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The US Constitution Should Be a Living Document

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Voting Style: Open Point System: Select Winner
Started: 12/4/2016 Category: Politics
Updated: 1 year ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 961 times Debate No: 97632
Debate Rounds (4)
Comments (16)
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R1 is for acceptance only; no new arguments in the last round. Other than that, everything (excluding blatantly anti-debate practices like Google Doc links to avoid the character limit) is fair game.

"Should" implies moral desirability.

A "living constitution" is one that " . . . changes over time, and adapts to new circumstances, without being formally amended" (1). Generally, this interpretation is opposed to originalism, which states that "those who make, interpret, and enforce the law ought to be guided by the meaning of the United States Constitution—the supreme law of the land—as it was originally written" (2).



I accept.
Debate Round No. 1


Thanks to Shab for accepting this battle to the death debate.

Untraditionally, I will not be laying out a framework for this debate yet. Instead, I am merely going to present facts this round, which I will use to make my case in the next round. Assume that my framework is natural rights; if Con doesn't contest, this is the framework we will use.

Con must argue that the Constitution should be a "dead" document to succeed. Accordingly, these facts I present will be used in the next round to accomplish two objectives: 1) to show that the Constitution should be living, and 2) to show that the Constitution should not be dead. Because it can only be one or the other, judges should treat both types of arguments as positive arguments that advance my case.

How the Founders Intended It?
Significant hullabaloo is raised by some in defending the "original" Constitution. However, the Constitution from its inception was actually intended to be a living document, according to a significant number of its creators and ratifiers. The Constitution was not a coherent statement of ideology, outside of certain vague commitments to liberty. It was the product of compromise (1). Specifically, the compromise was between Federalists and Anti-Federalists. The Anti-Federalists would find camaraderie among the originalists today. The Federalists included John Marshall, a delegate to the Virginia convention to ratify the Constitution, and the fourth Supreme Court justice, responsible for the creation of judicial review (2). It is important to note that judicial review stems from no explicit constitutional authority authority whatsoever--it is truly one of the first and most famous examples of the living constitution, far before the phrase was coined. We can indeed see this same evidence of two interpretations of the constitution in the debate over the Repeal Act in 1803--"[T]he Federalists urged that the constitutionality of the Repeal Act be referred to the Supreme Court. The Republicans responded that the people, not the courts, were the judges of the constitutionality of acts of Congress" (2, pg. 313). Furthermore, "Only 11 of the 55 delegates to the Constitutional Convention, according to Madison's notes, expressed an opinion on the desirability of judicial review. Of those that did so, nine generally supported the idea and two opposed" (3) We'll return to Justice Marshall later, but for now it is enough to say that originalism was not the doctrine of the Founders. I will explain the importance of this in Round 2.

Judicial Review--In Defense of Liberty

The GPO has published a handy-dandy list of things deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court (4). Of particular note are cases 150, 144, 140, and 133. I will not use them now, but I have acknowledged that as a courtesy to my opponent.

The fundamental fact about rights is that, by definition, they cannot be subjected to a vote. Either they exist, or they do not exist, and woe be to the positivist that ascribes only the "rights" they like to the people they like--if rights are mutable, they are not rights. A dead constitution necessarily entails that we rewind our conceptions of rights, and of morality, to an earlier, worse time.

More than just judicial review, the living constitution approach ensures that the Constitution is a document worthy of respect. The law is not an end, it is a means to the end of the public good. There is no quality of law that gives it an intrinsic utility or moral worth. Even the law of a religious society with religious law is worthless if the law is not followed. To the extent that the law protects the public welfare, it is worthy of praise; to the extent that it damages the public welfare, it is worthy of scorn.

One of the great successes of the Living Constitution recently has been Obergefell v. Hodges. In that case, the Supreme Court struck down bans on gay marriage because of the Due Process and Equal Process clauses (5). Both clauses clearly were not meant to apply to gay marriage, and it is doubtful the Founders would have supported gay marriage. Yet, because of the actions of the Supreme Court, gay marriage is legal, and it is guaranteed to remain legal. No legislature can change that.

The Living Constitution approach has successfully ensured that the Constitution remains a document worthy of respect that preserves the rights of the people.


