The Instigator
Smithereens
Pro (for)
Tied
0 Points
The Contender
kenballer
Con (against)
Tied
0 Points

Solipsism is entailed by logical extension of Idealism

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Voting Style: Open Point System: 7 Point
Started: 8/6/2017 Category: Philosophy
Updated: 5 months ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 1,048 times Debate No: 103434
Debate Rounds (4)
Comments (40)
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Smithereens

Pro

Definitions

1) Solipsism: The self is the only existing entity.

2) Idealism: The only reality that exists is a mental reality, ie. no physical reality.

3) Entailed by logical extension: followed to it's natural consequence.

I've chosen these definitions to reflect common usage of the terms, technicalities will not be entertained. In this debate I will show why an extension of Idealism's premises entails Solipsism. Con will argue the opposite.

Format

Asian Parliamentary style: Affirmative case begins, Negative opens with rebuttal then positive material, Affirmative rebuts and presents more arguments, negative rebuts and presents further arguments, Affirmative rebuts and summarises, Negative rebuts and summarises. Rebuttals come before material.

Voting

Sources (2 points) is being substituted for a custom criteria, 'Method.' Award these two points to the debater who had better responsiveness to opponent's arguments. Responsiveness describes argument styles that accurately adapts to material presented by the opponent. High responsiveness is accurately identifying the central point of the opponent's arguments. Poor responsiveness involves straw manning during a rebuttal or ignoring positive material from the opponent. Responsiveness is more focussed around rebuttal performance than positive material.

Rules

Standard Etiquette applies.
Do not accept the debate, express interest in the comments.
Deviation from the debate format will result in Method penalty (2 points)
By accepting the debate you accept all stated specifications made here.


kenballer

Con

I accept.
Debate Round No. 1
Smithereens

Pro

Case Specific Definitions:
To demonstrate internal validity, symbolic renditions of syllogisms are provided. Here I define key symbols:
S(M) = Mind of self
~S(M) = Mind separate to self
~S(E) = Entities (percieved as) separate to self
E(M) = External epistemological mechanism
I = Idealism


A) Epistemological necessity of solipsism in mental reality

1.
Minds separate to self exist if and only if entities perceived as separate to self express like properties to minds separate to self.

~S(M) [(E): ~S(E) ∧ {~S(E):⇔~S(E)[S(M) ∧ ~S(M)]}

2. If both Mind of self and Minds separate to self exists, there must exist an external epistemeological mechanism that causes entities perceived as serparate to self to express like properties to minds separate to self

[S(M) ∧ ~S(M)] → E(M)

3. An external epistemological mechanism defeats Idealism

E(M) → ¬I

4. There is no external epistemological mechanism.

I ¬E(M)

C: Minds separate to self do not exist.

¬[~S(M)]

Fig 1. Minds separate to self reductio ad absurdum



B) Modal argument against Idealism without Solipsism

1. There exists a possible world in which Idealism (I) is instantiated

I

2. There exists a subset Solipsism (S), contained in the set of all I.

S ⊃ I

3. I minus S exists if and only if there exists a essense P who is both a property of S(M) and it's own discrete entity.

(I - S) ⇔ P: P{S(M)} ∧ ¬P{S(M)}

4. In no world I, can P exist simultaneously as an entity and a property.

¬[P: P{S(M)} ∧ ¬P{S(M)}]

C: The subset I minus S does not exist.

¬ (I - S)

Fig 2. I minus S subset infers identity violation in P



Summary Remarks:

In a world where all reality evolves from the mind, we are forced to accept that other minds similarly evolved from the mind of self. This is necessitated given that other minds are a part of the reality in our mind. Thus there are no minds outside our own mind unless they are not within the reality of our mind. The contradiction is in suggesting that there is a reality not within our mind, as this defeats Idealism.

A solution I posited in my second argument and subsequently refuted was the model whereby a god mind was invoked as the solution to somehow make a reality possible where Idealism was true but Solipsism was false. Under Idealism, the only entities are minds, and minds cannot be properties as there is no higher order entity than the mind. Thus a god mind, which would either be a property of S(M) or vice verse presupposses that inherent contradiction.

