I would've liked to seen answered. A nonoriginalist judge would only be doing their job if they used the founder's intent, or accidentally did so. It is SC justices' job to interpret how to apply the current law, not make a new contradictory interpretation to justify an judgement. If it's really something the original founding principals didn't cover, there can be no judgement, since their job is to only judge based on current law.