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The Contender
Con (against)
7 Points

Sex with animals is ethically permissible

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Post Voting Period
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Voting Style: Open Point System: 7 Point
Started: 12/17/2012 Category: Philosophy
Updated: 3 years ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 3,273 times Debate No: 28332
Debate Rounds (5)
Comments (14)
Votes (2)




First I would like to thank CFR for accepting this debate topic. I would like to additionally offer to all interested that I would be glad to debate this topic with other people. Finally, I would like to encourage CFR to collaborate with others n the assembly of his arguments, as per rule 8 below.

The topic of bestiality and zoophilia are questionable and oft sticky topics (pun intended), which generally produce a visceral reaction in the course of their discussion. Historically, sex with animals has been among the acts considered most obscene, an abomination above most -if not all- other things considered abominations. Despite this, there are in fact a great many things which human emotion arguably gets wrong about ethics: the human desire for revenge, forced heteronormativity, fear of change. In many people the list of emotional malfunction goes far deeper, into neuropathy, and psychopathy. Emotion is an approximation at best of "what is right", and as such, it becomes a valid question as to whether the visceral but none-the-less emotional animus against sex with animals is appropriate.

As such, this debate is to explore whether such an animus is philosophically justified, or whether that animus is something that we ought overcome.

1) First round is acceptance*, second round is argument, third round is rebuttal and additional supporting arguments, fourth round is pure rebuttal and final round is closing. Upon mutual agreement via comments or PM, round 5 may also include a final counter-rebuttal.
2) *CON may go first; if CON uses his first round for argument, CON agrees his last round shall be a blank post, and for the purposes of voting, rounds for CON shall be offset by one post.
3) Responses shall be directed towards the previous rounds(s) only. Round 2 "initial arguments" are to be independent.
4) No direct "vote pandering". An argument ought stand on its own, without appeals to emotion or ad hominem.
5) No "sneaky ****erism". This is defined as making declarations to win an argument rather than making an attempt to investigate whether a claim is actually valid or supported by reason. The winning argument here is to be determined as that argument which stands up to reason, not which argument/person people subjectively like more. In accepting, CON agrees that any votes which do not reflect an objective evaluation of the arguments (subjective votes) are invalid and to be ignored during final evaluation, retracted, or negated.
6) No extended arguments, except if mutually agreed upon.
7) Shared BoP; all positive claims must be defended, and all arguments must be supported with reasons; this is a philosophical debate, and first principles must be mutually accepted, if used as a basis of argument. Argument from authority, argument from tradition, and the naturalistic fallacy are all accepted as fallacies by CON.
8) Shared participation is encouraged; while there can only be one formal "PRO" and one formal "CON", any independently supported argument may be advanced and picked up by the formal debators.
9) First principles accepted in this debate must include that: "The universe exists"; "knowledge exists"; "all descriptive models have greater value than any non-descriptive model"; and that "equals OUGHT be treated equally".
10) Additional rules as presented by CON shall be discussed in comments before being accepted.


Challange accepted.
Debate Round No. 1


Thank you CFR for accepting this debate. In the pursuit of clarity, I’d like to detail that the “animals” of the resolution are specifically not “people”, and further that the ethical acceptability is applying to “sex with animals”, and not some other thing that is neither necessary for, nor necessarily caused by, said sex. QUESTIONS about these distinctions are to be addressed in comments or PM.

Additionally, any claim I have made to which there is some doubt or misunderstanding, I will gladly provide additional support or clarification in my next post; my opponent has merely to ask.



Applying to an activity performed on or with a entity: Lacking informed consent.

  1. Animals have pragmatic value to People, at best
    Ethical value is the value that PEOPLE have to other PEOPLE, and all other things need only be afforded pragmatic value; without ethical value, consent of any form need not be garnered in imposition upon animals.

    1. Game theory establishes that people are optimally a community apart from other entities.
      1. Darwinian evolution is optimal with competition between individual, species, pack, and family. The extent of value to animals to each other is that of pragmatism, and thus form tribes.
      2. Memetic evolution (the type of evolution People do) is best WITHOUT competition between individuals in the group of people; people have intrinsic value to other people and optimally form a society, or a community of all people, as any person’s adaptations can be passed to and thereby benefit any other person. However the extent of value for non-people remains that of pragmatism, as animals do not contribute useful adaptations in the form of ideas.
        1. Such a difference is seen between populations of bacteria, and multi-cellular organisms: all cells in the multicellular organism form a community or collective, at which point overt competition becomes detrimental to the body.

    2. People have ethical responsibilities from the basis of first principles, which animals cannot take part in.
      1. A definition of freedom:
        1. The freedom of a person to be is the extent of all things which do not themselves do insult to another person's freedom to be.
        2. That which does such insult is not a freedom.

      2. A definition of responsibilities:
        1. We have a responsibility to all other persons who claim freedom to defend that freedom from that which would do it insult.
        2. This by its nature includes a responsibility to NOT do that which is NOT a freedom.

      3. A definition of fairness:
        1. That which we claim for ourselves as freedom must be accepted as freedom for others, or denied among the freedoms of self.

      4. In order to claim freedom, one must consent to imposition of responsibility, an acceptance of the community of people and their ethical value.
        1. Animals are functionally unable to accept or understand freedom from first principles; they lack a theory of mind, and a concept of identity, and lack the ability to ever attain it.
        2. As understanding of freedom is necessary to claim freedom, animals need never be offered freedom.

    3. People are existentially sustainable, animals are not.
      1. Evolution of memetic collectives is far faster than Darwinian evolution, which requires a new generation to imperfectly select for minute change.
      2. Such faster evolution means the ability to avoid or survive through planetary extinction events and solar reintegration, and potentially to identify such existential threats before they become imminent.
      3. As this life in this existence is all there definitely is (not to be read as “definitely all there is”), all observable meaning is tied up in the survival of life, and as survival is only likely for people and those things we retain as useful tools, it is the pragmatic value of animals which is most important, not just to us, but also to their own survival.

  2. Differences between Ethical and Pragmatic concerns

    1. This debate is not about pedophilia or the mentally disabled; such sex is questionable for ethical reasons, which are generalized for pragmatic reasons.

      1. Often in discussions such as this, attempts are made to draw connections between irrational children, and irrational adults, and irrational animals. I will gladly, at the conclusion of this debate, have an additional debate over the categorical acceptability of sex with children, but such a debate would be one-sided, in that we would be arguing between the logic which leads to “sex with children and/or the mentally disabled is unacceptable” rather than the validity of the resolution itself.