My opponent is faced with the philosophically daunting task of demonstrating a reality where Idealism can exist while solipsism is false. I have demonstrated why this necessarily infers logically incoherent statements via reductio ad absurdum and identity violation.


Heil Smithis.

kenballer

Con

A) Epistemological necessity of solipsism in mental reality

I accept premise 3 and 4, but I reject premise 1, which leads me to reject premise 2.

I know that other minds exist because they express properties that my mind also expresses which would show me that they are in fact a mind. Moreover, they make distinct choices that are separate from how I identify myself. For example, God is considered an objectively morally perfect being and thus has moral authority to issue commands upon humans. This means that anything contrary to God’s nature is a sin including anybody who disobeys him. In Genesis, God told Adam and Eve that they can eat from any tree within the Garden of Eden except the tree of knowledge. When Adam and Eve ate from the tree of knowledge instead of the many others, they made a distinct choice that was contrary to God’s nature. Thus, an external mechanism is not necessary to decipher whether there are other minds because abstract objects created in my mind don’t have free-will in the same way concrete objects would not have free-will in materialism.

B) Modal argument against Idealism without Solipsism

I don’t understand what Pro means by “ Idealism is instantiated”so I can’t fully say whether I accept it. I will accept it anyways along with premise 2 for the sake of further discussion. I also accept premise 4, but I reject premise 3, which I am assuming its referring to God..

God is a discrete entity only and NOT a property of my mind because God is considered to be a necessary mind that exists in all possible worlds and represents objective reality. Otherwise, To suggest that X is conceptual therefore the thing that X is based upon is conceptual would be a fallacy of composition. For instance, conceptual applications of the mind are contingent upon my mind and God is conceptual. However, the concept itself is pointing to something that is supposed to be objective and mental, which would be God. Therefore, Pro’s argument would not hold up or apply to God; Instead, the argument would only work if this was a physical object or another human mind in question. If Pro was referring to P as another human mind, then the argument is no different from the previous one.

My argument for Idealism minus Solipsism

It is important to point out that there are several different interpretations of idealism and I suspect that some of them would inescapably lead to solispism, such as what Pro has suggested in his arguments. Nevertheless, Idealism encompasses more than just minds and their subjective ideas. As Pro briefly discussed, it includes an objective mind (i.e. God), but it also entails objective ideas, which will be my main point of contention against solipsism.

The logical absolutes, such as the law ofidentity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle,are considered to be necessarily true in all possible worlds. More importantly, they are taken as laws that guide and underlie everyone's thinking, thoughts, expressions, discussions and more. As Descartes claimed himself that the very act of doubting one's own existence served, at least, as proof of the reality of one's own mind; there must be a thinking entity in this case the “self” for there to be a thought and, as a result, it cites the law of identity.

However, this is obviously very problematic if solipsism is true. For instance, we know the laws of logic exist externally from our minds because we can’t think of a possible world where they could not exist in and be untrue.This is why they are considered absolute because no situation could arise which would cause us to reject these logical truths. On the other hand, I can envision a world where there are no minds except my own, which would force me to question whether other minds exist beside my own. Therefore, if only my mind and the subjective ideas I create within my mind exists according to solipsism, then how can the very laws that have to underlie my thinking “self” exist outside my mind as well.

Premise 1: The laws of logic provide the basis of my thoughts

Premise 2: I can think of a situation where only my mind exists

Premise 3: I cannot think of a situation where the logical absolutes do not exist

Conclusion: The laws of logic are external and objective entities.

On this basis alone, we can conclude that idealism does not lead to solipsism or that solipsism is false without even invoking God. With that said, I will be showcasing additional arguments using God but it will have to be in the next round in order to stay consistent with the required format.

Debate Round No. 2
Smithereens

Pro

Preliminary Remarks:
"we know the laws of logic exist externally from our minds because we can’t think of a possible world where they could not exist in and be untrue." My opponent has successfully defeated Idealism while attempting to disprove solipsism.

1. Refuting Idealism minus Solipsism

My opponent cites the existence of logical absolutes as evidence against solipsism. In this argument I will show that solipsism doesn't attempt to refute logical absolutes, and further show that Con's argument can be applied to disprove Idealism via logical absolutes, as he has already done so in his quoted argument.

