The Instigator
Pro (for)
7 Points
The Contender
Con (against)
14 Points

There are no compelling objections to anarchism

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Post Voting Period
The voting period for this debate has ended.
after 4 votes the winner is...
Voting Style: Open Point System: 7 Point
Started: 10/31/2012 Category: Politics
Updated: 3 years ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 4,126 times Debate No: 26690
Debate Rounds (4)
Comments (16)
Votes (4)





The resolution for this debate will deal with anarchism and whether it would have a legitimate possibility of effectively and qualitatively providing various social services which are generally recognized as necessary for the existence of civil society.

In this debate, Pro is tasked with establishing a general framework for the effective production of these services (as well as their plausibility, just saying it's possible that everyone would get along is insufficient) while also refuting Con's arguments. Con's burden is to both attempt to refute Pro's framework, as well as to forward and defend one or more compelling objections to anarchism.


Anarchism in the scope of this debate does not concur with the vulgar use of the term (referring to chaos or lawlessness), but instead with the political philosophy advocating a form of social organization without a territorial monopoly on the provision of law, defense, arbitration, or any other services. More specifically, I will be defending free market anarchism[1] when non-institutional specifics are brought up.

The term State refers to an institution which holds an aggressive monopoly on the provision of law, defense, arbitration, and in most instance other services (such as roads or mail delivery). Aside from monocentric control of the provision of these services, a State also has the power to tax the inhabitants under its control.

A compelling objection in this instance will refer to an objection levelled against anarchism which shows it to be incapable of providing necessary social services (such as law and order) effectively or qualitatively. I don't think Con will be guilty of this but just in case, an argument along the lines of saying that some service X would be 5% more efficient then anarchist service X wouldn't be considered compelling. The term compelling implies a strong difference between the respective provision of the given services which sways strongly in the State's favor.


1. Drops will count as concessions.
2. Semantic or abusive arguments will not be counted.
3. New arguments brought in the last round will not be counted.
4. R1 is for acceptance. Argumentation begins in R2.
5. BoP is shared between Pro and Con.




I accept the debate. I don't think it will be an issue, but I would like to clarify a definition by pulling a quote out of Pro's own source. Market Anarchism is a society where "law enforcement, courts, and all other security services would be provided by privately funded competitors rather than through taxation, and money would be privately and competitively provided in an open market. Therefore, personal and economic activities under anarcho-capitalism would be regulated by privately run law rather than through politics." Naturally, this expands to any service would be provided by the open market, not just legal services.

I know this round is for acceptance, however, with only 4 rounds, if I bring these up in my R2, my opponent will only have their R3 and R4 to discuss it, so I'd like make some assumptions that I believe my opponent will agree to (if not, we can debate them).

1) The open markets follow economic laws, such as supply and demand.
2) We are discussing hypothetical situations with hypothetical governmental structures (or lack there of). Any discussions of past failed attempt at either is outside the scope of this debate.
3) In our hypothetical situations, we must assume the modern human nature. I cannot claim that in my hypothetical government, that 100% of the population absolutely adores 100% of what the government does and it is run by 100% pure and honest people with no cases of fraud or abuse. Likewise, my opponent cannot do the same.

With that, I will not make any arguments regarding the resolution and allow my opponent to start in R2.

Thank you,
Debate Round No. 1


My opening argument will not be comprehensive. I only plan on introducing a framework, not anything insanely specific. I'll tailor my arguments next round depending on Con's R2.

Institutional Analysis.

There are two types of political setups (speaking in hugely broad terms), States and non-States. States run into a number of seemingly insurmountable difficulties. One major problem is that which has been developed by workers in public choice theory. Public choice theory analyzes the various incentives laid out by various institutions, notably States. In a State we have three basic archetypes, the voter (everyday citizen), the politician, and the special interest. Special interests can be from corporations, individual political movements. etc. Their defining characteristic though (as far as being relevant to this debate) is that they are part of an organized group attempting to procure benefits upon themselves from the government.

Public choice offers up a poor picture of the way States work, especially the more centralized or higher up they are (i..e, Federal as opposed to state governments). A set of perverse incentives is offered to each major group of political actors, turning individually rational actions into collectively detrimental outcomes. For instance, the cost for the Federal government to subsidize a given corporation might be $20,000. Divided by the number of tax-paying citizens, this equals out to a very small amount, almost unnoticeable at that. Now given the fact that costs are spread apart so widely , the average person is incentivized economically (as the subsidy cost him or her next to nothing) not to concern themselves with the issue.