      2. My particular position on this aspect is rather threefold:
        1. Children are generally potentially future adults, with an entitlement to either a full measure of the activity required to make them free as possible from natural evil or imposition, OR a swift death. As such, the future person has the right to decide if and when they will have sex, and as such are ethically harmed by pedophiles.
        2. Children represent a devotion of resources spent to produce rational adults, and the effects of sex increase those costs, or cause them to be outright lost (through depression and suicide, for example). Even in the case of “doomed” children, there is the possibility of breakthrough preventing the doom, and thus reason to defend their rights.
        3. Sex with children is at best extremely difficult to find ethically justifiable, and thus demands the greatest amount of caution, to the extent it becomes pragmatic to treat it as if it were categorically unacceptable so as to prevent false-negatives AND false positives in identification of unethical cases.

      3. My position on the mentally disabled is similar:
        1. The “mentally disabled” may actually have all the necessary qualities of a person, and thus be a person, and it is difficult to ascertain the “edge cases”; giving them the benefit of the doubt with ethical treatment is preferable to violating the ethical rights of a person, and so necessitates requiring what seems as informed consent in such instances.
        2. The mentally disabled may have pragmatic value as independent operators in society (as “property” of society), and as such that value that society has is potentially damaged or destroyed through such activity. Such is made clear by the fact that the mentally deficient generally have legal guardians.
        3. Sex with such people-shaped-animals after accurate identification is generally allowed, when the legal guardian of such a person allows it to happen, though not with the legal guardian for rightful reasons of conflict-of-interest.

    2. Sex with animals is questionable for exclusively pragmatic concerns, and generally those are easily resolved.
      1. Differentiation by species is easily accomplished.
      2. Animals will never “grow up” into persons.
      3. IF it is ever the case that animal-shaped-people become a reality, then pragmatic concerns may arise; however it does not affect the ethical acceptability of sex with animals, merely the pragmatism of allowing it.

  3. Argument from Common Sense

    1. It is common sense that imposition on animals is generally allowed
      1. We allow clearly sexual imposition such as castration, molestation, masturbation, forced sexual coupling, and manual fertilization (with devices or with hands); nonconsensual sex with them for OUR gratification is no different.
      2. We allow much more grisly things like killing, breaking, knocking, tying down, trapping, keeping captive, and poisoning; mere sex is nothing next to that.

    2. Treating animals ethically produces an existential threat to people
      1. We need to be able to feed ourselves; imposition has been and continues to be necessary to do that.
      2. We need to be able to defend ourselves; imposition has been and continues to be necessary to do that.

  4. Conclusion
    1. Ethics are clearly for people, not animals.
    2. Pragmatic unacceptability is different from ethical unacceptability.
    3. Common sense dictates that imposition upon animals is acceptable and even necessary for existence of people.
    4. Therefore, having sex with animals is ethically permissible.



I would like to thank my opponent for his well thought
out case.

Is sex with animals an ethical question?

The first way to establish an ethical dilemma is to see
whether an ethical dilemma exists in the first place. One cannot comment on an
ethical conception of a prime number it is literally ethically void, or having
no ethical value at all. If nothing ethical comes out of the question than
obviously it is ETHICALLY permissible. We can establish the ethical validity of
the question by simply defining ethics. Ethics has three main branches: Applied
ethics, Normative Ethics, and Meta-ethics. Now the branch of ethics we are
dealing with now is known as normative ethics. It concerns itself with what one
should do. So the question being should one have sex with animals is indeed
coherent and it is obviously of contention between me and my opponent therefore
it can be ruled an ethical question.

Animal rights and Freedom Irrelevant?

Let’s imagine that non-rational animals (not humans)
have no rights, no freedom, and no comprehension of anything. Let’s assume
Descartes assertion that animals feel no pain and have no souls is correct.
Does it follow that one should be allowed to have sex with animals? My case
would lead us to think not. Animals and People are entitled to the amount of
rights they are able to comprehend. Hence, kicking your dog is wrong because it
can comprehend (to limited extent) pain. Even were this not true it would still
be ethically impermissible to have sex animals.

Teleological Account of Human Nature and Bestiality

What constitutes a good knife? One that cuts well
obviously. What constitutes a bad knife? One that does not cut well. An agent
that performs its function well or telos is a good agent. For example, In order
for agent A to accomplish B, A must reasonably do C. The function of human
agents as a whole is act rationally according to Aristotle. The function of the
mind is to produce rational thoughts a mind that doesn't is considered a bad
mind. Anything can be considered on basis of telos can find it’s good. What is
right depends on the goal. But as Aristotle defined men, in order to be moral
must act rationally. Morality is rationality. My opponent seems to think that
because rationality is objective and non-changing in cannot be based on
function. As Contradiction once said "Given a teleological account of
human nature, there is no fact-value distinction, for value is built into fact
from the very beginning. If the purpose of eyes is that they see, then it
follows straightforwardly given their telos that eyes which see well are good
eyes. Nature is not merely descriptive, but also prescriptive.
"Ought" claims are not derived from "is" claims, but
present to begin with". Objective purpose is inherent rather than
subjective intention. I don't intend that my eyes see they simply do. Since
goodness is defined on what is proper for something and we have something
objective to evaluate its performance with we can evaluate the reproductive
organs, which function are to reproduce using them toward some other end where
no procreation is impossible is immoral in this sense. But let’s take this a
step forward, what if Teleological conceptions of morality are wrong.

Duty: Deontology takes a bite out of Bestiality

He who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men. We can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals.-Immanuel Kant

Kant is the most influential deontological philosopher.
Deontology is obviously a much different philosophy from teleological
conception of morality however I believe we will arrive at the same conclusion
as my previous argument. While Kant did not believe we had any duties to
animals per se we may have duties that directly affect them as we are the
rational being in his philosophical system. When Kant started his ethical
system he was very frustrated with all the wishy washy ethical systems of his
day so he proposed a stone cold non-negotiable that everyone had to follow all
the time for it to work. He proposed that morality is based in rationality and
that in order to discover whether you should be allowed to do something you
have to make the maxim a natural law and run it threw two tests: one, whether
the world is even conceivable in these circumstances and two whether you could
rationally will to do the maxim in the such a world. Having sex with animals
fails both tests and is therefore impermissible. If it were a natural law that
everyone would be allowed to have sex with animals than it becomes permissible
to act on sexual pleasures rather than rational thought. In such a world men
would be allowed to risk life and limb for simple sexual pleasure, this world
is not conceivable. My opponent may say that men risk these things now but
having their sexual organs bitten off isn't quite as high of a risk with a
female human rather than a panda. But let’s move on to the other test the
"rational will" test, could or would rationally will to act on maxim,
and honestly most people would probably agree you can't rationally will
yourself to have sex with animals. The pragmatic concerns make it ethically
immoral because it is irrational. The sexual pleasure resulting do not outweigh
the negative aspects (diseases and potential danger to self). Kant is very firm
on the point that in order for an action to moral it must be rational and we
can clearly see that it isn't rational to have sex with animals.

