The Instigator
Rational_Thinker9119
Pro (for)
Losing
3 Points
The Contender
wiploc
Con (against)
Winning
6 Points

The Modal Ontological Argument for God's existence is logically valid

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Post Voting Period
The voting period for this debate has ended.
after 3 votes the winner is...
wiploc
Voting Style: Open Point System: 7 Point
Started: 6/9/2012 Category: Religion
Updated: 4 years ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 2,851 times Debate No: 24189
Debate Rounds (4)
Comments (17)
Votes (3)

 

Rational_Thinker9119

Pro

I will be arguing that Plantinga's Modal Ontological Argument for the existence of God contains no broken logic. My position in this debate is that if premise 1 is true, a maximally great being must in fact exist. My opponent must argue that even if premise 1 was true, it wouldn't lead to the inevitable conclusion of God's existence.

Basically, this debate will not be on the truth of the first premise, but on whether or not the argument proves God exists if the first premise is true hypothetically.

P1: It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
P2: If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
P3: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
P4: If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
P5: If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
P6: Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

First round for acceptance.
Debate Round No. 1
Rational_Thinker9119

Pro

I thank my opponent for engaging in this debate. However, I do not believe I need much space to explain why the argument is valid if we assume the truth of the first premise for the sake of argument.

Modal Logic

In modal logic, we infer that if some entity is logically possible then this entity is exists in some possible world. To exist in some possible world however, there must also contain no type of contradiction internally involving this entity. [1]

Maximally Great Being

A maximally great being is a being with all of what we would call great making properties. Now, it is self evident that it would be greater to exist in all possible worlds rather than simply just one possible world. If another being existed in more worlds than another, then that being would be greater. Thus, if a maximally great being exists in at least one possible world, then necessarily, this being exists in all possible worlds (or else, there would be no way to claim this being was maximally great). [2]

The Premises

Lets take a look at the premises of the Ontological Argument to see if they follow logically..

P1: "It is possible that a maximally great being exists."

We are going to assume the truth of the first premise for the sake or argument.

P2: "If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world."

This follows from Modal Logic, as I already explained previously.

P3: "If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world."

This follows from the very concept of a maximally great being, as I explained previously.

P4: "If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world."

If there is not a single possible world where this being does not exist, then the being must exist in the actual world. This is because out world is obviously possible, because if it was impossible, we wouldn't exist. So, since this being exists in every possible world, the being necessarily exists in the actual world.

P5: "If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists."

This is self-evident.

P6: "Therefore, a maximally great being exists."

This conclusion follows logically from all the preceding premises. If we assume that premise 1 is true for the sake of argument, then this argument is a logical proof for the existence of a maximally great being.

Parodies

Some people are under the false impression that this argument can prove anything. For an example, some people think this argument can prove the existence of a maximally great cell phone. However, a cell phone is a contingent and a maximally great being is a necessary being. Some may think that it can prove the existence of a maximally great alien, but once again, an extraterrestrial is contingent to nature and we are discussing that which is completely necessary.

Conclusion

If we assume that premise 1 of the Modal Ontological Argument is true, then the argument logically proves the existence of a maximally great being ("God"). The logic is very simple once you understand it, and most objections to the logic seem to be misunderstandings of it.

Sources

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org...
[2] http://www.doxa.ws...
wiploc

Con

Thanks, Pro for this opportunity to explain, with a lucid partner, what is wrong with the modal ontological argument.

(Quotes from Pro's post are boldfaced:)


In modal logic, we infer that if some entity is logically possible then this entity is exists in some possible world.

That's not an inference. It's the definition of "possible."

A maximally great being is a being with all of what we would call great making properties.

That's completely arbitrary and undefined.

it is self evident that it would be greater to exist in all possible worlds rather than simply just one

Incoherence is not self evident. Transworld identity doesn't make sense. Plantinga says that if X exists in one world, then the closest (most nearly X-like) thing in another world is X. But there's no reason to accept that. If Jehovah exists in this world, and a rock is the closest thing to Jehovah in another world, does that make the rock into Jehovah? Does that mean Jehovah exists in both worlds?