1.1) There is no reality beyond the solipsistic reality for logical absolutes to apply to

Reality is everything that exists. This is not different in a Solipsistic reality. Logical laws apply to all of reality, and by definition there is nothing beyond reality. Thus logical laws apply to only reality. In any reality, logical absolutes are the same. This is what Con means when he calls them objective. In any possible world, there will be those same laws of logic applying universally. Let us assume reality is solipsistic. Can we conceieve of logical absolutes that apply beyond the solipsistic reality? No, because there is no such thing as 'beyond' the solipsistic reality. For Con's argument to follow, there in fact needs to be a coherent concept of 'beyond reality.' This isn't the case, thus Con's argument fails.

1.2) External Logical absolutes are as incompatible with Solipsism as with Idealism

Either logical absolutes are a product of the mind and the mind's mental reality, or they are sourced from somewhere external. One of the key tenets of Idealism holds that there is necessarily nothing which is not mental. Mental reality is all of reality. An immediately apparent implication is the fact that these logical absolutes Con speaks of, being 'external to the mind' are not compatible with the idea that logical absolutes are evolved from the mind.

1.2.1. Either Logical absolutes are evolved from a mental reality, or a non mental reality (law of excluded middle)

1.2.2. If Idealism is true, logical absolutes are evolved from a mental reality (definition)

1.2.3. Logical absolutes transcend mental reality (con's argument)

C1: Logical absolutes are not evolved from a mental reality

This argument is especially effective against Idealism because while my opponent was attempting to prove that not all Idealistic realities are solipsistic realities, he failed to consider that all Solipsistic realities are necessarily Idealistic realities. If Solipsism is false due to the Idealism inherent in it, then it is not so much the single mind which is the problem as it is the mental reality. Solipsism is after all, Idealism but with just one mind present. Con's argument doesn't distinguish between Idealism with one mind and Idealism with many minds. He claims that Solipsism is false because it cannot account for logical absolutes. The thing is, if we add another mind to the solipsistic reality, we still cannot account for logical absolutes because the nature of reality has not changed. It is still fundamentally a mental reality. Con's argument thus negates the resolution.

1.3) Further Analysis of Con's argument

Con in this debate is tasked with showing why Idealism works without solipsism. In support of this he argued only that logical absolutes exist transcendentally to the mind, thus solipsism is false. Con has attempted to argue nothing more than that Solipsism is false. Con should be reminded that he still needs to show why Solipsism is not entailed by Idealism. Showing that Solipsism is false does not show that it isn't entailed, it simply shows that solipsism is false and supports the idea that Idealism is false as well.

In his argument, Con presents a faulty syllogism that doesn't follow. As you can see, premise 1 and 2 use two different terms for a similar concept, neither of which are used again in the argument. Each premise doesn't link terms from the prior premise. Furthermore, the argument attempts to mimic modal logic but has the feel of a basic categorical syllogism. Since currently the syllogism doesn't work and is poorly written, I have rewritten it in modal logical so that I have something substantive to argue against.

1.3.1. If thought exists, logical absolutes exist.

1.3.2. There exists a possible world where only thought exists.

1.3.3. There exists no possible world where logical absolutes do not exist.

C2: Logical absolutes are transcendental to thought.

The first problem you may have noticed with this argument is that premise 3 is entirely redundant and the conclusion doesn't even attempt to link to the premises. Premise 2 is wrong because a statement that is necessarily true in a world where only thoughts exists is not consequently transcendental to thought, it is simple true in the world where only thought exists. The premises are not sound, they don't flow and they don't link to the conclusion. The argument is invalid.


Affirmative Arguments:

2) On Epistemic Mechanisms

Last Round I presented the argument that the absence of a mechanism that allows minds to experience coherent information exchange means that any Minds seperate to self ~S(M) are necessarily evolved from the Mind of self S(M). In other words, if Idealism is true, any other minds in your mental reality are actually evolved from your own mental reality, and not a reality separate to your mental reality.

My opponent attempted to contest by claiming "I know that other minds exist because they express properties that my mind also expresses which would show me that they are in fact a mind." He later rambles on about God, sin and the bible but as this isn't relevant I won't address it.