The major point to be made thus, is that States simply act as a middleman, and more. Besides simply handling transactions from consumers (citizens/tax payers) to the actual producers of given services, the State creates a system whereby it becomes impossible to rationally gauge cost-benefits. Now in a normal setup, someone can perform a cost-benefit analysis since they are the only ones paying and receiving the good. Where States are concerned though, paying and receiving become highly separated. My tax rate remains relatively constant in relation to what I receive. Therefore I have a financial incentive to receive as much as I can. This creates a sort of tragedy of the commons and largely explains why gross Federal spending in the U.S. has continued to increase seemingly exponentially even while deficits skyrocket.

Obviously I can't *just* show the institutional flaws of Statism. After all, my opponent can simply argue that anarchism would be worse. But the reason institutional analysis of a non-State system would appear to be superior relies on a few reasons. (A) Individual cost-benefits are better related to individual preference and (B) non-monopolized markets (even in defense/protection) produce better services at better prices.

(A) Cost-benefits under markets.

In a market economy, one gets what one pays for. This seems relatively simple but it carries with some very important conclusions. In relation to the tragedy of the commons under Statism, anarchism would allow for one to have more control over how much of a particular service conforms to their individual preference, unhampered by something of a mad dash to absorb resources before someone else does. An example will be helpful to explain. Consider protection services. Under States, protection is broadly similar. Someone who might greatly value security will (all things being equal) pay the same rate as someone who values security very little. The reason the anarchist (market) program best solves this problem is that it allows individuals to tailor their services specifically to their preferences. This specific aspect works against the mono-standardization of State services. State create a situation where individual preference is threatened. When defense and protection is catered by markes, individual preference reigns supreme, when States do it standardization does.

(B) Monopolization vs. Competition.

Basic economic theory shows us that when more producers are at work in a given field, price will tend to be lower and quality will tend to be higher than in a market monopolized by a single firm. This is owing to the fact that price and quality are to a large extent determined by supply and demand. Consider a town with only one grocery as opposed to one containing five or ten. In the first town, the producer is in an extremely strong position bargaining wise which allows for the raising of price as well as the ability to be more lax on quality. Competition is a strong counter to this as when a producer is vulnerable to competition, it must change its price to more reflect the relative supply and demand (with similar effects in regards to quality) lest it lose customers to another firm. Markets on an a priori analysis so much more socially beneficial incentives than do monopolized institutions (States), making them preferable. Anarchism means meaningful competition in the field of defense and protection while States are more or less just geographical monopolies.


I would like to thank my opponent for their argument. I will spend only a little time addressing my opponent's previous round before offering up my arguments. I would also like to point out that since most of what we are talking about is theoretic situations, there are not likely going to be many sources.

A) Public choice theory.

My opponent correctly points out the three main archetypes, however, he completely ignores that these three archetypes also exist in the private market with only two small differences. Rather than "the voter" they have "the customer" and rather than "the politician" they have "the manager" (which is usually the owner(s), however really applies to anyone that has the authority to make management decisions). But the same flaws exist, in that special interest will corrupt the system for benefits and have the cost of the benefits passed on to the customers at a heavily diluted rate.

Both the state and non-state have methods of attempting to deal with this, which are actually very similar. The voters can vote for different politicians and the customers can go to a different store with different managers. The main differences are that the customers are basically voting with their money, so customers with less money, have less of a voice to change the corruption.

The other difference is the cost associated with physically going to a difference store. Continuing off of my opponent's example of grocery stores, I have 1 store that is only a block away, the next closest is 2 miles. This means if I'm just going to get a gallon of milk and food for dinner, my bill may only be $10, but the gas to get to the second store option will be about $1. That raises the cost of my choice by 10% (the third choice is 5 miles away, which only raises the cost of travel). That means that the close store can raise their prices through corruption to be 10% higher than the next closest store. With politicians, there is no increased cost of voting for one person over another.

B) Monopolization vs Competition.

This is actually a poor reason. This is because Monopolization can be bad because the monopoly controller can jack up prices (or lower quality, but both are to jack up revenue and income) and leave people with no choices. However, a state has no reason to jack up prices because any revenue that they make goes to the owners, which are the people. If the government runs a $500 billion surplus, that surplus does not go into the president's or congress's pocket. So while a private company may be tempted to bringing in more money for their owners, there is no such incentive for a government entity.

There is also no real monopoly so long as there is a democracy to vote in new people, or at least vote in new bosses for others (not every position is voted on, but those that are not have their bosses voted on).