No, it means Plantinga was reduced to lame arguments.

A "possible world" is one with no logical contradictions.

Some possible worlds have no gods. That's not a contradiction, therefore those are possible worlds.

Therefore, we know for a fact that there is no god who exists exists in all possible worlds.

If another being existed in more worlds than another, then that being would be greater.

That's an arbitrary claim. Whether that seems "great" depends entirely on whether you happen to like that kind of thing.

Since gods seem generally nasty, I'd say the greatest god wouldn't exist in any worlds. That's not a compelling argument, but it's every bit as strong as Pro's.

if a maximally great being exists in at least one possible world, then necessarily, this being exists in all possible worlds

You can't infer this from the arbitrary and undefined attribute of "greatness."

Your only hope is to define "maximally great" to mean this. Doing so will give your argument much more rigor than the theists' similar arguments.

Of course, that would also mean that P1 would be false, since we know there are possible worlds without gods.

Such worlds are not impossible. Therefore they are possible. Therefore a god that exists in every possible world is a contradiction, an impossibility. Therefore—if you define "maximally great" as meaning that something exists in every possible world, it becomes impossible for a maximally great god to exist anywhere, in any possible world.

So, since we've stipulated that a maximally great god exists in some possible world, we have precluded "maximally great" from meaning "exists in every possible world if it exists in any possible world."

Whatever else it means, it doesn't mean that, or P1 would become false. And Pro is estopped from saying that P1 is false.

Therefore, we can neither define nor infer nor deduce that "maximal greatness" involves existing in every possible world.

It can't happen, or P1 would be false.

P1: "It is possible that a maximally great being exists."

Stipulated, for the sake of argument.

P2: "If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world."

The definition of "possible," in possible-world-speak.


P3: "If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world."

Clearly false, given that P1 is stipulated as true.

P4: "If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world."

Yes, the actual world is possible.


P5: "If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists."

Yes.


P6: "Therefore, a maximally great being exists."

This conclusion follows logically from all the preceding premises.

No, either P3 is false or P1 is false. Since we have stipulated the truth of P1, it follows that P3 is false. Therefore the proof is not valid.

You cannot have a valid argument in which the premises contradict each other.


Parodies

some people think this argument can prove the existence of a maximally great cell phone. However, a cell phone is a contingent and a maximally great being is a necessary being.

Maximally great gods were invented just for the the silly modal ontological argument. If we can invent maximally great gods, we can also invent maximally great cell phones. If Pro's logic were sound, a maximally great cell phone would exist. And a maximally great everything else would exist.

Want a free hamburger? Just imagine a maximally great one, and it will necessarily appear---if Pro's logic is valid.

The modal ontological argument is flawed, and the parodies make this clear.

Let me float my own parody:

Consider Xal-X (pronounced Zal-Zee) the ascetic demon of quadratic equations. Xal-X is, by definition, existent in every possible world if he is existent in any. And he is also, by definition, logically incompatible with gods. That is, there are no gods in any possible worlds in which Xal-X exists. If a god does exist in a world with Xal-X, that is a logical contradiction, and that world is an impossible world.

P1: "It is possible that Xal-X exists."
We have every bit as much reason to suppose this as we do to suppose that it is possible that a "maximally great being" exists.

P2: "If it is possible that Xal-X exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world."
Because this is what "possible" means in possible-world speak.

P3: "If Xal-X exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world."
We know this from the definition of Xal-X. This is what Xal-X is.

P4: "If Xal-X exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world."
Obviously.

P5: "If Xal-X exists in the actual world, then Xal-X exists."
Obviously.

P6: "Therefore, Xal-X exists."

Hey, if Pro's logic is good, then my logic is good, because I'm using the same logic.

P7: "Therefore, no god exists in any possible world.

This follows from P6 and the definition of Xal-X.

Hmm. My logic is exactly as good as Pro's logic, but we reach contradictory conclusions. Gods cannot both exist and not exist.

We know, then, that there is something wrong with the logic that Pro and I have been using, the logic of the modal ontological argument.

Even if we couldn't pinpoint where (though I have identified Pro's problem in P3) we would know that there was some invalidity hidden in there somewhere.