The Achilles Heel of Bestiality found!

Now we come to Kantian deontology's foil, antithesis to
Deontology, the joker to Deontology's batman, Consequentialism.
Consequentialism is the theory that actions ethical content are entirely
dependent on the consequences of such actions. There are many different forms
of consequentialism and while it may to some seem to favor bestiality, it
really doesn't. Let’s think of the personal implications of having sex animals,
first you have the knowledge you are doing something that is not typically
normal and if anyone finds out you know that you may be shunned(wrong or not),
inciting feelings of guilt. Also you have potentially opened yourself to many
diseases along with potential diseases; typically if the sexual actions is
unwelcome many animals are rather vicious. But is this the only negative
aspect? Let’s think of the societal implications, do we really want to
encourage our youth to perform sexual actions on basically anything we want despite
the pain or anger it shows? Do we really want to tell our children that
behaving sexually irresponsible is permissible? Do we need to give them more
cause to act on sexual pleasure rather than rationality? The greater good seems
to slightly favor not allowing people to have sex with animals, but let’s take
it a step forward and address Ulitilitarianism the most common form of ethical
consequentialism today(in my opinion). Does allowing people to have sex with
animals really make more happiness for the majority of people? I'd say not for
many reasons. Considering the majority of people disagree with the resolution
including an incredibly powerful company that you may of heard of named PETA.
Now I am not saying they deserve so much power but they do, and there is no way
in heck that they will let this go through easily. They will run commercials,
they will get the religious right out, and they will get every bit of support
to morally scrutinize sex with animals. All that discomfort and anger is much
more unhappiness for the majority of people versus the little amount of
happiness you may get from sexual actions with animals.

As I do not adequate space to continue refuting the
resolution I must end here, but I would ask voters to ask when considering the
resolution, what is more commonsense? I will post my rebuttal next round(as per
the rules). The resolution stands negated.

Works Cited


Debate Round No. 2


Sex with animals as an ethical question.

It is clear that CON is attempting to straw-man my argument in this section. My contention is not, and never will be that "should one [should] have sex with animals", which would define sex with animals as a responsiility, but rather that people merely be entitled to the freedom. While it is seemingly minor, it is actually quite important to my case.

Animal Freedom is Irrelevant.

In his section on the relevancy of animal rights, CON argues, the burden of proof rests on the claimant that they have a soul. No credible evidence exists for souls of any sort, and it is likely that when something dies it is simply dead, and so the pain that it endures in life is irrelevant. All the pain and comprehension that it endures is worth nothing once it dies, and death for animals is inevitable and even necessary for their evolutionary strategy to work.

Teleological Account of Human Nature and Bestiality.

In response to CON's claims on teleology, teleology is only valid as claim for normative ethics if there is both an agent, and an intent in evidence. A knife is a good knife if it cuts well IFF there is an agent who wants to cut something with that knife, and the teleology only applies in that specific situation. It is invalid to say that "A knife is a good knife if it cuts well" if the purpose for which the agent needs a knife is principally to stab and open a hole centered on the initial point of penetration; in this case cutting too well may in fact be detrimental to the functon of a knife used to that end. His argument that his teleology or Aristotle's teleology are correct are merely arguments from authority, and to be discounted. Rather, I propose the teleology of a person to be whatever they damn well please, so long as it does not attempt to define the teleology of another person... and in that case, we get right back to the point of the normative ethics I proposed in the first place, and Teleological accounts of human nature then turn to support the case for PRO.

Deontology: Kant Screws the pooch

On deontology, he proposes a straw man. First, how is it inconceviable that people be able to do whatever they damn well please, so long as they do not violate the freedom of others to do whatever THEY damn well please? Second, it is a simple matter to rationally allow others to do whatever they damn well please, so long as they let you do whatever you damn well please. Both of Kant's rules are satisfied. It is, further, a simple matter to rationally will yourself to have sex with an animal: A person may have a biological sexual drive that needs reduction, an animal that will serve that purpose, and as such t is rational to use the animal for that purpose. His argument here seems to hold NO water whatsoever, and in all actuality deontology supports beastiality.

Consequentialism: Conflating pragmatism with ethics

As far as consequentialism, it is another word for pragmatism, and it fails in every way that a thing can fail to be equal to ethics. It is essentially saying that the ethicalness of something is defined by how well you can avoid consequences, and it is the philosophical equivalent of nihilism or solipsism. We have long accepted that might does not make right, no does the ability to "get away with it". Following this, CON makes an appeal to law, appeal to popularity, and an appeal to authority by which such a thing is argued by CON as wrong. Such an argument rightly fails against gay rights, and against interracial marriage, and it must fail against beastiality.

Further, he has a BOP to determine that satisfying one's sex drive is not itself rational, so long as it does not violate the freedom of an ethical agent.

As such, CON stands thoroughly and completely rebutted.

  1. Animals have pragmatic value to People, at best
    1. More on game theory
      cause of the lack of any thing that may be considered a soul, evolutionary strategies are relevant to the discussion of what beings may have value.
      1. For Darwinian evolvers , their evolutionary strategy necessitates death; it cannot be divorced from the cycle of "1) have children with mutations, 2) organisms compete over resources 3) losers die 4) winners return to step (1)". Critters which evolve primarily in the Darwinian mode cannot and must not realize the first and most basic freedom to be, and extending it to them without fully making them people is an insult to what they are. Without an after-life, however, only their external effect on the world is relevant to their species or any other species. As such animals have only pragmatic value.
      2. For memetic evolvers, death is neither necessary or beneficial. The unit of such evolution is the idea, which is the "DNA" of memetics, and any organism or entity able to understand that idea may benefit from that adaptation. If one person has a good idea, all people can benefit without the need for any death. In this way, they ideally form a community where the ideas compete, and the people do not. As a rational goal of people is to prevent death, and as this life is all we have, it then becomes important to guarantee freedom. As such, people have intrinsic value to themselves which does no insult to the survivability of the community of people, and thus people have every responsibility to accept the intrinsic value of other people as equals ought be treated equally
    2. More on ethics
      Teleologically speaking, as the telos of the person is an intrinsic finality, and as such purely up to the person in question. That being accepted, the same logic which CON purportedly accepts as valid supports (teleology) serves as a path by which the above ethical rules may be reached.
    3. More on existential sustainability
      1. Simply put, if people find use for animals in relieving our sex drives, it is a fundamental good for animals, as we then have a reason to save them when we save ourselves from some existential threat. This is directly in line with CON's claim of consequentialism as that the consequences to the actions of animals of being useful to humans is enough to establish responsibility to be useful to humans.
  2. The difference between ethics and pragmatism
    1. Why pragatism is not ethics
      Normative ethics, accepted by CON as the subject of this debate, is concerned principally with what no man ought do. In various situations, such an argument has been applied that the happiness of the majority authorizes them to do injury to the freedom of a minority to be. In Germany, it was decided that being Jewish was to be scrutinized, and that all that discomfort and anger with jewish people was more important than that little ammount of happiness had by those people through their freedom to be.
  3. On common sense
    1. The special pleading of CON
      This particlar point was in fact a basis from which to argue that CON has a burden of special pleading which he needs to address. CON has yet to forward any suitable argument as to why those things might be considered as evil or not evil, but by which sex with them is somehow different; I have certainly met my burden to demonstrate why they are not.
  4. Conclusions
    CON has yet to provide any argument in favor of his ethical principles, or even detail what those principles are; he has provided 3 different and conflicting ethical frameworks without providing support for why any one of them must be right. He has not argued his accepted claim that sex with animals is ethically impermissible, IE that some necessary causal relationship exists between "sex with animals" and some ethically impermissible activity.
    1. Ethics are clearly for people, not animals.
    2. Pragmatic unacceptability is diffrent from ethical unacceptability.
    3. Common sense dictates that imposition upon animals is acceptable and even necessary for the existence of people.
    4. Therefore having sex with animals is ethically permissible.