Focussing on my opponents claim, we can see that his justification is mistaken. In a mental reality, all properties are evolved from the mind. Thus all the properties of all the minds that appear to be similar to your mind are in fact your own perceptions. We can demonstrate this with a simple thought experiment. You pass three unique minds waiting at a bus stop, A, B and C. By Con's argument, since A, B and C all have similar properties to your mind, they must all exist as individual minds. However, C is actually a sophisticated robot and doesn't have a mind. Thus you have been fooled into thinking that C is actually a person.
This thought experiment shows that you need an epistemic mechanism to demonstrate the existence of another mind (as I pointed out in round 1).

The minds of others in Idealism actually don't exist, as you simply perceieve them as being a part of your own reality. They are evolved from your own mind, and cannot exist because there is not epistemic mechanism that shares information about reality to them. Note the following diagram:


S(M)1 is you. You live in Mental reality 1. For Idealism to be true, S(M)2 also needs to live in Mental reality 1. Unfortunately S(M)2 lives in Mental reality 2, and thus you are the only mind that exists. Reality is therefore solipsistic. To solve this issue, a mechanism by which multiple minds can perceieve the same reality is required:

Such a reality would indeed be Idealism minus Solipsism, however both Con and I agree that E(M) is a incoherent idea, thus Idealism will always infer solipsistic realities.

3) On Identity Violation

Con elects to reject only premise 3. Quite simply, he should be taking issue with premise 4 and not this one because this is true by definition. In Idealism, anything that interacts with an entity is a property of that entity. This is because entities do not have a physical form under Idealism, there is a logical limit to what they can be. An entity which is not as high order as a mind can be a property of a mind, but a mind cannot be a property of another mind. Ergo P is not instantiated.


Summary remarks:
Con's current argument against Solipsism doesn't fulfil his BoP. Next round is his last opportunity to present an argument against the topic.


Heil Smithis.
kenballer

Con

1.1) There is no reality beyond the solipsistic reality for logical absolutes to apply to

Remember, the argument entails that the laws of logic themselves ARE objective reality, which is why they are considered additional entities because they are not contingent upon anything. More importantly, they can apply to other abstract entities. For example, wave functions are mathematicals objects that represent a possible configuration of matter or a universe, which are not physical as well.

1.2) External Logical absolutes are as incompatible with Solipsism as with Idealism


I was only trying to be consistent with Pros definition of idealism at the start of the debate:

Idealism: The only reality that exists is a mental reality, ie. no physical reality.

As you can see, his definition of idealism only excludes physical reality or entities, but it does not exclude abstract entities, which are not physical. More importantly, you could have a dualist framework minus physical entities where one human mind co-exists eternally with these abstract objects. For instance, I could just be a floating mind that actualizes each possible configuration of a world from the universal wave-function (i.e. the Platonic realm). Thus, we would still have idealism (one mind + abstract objects) minus solipsism (one mind). Again, there are other types of idealism and the one I described above is called Platonic Idealism. I also was trying to stay consistent with Pro's required format so Pro cannot claim I was inconsistent with the resolution he established. With that said, I plan on making an accumulate case for my position.

1.3) Further Analysis of Con's argument

Con presents a faulty syllogism that doesn't follow.

Sadly, I have to concede here. I am not good at constructing my own syllogisms. The only reason I tried within this debate is because during my discussions with Pro beforehand, he insisted that I construct them. Luckily, the debate is not about who crafts the best syllogism so I will scrap this one but I will still keep the argument.

2) On Epistemic Mechanisms

Pro did not really respond to the other aspect of my refutation, which involved more than just similar properties but also distinct choices. Or maybe Pro just missed the other side of my argument. To prevent this from happening again, I will use Dharmakīrti syllogism I found online, which is not my own because I am terrible at constructing my own:

P1: I experience actions of a certain type.

P2: Actions of this certain type have their cause in consciousness.

P3: These actions do not have their cause in my consciousness.

C1: Therefore, these actions have their cause in another consciousness.

C1: Therefore, consciousnesses other than mine exist.