Moving on to my arguments, we can break them down into 4 distinct arguments. While there are many more, we will focus on these three, due to time and character limits.

1) Free Rider Problem

The FRP is most commonly associated with national defense, but really applies to anything that cannot effect only individuals, such as flood protection.

Usually, market anarchists suggest that insurance companies would run private defense (people would voluntarily pay an insurance company to protect them from potential foreign invaders). If my opponent wishes to argue something different, he is free to do so. If you are living in a house in the middle of a community that is paying the defense insurance, then there is no benefit for you to pay as well. Invasions do not target only uninsured homes, but the entire community, so a defense company is not able to only defend the paying customers, but either the entire community or none of the community.

This also applies to the construction of anything that is designed for preventing (or limiting the damage of) natural disasters, like levees and flood walls. Since they can only prevent or limit damage for everyone or no one, there is no incentive for any individual to voluntarily pay for the service.

2) Insurance

This can really be applied to most business structures, however we will focus primarily upon insurance because it is one of the simplest when it comes to the net income equation, and the "quality" is not based on any design, but on the service of employees (of which either state or non-state would have access to).

The revenues are simply the monthly premiums of customers, no more no less. The other side of the equation is the expenses, which are your overhead and payouts. A private company, competing in the free market must attempt to make a profit (else have investors pull their funds out for other alternatives). A state company does not, since any profit goes back to its "shareholders" with are the customers. This means that a state company can take that "profit" and apply it to any of the three different places, lower premiums, higher payouts, or better paychecks for employees (usually it would be a balance of the three).

These will mean that a state insurance is naturally more efficient and effective than a private company. Of course, just like with companies, depending on how they are run, they can do well or poorly and it is no different with a state run. A bad manager and make the company less effective, but the basic layout shows that the state run is naturally better.

3) Private Arbitration

This basically ties back to private court systems. The first thing to know is that the state does not have, nor does it need to have, a monopoly on this. While the state does have the ultimate authority should people choose not to agree to arbitration, arbitration is actually a popular option for disputes. However, we do see a number of issues arise that come from a conflict of interest within these arbitration which we will look into.

If you take a moment to look at any contract that you are in (phone, TV, internet, rent, loans, etc) you'll most likely find an arbitration clause [1]. This is basically a section of the contract that says if you want to take something to arbitration, you must go through a particular arbitration group. You don't get to choose. Now, arbitration groups have two conflicting interests. One, to be as fair as possible, and two, to be as generous to their customer as possible. If we are honest, we will know that the company that drafted the contract is the real customer, they are the ones bringing the arbitration to that arbitration company. What inevitably ends up happening, is that the arbitration companies begin siding unjustly with the companies that are bringing them the cases since if they don't, those companies will start taking their business else where.

4) Sub-street monopoly

One of the biggest monopolies that will form under market anarchy is the roads. I'm not talking about toll roads on the highways, but the sub-streets. The roads that lead into business parking lots, or the street that your house is on, or the street that a thousand homes in suburbia all exit to, will all be privately owned by different entities. The biggest problem is that it is not physically possible to have a number of roads that connect to your driveway so that you actually have a choice to create competition. There is only one road, period. There is only one piece of land, which holds the rights to charge whatever it sees fit, for you to use, either by car, bike, or foot. This is the very monopoly risk that my opponent attacked in his round, part (B).

We know this is not an issue for a state, for the reason that regardless of the monopoly, you can always vote different people in that will not act that way, so your choice cannot be taken away. We also reference back that there is no incentive for the state to make a profit, since the profit goes back to the people anyway.

Thank you

Debate Round No. 2


===Pro Case===

Public Choice.

Con's first claims that private and public institutions generally deal with the problem of public choice the same. This is correct in a sense, but in the specifics, private institutions differ widely. First, Con fails to take into account centralization/decentralization. Nation-states are strongly centralized in regards to the most important policies, those that are nationwide. Private firms (while are sometimes nationwide) we could expect to be smaller and more decentralized under anarchism. The free market has a natural mechanism limiting the size and scope of private institutions which is only bypassed through State policies like enforcement of intellectual property, outright subsidization, and cartelization via higher regulatory overheads. Under a free market (one without State policies such as the above), private firms would be smaller and thus more vulnerable to consumer pressures.


(i) Prices. The incentive to pocket surplus proceeds isn't the only price problem under monopoly. There's also the fact that monopolies are less open to market pressures, hence prices (taxes under states) are more or less determined by a combination of the political climate than they are a reflection of market forces. The State has no way of rationally allocating its resources, therefore taxes transfer this burden on to consumers (tax-payers).