Note: I am not allowed to respond to criticisms made in this round, so voters do not take his supposed refutation as acceptance.
What's wrong with my opponents case?
The vast majority of my opponents case is irrelevant as stated in my case, it matters not whether Animals have rights or they can be apart of ethics, the point of this debate is what is permissible for us to do. Should we be allowed to have sex with animals is the basic question. But as my opponents case hinges on whether animals have rights, I will attempt to refute his view that animals have no rights. The truth is if my opponent cannot make the case that ethics do not also belong to animals then he has been successfully refuted. Furthermore my opponent fails to define terms non-circularly, for example, he says freedom is to be extent of all things which do not insult another person's freedom to be. You, for one, cannot define something by putting it in its own definition, I will define freedom in a non-circular manner:
" To be able to do what is ethically permissible"
The Incapacitated Human Argument
My opponent conceives a world where in order for someone to have rights they must(albeit very implicitly) accept ethical responsibilities and acceptance of the community. Now what does that entail? In plain terms, all it means is that someone must consent to accept ethical values of others as their own. While I completely disagree, let me run this further to what this entails for humans that are unable to make that commitment. My opponent brings up two groups that are equally ethically questionable. Lets move to what my opponents conception of how one gets freedom. My opponent conceives freedom as something one needs to accept responsibility in order to hold. This is so arbitrary its hard to know where to start. Nobody implicitly or explicitly accepts societal responsibility to be ethical. But even if they did there are people which cannot accept responsibility. Under my opponents definition people who cannot accept responsibility can therefore be imposed on because they do not have freedom. Now that entails anyone can have sex with not only animals, but people are currently incapacitated or permanently incapacitated. Furthermore, what about necrophilia? Is that permissible as well? I submit even his argument with mentally disabled people is blatantly false, humans cannot be considered property even if they are irrational. Being irrational is not a reason to be allowed to imposed on. Especially not sexually.
My opponents ethical subjectivism
My opponent is clearly advocating ethical subjectivism without defending it. He offers the societal form of ethical behavior. He submits that must consent to community values in order to be apart of them, now lets think about what that means. He submits if we fail to commit to societal values then we to can be forcibly raped. Therefore, rape in prison is perfectly permissible. My opponents whole argument is contingent on the acceptance of community values, so going against these morals is not only immoral according to my opponent but also warrant of removal of all rights. My opponent misconstrues legal rights vs natural rights, in that he doesn't understand that natural rights are not contingent on the societies right to revoke them. The reason why my opponent is advocating this form of ethics is because there is no way to conceive ethics to accept sexual relations with animals. "In order to claim freedom, one must consent to imposition of responsibility, an acceptance of the community of people and their ethical value." This is subjectivism at its highest level. Anyone who values freedom remotely should join me in negating this resolution because if the definition of freedom is contingent on community values many people have lost their complete natural and legal rights. Furthermore, my opponent does not understand the implications of this definition, if we were in Nazi Germany according to my opponent then we must accept their ethical values or lose all natural rights, and it is important to note the extreme difference between me and my opponent, he conceives rights as given to you by the government, I do not. Freedom is inherent. Let me propose one more situation before I move on to the Argument from Commonsense.
Argument from Daniel Kaye and the Andrew Sisters
My opponent conceives ethical responsibility to be given to only those who are rational, and those who can accept the community values, but I ask my opponent a question, are we supposed to be allowed to rape them simply because they are irrational in societies view? What constitutes rationality if it can only be conceived in a community? I would hope my opponent would say no. There have been example of many cultures with lesser ethical values, yet we all almost universally agree raping them would not be appropriate. This is the exact parallel of animals because both parties are irrational at least in societies conception of morality.
Argument from Commonsense
The argument from commonsense is clearly a invalid deductive argument, maybe my opponent means it to be inductive like the majority of his case. I will show that this invalid anyway. Imposition is a interesting concept, I submit the majority of the situations my opponent supposes are impermissible and I would suggest my opponent report this to PETA if he sees any of these things(with the exception of a couple exceptions). Clearly some of these things are to help animals, such as forced coupling but no one would say a non-trained individual do anything of sort. My opponent says we regularly cut off animal penises and molest them but clearly this is false, I ask the reader when was the last time you(just for one example) masturbated your cat. One hopes that no one says last week. With regards to killing, there is a obvious reason why we allow killing animals and sexual intercourse is impermissible, it is simply because freedom doesn't naturally entail not being killed. Think about it this way. What gives us the right to kill people in war but not rape them, clearly it is a similar situation. It is commonsense in war time that we can kill people but not rape them. It is because not being killed isn't a natural right, it is a right granted by a government. This is one of the reasons we made societies in the first place so that we were free from death and despair. What separates us from animals isn't merely our rationality but our ability to live without fear. Sex and killing are different categories, this can further be explained by showing ethical implications of domesticated and farm animals. Now with farm animals we can kill them to feed ourselves, but we generally treat them well up to that point, they are conditioned to a certain end. However we would never kill our dog without provocation, certainly this is a right granted to him by us. Nevertheless we would never consider it ethically permissible to have sex with either the dog nor the farm animals. The difference between sex and killing is the difference between natural and legal or government granted rights. My opponent claims the imposition of commonsense=truth but then to the audience what does your intuition tell you? Usually commonsense will dictate that sex between members is actually ethically and pragmatically impermissible for many reasons.
My opponent wants to justify the bestiality affection some people show but it is clearly ethically impermissible because although animals do not have legal rights they have to a limited extent natural rights. My opponents next post clearly illustrates his lack of understanding of contemporary ethics. But I am forced to wait to refute his outlandish statements. I would say the resolution stands refuted. Please vote Con today, thank you.
The reason I use many frameworks for my case is very specific. I want to show that any framework that can be possibly used with inevitably lead to bestiality being impermissble.
Debate Round No. 3


What's wrong with "what's wrong".
While my opponent has claimed that large portions of my case are irrelevant, he has yet to establish why. He has made the claim that freedom is to be able to do that which is "ethically permissible", and claimed that this definition is non-circular, except that the definition of freedom used thus far is exactly "that which is ethically permissible"; such a definition would be tautological and thus worthless.