The God example I gave before was a perfect illustration of this argument. Its a shame Pro missed it because if he replaced God with the self-existing human mind, he would have seen the argument for what it was. Here is the illustration again, but this time lets assume God is a human mind. In Genesis, God told Adam and Eve that they can eat from any tree within the Garden of Eden except the tree of knowledge. When Adam and Eve ate from the tree of knowledge instead of the many others, they made a distinct choice that was contrary to God’s nature.

Alright, so here is my point. When Adam and Eve ate from every tree except the tree of knowledge, God knows that the entities he percieves have similar properties that a mind would display because they made choices that were not contrary to his nature. However, when Adam and Eve ate from the tree of knowledge, they also made a distinct choice that was contrary to his nature. Thus, its a combination between the choices that other minds make AND the nature of those choices, which give me a reason to believe the existence of other minds. In other words, I can make predictions about what other minds will do or not do based upon my own nature within me without relying on an external mechanism to discover their existence. This objection does not necessarily refute Pro's argument, but it does provide a reason for why I reject the first premise.


3) On Identity Violation

I did not reject premise 3 simply because I did not agree with it. I rejected it because I identified a category fallacy, which naturally undermines his entire argument as a result. Since Pro did not address this fallacy, there is no reason to discuss it further.

My Comprehensive Case for Idealism Only

Even though my ideas of memory and imagination that I experience are wholly subject to my will, my sense-experiences are not similarly compliant. For instance, my power to choose whether I react to a hot stove that I put my hands on or the flicker of my eyes when objects appear suddenly in close view did not originate from my will. I am going to have to use Berkeleys syllogism as well for this argument to flow right:

P1: All contingent ideas are caused by some mind.

P2: I experience ideas that are independent of my will.

P3: Ideas that are independent of my will must be caused by a mind other than my own.

C1: Therefore, a mind other than my own exists.

As stated in round 2, the laws of logic and mathematical objects form the basis of all mental thought. I can envision a world where there are no minds except my own, which would force me to question whether other minds exist beside my own. However, I can’t think of a possible world where the laws of logic and mathematical objects do not exist. Thus, I know that the laws of logic exist independent of minds existing. Now, I am going to combined these two arguments into one.

P1: Every existing thing has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.

P2: If I have an explanation of my existence, that explanation is an objective mind.

P3: I am an existing entity.

C1: Therefore, the explanation of my existence is objective mind.

So far, we have established the existence of objective ideas and an objective mind. Now, I am going to combine these arguments to make God who would be an omnibenelovent, omniscient, and omnipotent that exist in all possible worlds:


P1: It is possible that a maximally great mind exists in my world.


P2: If it is possible that a maximally great mind exists in my world, then a maximally great mind exists in other possible worlds.

P3: If a maximally great mind exists in other possible worlds, then it exists in every possible world.

P4: If a maximally great mind exists in every possible world, then it exists in my world.

P5: If a maximally great mind exists in my world, then a maximally great mind exists.

C1: Therefore, a maximally great mind exists.



Since we would expect a maximally great mind to be all-good all-powerful all-knowing and exist in all possible worlds, we can assume that God would not allow me to deceive myself and wants the best for us. This would involve optimizing my sense experiences through the interaction of other minds and ,as a result, maximize my uniform experience because without this we could not know how to act upon anything that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. In other words, I know that other minds exist because God has revealed it to me through his perfect will and nature. Thus, we have no reason to assume that our knowledge of other minds is a result of deception according to our trust in God.

Debate Round No. 3
Smithereens

Pro

1. Con's case for Idealism only

It doesn't work, and here's why:

P1: All contingent ideas are caused by some mind.

P2: I experience ideas that are independent of my will.

P3: Ideas that are independent of my will must be caused by a mind other than my own.

C1: Therefore, a mind other than my own exists.

Premise 3 is false. In a mental reality, you create the entire reality, including things that you don't want to see or interact with. Imagine it like a person with delusions of persecution. They don't want to be persecuted, but their mind shows them the persecution independently of their will. Likewise with mental realities, things that are beyond your control are still evolved from your own mind. Another example is taking a hallucinogenic drug. This induces your mind to show you things that you didn't ask for, and are beyond your control. The source is still your mind, therefore the argument is false.