(ii) Democracy. Con also claims that democracy somehow wipes away this problem since bad governments can simply be voted out. However, Con fails to take into account both the fact that nation States have a very small output of possible replacements (ex. the current Presidential election has only two more or less similar viable candidates) and the fact that most voters are incentivized into ignorance under statism. It's certainly possible that a larger pool of replacements could come up, however this requires large scale action. And given the individual uselessness of a single vote and the subsequent rational ignorance it entails, this is an unlikely occurrence save extreme circumstances.

===Con Case===

Free Rider Problem.

Con's case isn't that private communities or organizations are unable to fund collective goods, only that a certain kind of individual subscription mechanism is untenable. I don't wish to deny this. However, that doesn't mean bundling is impossible under anarchism (something critics tend to presuppose). One way to incentivize bundling for public goods under anarchism is by mutual assurance contracts. Under such a contract, possible subscribers contract themselves out to pay a rate for a given good if and only if some necessary amount of other subscribers also follow suit. This switches the incentives from not paying to paying since the good is (a) certainly possible to produce and (b) one isn't vulnerable to free riders choosing to just let others fund the service. Apply this to the natural disaster insurance point as well.


Furthermore this objection in itself has hardly been substantiated and rests on severely flawed premises. For instance, Con fails to take into account the profit/loss method of economic calculation. A state-run insurance agency wouldn't have any way to decide whether or not it's services are actually working at the most efficient level. This owes to the fact that markets coordinate relative supply/demand by the profit metric. If a firm is losing money, there's something they're doing wrong and they can adjust to fit this. State run institutions don't run on a profit/loss metric. Instead, they generally run on legislative fiat i.e., mandates from legislatures. In this sense ex ante, private institutions are actually more efficient than state run, contrary to Con's counter.

Private Arbitration.

Con makes the point that (a) people generally don't have a choice in which arbitration firm they go to and (b) that some private arbitration service would be more likely to be biased in favor of the firm hiring them. The first point is false and is merely an example of bundling. It doesn't mean that one doesn't have a choice in which arbitration service one can go to. It just means there exist incompatibilities i.e., choice isn't infinite. If one goes with phone company X they might have to go to with private arbitration service Y. But that doesn't mean arbitration service Y is the only option. Phone company A might contract to private arbitration service B or C. There are still numerous options available, more so than the singular final authority of the State judicial system surely.

On Con's second claim (that private arbitration services would err on the side of firms hiring them), this lacks real substantiation. Con is assuming a general lack of consumer service on the part of private institutions. I would find it at least somewhat likely that when phone company X's private arbitration service that it contracts out weights in it's favor a substantial percent of the time, that consumers would follow suit and switch to a more reliable service. Furthermore, Con is extrapolating some sort of universal way that private arbitration would work based on the case of how private arbitration works under statism, an unjustified leap on his part.

Sub-street Monopoly.

(i) Con is making an unsubstantiated assumption regarding possible anarchist legal procedure. First, he conjures up the false image of private institutions as omnipotent robber barons who can do literally whatever they want I they don't have a State watching them. This is not true. Private firms must always balance short term losses for long term gains. Road company X charging anyone $1,000 every time they want to get out of their driveway would run into a few too large problems. One of these has to do with the fact that no one's going to contract a company to build roads if they're prone to financial abuse of their consumers. The second has to do with the fact that we could expect sub-streets to be more organized along neighborhood community control. Roads are a collective good. This doesn't mean individual subscription is completely untenable (we could see a lot of that for highways), only that roads could be better managed by bundling. The problem lies in the fact that people presuppose States are the only possible way of doing this. But as we can see with things like gated communities, private bundling isn't implausible under anarchism.

(ii) Con's claim that states aren't vulnerable to this problem because they can "vote difference people in" and hence "your choice cannot be taken away" is also false. For the full refutation of this point, see back to my public choice point. Voters have little actual choice in regards to state and Federal elections. As pertaining to localized government, this is true but it applies just as well to anarchism given my point just above regarding things like home owners organizations, condo communities, neighborhood organizations, etc.



Public Choice

My opponent makes a few assumptions and plain false claims. First, he assumes that centralization is a negative thing, while providing no reasoning. This is easily understood to be false by understanding how any company that actually hires people is structured, and what structures work and which do not. As a company grows (we will address why the free market does not limit it in a moment), the owner is not able to micro-manage the company, as doing so will usually cause a company to fail [1][2] and so must delegate authority and responsibility to managers, while also maintaining ultimate authority to control the company, through centralization and a well organized chain of command.