It is further not circular to say that freedom is the extent of all things which are not contradictory to the will of another person; as outlined in my round 3 post, it is non-contradictory because it is essentially saying "freedom is the ability act in accordance with determining one's own teleology for themselves in any case so long s it does not attempt to dictate the teleology of another person." In this way it is neither circular nor problematic.

Society requires responsibility.
First let me note here that my opponent has made several straw-man attacks against my position. First, he has clamed that my own position demands that others be forced to accept the ethical values of another person as their own; it means no such thing. While indeed I may hold these ethical values, they are not from me, but rather from a logical investigation of first principles, themselves implicitly accepted by all people in their interactions with the world around them. As he clearly fails to understand this point, his extrapolations cannot be based on any thing that a rational person might call logic. Moreover, he makes the unfounded assumption that I accept all humans as persons, which I do not; it is clear that not all persons are necessarily humans, and not all humans are necessarily persons.

It is obvious that responsibility and obligation are necessary for society. We have various emotional implementations of responsibility whose existence speaks directly to the fact that it was good for our survival as a social species. If not for the responsibility to not murder and to defend each other from those who break from that responsibility, society would quickly fall apart. It is even further apparent that societies the world over and througout history have recognized this vital responsibility.

He has attempted further to bring up red herrings. Those agents which have the potential to be future pople namely the child and the incapacitated have every right to the freedom to be, once they are people, and that includes the freedom to decide if and when to accept the many consequences of sex. Further, he makes a blatant assertion that humans cannot be considered property. Unless he can point to some magical quality of homo sapiens that makes them somehow different from dogs, cats, fish and rocks his argument will be nothing but bald assertion. Finally, there remain strong pragmatic reasons not to permit sex with dead humans, as that necessitates human bodies, the lust for which may drive someone to produce such bodies from potential people, especially as they do not normally stay fresh.

My ethical objectivism
My opponent has in round 3 made a blatant lie; there is nothing subjective from the derivation of ethical responsibilities and freedoms from metaphysical first principles. It is quite obviously the definition of objective ethics. Further, my opponent has made a strawman here, claiming that my position is that a failure of a human to be a person is sufficient reason to allow absolute imposition upon them. That is the case if and only if we could guarantee that the target is truly are not a person or capable of ever becoming one, and such a task is beyond our abilities. While such acts may not be ethically impermissible, it is pragmatic to treat them as if they are impermissible because we cannot currently differentiate.

Second, he claims thait is my contention that societies retain the ability to revoke some natural right, when I have made no such claim. It is only the individual who may revoke or claim their rights as a person, through their acceptance of their responsibility. In fact, it is clear that my opponent is clearly advocating ethical subjectivism, given his appeal to populism in round 2: "[A]llowing people to have sex with animals... [does not make]... more happiness [because]...the majority of people disagree with the resolution"

I will reiterate that it is not subjective to derive ethics from first principles necessary for rationality, however it IS subjective for my opponent to claim that the majority's views on an issue define the correct course. I'll point back to the previous points I have made about slavery, interracial marriage, and gay rights.
CON's strawman argument from authority

First, let us identify his argument for what it is: a strawman argument. I have so far not claimed that ethics derives from the community, but rather that ethics and thus community derive from rationality. Indeed, it is not society that defines what it means to be rational, but rather to be rational is to have some specific and objective traits, and the acceptance of the value of community when it is available is merely the extension of the use of those traits. Such a person is rational, even if they were the only person in existence. Even if a culture has lesser ethical values, it is composed of humans which may be people, or may become people, and every one of those potentil people deserve to be treated in such a way that will ensure their freedom to act as people.

CON's lack of common sense.
Con has made various incorrect factual claims and strawman arguments. First, he has claimed that I have contended that we "cut off animal penises". Any such claim would be a symantic contention. "castration" as used represents the behavior of removing the testicles and/or ovaries from an animal, which is done commonly. Further, is actual proof that masturbation of animals is not only done, but that it is common.

Additionally, CON has made the failed and utterly false claim that freedom doesn't entail not being killed against your will. It is obvious that freedom (even the freedom to die) requires existence first. Further, this is not a discussion of the ethics of war. This is a discussion about sex with animals. Those same pragmatic reasons to prevent imposed sex with other potential people still applies here. In a war, either one or both sides are irrational, particularly since one side or the other isn't willing to treat equals equally, hence either one or both sides have every right to defend themselves, either in the manner of a person defending himself against an animal or two animals fighting over a scrap. The only difference is that when it can e identified as the former, there is a responsibility for all rational people to lend assistence in some way. Further, there is a big difference, and one my opponent seems to miss, between can and should[ethical] and should[pragmatic]. These three different concepts can be seen as follows: I CANNOT lick my elbow. I SHOULD NOT[ethical] prevent a person from making attempt to lick their elbow. I SHOULD NOT[pragmatic] attempt oral sex with a shark. This becomes significant because we don't have such sex because of the third such reason.
As common sense goes, if we are to intentionally deprive a farm animal of existence, once its existence is gone what does it matter that someone had sex with it? Unless my opponent wants to make some claim of magic, that some angry god will smite us for doing so, or that it lives forever and is immortal, such a claim that there is such a necessity for such treatment is spurious.

My opponent has claimed that animals have natural rights, AND that these natural rights preclude having sex with them. He has not provided evidence for these claims, while I have provided evidence for my own. He has attacked many straw men so far, but few or no real arguments. The resolution stands defended.