He then goes on to provide an argument for why God should exist, which isn't really in the scope of this debate but I'll address it for the sake of sportsmanship. Here I've copy pasted the argument and shown why it's invalid by switching out 'God' for 'a matrix that holds every brain in a jar' without invalidating the conclusion:

P1: Every existing thing has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.

P2: If I have an explanation of my existence, that explanation is a matrix that holds every brain in a jar

P3: I am an existing entity.

C1: Therefore, the explanation of my existence is a matrix that holds every brain in a jar.

Besides that, premise 1 is wrong because it assumes everything is caused, except for presumably an uncaused caused which is God. In a mental reality however, if God can be uncaused, then so can everything else, because an Objective mind has the same properties as my own mind.

The next argument he brings up is an ontological argument for God, but this is too far beyond what I made this debate for. We are arguing over whether or not Idealism infers solipsism, not whether or not there is a god. I'm not going to respond to this argument, as it's a new debate in itself, one which I've done many times and don't intend to do here.

unfortunatetly this is all the new material Con brought up to support his BoP. Before moving onto my arguments, I'm going to demonstrate the sort of reality that Con is building with his entire case and why it doesn't work:


Shown here is S(M)1, which is me/you, the person who is reading this. You live in a mental reality that is evolved from your mind. ~S(M) is a mind separate to self. They are the minds that Con needs to show as being independent minds in order to have Idealism without solipsism. What Con has failed to show however is that ~S(M) is not actually created by your mind. They live in your mental reality, but how are they different to a potted cactus sitting by your window? Con claims it's because they can do things which are against your will, but this is absurd because a tree can fall on me against my will and that doesn't mean a tree is a mind separate to me. There are no identifyable properties that allow us to identify other minds. Not only this, but there is no way for other minds who live in our mental reality to perceive the same reality we do. It lacks an epistemic mechanism to share information. I've shown why an E(M) cannot exist and Con has agreed that it can't. there is therefore no method by which an Idealistic universe can exist without it being inherent solipsistic.

in this summary of the Aff case I will deal with any issues that Con took with the premises:

A) Epistemological necessity of solipsism in mental reality

1.
Minds separate to self exist if and only if entities perceived as separate to self express like properties to minds separate to self.

Con agreed in round 3, other minds are things we should be able to identify.

2. If both Mind of self and Minds separate to self exists, there must exist an external epistemeological mechanism that causes entities perceived as serparate to self to express like properties to minds separate to self

As shown, in order for us to perceive the same mental reality and not different mental realities, there needs to be a mechanism by which information from one mind can reach another mind.

3. An external epistemological mechanism defeats Idealism

Con agrees.

4. There is no external epistemological mechanism.

Con Agrees

C: Minds separate to self do not exist.

Because we cannot perceive the same reality without information exchange, your reality is necessarily solipsistic.


B) Modal argument against Idealism without Solipsism

1. There exists a possible world in which Idealism (I) is instantiated

That is to say, Idealism is not impossible.

2. There exists a subset Solipsism (S), contained in the set of all I.

That is to say, All solipsistic realities are Idealistic.

3. I minus S exists if and only if there exists a essense P who is both a property of S(M) and it's own discrete entity.

For Idealism to exist without Solipsism, there needs to be something that can link minds together, and such a thing would therefore be both an entity of itself and a property of the mind. Con both agreed and disagreed with this point. He took issue with it, but later argued that a god-mind is indeed necessitated.

4. In no world I, can P exist simultaneously as an entity and a property.

A mind cannot be another mind's property without being inherently evolved from it. It either exists independently of that mind or is evolved from that mind. There is no middle ground, and thus a linking mechanism is not possible without an external reality.

C: The subset I minus S does not exist.


Conclusion:
Con attempted to show that I minus S can exist by claiming that:
1. Logical truths transcends the mind and thus must be external to it, which means Solipsism is false.
2. Things that occur in my mental reality against my will must be the product of other minds.
3. My mind must be created by another objective mind.

1 was shown to be false because it's actually true of Idealism, not Solipsism specifically. It was also shown to be false because logical laws apply to only reality, as there is nothing beyond reality, thus a solipsistic reality comfortably explains how logical laws exist.