We know that the modal ontological argument is invalid.

We know that the resolution is false.

Conclusion:

The ontological argument is not valid.

The resolution is false.

Vote Con.

Debate Round No. 2
Rational_Thinker9119

Pro

Addressing My Opponent's Arguments

"A maximally great being is a being with all of what we would call great making properties.

That's completely arbitrary and undefined."

Here is the definition of great:

great/grāt/

Adjective:
Of an extent, amount, or intensity considerably above the normal or average.
[1]

So a great being would exist in possible worlds to an extent, amount, or intensity considerably above one possible world. However, a maximally great being would exist in all possible worlds because if it didn't, then a being who could would be a maximally great being, and this is all based on the assumption that the truthfulness has been established of a maximally great being being possible in the first place.

My opponent mentions some "most nearly X-like" argument Plantinga apparently produced. However, this doesn't have much bearing on my argument as far as I can tell.

Now, Con claims:

"
Since gods seem generally nasty, I'd say the greatest god wouldn't exist in any worlds. That's not a compelling argument, but it's every bit as strong as Pro's".


This makes no sense, because to be maximally great is to exist necessarily because it's less great to be contingent. So the idea of a maximally great being not existing if it is possible for him to exist, is logically incoherent. Also, God being nasty is based on scripture, but this is delving in epistomology when this is the ontological argument.

"if a maximally great being exists in at least one possible world, then necessarily, this being exists in all possible worlds

You can't infer this from the arbitrary and undefined attribute of "greatness.""

I defined greatness in this round, and will continue to do if needed. The "greatness is subjective" argument presented by opponent simply isn't very convincing. If it's possible for a maximally great being to exist, necessarily, this being exists in every possible world.

"P3: "If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world."

Clearly false, given that P1 is stipulated as true"

Clearly true you mean, there is no way around it I'm afraid. If the being didn't exist in every possible world, then the being simply isn't maximally great. If you accept the possibility of a maximally great being, then P3 is unavoidable.

"No, either P3 is false or P1 is false. Since we have stipulated the truth of P1, it follows that P3 is false. Therefore the proof is not valid.

You cannot have a valid argument in which the premises contradict each other."

No premises does contradict each other though, pro seems to just be making up problems with the argument that simply don't exist. Since P3 clearly follows if we accept premise 1 is true, and we already agreed that the truth of premise 1 is to be assumed for this debate, then the argument is logically air tight.

Parodies

Con's parody fails. Xal-X would have to be maximally great in order to exist in all possible worlds. So if this being exists, then this being would be God. However, a being cannot both be God and incompatible with Gods. Therefore, this parody involves incoherence.

Conclusion

My opponent simply put forward a weak parody and the old "greatness is subjective" argument. These arguments have failed in the past and they fail now. If we assume the truthfulness of the first premise, then a maximally great being's existence is inevitable and inescapable.

The resolution has been affirmed.

Sources

[1] http://oxforddictionaries.com...;

wiploc

Con

A famous "proof" that 1 equals 2 goes like this:

  1. Let a=b.
  2. Then a^2 = ab,
  3. a^2 + a^2 = a^2 + ab,
  4. 2 a^2 = a^2 + ab,
  5. 2 a^2 - 2 ab = a^2 + ab - 2 ab,
  6. and 2 a^2 - 2 ab = a^2 - ab.
  7. This can be written as 2 (a^2 - a b) = 1 (a^2 - a b),
  8. and cancelling the (a^2 - ab) from both sides gives 1=2. [1]

Is this a valid proof?

A valid proof is one in which the conclusion must be true if the premises are true. [2]

Certainly nobody can challenge the truth of the premise: "Let a=b."

So, either this proof is valid, or one equals two.

But one doesn't equal two. We know, therefore, that the argument isn't valid.

We know this even if we can't identify the error. The error is in there somewhere.

In the above "proof," it happens that we can identify the error, but we would know the proof was invalid even if we didn't find the error. We would know this because:

A valid proof is one in which the conclusion must be true if the premises are true.

