The Instigator
Rational_Thinker9119
Con (against)
Winning
10 Points
The Contender
KRFournier
Pro (for)
Losing
7 Points

The Ontological Argument For God's Existence Is Sound

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Post Voting Period
The voting period for this debate has ended.
after 4 votes the winner is...
Rational_Thinker9119
Voting Style: Open Point System: 7 Point
Started: 10/29/2013 Category: Philosophy
Updated: 3 years ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 3,121 times Debate No: 39631
Debate Rounds (4)
Comments (35)
Votes (4)

 

Rational_Thinker9119

Con

Rules

My opponent will present any one version of the Ontological Argument and try to prove the existence of God. If he/she succeeds then he/she wins the debate. If I sufficiently undermine the argument to the point where my opponent has not established God's existence with the version of the argument chosen, then I win the debate.

The first round is for Pro's opening argument. Additionally, in order to ensure that we get the same amount of rounds, in the last round, Pro must simply only put:

"No argument will be posted here as agreed."
KRFournier

Pro

I will be defending Alvin Plantinga's version of the Ontological Argument. For the benefit of those readers unfamiliar with modal logic, I will begin by reviewing the semantics of modal logic's language.

Modal Logic Semantics

In a modal argument, certain words act more like logical operators then they otherwise do in everyday language. Here are the terms that we will be dealing with along with their modal definitions:

World – A world is a discrete reality. It does not refer to planets or the cosmos. It simply is a modal term for "what is or can be."

Possible World – A possible world is a reality that is logically coherent. A possible world may or may not exist. This is a modal term for "what can be."

Actual World – The actual world is our reality, whatever it may be. This is a modal term for "what is." Note that the actual world is also a possible world.

Impossible – Something is impossible if it exists in no possible world. Something possible, then, is something that is logically incoherent, like a married bachelor.

Possible – Something is possible if it exists in at least one possible world. Something possible, then, is something that is logically coherent.

Necessary – Something is necessary if it exists in every possible world. In other words, its non-existence is impossible. Necessary entities are also possible entities.

Contingent – Something is contingent if exists in some possible worlds and not others.

With these terms under our belt, it's important to also note that when we talk about possible worlds, we are not talking about an infinite number of realities out there in the void. We are talking about descriptions of reality. So, when I say a unicorn exists in some possible world, it does not mean that a unicorn exists in world I (an imaginary world) and does not exist in world A (the actual world) as though these are two separate realities actually bobbing around out there somewhere. What it really means is that I can describe a reality in which a unicorn exists without encountered logical contradictions even though unicorns do not exist in our actual reality. I think this distinction will become important during our rebuttals.

God

For the purposes of this debate, I will define God (modally) as a "maximally great being." A maximally great being is a being which is maximally excellent in every possible world. Maximal excellence includes omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection. This is how Alving Plantinga conceived of God for this particular argument. A maximally great being is, by definition, a being for which there is no being greater than itself.

Argument

Here is the argument. I am using "God" in place of "a maximally great being."

1. It is possible that God exists.
2. If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible world.
3. If God exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If God exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
6. Therefore, God exists.

1. It is possible that God exists.

This premise asserts that the aforementioned notion of God is logically coherent. This will be taken as prima facie true until such time as my opponent chooses to contend it.

2. If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible world.

By virtue of the notion of "possible" in modal logic, if something is logically coherent, then it is possible. This means that we can describe a reality wherein God exists without logical contradiction.

3. If God exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

This is proven by the impossibility of the contrary. Any attempt to conceive of a maximally great being that does not exists in every possible world reduces to absurdity. For example, one might argue that a maximally great being exists in the understanding but not in reality. However, such an argument is invalid. Let's take a look:

(1) God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (premise)
(2) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone. (premise)
(3) God's existence in reality is conceivable. (premise)
(4) If God did exist in reality, then He would be greater than He is. (1 and 2)
(5) It is conceivable that there is a being greater than God is. (3 and 4)
(6) It is conceivable that there be a being greater than the being than which nothing greater can be conceived. (5 and the definition of "God")

As we can see, the attempt to discredit this premise results in contradiction. Any attempt to conceive of maximally great being that does not exist in every possible world ends up proposing simultaneously both a being of which there is no being greater and a being greater than that being.