Note: I am not allowed to respond to criticisms made in this round, so voters do not take his supposed refutation as acceptance.
A Point On Animal Rights
My opponent claims that I made some sort of claim that animals have souls or don't, I was merely saying even if they don't(which I am not supposing in this case), it is irrelevant! It is even irrelevant whether they have rights! I gave arguments to why animals do have rights in my opening argument which my opponent has yet to address and that was that things are given rights according to how much they can understand.
My three points:
My opponent has addressed my arguments rather poorly in fact I would go further in saying that the major of his case is not at all related to ethics and is more on evolution while he could say that it furthers his case when it comes to this debate it is almost irrelevant! Now my main point is that it doesn't matter what ethical system you adopt, you cannot get around this normative certainty. Now my opponents basic rebuttal is that people should be what ever they want as long as they don't interfere with other people's freedom, I will address each rebuttal in detail but I want to address this notion. Their are plenty of things that moral that may interfere with a individuals freedom. For example, one could restrain a individual who has likely committed a crime, it called citizen arrest. This interferes with a individuals freedom, and it is not even certain he has committed a crime but under extremely likely circumstances it is still moral.
Teleology and Intrinsic Finality
My opponent claims that knifes are
for cutting because that was the intention of knife makers. He seems to claim that there exists no function outside of intention of the agent. I fundamentally disagree if there is no such thing as functions then we cannot make sense basic biology certainly my opponent agrees with the normative nature of medicine, if my opponent is correct there is nothing objectively better about a functioning heart versus a non-functioning heart. Certainly the nucleus had the function of producing DNA prior to anyone noticing. My opponent says if the agent wants to use a knife to stab then the knifes function is to stab, this is mistaken, functions are inherent. So if a purpose of a knife is to cut then it is a good knife, so trying to stab with it is irrelevant to cutting or its function. Now with regards with to intrinsic finality, it absolutely mistaken, biologically speaking the function of a person is to survive and reproduce and act rationality in accordance with its organs. Now their are many reasons to think that it is not based on a individuals choice as Tim Hsiao argues:
"As a way of response, one might attempt to explain proper functioning, and thus flourishing, in terms of intention or desire. So, health is seen as merely the state of living in a way one so desires. Similarly, medicine is not about restoring an objective bodily function, but about orienting the body to a state which one happens to prefer. But this approach seems to be mistaken... Moreover, approaching health and disease from the perspective of desire would rule out the possibility of there ever being such thing as a disordered desire, which in turn rules out the very possibility of mental illness. But clearly there are such things as disordered desires, such as a desire to have one's perfectly healthy leg amputated or to kill oneself. These desires are disordered because they are directed toward the destruction of a bodily good. Indeed, desires themselves are an inclination to attain some good, and thus proper desires ought to be directed toward goods that are in fact perfective of human nature. Health and disease are thus grounded in proper biological functioning,not desires."
Deontology and my opponents misunderstanding
My opponent misunderstands the term rationally willed for one, and for two when Kant supposes it become a natural law what he means by that is everyone has to do it! So it is rational that everyone always have sex with animals when their desire hits them, my opponent clearly sees the irrationality behind that, and rationality is morality according to Kant. So according to Kant this world is inconceivable and therefore the action is impermissible What my opponent doesn't understand about the term is its application not its actual definition, Deontology tells us that morality lies in the act alone so when evaluating the criteria for a action to be permissible we cannot speak in generalities, we must see whether we can rationally will that we have sex with animals, which is a deliberate process of seeing whether that particular actions is rational. Which as I provided reasons for why it is not rational. Objection stands.
The problem with my opponents objections to consequantialism is that they are all assertions bare of any evidence or logical backing to his claims, when he says "appeal to law, authority,etc" he must explain how and why not simply assert it I will say "I AM REFUTED!!!" he must justify each of his claims appropriately, until he does that I see no reason to respond to his assertions yet I will. My opponent seems to think I mean whatever society wants we ought to act on, I was saying in the greater good may be considered what is rational and moral and therefore by acted upon. Therefore my objection is not touched, furthermore my opponent has not defended his view against individual consequantialism or ultitarianism. My opponent claims I have the BOP to prove having sex with animals is irrational. I actually did show that but I will show my opponent where "(diseases and personal danger to self...personal implications of having sex animals,
first you have the knowledge you are doing something that is not typically normal and if anyone finds out you know that you may be shunned(wrong or not), inciting feelings of guilt. Also you have potentially opened yourself to many diseases along with potential diseases; typically if the sexual actions is unwelcome many animals are rather vicious.". As my opponent and the voters can see it is very irrational to have sex with animals. I have meet my BOP unlike my opponent.
Pragmaticism and Rationality and Morality
Now my opponent keeps accusing me of adequating Pragmaticism with morality, I am doing no such thing, I am adequating aspects of pragmatics with rationality and I am justifying that rationality has a big role in ethics. Ethically speaking an action cannot be truly moral unless it has deliberate and rational choice behind it. In fact supposing no choice makes rational choice impossible and makes morality impossible. As Stephen_Hawkins argues "our actions are determined by forces outside of our control. In fact, all of our actions are caused by events before even our existence: our acts which are the consequences of the laws of nature are surely out of our control. Thus, there can be no moral responsibility, and thus no morality," therefore if pragmaticism cannot be adequated with rationality and not morality by relation then truly morality doesn't exist. Therefore the resolution cannot be affirmed because it would make not logical sense. Now I am not saying pragmaticist ethics are true but they have a role in rationality and therefore pragmaticism(while not equal to ethics) have a role in ethics.
My opponent has not refuted my objections and nearly conceded the teleological aspects of ethics even though he misunderstood teleological ethics in the first place. My opponent has failed to meet his burden of proof even if his arguments work. Furthermore my opponent endorses a nearly incoherent version of "freedom ethics". I can only see a strong Con vote today. Thank you.
Debate Round No. 4


In summation:

Over the course of this debate it has been my contention that ethics is about securing freedoms and about fulfilling responsibilities, that ethics are for people, and that there is having sex with an animal does not violate the freedom of another person.

CON's initial response was a naturalistic fallacy (CON's argument from teleology), an argument from incredulity (CON's deontological argument), and an argument from populism (CON's consequentialist argument), and I dismantled them handily. Additionally CON's case has been heaped with a plentiful smattering of lies, mischaracterizations, and straw-man arguments.

On the existence of the soul, Without a soul, the pain of a non-person does not matter, and such pain does not infer rights, and thus con's claim of animal rights was refuted entirely.

CON's failed argument from teleology
is essentially a thinly veiled attempt at an argument from divine intent, and evolution demands that the teleological argument fails. While one thing may do a task reasonably well, that thing is not necessarily intended for that task and it's functioning well in that task is incidental unless there is an agent acting with intent. It has been my contention that teleology requires an agent, and that there is no purpose without an agent. My opponent uses argument from authority (most recently Tim Hsiao), and commits the naturalisic fallacy, and makes an unconvincing case at it. A telos requires intent, and intent requires an agent, as I demonstrated clearly in round 3.

CON's failed argument from deontology is nothing more than an argument from incredulity, strawman, and argument from authority. I see no irrationality in having sex with animals; it is in fact quite rational as I put down in my rebuttal in round 3, and he has not actually addressed that point. His speeches are clearly scriptural acceptance of deontology, without support of that ethical framework, a support which I have asked for and a support CON has not given. It is merely the world according to Kant, an argument from Kant's moral authority.