Therefore:

If an argument starts with true premises and reaches a false conclusion, the argument is not valid.

As it happens, we can identify the invalidity in the above mathematical proof. In the last step, we cancel (a^2 - ab) from both sides. That is, we divide both sides by (a^2 - ab). But, since a=b, (a^2 - ab) equals zero.

So the "proof" divides by zero, which is not a legitimate operation; division by zero is undefined. When you divide by zero, you get nonsense.

Nonsense and contradiction are no part of a valid argument.

This can be rephrased:

If an argument contains nonsense or contradiction, it is not valid.

-

Pro's argument contains nonsense, so it is not valid.

According to that argument, god exists in all possible worlds. But "all possible worlds" includes many godless worlds. He is saying that god exists even in worlds without gods.

That's nonsense. It's contradiction. It is no part of a valid argument.

Pro's argument is not valid. The resolution is refuted.

-

How do we know that the possible worlds include godless worlds? By the definition of "possible worlds." A possible world is one without logical contradiction. Godless worlds have no inherent contradiction, so some godless worlds are in the set of possible worlds.

Therefore, when Pro asserts that god exists in all possible worlds, he asserts that god exists even in godless worlds.

That's nonsense. It's contradiction. It is no part of a valid argument.

The modal ontological argument depends entirely on this sleight of hand. We aren't supposed to notice that there are godless worlds among the possible worlds.

-

Second Refutation:

It is false that god exists in godless worlds. Thus, one of the (intermediate) conclusions of Pro's argument is false. Since we've stipulated the truth of P1, and since Pro insists that his other premises are true, that leaves us only one possibility: The argument is not valid.

As I've pointed out, we know the argument isn't valid even without identifying the specific error. But I'll mention some anyway:

-

Pro claims that god (maximally great being) wouldn't be god if he didn't exist in all possible worlds. That's pretty silly. Imagine saying to Jehovah, "You're not so much. There are possible worlds in which you don't exist!"

No, Pro's claim that a god of one world is somehow diminished by not existing in another world is arbitrary and unsupportable. He bases this claim on his arbitrary and unsupportable interpretation of the term "maximally great."

-

God's "greatness" is undefined confusion. Pro defines "great" as, "Of an extent, amount, or intensity considerably above the normal or average." Can god be great in both tallness or shortness? Can he be greatest in both justice and mercy? No, these are obvious contradictions. Arguments based on god's "greatness" are subjective and whimsical.

-

"Maximal" is a hedge word. It doesn't mean maximum. It means "tending toward maximum, or, "as close to maximum as you can get without causing a logical contradiction." This is so Plantinga won't get hung up by the obvious contradiction between, for instance, justice and mercy.

This may preserve the argument from one contradiction: If we stipulated that greatness involved existing in a great many possible worlds, we wouldn't be insisting that god existed in every possible world. He wouldn't have to exist in godless worlds.

But where does that leave the argument?

If god doesn't exist in godless worlds, then there's no proof that he exists in this one.

If we don’t take god's maximal greatness to be perfect greatness, then there is no valid way to reach Pro's conclusion that god exists.

And if we do take "maximal" to mean "maximum" then we have the contradiction of god existing in godless worlds.

-

Pro doesn't like my complaint about transworld identity. There are possible worlds containing nothing but one grain of sand. Is this bit of grit Jehovah? Only if transworld identity works.

For obvious reasons, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says, "The subject of transworld identity has been highly contentious, even among philosophers who accept the legitimacy of talk of possible worlds." [3]

Pro is reduced to this: Of worlds consisting of only one smidgeon of grit, he must say that the grit is a maximally great god.

That's nonsense. And nonsense is no part of a valid argument.

-

Pro says my Xal-X parody fails because Xal-X must be maximally great to exist in every possible world. This is another arbitrary redefining of "maximal." At some times it consists of every possible greatness. But when that becomes awkward, it suddenly means only and exactly, "existing in every possible world."

That's equivocation. That's a logical fallacy. Pro's argument relies on a fallacy that is no part of any valid argument.

-

Conclusion:

Pro's argument fails because it relies on equivocation (emergency redefinition of maximal greatness).