4. If God exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

Since the actual world is within the set of possible worlds, any necessary being exists in it.

5. If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.

By virtue of the notion of "actual" world in modal logic, this must be the case.

6. Therefore, God exists.

The conclusion follows inescapably from the premises.

Conclusion

The syllogism is logically sound and the resolution is affirmed. I look forward to my opponent's rebuttal.

Debate Round No. 1
Rational_Thinker9119

Con

Introduction

If an argument as interesting as the Ontological Argument is going to be defended sufficiently on DDO, then my confidence lies with KRFournier. However, as I will demonstrate in this round, the argument from Pro, presented as is, does not establish the resolution at hand.

Model Logic Semantics

I do not have many issues with this section, accept for one minor detail. Below, my opponent defines a possible world as:

Possible World – "A possible world is a reality that is logically coherent. A possible world may or may not exist. This is a modal term for 'what can be.'"

When Pro defines a possible world (or what is "possible"), he essentially defines it simply as a state of affairs that is logically coherent. However, this does not seem like a sufficient definition. A possible world is also metaphysically consistent. This means that even if a proposed world is logically coherent, it can still be impossible if there is a metaphysical violation which doesn't necessarily violate the laws of logic specifically. For example, something coming from nothing violates ex nihilo nihil fit, and is the case in no possible world if one accepts this principle as a strict metaphysical necessity. The fact that this scenario doesn't violate any of the deductive laws of logic doesn't change the conclusion that in no possible world does something come from nothing. According to my opponent's definition, all that is required is logical coherency for a state of affairs to be possible; this is false.

Additionally, I would like to define some terms of my own:

(i) Epistemic Possibility[1]

(ii) Subjunctive Possibility (Modal Possibility in context)[2]

To say something is epistemically possible is to say that it may be true, and it might even be subjunctively impossible; we just do not know (it may be true "for all we know"). This is how most people conceive of possibility. However, to say that something like a maximally great being for example, is subjunctively possible (which the Modal Ontological Argument necessitates), is to say that a maximally great being is definitely not impossible with no epistemic room for error. Or, more precisely; it is not possible that it is subjunctively impossible that a maximally great being exists. That is a basic modal inference based on modal axiom S5 (necessarily possibly A, follows from possibly A)[3]:

Diamond ("possibly")
Square ("necessarily")



God

Of course, I will accept the definition of God as a "maximally great being" for this debate.

Argument

Is the Modal Ontological Argument for God's existence even logically valid? I would say that it is. If the first premise is true, then the rest of the argument just follows naturally. If God is possible, he would exist in some possible world. We would come to know this truth simply by unpacking the concept of a possible world. If he exists in some possible world, does he exist in all of them? Well, if God is conceived us as a necessary being (which he is), then the anwer is yes. This is based on the modal axiom S5[4]:

Diamond ("possibly")
Square ("necessarily")



Possible necessity, entails actual necessity (just like how possible, means necessarily possible via S5). If God exists in every possible world, that includes our world as it is self-evidently possible. If God exists in the actual world, then God exists. The argument is pretty straight forward and it is obviously logically valid. The question that remains pertains to what reason we have to accept the initial first premise as true that the rest of the argument follows from.

It Is Possible That God Exists

As I outlined earlier on in this round, something has to be metaphysically possible to exist in some possible world, not just logically possible. Therefore, claiming that God is possible simply because he is not logically impossible is not a sufficient foundation for the crucial premise in question. Regardless, the implication that God is logically coherent is nothing more than a presumption. Pro must show that God is necessarily possible in order to meet his burden of proof. Therefore, any prima facie cases which leave room for epistemic error do not seem to apply to our Modal situation here, as this type of case would at best show that God is merely epistemically possible, which entails that we accept his possibility because because we lack knowledge of anything that contradicts the possibility of God; not metaphysically possible, which entails that it is necessary that nothing contradicts the possibility of God. It must be shown that, necessarily, God is not impossible (this follows from axiom S5). Since this has not been demonstrated, then the conclusion that God exists has not been shown to be true.