Quite the segue, eh? This section demonstrates the harm caused when constitutions--in this case, the unwritten Roman Constitution--are insufficient to provide for the people. The beginning of the end of the Roman Republic is generally traced to the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus (6, pg. 144). Rome was in dire straits. The poor filled the streets of Rome, and wealth continued to be concentrated in the hands of a few (pg. 145). Tiberius pushed for land reform. Tribunes, as it happened, all had the power to unilaterally veto any proposal, and one by the name of Marcus Octavius did just that (146-147). The common people wanted reform (147). The law was intransigent. The natural response? Tiberius convinced the assembly to eject Octavius from office, a step with no legal precedent (147). For his trouble, Tiberius was murdered by the pontifex maximus and a mob of senators and retainers (147). This set the stage for enduring conflict between two camps--the populares and the optimates--with the former relying on popular support to pass reforms and the latter relying on senatorial support to promote stability (153). The clear issue is that there was a dichotomy between the two, when there shouldn't have been a dichotomy. Choosing between terrible law and lawless reform is not a choice. The populares largely gave up on the law altogether, and the optimates failed miserably in their attempts to restore the Republic.

A dead constitution goes the way of the optimates--into extinction and irrelevance. It can preserve no freedom in the long run, because it preserves only itself. A living constitution, on the other hand, would have bypassed many of the problems traditionalist Rome had with the populares. It would have enabled Tiberius and others to enact the will of the majority while preserving the rest of the Roman institutions. Attempting reforms under a dead constitution is like attempting a surgery with a battleaxe. You'll get the problem area cut out just fine--and a few other vital organs while you're at it. The scalpel of the living constitution is necessary to preserve this stability.

In this round, I demonstrated several strengths of a living constitution, and provided necessary historical context for understanding my case. A living constitution more effectively protects liberties, more effectively allows for reform, and was favored by a good number of the Founders.



  2. John Marshall by Jean Smith




  6. The Romans: From Village to Empire by Boatwright et al.



I fully welcome my opponent's unconventionality, and shall follow suit. Since my opponent has not justified his framework, not has he made positive arguments generally (as opposed to assertions), I am free to do the same.

I will, in this round, present two arguments, each negating the resolution, based on two contrary assumptions (the first, that a constitution may have authority extended through time, and, the second, that a constitution cannot), such that, no matter what my opponent makes of the framework in which I am working, my conclusion is inevitable. Note that this is in direct opposition to my opponent’s unwarranted decree that “
Con must argue that the Constitution should be a "dead" document to succeed” – I must only argue that it should not be a living document (which includes an utterly impotent, and, therefore, de facto nonexistent constitution).

I do not challenge my opponent’s acceptance of “natural rights”, but the exact list of rights he is accepting must be clarified before discourse may be had. So that there exists no ambiguity, I will operate with the assumption that the primary right is the Right to Autonomy, which has corollaries: the Right to Property and the Right to Self-Ownership. The Right to Autonomy states, generally, that each man has the right to exercise their own free will; the Right to Property that each man has the right to act exclusively over unclaimed material or material within his domain (this right also establishes the right to domain); the Right to Self-Ownership that each man must be treated as property of only themselves (unless they sign themselves into slavery), which, as explained, implies that they have exclusive control over their own person. If my opponent wishes to challenge any of these rights, I will present their justifications.

The way my case is constructed means that, if my opponent cannot show that the Constitution is not “dead”, then it does not and should not have authority. Therefore, many of my opponent’s arguments work towards my conclusion.

To give the foundation of my argument, I present passages from Lysander Spooner’s No Treason/Constitution of No Authority. Quoting the noble man on why Constitutions bind only those who signed them, and only on the terms that they signed them under:

“Those persons, if any, who did give their consent formally, are all dead now. Most of them have been dead forty, fifty, sixty, or seventy years. And the constitution, so far as it was their contract, died with them. They had no natural power or right to make it obligatory upon their children. It is not only plainly impossible, in the nature of things, that they could bind their posterity, but they did not even attempt to bind them. That is to say, the instrument does not purport to be an agreement between any body but “the people” then existing; nor does it, either expressly or impliedly, assert any right, power, or disposition, on their part, to bind anybody but themselves. Let us see. Its language is: “We, the people of the United States (that is, the people then existing in the United States), in order to form a more perfect union, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” It is plain, in the first place, that this language, as an agreement, purports to be only what it at most really was, viz., a contract between the people then existing; and, of necessity, binding, as a contract, only upon those then existing. In the second place, the language neither expresses nor implies that they had any right or power, to bind their “posterity” to live under it. It does not say that their “posterity” will, shall, or must live under it. It only says, in effect, that their hopes and motives in adopting it were that it might prove useful to their posterity, as well as to themselves, by promoting their union, safety, tranquility, liberty, etc.”

And on why those bound by it must have signed it of their own accords:

The laws holds, and reason declares, that if a written instrument is not signed, the presumption must be that the party to be bound by it, did not choose to sign it, or to bind himself by it. [...] Neither law nor reason requires or expects a man to agree to an instrument, until it is written; for until it is written, he cannot know its precise legal meaning. And when it is written, and he has had the opportunity to satisfy himself of its precise legal meaning, he is then expected to decide, and not before, whether he will agree to it or not. And if he do not THEN sign it, his reason is supposed to be, that he does not choose to enter into such a contract. The fact that the instrument was written for him to sign, or with the hope that he would sign it, goes for nothing.

Where would be the end of fraud and litigation, if one party could bring into court a written instrument, without any signature, and claim to have it enforced, upon the ground that it was written for another man to sign? that this other man had promised to sign it? [...] The very judges, who profess to derive all their authority from the Constitution — from an instrument that nobody ever signed — would spurn any other instrument, not signed, that should be brought before them for adjudication.


Moreover, a written instrument must, in law and reason, not only be signed, but must also be delivered to the party (or to some one for him), in whose favor it is made, before it can bind the party making it. The signing is of no effect, unless the instrument be also delivered. […] The Constitution was not only never signed by anybody, but it was never delivered by anybody, or to anybody's agent or attorney. It can therefore be of no more validity as a contract, then can any other instrument that was never signed or delivered.” [2]

Prong the First: If a Constitution is to Have Authority, it Must Not Change

This is obvious by the fact that a contract is binding only insofar as it was consented to, and that “progress”, no matter to what end, would obliterate the ability for the terms of a contract to be specified (and therefore it could not be agreed to – empty and tabula rasa contracts are not contracts).

Prong the Second: If a Constitution Changes, and Therefore Has No Authority, it Must be Discarded

My opponent’s arguments mostly reject the consistency of our Constitution, and, therefore, we move to this prong. This conclusion is clearly given when one accepts that an improper contract is not binding; therefore, my opponent has shown that a living Constitution would be impotent, and, therefore, neither practically nor morally desirable.

In addition, my opponent must recognise the difference between holding that a specific Constitution, by definition enduring, should be living, and that morally bankrupt Constitutions should be destroyed and replaced by More Perfect ones, and, if such replacement is impossible, just destroyed. My opponent needs to justify why the first would have been morally superior for, for example, Rome.

Debate Round No. 2


I accept Con's list of rights, but I will also add a list of my own. The exhaustive list of rights is everything that is necessary to provide equal respect and concern for all citizens. According to Ronald Dworkin (Justice for Hedgehogs), "Someone's total freedom is his power to act in whatever way he might wish, unimpeded by constraints or threats . . . His negative liberty is the area of his freedom that a political community cannot take away without injuring him in a special way . . ." (366). The distinction between the two is important. Borrowing from a secondary source,

Dworkin believes that a right to liberty in general is too vague to be meaningful. However, certain specific liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom of worship, rights of association, and of personal and sexual relations, do require special protection against governmental interference. This is not because these preferred liberties have some special substantive or inherent value (as most rights philosophers hold), but because of a kind of procedural impediment that these preferred liberties might face. The impediment is that if those liberties were left to a utilitarian calculation, that is, an unrestricted calculation of the general interest, the balance would be tipped in favor of restrictions.