It fails because it involves nonsense and contradiction (god existing even in godless worlds).

It fails because one of the conclusions is false. (It is obviously not true that god exists in every possible world. Since Pro insists that his premises are true, it follows that the error has to do with validity.)

It fails because "maximal" does not mean what Pro thinks it means. (If it meant maximum or perfect, that would involve Plantinga (and Pro) in contradictions.)

It fails because relies on a term, "maximally great," which is undefined, subjective, a matter of caprice.

-

Pro has the burden of proof, but his argument is shot thru with patent flaws.

Vote Con.

Debate Round No. 3
Rational_Thinker9119

Pro

This is going to be short and sweet.

A famous "proof" that 1 equals 2

This has nothing to do with the ontological argument, so my opponent wasted his time with this.

Now...

"According to that argument, god exists in all possible worlds. But "all possible worlds" includes many godless worlds. He is saying that god exists even in worlds without gods.

That's nonsense. It's contradiction. It is no part of a valid argument.

Pro's argument is not valid. The resolution is refuted."

Like I said in the first round, all these objections are based on misunderstandings. If the first premise of the Ontological Argument is true, then a maximally great being exists necessarily. Thus, to say that that there are possible "Godless" worlds would be a contradiction. If a being is necessary, then there are necessarily no possible worlds where God doesn't exist. Thus, if we assume the first premise of the Ontological Argument, the idea of a possible "Godless" world is a contradiction (If something is necessary, then there are no possible world where this being doesn't exist).

So my opponent's argument fails, because if a maximally great being exists this being is necessary, thus the idea of possible "Godless" worlds is a logical contradiction contrary to what my opponent states.

Second Refutation

The first part of this is just regarding the possible "Godless" worlds (which I debunked already).

"God's "greatness" is undefined confusion. Pro defines "great" as, "Of an extent, amount, or intensity considerably above the normal or average." Can god be great in both tallness or shortness? Can he be greatest in both justice and mercy? No, these are obvious contradictions. Arguments based on god's "greatness" are subjective and whimsical."

A maximally great being would have all great making properties that don't contradict each other. There is no contradiction in a maximally great being existing in every possible world if he existed in one, in fact this is necessary if he is maximally great! Thus, if you find two properties that contradict each other, this only means you throw out one of the properties, not the idea of a maximally great being all together. Thus, to accept the possibility of a maximally great being, leads to the conclusion of God's existence because it is the existence of a necessary being.

"If god doesn't exist in godless worlds, then there's no proof that he exists in this one.

If we don’t take god's maximal greatness to be perfect greatness, then there is no valid way to reach Pro's conclusion that god exists.

And if we do take "maximal" to mean "maximum" then we have the contradiction of god existing in godless worlds."

As I already explained, if the first premise of the ontological argument is true, there are no Godless worlds. It's a logically contradiction to claim that something necessary, could possibly not exist. Thus my opponent's whole case fails.

"Pro is reduced to this: Of worlds consisting of only one smidgeon of grit, he must say that the gritis a maximally great god.

That's nonsense. And nonsense is no part of a valid argument."

Huh? The only argument that is nonsense is this argument lol

Conclusion

I didn't take much time on this because Con's arguments are so terrible, and my case is clear. There are no possible Godless worlds because God is necessary if you accept the first premise of the Ontological Argument (which Con agreed was the case for this debate). There are no problems with the ontological argument if you accept the first premise, except for the imaginary problems made up by Con that don't even exist and aren't acknowledged in the academic world. I showed the simple logic of the Ontological Argument in the first round, and all of Con's objections were based on misunderstandings of the argument. Thus, the resolution has been affirmed.

wiploc

Con


Thanks to Pro for this debate, and this topic. And thanks to any readers and voters for their comments and illumination.



God Does Not Exist in All Possible Worlds.



We know he doesn't. We know it because of the definition of "possible world."



A possible world is one without logical contradictions. Godless worlds have no inherent contradictions, so some of them are possible. Godless worlds are possible.



Gods cannot exist in godless worlds. That would be a contradiction.



Therefore, since some possible worlds are godless, no god exists in all possible worlds.