Conclusion

The Ontological Argument presented by Pro is logically valid. However, the support for the initial premise is insufficient. Pro has not proven that God is logically coherent, or metaphysically coherent for that matter. Also, he simply bare-asserts prima facie warrant for the first premise (which I see no reason to grant). In any event, a prima facie case may warrant the epistemic possibility of God, but is not clear how it would warrant the subjuctive possibility of God.

Since Pro has not supported the crucial premise of the argument properly; the resolution has not been established.

Sources

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org...
[2]http://en.wikipedia.org...
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org...
[4] http://www.unc.edu...
KRFournier

Pro

I think my opponent and I are on the same page when it comes to that which constitutes what is modally possible. I was in error to conflate logical possibility with metaphysical possibility. It was not my intention to confuse matters but exactly the opposite. I was hoping to keep the language from getting overly confusing and burdensome to the readers. I meant the term to be generally inclusive rather than exclusive, so there was no attempt on my part to avoid metaphysical possibility.

It is Possible That God Exists

The proof that this first premise constitutes a metaphysical possibility is found in the notion of a maximally great being. If such a being exists, it exists necessarily in a metaphysical sense. This is what it means to be maximally great. If I say God is an epistemic possibility, i.e., it is possible God exists or possible he doesn't exist, then I have just described a contingent being that would clearly be less than maximally great. To say it another way, metaphysical possibility is a greater quality than epistemic possibility.

We are left with the concept of a being that is either possible or impossible. The only way to determine possibility at this point is to rule out impossibility, but falsifying this premise is not the job of Pro. I did not come to argue against myself. That's why I initially opened the door for refutation in my opening round. I know of many objections against the coherence of a maximally great being, but I do not see why I must anticipate all of them.

As it stands, the coherence of a maximally great being is not disputed and therefore a maximally great being is not impossible. Thus, it is metaphysically possible and the first premise stands.

Conclusion

My opponent's only objection thus far was that I did not substantiate the first premise. I had assumed the concept of a maximally great being made it self-evident that I was working within the purview of metaphysical possibility. I think I have now satisfied this burden and look forward to a refutation from my opponent.

With the first premise defended and the validity of the ontological argument no longer in dispute, it seems reasonable thus far to view the resolution as affirmed.

Debate Round No. 2
Rational_Thinker9119

Con

Introduction

I thank KRFournier for his response. My opponent seems to acknowledge his error with regards to insinuating that logical coherence is sufficient for metaphysical coherence. Thus, I see no reason to really harp on that issue. The question that then remains pertains to whether or not Pro has proven God to be possible.

It is Possible That God Exists

In this section, I will dissect all of my opponents claims in search of errors:

"The proof that this first premise constitutes a metaphysical possibility is found in the notion of a maximally great being. If such a being exists, it exists necessarily in a metaphysical sense.
This is what it means to be maximally great." - Pro

The above basically states that if God is possible, then he is metaphysically possible, and he exists necessarily in a metaphysical sense. Of course, I agree. However, it doesn't follow from this that God actually is metaphysically possible, just that if he is possible then the type of possibility that deals with God is metaphysical possibility, and he would exist necessarily in a metaphysical sense if that was the case. Pro still must prove that God is actually metaphysically possible in the first place.

"If I say God is an epistemic possibility, i.e., it is possible God exists or possible he doesn't exist, then I have just described a contingent being that would clearly be less than maximally great. To say it another way, metaphysical possibility is a greater quality than epistemic possibility." - Pro

The above seems to show a contradictory position in Pro's argumentation. In his first round, Pro tries to support the possibility of God prima facie. However, prima facie cases leave room for epistemological error regarding the premise that God is possible (he even left the door open for me to "contend it", as if it was contendable!), which means he is calling God metaphysically possible, but supports that notion as if God was epistemologically possible with a bare-assertion of prima facie warrant in the first round; which seems self-refuting.