CON's failed argument from consequentialism is nothing more than a discussion of pragmatism and appeal to populism. That my opponent fails to see how his arguments is particuarly damning of his position. However as he has demanded expanded claims, as per my assurances in round 2 that I would support my accusations of fallacious thinking more fully if he asked, I will do so:

"Let’s think of the personal implications of having sex animals, first you have the knowledge you are doing something that is not typically normal and if anyone finds out you know that you may be shunned(wrong or not), inciting feelings of guilt." This runs into the is/ought problem, the naturalistic fallacy. Just because the feelings of guilt ARE, does not imply that the feelings of guilt OUGHT BE, and many who have such sex do not feel such guilt in any regard.

"Also you have potentially opened yourself to many diseases along with potential diseases; typically if the sexual actions is unwelcome many animals are rather vicious." Such is a discussion of PRAGMATISM, as previously outlined. In any acceptance of such pragmatism, if consequences can be entirely avoided, there remains no objection! Thus it is not the "sex with animals" but rather "the exposure to disease and injury" which is considered unethical by the consequentialism. This is a clear red herring.

"[D]o we really want to encourage our youth to perform sexual actions on basically anything we want despite the pain or anger it shows?" And here con makes a straw-man argument, particularly in obliquely claiming I am for the encouragement of such activities; I am not nor have I ever said I was. In fact at the beginning of round 3, I specifically focused on making such a clarification. I am merely for neutrality towards those who independently decide to engage in them.

"Do we really want to tell our children that behaving sexually irresponsible is permissible?" Here CON begs the question that such sexual behavior is necessarily "irresponsible".

"Do we need to give them more cause to act on sexual pleasure rather than rationality?" Here CON begs the question again, assuming that fulfilling sexual drives is irrational; I have in fact argued in my round 3 rebuttal of CON that it is in fact rational to fulfill one's sexual drives.

"Does allowing people to have sex with animals really make more happiness for the majority of people?" Here con assumes that happiness is the measure of "goodness" and commits the naturalistic fallacy. There is no magical trait of happiness that means it is necessarily good. In a world where people are made blissfully happy by killing their first born son after he reaches adulthood, is it ethical for them to kill their firstborn son? No. It is more likely the case that such happiness itself is EVIL.

"Considering the majority of people disagree with the resolution...." Is a clear appeal to the authority of the majority. This is known as the fallacious 'appeal to populism'.

"...including an incredibly powerful company that you may of heard of named PETA." Is a clear appeal to the authority of the organization PETA and their ability to make procamations via their might.

"All that discomfort and anger is much more unhappiness for the majority of people versus the little amount of happiness you may get from sexual actions with animals." This is the same objection brought against gays serving in the military, women voting, brown-skinned people's freedom and right to vote, and marriages between those with brown skin and pink skin. It failed then, it fails now. The question we are investigating is not whether the happiness of those who have sex with animals is sufficient, but whether there is sufficient reason for the aforementioned unhappiness. I have made a case that there is not. Again con has committed the naturalistic fallacy.

CON's attempt at argument from deterministic nihilism is a new argument. As was agreed to, CON was not to present new arguments in round 4, as that round was reserved for rebuttal and counter-rebuttal. In making such an argument, CON denies the existence of knowledge, and contradicts all of his own arguments about rationality and teleology. Even if the universe is deterministic, that still does not speak to the metaphysics of what ought be, which is the ethical question. If there is no ethical truth, all things are potentially ethicaly acceptable, and thus the resolution is supported by CON.

In conclusion, I have met my burden of proof that ethics are for people, that ethics is not pragmatism, and that common sense supports imposition on animals. CON has not provided any acceptable burden of proof that ethics are for animals; his claims were nonsensical. CON has engaged in outright lies, strawman arguments, red herrings, appeals to authority, and naturalistic fallacies. NONE of his arguments hold water, as I have repeatedly demonstrated, wheareas my own arguments clearly do; Finally, CON has made an attack on freedom ethics in his final round of argumentation, despite having dropped the point of validity of those ethics, and while claiming incoherence he has yet to demontrate that incoherence, and his time to do so is over.

A suggested RFD:
  • Conduct to PRO for staying within the rules of the debate, and because CON has outright lied in his poorly researched claims.
  • S&G Tied. Both PRO and CON have various minor spelling and grammar mistakes of similar character.
  • Convincingness to PRO; CON has committed numerous eggregious fallacies over the course of the debate which undermine his position. He has failed to meet his BOP of the validity of any particular ethical frameork, and even attacked said validity, whereas PRO has met his burden of proof for his ethical framework.
  • Reliability of sources to PRO; CON's use of sources as arguments from authority rather than arguments as evidence is clear. CON has failed to request sourcing, despite the offer do so.