. . . Dworkin says that if a vote were truly utilitarian, then all voters would desire the liberties for themselves, and the liberties would be protected under a utilitarian calculation. However, a vote on these liberties would not be truly utilitarian nor would it afford equal concern about and respect for liberties solely by reflecting personal wants or satisfactions of individuals and affording equal concerns to others . . . because [of] external preferences, such as prejudice and discrimination against other individuals deriving from the failure to generally treat other persons as equals . . . These external preferences would corrupt utilitarianism by causing the individual to vote against assigning liberties to others.

Accordingly, the liberties that must be protected against such external preferences must be given a preferred status. By doing so, society can protect the fundamental right of citizens to equal concern and respect because it prohibits "decisions that seem, antecedently, likely to have been reached by virtue of the external components of the preferences democracy reveals."

(The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights, Jerome Shestack, Human Rights Quarterly 20.2: 201-234)

Con's first point deals with liberty of contract. His argument basically boils down to the "Contract? I never signed a contract!" shtick, and you shouldn't buy it for a number of reasons. First, the principle that liberty is inviolable overrides consent--in other words, rights cannot be subjected to a vote, for the simple reason that if they can be revoked by a simple majority vote, they aren't really rights. Second, consent of the governed is not valuable as an end, but a means to an end. Suppose a woman opposes restrictions on abortion until fetal viability, but the state they reside in institutes waiting periods, requires consent of parents/the court, etc. They did not consent to those restrictions being placed upon people. Even if she are in the government itself, it cannot be said that the women "consented" to such restrictions. The sense of consent that Con uses is this broad sense, in which every person must consent to every single law they live under and every condition that would potentially infringe on their freedom, and it is a total fantasy--there is zero possibility of ever achieving broad consent like that. Even in the state of nature, the fantasy land where everyone voluntarily consents to contracts, Con cannot pretend that people "consent" to starvation, for instance. If we accept that consent of the governed is thus not a right, then we have destroyed our own framework that we agreed to. The only solution is to change the way we view our terms.

If I have an apple, for instance, and a thief takes it without my permission, what is the crime? The crime in itself cannot be my lack of consent; the crime is the theft of the apple, and the lack of consent is why it is a crime. However, say a random stranger, in an act of kindness, slips $20 into my coat. I did not consent to that, but was any crime committed? After all, I did not consent to this action performed on me. Consent of the governed is a means to the end of the protection of liberty--it is not an end in itself. It does not matter that Americans today did not sign the Constitution. If one were to sign a regular contract, ignorant of some of the provisions, and it turns out that those provisions are actually favorable to the ignorant person, there is no injustice. What grants the Constitution legitimacy is not consent; it is its protection of the rights of the people. As Dworkin notes, " . . . a collective decision to impose a duty not to kill and to threaten a serious sanction for any violation is in itself an insult to the dignity of subjects. On the contrary, your dignity as an equal citizen requires that government protect you in this way. It is not demeaning . . . to accept that a majority of your fellow citizens has the right to fix traffic rules and enforce the rules they fix, provided that the rules . . . are not wicked or desperately foolish" (Dworkin 367).

With this in mind, we must devise a different analysis from what Con has suggested. The measure of any governmental system is not whether it is completely consensual, but whether it is just, and by extension, whether it protects individual liberties. Con's argument is wholly based on contract language, which I have debunked, but his alternatives seem to be meaningless when it comes to protecting liberty--destroying and replacing Constitutions in itself carries no inherent procedural benefit. A Living Constitution does. As Dworkin noted, democratic utilitarian calculations and votes on rights are inherently unjust because of discrimination against others, so the rights cannot be put to a vote. They must be protected by an independent institution--the Supreme Court. Rehashing constitutions every few years or abolishing the constitution is merely a more complicated form of the tyranny of the majority. Extend Obergefell v. Hodges as an example of protection of rights thanks to the Living Constitution. Extend judicial review as another example.