"We are left with the concept of a being that is either possible or impossible." - Pro

Yes, God is either not impossible, or impossible... This is self-evidently a true dichotomy.

"The only way to determine possibility at this point is to rule out impossibility, but falsifying this premise is not the job of Pro.I did not come to argue against myself." - Pro

Pro has the burden of proof to establish the premise that God is not impossible; ruling out the impossibility of God is certainly part of this. I mean, if nobody has even ruled out that which makes God impossible, then it hasn't actually been established that God is indeed not impossible, as these two statements are essentially equivalent:

i) God is not impossible

ii) Nothing is the case which makes God impossible

Pro has not shown that nothing is the case that makes God impossible so far in this debate. Thus, Pro has not met his burden of proof yet. Either way, I hope Pro is not suggesting that I must show that God is impossible. Asking me to show that God is impossible would be to ask me to falsify the Modal Ontological Argument. If one reviews the rules of this debate however, they will see that I only have to show that Pro hasn't established the argument at hand; I do not have to falsify the argument at hand. There is a difference between undermining an argument, and falsifying an argument. If this is not what Pro is implying, then we can move on.

"That's why I initially opened the door for refutation in my opening round. I know of many objections against the coherence of a maximally great being, but I do not see why I must anticipate all of them." - Pro

The reason that Pro must anticipate them all and rule them out is because if this is not done, then God is only possible "for all we know". The very fact that Pro concedes there is something to anticipate (potential defeaters of the first premise) shows that Pro is only supporting the notion that God is epistemologically possible, not metaphysically impossible. However, according to Pro himself, this goes against the very notion of a maximally great being! Therefore, Pro seems to be confused about his possibility, and is contradicting himself in the process.

"As it stands, the coherence of a maximally great being is not disputed and therefore a maximally great being is not impossible.Thus, it is metaphysically possible and the first premise stands." - Pro

The error with the above argument is that it has been disputed. Not in the sense that I hold the first premise to be false, but in the sense that I am showing how my opponent hasn't met his burden of proof pertaining to demonstrating the first premise is true. Not only that, but my opponent's stance here entails a fallacious Argumentum ad Ignorantiam. The logical fallacy is as follows[1]:

Statement not-p is unproved
p
is true

Pro is arguing that since I haven't shown the incoherency in God, then it is true that God is possible. However, even if I haven't argued for the incoherency of God, it wouldn't follow that God is metaphysically possible. This is an elementary logical fallacy that Pro is engaged in. Pro has to prove the first premise is true. Just putting the premise out there and expecting me to prove it false (which seems to be what Pro is actually doing) is not sufficient to prove the premise true. Since Pro's argument is based on a logical fallacy; his position here is invalid and does not hold.

Conclusion

Pro argued that if God is possible, then he is metaphysically possible and not merely epistemically possible. The problem is that God actually being metaphysically possible and existing in some possible world doesn't follow from the conditional statement provided. Not only that, his argument is entirely contradictory. He assumes God is epistemologically possible on one hand, but metaphysically possible on the other. How? Well, he thinks he can defend God is possible prima facie, but that means that God is possible "for all we know" (as prima facie cases leave room for epistemological error). If God is really subjunctively possible, then it actually has to be true that God is indeed not impossible, and that it is a fact that there is nothing that makes God impossible which is the case. Has Pro demonstrated that there is nothing that makes God impossible which is the case? Not even close. The closest thing to an argument that we saw from Pro in the last round in favor of the first premise being true was based on a logical fallacy known as appealing to ignorance. Not having a defeater for p, does not make p true. Thus, even if I have not shown any logical inconsistency in the idea of God; God's possibility has still not been proven true based on that fact alone.

Since all I have to do to win the debate is show that Pro has not established the conclusion of the argument (I do not have to show the conclusion false), and I showed that Pro has not even proven the first premise of the argument; the resolution has not been established.

Source(s)

[1] http://philosophy.lander.edu...

PS. The video attached is for educational purposes, as it parallels my positions in this debate very well.