2 was shown to be false because inanimate objects in a mental reality can also act against my will, yet they don't have minds, therefore things acting against my will is not evidence for another mind.

3 was shown to be false because my mind doesn't need a cause any more than a god mind does. Furthermore, even if minds did need a cause, it could well be a physical cause like the matrix, where all our brains are in a jar.

The affirmative case showed that I minus S cannot exist because:
1. The subset would require an epistemic mechanism to share information between minds, which (as Con agreed) defeats Idealism
2. A god-mind or any other information sharing mechanism that is itself a mind cannot exist because then it would be both evolved from the mind and not evolved from the mind, which is a contradiction.

Therfore, Solipsism is entailed by logical extension of Idealism.


Heil Smithis.

kenballer

Con

Imagine it like a person with delusions of persecution. They don't want to be persecuted, but their mind shows them the persecution independently of their will.

I am really not following Pros example here. If my mind shows me delusions of persecution without an external mind , then its my mind that is creating those delusions on purpose. I have already said and agreed with this before that my ideas of memory and imagination that I experience are wholly subject to my will. As a result, this objection does not successfully refute anything about the argument because it is not dealing with sense ideas, which are different.

Another example is taking a hallucinogenic drug. This induces your mind to show you things that you didn't ask for, and are beyond your control.

Now, this argument is actually referring to sense ideas, but Pro is appealing to an epistemic or external mechanism that I thought we agreed does not exist according to this debate. More importantly, the choice to introduce outside drugs inside my mind would be subject to my will and I would be aware of it even though the ideas created within me would be beyond my control once the drug is taken. Thus, the objection falls short as well.

The next argument he brings up is an ontological argument for God, but this is too far beyond what I made this debate for. We are arguing over whether or not Idealism infers solipsism, not whether or not there is a god. I'm not going to respond to this argument, as it's a new debate in itself, one which I've done many times and don't intend to do here.

All my arguments were relevant to the debate and necessary to make a comprehensive case for Idealism minus Solipsism. For instance, I made two arguments beforehand that established the existence of objective ideas and one external mind that my mind is subject to. The contingency argument was presented to show that this mind exists by necessity and thus is an objective mind. Then, I presented the Ontological argument to combine the previous arguments and show that God exists who is a maximally great being. This allow me to establish the existence of other minds as a result.

Con claims it's because they can do things which are against your will, but this is absurd because a tree can fall on me against my will and that doesn't mean a tree is a mind separate to me. There are no identifyable properties that allow us to identify other minds.

Again, it is more than just against my will but it’s against my nature as well. Pro keeps isolating the two, but it is not an either/or proposition I am arguing but a both/and. Moreover, the will and nature of a mind are two different things. The nature of that mind encompasses ideas within the mind.

there needs to be something that can link minds together, and such a thing would therefore be both an entity of itself and a property of the mind. Con both agreed and disagreed with this point. He took issue with it, but later argued that a god-mind is indeed necessitated.

I dont understand why Pro continues to commit this category fallacy without a response back from him that would explain to everyone why it’s not a fallacy.

Again, although conceptual applications of the mind are contingent upon my mind and God is conceptual, the concept itself is pointing to something that is supposed to be objective and mental, which would be God. This means Pro’s argument does not apply to God anymore than it would apply to the laws of logic. To suggest that it does would be a fallacy of composition.

I will just encourage voters to watch a discussion between Matt Slick vs Matt Dillahunty on the Atheist Experience show. Pro is essentially making the same argument that Matt Slick used and Dillahunty refuted except God is replaced with the laws of logic.

My Case for Objective Ideas

Again, there are several different interpretations of idealism, and Pro’s definition of idealism in this debate did not rule out any of them including platonic idealism. Pro responded and suggested that I needed to provide a coherent concept of “beyond reality” in regards to these objective ideas for the argument to follow. I proceeded to explain how my argument could work using a dualist framework ,which excludes physical reality, where objective ideas can apply to other objective ideas including my mind while all exist externally. Thus, despite a poorly constructed syllogism, the argument for platonic idealism alone proves idealism minus solipsism. Pro himself even acknowledged the existence of objective ideas and admitted it disproves Solipsism. Moreover, Pro’s no response to my dualist model being coherent within idealism is a concession on his part that it does NOT disprove idealism as well.