My opponent then states, also without evidence that companies will naturally be limited in size. This is false under any basic business understanding. Several key reasons are the ability to buy in bulk (saves money), ability to afford advertising, vendor leverage (if your business is a large portion of their business, they have to kiss your bum), wide spread locations (when people travel, they will like to eat somewhere familiar, that is one reason starbucks does so well), and many more.


(i) My opponent ignores how votes are no different in pressure to a government as customers to a business. So long as there are votes, there is pressure.

(ii) My opponent strawmans democracy, seemingly implying that the US version of democracy is the only possible version. A democracy may only have two, it may have ten. It is no different than only having two or ten choices for a business. My opponent also says that each vote matters very little. That depends on the size of the nation, which could be only a few hundred, in which each vote is very important. My opponent also ignores the obvious comparison to a large company, where a single customer makes very little difference to the bottom line of the company.


Free Rider Problem

My opponent's option does not refute the free rider problem. Even under his possibility (which he provides no reason to believe that will happen, only that it could, of which he cannot force, only market forces can), the FRP still exists. If the insurance companies only charge if X number of people sign up, then everyone beyond X is still getting the benefits without paying for them, and so they are still enjoying the costs of others.

My opponent's example also fails because no company is going to invest in such a sunken cost without a long term contract. If enough people want a dam and are willing to pay monthly for it, an insurance company is not going to build it unless they have a contract to ensure that they keep getting paid (basically like a loan to the people). The risk is just too great for any business to risk without long term contracts (which only amplifies the FRP).


Pro is simply wrong. When it comes to efficiency, private companies can not match medicare's efficiency [3]. Even when anti-medicare groups add what they call "hidden costs" the overhead is still only 5.2%, while the private sector is 16.7%. Pro also falsely assumes that the market drives to the more efficient levels. The market drives to the most profitable levels, not the most efficient. While the two are often linked very heavily, they are not the same, and to group them is a humpty dumpty fallacy.

Private Arbitration

Pro starts off with a horrible double standard. While you go with one company, you are locked into one arbitrator. However, Pro believes that this is okay, since you can choose a different company which may or may not be locked into a different arbitrator. That is the same as saying that while living in the US you are stuck with the US laws, but that is okay, because you can go to any other country and be stuck with their laws, so you always have a choice (and thus, he is refuting his own "the state is a monopoly" argument that he presented earlier).

Pro also fails to understand that it doesn't matter if you can choose different companies, because for each and every one, whatever arbitrator they lock you into, that arbitrator has an extremely high incentive to side with the company that hires them. Pro continues to assume that people would simply wise up and choose a company that did not do this. However, he never addresses that they will always have that massive incentive. He also fails to realize that this is what is currently going on with private arbitrators. Because there is too much information in the world for people to process it all, much of it has to be ignored, and arbitration tends to be one of them [4][5]. Pro also assumes that markets will react to what is better for the consumer. A clear case that this is not always true was when a phone company raised their termination fees on smart phones, one might think that this would push competitors to take some market share. Instead, all major companies quickly followed suit [6], giving the people no real alternative in choice as far termination fees go. This is the same with the arbitration, even though it is better for the customers for them to be fair, it is better for the companies for them to not be fair, and so long as the companies do what is best for them (as the market drives them to do) they will continue.


My opponent fails to realize several things and ultimately, actually begins arguing against anarchism by the end.

First, companies can, and often do, work under many multiple names that are not often known to be tied together. The company I work for only has a few hundred employees and does business under 3 different names. Many of our customers are not actually aware that we are owned by a different company in Japan. This would allow companies to build roads under one name, then operate it under another. This also ignores a corporations favorite legal phrase, "prices may change at any time without notice." This allows companies to lure people in with temporary deals (just like Dish Network giving a low rate for the first year, or credit being offered with 0% and no payments for X months).

Pro finally goes on to basically create a government as a solution to the problem. While he has not presented any reasoning that such issues would not arise under anarchy (only that something else may rise as well), he says that "we could expect sub-streets to be more organized along neighborhood community control." This is just a long phrase for a small state, namely a community state.

If we go back to Pro's R1 where he provides definitions, here is his definition of anarchism, "form of social organization without a territorial monopoly on the provision of law, defense, arbitration, or any other services." Neightborhood community control is a territorial monopoly on roads (in that community), and so is not anarchy as defined for this debate.