KRFournier

Pro

Since this is my last round per Con's rules, I do want to take a moment to thank him for his time. Unfortunately, we didn't get to dive into anything of interest and seem to have gotten bogged down in technicalities. I must admit, having read his previous debate on this subject, I was looking forward to more stimulating discourse.

It is Possible That God Exists

Con says I still have not supported this premise because I have not proven that God is actually metaphysically possible. I find this line of reasoning bizarre to say the least. God is either metaphysically possible or he is not. That is all this premise is after. If he is metaphysically possible in at least one world, then this premise holds. What does the term "actually" even add to this discussion? If something is metaphysically possible in the modal sense, then actually is metaphysically possible in the modal sense. He seems to be speaking in tautologies.

If I have not met his burden of possibility, then fault lies with him for not explaining it more clearly. It seems as though he is obfuscating the intentions of this premise for no real purpose and without good reason. I accepted the distinction of metaphysical possibility and showed that it was necessarily true in my previous round, then he adds actual metaphysical possibility leaving me only my last round to decipher his meanings. I must object, therefore, to his line of reasoning. It is a red herring.

He goes on to say that it is indeed my burden to loop through all possible objections to the coherency of the definition of God above. This is frankly absurd in a debate format limited to 8000 characters. There could be any number of things—both realized and unknown—that contradict the possibility of God. It would be impractical for me to iterate through them here. I invited my opponent to engage me on this point and he simply says he doesn't have to. This is begging the question. I asserted and defended the first premise so employing ipse dixit is insufficient rebuttal.

Lastly my opponent accuses me of arguing from ignorance. This is not the case at all. I am not relying on the coherency of God because there is lack of evidence for it. Rather, I am relying on the coherency of the terms themselves. There is nothing inherently contradictory with the definition of God given the fact that (a) the terms are themselves coherent by virtue of the presumption that language is coherent and (b) the terms are not in contradiction. This is further affirmed by our ability to intuit the concept of God. We cannot, on the other hand, intuit a married bachelor.

Note that I wasn't asking him to prove the argument false or even prove this premise false. I was asking him to offer rebuttal to it. I was expecting him to offer at least one counterexample that would show this premise impossible. In fact, that is how most debates engage this topic. If God is not possible, then Con should have offered a reason why. Con even did this in his last debate. Instead, he just repeats himself over and over that I haven't done enough. I think I have sufficiently explained at this point why his assertion is unreasonable.

Conclusion

In the final analysis we are left with a contention that reeks of question begging on the part of my opponent. His tactic has been to simply say I haven't done enough and leave it at that, which I find a bit impolite since he started this debate. Con is insisting that he wins so long as I am unable to conceive of all possible contentions. This not only makes discourse nearly impossible on this subject, it is also beyond the scope of modal logic. Modal logic is meant to study the metaphysical without having to identify and observe every iteration of it.

Since I do not get the last word in this debate that Con started, I must leave it into the hands of the readers. I showed that metaphysical possibility was necessary given the qualities of a maximal great being. This is sufficient to show the first premise. Sadly, if Con finally does offer a fresh refutation in the final round, I will be unable to respond to it.

Thank you readers and Rational_Thinker9119 for your time and thoughtful consideration.

Debate Round No. 3
Rational_Thinker9119

Con


It Is Possible That God Exist

"Actually"

Pro starts off his argument with a red-herring about the word "actually". I am not claiming that there is a difference between metaphysically possible and "actually" metaphysically possible.

Metaphysical Possibility

My opponent states that if he has not met his burden of proof, then the fault lies with me for not explaining it more clearly. This is absurd. If Pro hasn't met his burden of proof, then the fault self-evidently lies with him. Pro then asserts:

"I accepted the distinction of metaphysical possibility and showed that it was necessarily true in my previous round." - Pro

The only thing Pro showed is that if God is possible, he is necessarily metaphysically possible and not just epistemologically possible. It doesn't follow from this that God is necessarily metaphysically possible, just that if God is possible in any sense, then it has to be metaphysically possible. Note, how this is a conditional statement. To claim that God's metaphysical possibility follows from this would be a non-sequitur. Additionally, I showed in my last round how Pro's argument is contradictory, as his argument both assumes God is metaphysically possible and epistemologically possible.