Since Con asked me to justify why a living constitution would be superior to a new constitution in Rome, I'll respond to that. The reason is as simple as that a new constitution was impossible to create. As I said last round, there was "enduring conflict between two camps--the populares and the optimates--with the former relying on popular support to pass reforms and the latter relying on senatorial support to promote stability (153). The clear issue is that there was a dichotomy between the two, when there shouldn't have been a dichotomy. Choosing between terrible law and lawless reform is not a choice. The populares largely gave up on the law altogether, and the optimates failed miserably in their attempts to restore the Republic." Had new constitutions been made, they would have inevitably slanted toward the more-numerous populares, who were the epitome of majoritarian, as evidenced by the many mobs that they formed to kill political leaders and kick people out of the Senate and all sorts of other fun things (sarcasm). If I haven't shown that a LC would be better, I've at least shown that creating a new Constitution or leaving the dead one would have been a lot worse.



On Framework

Note, here, that my opponent claims to have accepted my list of rights. Afterwards, he argues against the primacy of autonomy (saying that it must be compromised in the advance of something “greater”). He must have been very confused; there is no other explanation for this massive lapse in understanding. I specifically noted that the Right to Autonomy was the “primary right”, and other rights were corollaries.

Given that my opponent has still presented no justification for his framework except for saying, descriptively, that certain things are “just” or “respectful of dignity” (which my opponent seems to believe counts as proving it so), there is absolutely no reason to accept the “appended” rights he tries to tack onto my own framework. Indeed, the very fact that he ACCEPTS my framework and then argues against its fundamental nature should be enough to discredit his attempts at consistency.

The question one must first ask in this debate is "By what standard am I to pass moral judgement?” I pose one simple challenge to both my opponent and the reader: find any answer which does not, at least implicitly, require autonomy of the Will.

You will find that you cannot.

This being so, it is clear that, unless my opponent decides to finally offer a positive argument, my a priori true position must be accepted prima facie.


1. Consent of the Governed

Quoting Ayn Rand:

“A right is the sanction of independent action. A right is that which can be exercised without anyone’s permission.

If you exist only because society permits you to exist—you have no right to your own life. A permission can be revoked at any time.

If, before undertaking some action, you must obtain the permission of society—you are not free, whether such permission is granted to you or not. Only a slave acts on permission. A permission is not a right.”

It should be clear that I am not arguing that justice is “up to a vote”, or whatever other ridiculous position my opponent wishes to paint me as holding; justice is the protection of consensual relations and the destruction of all others. This is much different – justice is not “majority rules” or arbitrary under my theory, but, rather, justice itself is the principle of free association with the world and others. This is why my opponent’s rant about how “What grants the Constitution legitimacy is not consent; it is its protection of the rights of the people“ falls flat; that which professes to protect rights cannot itself be a slavemaster. Thus, my opponent’s strawman is burnt to a crisp.

The point made by my opponent about “practicality” is also worthless; is the unjust, then, to become just because it is expedient? I see no reason why one cannot consent to everything done to them; my opponent has a totally unjustified pessimism towards freedom.

Also, I do fully believe that starving is oftentimes consensual. I have no problem biting the bullet; it’s your job to show why I’m wrong even if I do get around your silly reductios.

Moving to another of my opponent’s scattered chains of twisted logic, he takes for granted that doing “beneficial” things is never unjust. This, while literally true, attempts to smuggle something past the reader: it assumes that non-beneficial actions actually are, in order to prove their moral acceptability. This is a ruse.

He says himself that the reason the theft of the apple is a crime is the absence of consent. There are no two ways about this: Pro has unequivacly conceded that a possible distinguishing factor of a criminal act, as opposed to any other act, is a lack of consent. This, in itself, torpedoes the argument that consensual action is not an end in itself (and also the idea that “kind things” are always just). If that done without consent is criminal (and therefore unjust), and benevolent actions are always just, nonconsensual actions must always be unbeneficial. Q.E.D.

I leave you with this unjustified, out-of-context segment of Robert Nozick (Anarchy, State, and Utopia is very relevant here) that should, in itself, be just as weighty as my opponent’s unjustified, out of context segments of Dworkin, and far weightier when taking into account my positive arguments for my framework:

“Political philosophy is concerned only with certain ways that persons may not use others; primarily, physically aggressing against them, A specific side constraint upon action toward others expresses the fact that others may not be used in the specific ways the side constraint excludes, Side constraints express the inviolability of others, in the ways they specify, These modes of inviolability are expressed by the following injunction: 'Don't use people in specified ways,' An end-state view, on the other hand. would express the view that people are ends and not merely means (if it chooses to express this view at all), by a different injunction: 'Minimize the use in specified ways of persons as means.' Following this precept itself may involve using someone as a means in one of the ways specified, Had Kant held this view, he would have given the second formula of the categorical imperative as, 'So act as to minimize the use of humanity simply as a means,' rather than the one he actually used: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.