P1 and P3 Cannot Both Be True:



P1 says that god (a maximally great being) possibly exists.



P3 says that if P1 is true, then god exists in every possible world.



But we have established that god does not exist in every possible world. Therefore, either P1 or P3 is false.



We have stipulated that P1 is true, so it follows that P3 is false.



What if P1 And P3 Were Both Stipulated to Be True?



That would be nonsensical. I would not have accepted the debate.



P3, then, is in contention. And, as established above, it is unequivocally false.



If P3 Is a False Premise, Does This Entail Invalidity?



Pro doesn't treat P3 as a given. He reasons his way to it. I offered him the chance to define maximally great beings as existing in every possible world. He didn't take the bait.



Instead, he tried to reason his way from "maximally great" to "exists in every possible world." There is no valid way to do this.



Why Not?



Because maximal greatness is undefined and undefinable. Greatness, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. Are strawberry gods greater than the dark chocolate kind? It's entirely subjective. Are gods greater for existing in a greater number of hypothetical worlds? It would only seem so if you liked that kind of thing.



When Pro was challenged on this point, he claimed that greatness is what results from "great-making properties." In other words, he defined his term in terms of itself. That's begging the question. That's circular argument. That's logical fallacy.



That's an invalid step in Pro's argument.



Could Pro Have Claimed P3 to Be a False Premise?



This question is suggested by the title of this debate, which claims that the modal ontological argument is logically valid. Could Pro have used that phrasing to suggest that he should win this debate if P3 is a false premise rather than a logical invalidity?



First, Pro never argued that, never made that move. That is no part of his position.



Second, that move would be inconsistent with the obvious intent of Pro's opening post. He said, " My position in this debate is that if premise 1 is true, a maximally great being must in fact exist." In other words, if Pro's argument contains any error as to either truth or validity (aside from an error in the truth of P1), then victory belongs to Con.



Third, Pro didn't treat P3 as a premise. He didn't say it was a given. He argued his way—-using fallacies—-to the conclusion that if P1 then P3.



Fourth, nothing is to be inferred from the label, "P3." Pro labeled every step of his argument P[something or other]. Even his ultimate conclusion, "Therefore, a maximally great being exists," is labeled "P6."



Summation:



We know that some possible worlds are godless. Therefore, no god can exist in all possible worlds.



Therefore, we know there is error in any argument purporting to show that a god exists in all possible worlds. That's a false conclusion.



Since Pro's conclusion is false, we know that he used either false premises or invalid form.



We have isolated Pro's error in P3. (P3: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.) But the error must exist even if you don't accept my explication of what's wrong with P3.



Some problems with P3 involve the undefined terms, and the arbitrary and subjective conclusion that a god is greater if he exists in more possible worlds. Begging the question and circular argument are among the demonstrable fallacies that Pro employed in his attempt to defend P3.



Conclusion:



Pro undertook the burden of proof to show that this argument does not use logical fallacies, but that turns out not to be true.



Pro's version of the ontological argument employs logical fallacies.



Vote Con.


Debate Round No. 4
17 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 10 records.
Posted by stubs 4 years ago
stubs
This is why I don't usually debate modal logic on here. Cause you get votes like that haha
Posted by wiploc 4 years ago
wiploc
: Posted by Rational_Thinker9119
: I said that if it's possible for a maximally great to exist, he exists necessarily. So I did show that a
: Godless world was a contradiction if you assume the first premise. Saying that there is a possible
: world where something necessary doesn't exist, is a logical contradiction.

The above assumes that maximal greatness entails necessary existence. But we didn't stipulate that, and it couldn't be proven.

In fact, it was proven not to be, given that we know for a fact that some possible worlds are godless.
Posted by Rational_Thinker9119 4 years ago
Rational_Thinker9119
I said that if it's possible for a maximally great to exist, he exists necessarily. So I did show that a Godless world was a contradiction if you assume the first premise. Saying that there is a possible world where something necessary doesn't exist, is a logical contradiction.
Posted by SK 4 years ago
SK
What clinches it for Con is the absence of a demonstration that a godless world is impossible. To demonstrate that, one would need to show that a godless world has a (logical) contradiction.