Over the course of this debate, my opponent has attempted to defend his position on sex with animals, by simply saying I am committing fallacies without giving any evidence to support this claim. Furthermore my opponent has completely avoided my objections by simply giving the answer that we should be able to do what ever we want as long as we don't interfere with others freedoms. This is simply a false position that virtually no modern day ethicist agrees with but lets address my opponents points.
Deterministic Nihilism
My opponent says I made a argument from deterministic nihilism but I did no such thing. I was merely saying if PRO is correct than it follows that morality cannot be based on rational choice because pragmatic concerns is how we make rational choices. So it follows from my opponents position that Deterministic Nihilism is true. My opponent simply doesn't understand that if his position is true it entails this, maybe my opponent wishes this to be true but he has justify this. I am not saying its true, but my opponents case leads us to that. This isn't a argument, its observation. Furthermore, my attack on freedom ethics in the last round was just building on previous rounds not a new attack that I simply introduced, it was part of a rebuttal that from the arguments he gave me.
On the Existence of the Soul
My opponent attacks a strawman when he talks about the existence of the soul he infers I believe that, but I do not nor was that my argument. I gave an argument to what rights actually are and my opponent has not addressed my argument this whole debate therefore he concedes and if that is true than at least some animals it isn't okay to have sex with. Remember the argument was that if animals understand a right they are entitled to it.
Teleology and Intent
One my inherent teleology doesn't rely on God; two even if it did there is no reason to presuppose atheism over theism. Furthermore there are other reasons to think that morality should be natural rather than nonexistent. It seems that the value exists independent of the subjective perceptions. Most people if asked whether right or wrong exists will say yes. But why should morality be understood as anything different than mathematics. Some people will say this is just a bunch of bare assertions masquerading as a logical inference(thank you Dr. Tom Morris) but nonsense if we suppose that something may or may not exist we don't automatically assume it behaves differently than other things simply because people have mixed reports on it. Now this is part of my argument: we needn't suppose neither separate ontological status nor non-existence if right or wrong is grounded in natural teleology. It is not only the most simple answer (Oakum's razor) but the most commonsense (not to say what is true is always commonsense). My argument of why it isn't necessary to say desire or incidental things was not a appeal to authority, I was giving a actual argument. Now my opponent has never brought up the naturalistic fallacy but I will address it here: my opponent has introduced it but remember that the function is what determines what is permissible. As Contradiction once said "Given a teleological account of human nature, there is no fact-value distinction, for value is built into fact from the very beginning. If the purpose of eyes is that they see, then it follows straightforwardly given their telos that eyes which see well are good eyes. Nature is not merely descriptive, but also prescriptive. "Ought" claims are not derived from "is" claims, but present to begin with".
Deontology defeats my opponent
More of my opponents accusations here with absolutely no substance to his claims. I do not teach acceptance of deontology for non-rational reasons. I simply said if one is to accept deontology one is forced to conclude that sex with animals is wrong. Deontology obviously one of options but its not the only one and I have offered all of three contemporary theories of ethics against sex with animals. Notice how my opponent abandons his critique of Kant's Deontology and now just says that I haven't justified it! Therefore, he agrees that his objections are not substantiated. And if that's true then my objection stands and it shows deontology does not support my opponents freedom ethics or sex with animals at all.
Consequentialism and My opponents only real argument
My opponent has actually tried to refute the connection between pragmatism and consequentialism. My argument isn't a appeal to populism but a argument from collectivism which is the theory that is opposed to liberalism/individualism, in that it says community is more important than individual. My opponent merely asserts this is wrong as is very revealing about his whole case, he seems to have a common theme say the other person is wrong without justification. Now onto his explanations of why I am wrong:
Naturalistic Fallacy and Guilt
The point wasn't that guilt was supposed to be there because of the moral ontology of sex with animals but rather showing the generally doing something that is against society's values leads to negative consequences(expected not actual which is all that matters really, you cannot know actual consequences all the time). My opponent also says I make a assumption on happiness being good, but from Utilitarian view goodness is happiness and what is good necessarily indicates what is right. My opponent simply states the Utilitarian view with refuting it. The objection stands.
Pragmatism and Consequentialism
My opponent has clearly failed to understand the argument, Sex with animals cannot be told in actual consequences it must be told in expected consequences because we cannot know the actual consequences in reality until after they happen my opponent has misunderstood the argument, I am not arguing the type of consequentialism my opponent thinks I am, if I were then anything that resulted good would be permissible even things with evil intentions. We would expect one who has sex with animals would result in injury or illness. Therefore, expected consequences is what's more important. Even if my opponents argument to work, it still doesn't the negative societal consequences.
Begging the question/Appeal to authority/Social Issues
I apologize if my opponent doesn't understand that irresponsibility is caused by irrationality, I should have made this clear. To the point of irrationality see explanation with Deontology and cross apply. To fulfill a certain irrational desire is always irrational regardless of rationality of categorical whole. In other words, fallacy of composition on Pro. My opponent has failed to read what I am arguing on appeal to authority charges I am not arguing their right because of their authority, I am arguing that since the majority of people are against this it causes much more trouble and pain for it to be seen moral and therefore(due to jurisprudence) legal, therefore on consequentialist grounds the objection stands. My opponent has made a categorical mistake on social issues, the reason why all those things were legalized were because their was no rational reason to prohibit them, so far from criticizing the argument he doesn't understand it.
My Opponents argument entails/Argument from Daniel Kaye and the Andrew Sisters
My opponent has not responded to my argument about savages being raped simply for not being able to grasp something under his definition of freedom, also my opponent thinks it unimportant that his ethics justify necrophilia of animals and people. Since my opponent hasn't responded to these we can see he simply concedes.
I will not tell you all how to vote on every detail of this debate, just note my opponent has not meet his burden of proof, he doesn't understand modern ethics nor does he understand what this ethics he advocates for entails, he has completely ignored the role of pragmatism in rationality, and has abandoned commonsense in favor of absolute sexual freedom. Vote Con.
Debate Round No. 5
14 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 10 records.
Posted by kevinbasner.31 3 years ago
Jarhyn had way better arguments than the BS that Center_for_Rationality was spewing! I think Jarhyn should have won! Most votes were only for Center_for_Rationality and shows strong bias and prejudice!
Posted by Jarhyn 3 years ago
I didn't go there, because I didn't want people to think that I was conceding that the pleasure of an animal was itself an ethical goal. Such a view contradicts freedom ethics. It is likely true that "Mutually pleasurable sex with animals is pragmatic", however, that does not provide any support for the resolution and would be a red herring.
Posted by PeteSteinman 3 years ago
I found it odd that despite drawing a clear line of eligibility to give INFORMED consent, there is still no consideration made for the animal's pleasure. Though the beast may not speak per se, there is a difference between consentual sexual contact (your dog humps your leg- if you rub him off, are you immoral?) and pure barnyard rape. He could have searched for middle ground without being quite so heartless...
Posted by Center_for_Rationality 3 years ago
I doubt it really matters whether Animals have rights. Either way its unethical, as you will soon see!
Posted by Jarhyn 3 years ago
Javiously, essentially, that's what we're trying to figure out; mere assertion does not suffice to establish the fact.
Posted by javiously 3 years ago
Man that's messed up. Animals have rights too bruh.
Posted by Jarhyn 3 years ago
Further, you should probably be aware, you can't just claim the validity of your moral/ethical background; you have to defend it with reason, or at least be prepared to provide adequate defense of contended points.
Posted by Center_for_Rationality 3 years ago
I disagree but thank you for permission :)
Posted by Jarhyn 3 years ago
Neo-Aristotelian naturalism has massive, and ostensibly unrecoverable problems in the face of evolutionary biology not to mention having issues with the naturalistic fallacy. I'm not going to say you can't, but merely that you probably SHOULDN'T (pragmatic shouldn't).
Posted by Center_for_Rationality 3 years ago
I am going to run Neo-Aristolilan naturalism okay?
2 votes have been placed for this debate. Showing 1 through 2 records.
Vote Placed by likespeace 3 years ago
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Total points awarded:03 
Reasons for voting decision: Thanks to Con. It was a distasteful subject and you defended humanity's position. I particularly liked the Consequentialist argument. You showed that, even if we assume a model of complete self-interest where the animal's pain is irrelevant--the worst model from an animal rights perspective--bestiality is still unacceptable.
Vote Placed by AshleysTrueLove 3 years ago
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Total points awarded:04 
Reasons for voting decision: WTF on CFR round 4 but other than that landslide. Argument go to CFR for answering all objections, Jarhyn dropped Argument from Daniel, Conduct to CFR for three reasons, didn't make bare assertions,didn't accuse of fallacies with no refutation, and didn't tell me how to vote. Seems like Jarhyn was off topic alot too. CFR didn't dispute Meimetic evolution but Jarhyn forced the issue when it wasn't apparant. Sources: I would give this to CFR since he had references and quotes and some sources but I am afraid of being accused of VB so I will leave at that even though CFR deserves 6 points.