Side constraints express the inviolability of other persons, But why may not one violate persons for the greater social good? Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm: we go to the dentist to avoid worse suffering later; we do some unpleasant work for its results; some persons diet to improve their health or looks; some save money to support themselves when they are older. In each case, some cost is borne for the sake of the greater overall good, Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons more, for the sake of the overall social good? But there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens is that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him-least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance (as other individuals do not) and that therefore scrupulously must be neutral between its citizens."
2. Rome (An Exercise in Inconsequentialism)

My opponent makes the rather unconvincing argument that, had the Romans made a new Constitution, it would likely itself have been in opposition to liberty, and thus the proper thing to do is not to make a new Constitution. The problem is obvious: I did not advocate for the creation of any Constitution, only a Constitution of a certain… constitution. Unless my opponent is fully committed to the idea that it is physically and logically impossible that such a Constitution be created, he must admit that it is possible, and thus relevant to the moral discourse. If this is done, it is clear that, of the choices, a new and truly just Constitution would be the obvious best.

In conclusion,

I wish the reader to keep in mind that my opponent constantly appeals to dignity. I ask: What is more dignified? Self-determination or subjugation?

To quote, again, Senpai Nozick:

“The minimal state treats us as inviolate individuals, who may not be used in certain ways by others as means or tools or instruments or resources; it treats us as persons having individual right with the dignity this constitutes. Treating us with respect by respecting our rights, it allows us, individually or with whom we please, to choose our life and to realize our ends and our conception of ourselves, insofar as we can, aided by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same dignity. How dare any state or group of individuals do more. Or less.”

Debate Round No. 3


Con is wrong, but I've been stuck away from a computer for the past two days and I can't respond in time. I'm posting to avoid the forfeit glitch.

For now, I concede. Hopefully we can do this again some time--I have some major fixes I made to my argument and I've learned not doing arguments in the first round was a poor strategy, lol.



what a clown
Debate Round No. 4
16 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 10 records.
Posted by bossyburrito 9 months ago
"According to Ronald Dworkin (Justice for Hedgehogs)"

*7 Points to Con*
Posted by ShabShoral 1 year ago
I hope you rot
Posted by SolonKR 1 year ago
True debating skills: concedes a debate, and still gets a tie out of it. :P
Posted by ShabShoral 1 year ago
Well, No Treason would be good, as well as ASU (which actually is anti-anarchy, but is still a tremendous work), Rothbard & Hoppe essays, and, of course, Atlas Shrugged.
Posted by SolonKR 1 year ago
Got any contrarian books to suggest? I WILL read Being and Nothingness first, but I'm open to anything (even objectivist garbage :P)
Posted by ShabShoral 1 year ago
Fair enough. I would have destroyed that in a heartbeat :)
Posted by SolonKR 1 year ago
I'd much rather just leave the concession. I only recently got close to actually finishing Justice for Hedgehogs, and have realized I was missing 90% of the argument (objective morality exists because morality is a value domain outside the empirical and all moral judgment can only be internal to morality--even if it's true that there's nothing we ought do or not do, that's still objective truth), it can only be deduced by moral argument because of Hume's principle, with that in mind there's the argument for Kant's principle, and THEN the political principles followed. The fact that I didn't have a clue what I was arguing kinda hurt the argument a lot. There's no way I would have won even with a conclusion.
Posted by ShabShoral 1 year ago
also why the F UCK are you bringing compatibilism in
Posted by ShabShoral 1 year ago
Dude, send me a google docs with your round and I'll post it instead of/alongside mine (depending on how fast I can get my response in)
Posted by SolonKR 1 year ago
Trying to type an argument for compatibilism (and against the necessity of an "autonomous" will for moral judgment) on my phone is like trying to make a souffle in an EasyBake oven. I don't think I'll be able to post this.
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