Now, if the BOP lies with Con to show that a godless world is not a contradiction, then it lies no less with Pro to show that a world with god is not a contradiction, either.
Posted by The_Fool_on_the_hill 4 years ago
The_Fool_on_the_hill
All possible are not the same.

There is possible from absolute, probablity. !/2
There is possible from the normal Curve Probability.
and the fallacy possibility from ignorance.

I do not know something therefore its possitibe.
its reallly and appeal to Ignorance.
AKa I don't know therefor I know it possible. ?????????????????????????
NO NO NO!!..
Possible worlds is GARBAGE and so is most of modal logic with it.
Posted by tapostol 4 years ago
tapostol
wiploc's example in the comment "A maximally great donut could be eaten over and over again. You'd never need to buy another donut. It would taste better than anything else you ever ate. It would be completely nutritious, but not too fattening." Ignores the first premise that it is possible for such a donut to exist.

I believe it would be more proper to use this particular ontological argument as a secondary argument after reasoning that the existence of such a being could exist.
Posted by tapostol 4 years ago
tapostol
wiploc's example in the comment "A maximally great donut could be eaten over and over again. You'd never need to buy another donut. It would taste better than anything else you ever ate. It would be completely nutritious, but not too fattening." Ignores the first premise that it is possible for such a donut to exist.

I believe it would be more proper to use this particular ontological argument as a secondary argument after reasoning that the existence of such a being could exist.
Posted by The_Fool_on_the_hill 4 years ago
The_Fool_on_the_hill
The Fool: now I read this debate a few times to make sure, to not to inbed my personal. But I felt that Wiplocs arguments were enought to show the fatal flaws in the proof. One thing being how the argument, attempts to define some into existence, as appose to actually referring to anything imparticular.
Wiploc: "That's not an inference. It's the definition of "possible."
Now I am assuming its he logical intuition speakinger here.

As he also pointed out that 'Greater', is really only what most would call subjective meaning. That is a definition which depends on our personal approval. This approvel then get projected on to an object. As in that was a "great movie" But the movies 'itself' being of physical sounds and moving pictures does not 'in and of itself' have the property of 'Greatness'. Making it even more irratational to project onto nothing in partular.
I hope my decision is considered, fair. I would love and am open to here any reservations about my decisions. They are much appreciated.
Posted by wiploc 4 years ago
wiploc
A maximally great donut could be eaten over and over again. You'd never need to buy another donut. It would taste better than anything else you ever ate. It would be completely nutritious, but not too fattening.

See how easy this game is.

If this doesn't prove the existence of a maximally great donut, then Pro hasn't proven the existence of a maximally great god.
Posted by SarcasticIndeed 4 years ago
SarcasticIndeed
Donuts don't have to be eaten, stubs, so that argument fails. But what about all the maximally great Gods?
3 votes have been placed for this debate. Showing 1 through 3 records.
Vote Placed by socialpinko 4 years ago
socialpinko
Rational_Thinker9119wiplocTied
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Reasons for voting decision: Con's point that a world which existed without a maximally perfect being would not entail a contradiction was a refreshing refutation of Pro's P1 since it entails the exact same reasoning. Obviously if no God could exist in a possible world without contradiction, the thesis that a God exists in every possible world would itself be a contradiction. While both methods of reasoning employ the same reasoning to mutually contradictory conclusions, it shows that the argument itself is invalid.
Vote Placed by The_Fool_on_the_hill 4 years ago
The_Fool_on_the_hill
Rational_Thinker9119wiplocTied
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Reasons for voting decision: comments
Vote Placed by Double_R 4 years ago
Double_R
Rational_Thinker9119wiplocTied
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Reasons for voting decision: It's a shame someone had to lose this. Cons case was very interesting and his refutation of defining maximally great was very well put. But regardless of the maximally tall vs. maximally short contradictions, I think Pros point that necessary is greater then contingent is still valid. If we grant Premise 1 and we then accept that an MGB is necessary, then the concept of a godless world is logically impossible. Con would have needed to refute necessary by showing a contradiction, but he did not.