The Fallacy Of Consequence

Pro argues that since it is impractical to expect him to show that God checks out with every possible world and that no argument against his coherency holds, that he doesn't have to. However, this is just a fallacy of consequence. Even if it is impractical, it doesn't follow from this that it isn't required to establish the resolution. The first premise of the Modal Ontological Argument is a positive claim stating that God is not impossible. To prove this premise, it has to be shown that nothing makes God impossible. Since Pro admits he cannot do this by ruling out that which makes God impossible, he inadvertently concedes the debate as this is necessary for sufficient support.

Pro Admits That God Does Not Exist

Pro admits the conclusion of the Modal Ontological Argument is false:

"There could be any number of things—both realized and unknown—that contradict the possibility of God." - Pro

However, if a maximally great being existed, then it would be false that there could be any number of things-both realized and unknown-that contradict the possibility of God, as God would be necessary! Thus, Pro just admitted that a necessary being does not exist, and shipped his own argument to the graveyard.

The Rules Of The Debate And Begging The Question

My opponent says that he has engaged me to try and challenge the coherency of God. Since, I say I don't have to challenge the coherency of God, then I am begging the question. Self-evidently, this is nonsense. The rules of this debate clearly state that all I must do is undermine the argument to the point where I have shown that Pro has not proven the conclusion true. Either way, Pro's concession that there could be things that contradict God's existence sufficiently shows that Pro has a self-refuting case.

Coherency Of Terms Of God =/= Coherency Of God

There could still be an external fact about the world which contradicts God. Thus, even if there is nothing internally contradictory about God, it doesn't follow that God is coherent.

Have I Offered Rebuttals To The First Premise?

Pro claims that even if I don't have to falsify the first premise, I should have at least had rebuttals to it. However, I have undermined every single piece of defense of P1 of the Modal Ontological Argument that Pro has thrown at me, and in my last round I showed how his position is contradictory as he confused epistemological possibility with metaphysical possibility. In this round, I proved how his whole case is even more self-refuting due to the fact that he admitted that there could be things which contradict God's existence. If those are not sufficient rebuttals; there are no sufficient rebuttals.

Do I have To Help Pro Win The Debate Against Me?

If the first premise is to be established as true, then it has to be shown that nothing is the case which makes God impossible. Pro claims that if there are things which make God impossible, then I should name them. This is clearly shifting the burden of proof. Pro's argument rests on there necessarily not being things which make God impossible (Pro has even contradicted that point). Therefore, he has to figure out what they are and rule them out on his own. I feel rather embarrassed that I have to remind my opponent that if someone makes a positive claim they must prove it true. I do not have to help my opponent by naming off the things he has to name in order to defeat me. That, clearly, is his job.

Straw-Man Argument

Pro claims that all I have done is claim that Pro has not met his burden of proof. This is false. I showed what Pro must do to establish his burden of proof, then proved why he didn't meet those requirements. That is hardly just asserting that my opponent has not met his burden of proof; that is actually demonstrating it. Additionally, Pro completely ignored my arguments in the last round accusing him of both assuming God is metaphysically possible, and epistemologically possible at the time time in a contradictory fashion. Those points were simply dropped as if they did not even exist.

Addressing Pro's Conclusion

Nothing about my rebuttals have been question begging, but Pro is certainly straw-manning. I am not just asserting that Pro hasn't met his burden of proof, as I have went into great detail explaining exactly why he has not met his burden of proof. For example, in order for Pro to show that God is not impossible, he has to rule out that which makes God impossible. If nothing makes God impossible, he must prove this. Since he has not done this (Pro even admitted he didn't have enough room), he hasn't established his burden of proof. That is a logically valid argument, not simply a bare-assertion like Pro is implying.