My Case for an Objective Mind

I constructed three deductive arguments that established the existence of God (i.e. another mind) without appealing to epistemic mechanisms. There was two premises that Pro was against between the three syllogisms.

The first premise he was against is how “Ideas that are independent of my will must be caused by a mind other than my own. I explained already that this premise was referring to sense ideas that are not a part of my nature and will. For example, if I am sleep depraved, I have a tendency to fall asleep against my will. Pro suggested I can just take a drug, but this is appealing to physical mechanisms and ,thus, the objection falls short. Thus, since all contingent ideas come from some mind, then at least one other mind exists.

The second premise he was against is how Every existing thing has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or an external cause. Pro suggested that I assumed everything had an external cause except God and then he proceeded to restructure my argument to include a different proposition to make it seem like he refuted it. This is not the case at all. I made two previous arguments that established the existence of Objective ideas and one other mind without assuming them. More importantly, I never suggested that these other entities created or sustained the existence of my mind. For example, I still can assume that my mind existed forever but possesses limitations that are imposed by an objective mind that may or may not have those same limitations. Thus, Pros objections here are essentially attacking a straw-man version of my argument, which is a violation of the rules Pro established within the debate.


My Case for Other Minds

I generally used God as an explanation for why we can infer the existence of other minds beside my mind and God’s mind. This is because God is a maximally great being who we would expect to maximize our well-being and reveal the truth that all other minds exist through his perfect will and nature. However, I also presented a syllogism that established the existence of other minds without invoking God, but it was mainly used as an objection to Pro’s argument. The nature AND the will that other entities display in comparison to my own nature and will can allow us to establish the existence of other minds. I made an illustration of the Adam and Eve story to convey this. Plus, I have already explained how Pro did not fully address my counterargument to his argument. Thus, I am assuming he is conceding here.

Conclusion

My case that proves Idealism does NOT infer solsispim comes in three arguments: Objective ideas, God, or other minds. Anyone of these arguments can prevent the logical extentsion of solispism, but all three arguments combined make a compelling case that leaves no doubt as to whether I met my BOP.


As far Pro's case, the fundamental reason why his arguments could not ever establish that God-mind Idealism inescaply leads to solispsism is because it will always lead you to make a category fallacy called the Fallacy of composition. Since God can establish the existence of other minds through his perfect will and nature, God-mind idealism also undermines Pro's other argument and ,thus, he does not meet his BOP.


Debate Round No. 4
40 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 10 records.
Posted by LostintheEcho1498 4 months ago
LostintheEcho1498
I gave it a good shot at understanding this, but tbh I don't feel qualified with what's going on here. Sorry, if you get near the end of the voting period send me a message and I'll judge what I can.
Posted by Smithereens 4 months ago
Smithereens
Cool, looking forward to your insights LostintheEcho
Posted by LostintheEcho1498 4 months ago
LostintheEcho1498
and sorry for the accidental spam
Posted by LostintheEcho1498 4 months ago
LostintheEcho1498
getting ready to start working on my vote, took a quick scroll and know I'm in for a good one lol lets see what we got
Posted by LostintheEcho1498 4 months ago
LostintheEcho1498
getting ready to start working on my vote, took a quick scroll and know I'm in for a good one lol lets see what we got
Posted by LostintheEcho1498 4 months ago
LostintheEcho1498
getting ready to start working on my vote, took a quick scroll and know I'm in for a good one lol lets see what we got
Posted by Smithereens 5 months ago
Smithereens
Ken you're almost out of time!
Posted by Smithereens 5 months ago
Smithereens
In this format, the last round is different in that you start by attacking your opponents positive material, and then you have to give a summary of your case without adding anything in.
Posted by kenballer 5 months ago
kenballer
Well no, of course not. I just made an argument without God involving abstract objects in round 2
Posted by Smithereens 5 months ago
Smithereens
Do you believe that Idealism can't work without god or something?
No votes have been placed for this debate.