Pro says below:

"Con is insisting that he wins so long as I am unable to conceive of all possible contentions. This not only makes discourse nearly impossible on this subject, it is also beyond the scope of modal logic. Modal logic is meant to study the metaphysical without having to identify and observe every iteration of it." - Pro

Once more, Pro forgets that he leaves the door open for epistemic error by admitting there are possible contentions against God. Thus, what he has just said is that God is epistemically possible. This directly contradicts Pro's claim that God is metaphysically impossible. Therefore, Pro's case is self refuting.

Pro says that he showed God is metaphysically possible given the qualities of a maximally great being. However, Pro only showed that if God is possible, he is metaphysically possible and not epistemically possible (my opponent even contradicts that). God being any kind of possible doesn't follow from this. That is simply a non-sequitur ("x does not follow from "if x"). Also, the fact that God is defined as maximally great doesn't make God metaphysically possible because of the concept. This is circular support for the premise, as it assumes the concept of a maximal greatness is coherent already to even make that move.

Conclusion

I did not bare-assert that Pro has not met his burden of proof; I showed specifically that Pro has not met his burden of proof. Not only that, I showed why his case is contradictory and self-refuting. He confused possibility types multiple times throughout the debate, and concedes the debate by saying:

"There could be any number of things—both realized and unknown—that contradict the possibility of God." - Pro

I completely agree with above, and this a point that shall remain unconsted by me as it is true. However, this is fatal to Pro's case and proves that Atheism is indeed true, and that Theism is false. This is simply because if God was necessary, then there could not be anything that contradicts his possibility. Pro fails by default regardless of any other arguments.

Vote Con.
KRFournier

Pro

No argument will be posted here as agreed.
Debate Round No. 4
35 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 10 records.
Posted by Rational_Thinker9119 3 years ago
Rational_Thinker9119
Ok, now your vote is valid janet, as you took away the unjustified source points you gave to Pro. I obviously disagree with your RFD, its not clear vote-bomb like your other attempts so you won't here anymore from me.
Posted by Rational_Thinker9119 3 years ago
Rational_Thinker9119
Nice RFD change again...

"He mostly used wikipedia as sources, and wikipedia can be changed. So my vote goes to Pro."

That at best justifies not giving me source points, that doesn't justify giving him source points when he had NO sources. You are so biased janet.
Posted by Rational_Thinker9119 3 years ago
Rational_Thinker9119
I would appreciate it, Sanders, if you quit following all my debates around vote-bombing me. I already reported you for your actions recently...
Posted by Rational_Thinker9119 3 years ago
Rational_Thinker9119
" janetsanders733"

Nice vote change but It's still a vote-bomb, he had no sources yet you gave him source points instead of me when I had the sources. You have been exposed as a biased troll Sanders, give it up.
Posted by Magic8000 3 years ago
Magic8000
RFD Part 1/2

Con critiques the argument saying Pro has said God is logically coherent. But he showed there was two types of possibility, our lack of knowledge of a contradiction and demonstrating something cannot possibly be impossible. It was said that Pro has not shown the latter. Pro stated that God is metaphysically possible, because God is defined as maximally great. Pro also says it would be Con"s job to show God is impossible.

Con said Pro"s rebuttal is basically saying if God possible, then he is metaphysically possible, but not demonstrated God is metaphysically possible. Con also says Pro is contradicting himself. Pro stated that epistemic possibility contradicts the definition of God. But Pro said premise one "asserts that the aforementioned notion of God is logically coherent". Pro seems to think it"s Con"s job to rebut the possibility of God. Con pointed out that Pro must prove premise 1, in order to do that, Pro must show God is not impossible. There is no other way, since he agreed epistemic possibility doesn"t cut it. Then Con says Pro commits an argument from ignorance. Claiming that since the possibility of God has not been disputed, God is not impossible.

Pro questions the use of the word "actually". Pro says trying to prove God is not impossible is an impossible task (which seems to kill Pro"s case) and begs the question. He claims God only needs to have metaphysical possibility in one world, making him metaphysically possible. He disputes the claim of an ignorance fallacy by stating he's not saying God is coherent because of lack of evidence. He's saying it's coherent because of the definition. I instantly saw that Pro is changing the subject there. Originally he was arguing that God was metaphysically possible because the coherence hasn"t been shown. Pro said "the coherence of a maximally great being is not disputed and therefore a maximally great being is not impossible.Thus, it is metaphysically possible",......
Posted by Magic8000 3 years ago
Magic8000
RFD Part 2/2

.....but now he"s claiming that God is coherent because of his definition. Clear strawman. Con says "actually" doesn"t claim a difference, thus it"s a red herring. Con points out Pro is only making a tautological statement. If God exists in one world where he is metaphysically possible, then he is metaphysically possible in all worlds. But worlds is referred to as possible worlds, so it"s a tautology, not answering Con"s objections. If God is possible, then God is possible. Con says Pro commits a fallacy of consequence. Pro says it's impossible to show God is not impossible, because it's would take too long. But this means premise one has not been demonstrated. Premise one is a positive claim, thus Pro needs to justify it. I think the most damaging this to Pro, is him saying this

"There could be any number of things"both realized and unknown"that contradict the possibility of God."

This is basically a concession. He can"t prove premise one. If it is possible that there can be something unknown that contradicts the possibility, then God is not necessary and thus non existent.

I feel that Con has overwhelmingly undermined the Ontological argument. Arguments to Con.
Posted by Rational_Thinker9119 3 years ago
Rational_Thinker9119
"Good arguments from both sides"

"Con argued very weakly"

Contradiction much?
Posted by Rational_Thinker9119 3 years ago
Rational_Thinker9119
"Con just made one point." - johnnyvbassist

Umm, I had three:

i) Con didn't meet his burden of proof on the first premise
ii) Con claims God is metaphysically possible, but supports that notion as if he was epistemically possible, which is contradictory
iii) Con admits that God does not exist, as he claims that there could be things which contradict his existence (which would be false if he was necessary).

Those points may or may not hold, but I definitely had more than one point.
Posted by Rational_Thinker9119 3 years ago
Rational_Thinker9119
So, I am sorry TheAntidoter, but that argument is certainly refutable.
Posted by Rational_Thinker9119 3 years ago
Rational_Thinker9119
IF God exists, then he is possible. That is true. But God existing doesn't follow from that. If I stub my toe it hurts, but that doesn't mean that I stubbed my toe. "If" statements about x doesn't entail x.
4 votes have been placed for this debate. Showing 1 through 4 records.
Vote Placed by janetsanders733 3 years ago
janetsanders733
Rational_Thinker9119KRFournierTied
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Reasons for voting decision: I think Pro had more convincing arguments, since he proved to Con that God exists in a metaphysicall possiblility. The problem with Con is he kept question begging, and throughout the debate he did not seem to read Con's argument carefullly and jumped to conclusions. . So my vote goes to Pro, since he thoroughly answered Con's questions.
Vote Placed by Magic8000 3 years ago
Magic8000
Rational_Thinker9119KRFournierTied
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Reasons for voting decision: RFD in comments
Vote Placed by johnnyvbassist 3 years ago
johnnyvbassist
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Reasons for voting decision: No sources from Pro. However, Con had a very accusatory tone. He asked too much out of his opponent. Good arguments from both sides. I agreed with Pro more but he did use a logical fallacy. But con argued very weakly. I believe Pro won only because he presented more information and Con just made one point.
Vote Placed by MysticEgg 3 years ago
MysticEgg
Rational_Thinker9119KRFournierTied
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Reasons for voting decision: A rather semantic debate, but that was necessary. My opinion wasn't changed (Rational convinced me during his last debate) on this matter. Conduct was fine, in the same sense that courtroom conduct is fine. Spelling and grammar were good. Arguments to Con, because he argued effectively and showed how Pro's straw men didn't hold. Pro also complained about the semantics, despite acknowledging the fact that the whole debate HAS TO BASED OFF IT. Lastly, Pro gave little defence and merely cited non sequiturs, strawmen, and red herrings. Sources go to Con, too, for the obvious reason that he gave more. Good debate.