I would like to thank my opponent as we move to our final round.

Debate Round No. 3


===Pro Case===

Public Choice.

Con is claiming that various economic considerations favor the centralization of business while failing to refute my points showing that centralization can in many ways be explained corporate favouritism by the State. Furthermore, Con is again mistaking a trend for a universal law. Just because there are instances in which larger firms may be more efficient than smaller ones doesn't mean that centralism is always > to decentralism. Con is mistaking a trend for a universal economic law and his points fail to refute the point that markets have a natural limiting factor i.e., that centralized growth is only efficient to a point. Con has completely failed to show why centralized growth is efficient forever or can never become inefficient.


(i) Prices. Con's price counter is essentially a concession since this debate is not of the type "anarchism vs. statism" but simply on whether there are compelling objections to anarchism. If votes are essentially the same as consumer pressure than at best this makes anarchism and statism prima facie similar and isn't a legitimate criticism.

(ii) Democracy. This contention is essentially the same as the above "Prices" contention. Con is arguing that size is a relevant consideration. Democracy may small in size, but so may States. It's also vulnerable to the same point as above. Con's claim that States and businesses are similar in this respect in no way forwards the Con position but works in favor of the Pro since this debate is on the existence of compelling objections to anarchism, not superiority of one system over another.

===Con Case===

Free Rider Problem.

Con's first counter is that I allegedly provide no reason to show that assurance contracts would exist, because I cannot force them to. However, the problem with this refutation is that it puts into place a burden of proof which only an explicit threat of force can fulfill. Con argues that we don't know that mutual assurance contracts would be put into place. Okay, we don't really know that Walmart will respond to economic incentives, but we can say it's probable.

Con's next criticism is that anyone beyond whatever number of people necessary is still a free rider since they still wouldn't have to pay for the service. However, Con fails to show why this alleged problem carries with it the same problems as a normal FRP. If enough people have paid for the service, it doesn't matter what other people do, since the service is fulfilled regardless. The only reason the FPR is a problem in the first place is because it makes the provision of services impossible. If they're provided, it ceases to become a problem.

Thirdly, Con for some reason presupposes that mutual assurance contracts couldn't conceptually be long term. Without substantiation though there's no reason to even take this into consideration. Furthermore I have no idea where he got the idea that mutual assurance contracts don't insure payment since that's basically the entire idea behind them.


Con's only claim is that Medicare is more efficient than private companies. Of course the term private companies is a hollow one since there is no free market in actual existence. Things like intellectual property rights, government regulations, externalized transportation costs, and a plethora of other government infringements on the market make any attempt to call "private" companies private in any real sense simple false. Furthermore the idea by Con that showing a single State service to be a mere 11.5% more efficient than private industry hardly counts as a compelling objection to anarchism as a whole (or even anarchism in that service only). Lastly, Con has completely dropped my rational allocation point.

Private Arbitration.

Con has attempted to equivocate being locked in to a contract with a single arbiter as the same as being locked into a single country's set of laws. There are numerous problems with this but let's get into just a few of them. (i) You don't have an original choice in which country you're born into, you do choose whichever cell phone company (or whatever service you choose) you contract yourself with. (ii) There's a much larger existential problem with relocating countries, relocating companies is (while at some times annoying) infinitely easier and less trouble. Con is trying to argue that basically everything can be considered a reasonable "choice", irrespective of any outstanding factors like geography or original choice. This was never my position and Con's attempt to group them all in together is frankly misleading.

Con's next point deals with the alleged incentive for arbitration services to always side with the company hiring them. He claims that I never addressed the incentive problem. However, if one reads my R3 one can see that I surely did. "I would find it at least somewhat likely that when phone company X's private arbitration service that it contracts out weights in it's favor a substantial percent of the time, that consumers would follow suit and switch to a more reliable service." Arbitration services literally only work based off of reputation (since the quality of their only service relies on it) therefore I fail to see how consumers would be likely to just shrug this off.

Sub-street Monopoly.

Con's claims that the neighborhood State is utterly fallacious and is routinely expected in debates on the subject. It arises from a flawed sense of what a State actually is, ironic since Con's entire counter here rests on definitions. A territorial monopoly is not as thinly defined as Con would have you think it is. It's not simply a single company or institution controlling a service in a specific place. Otherwise McDonalds would be a State since it controls fast food inside the restaurant. Con conveniently ignores what a State actually is. As defined in R1, it holds an "aggressive monopoly" i.e., one held up by force or threat of force. This is what separates mere businesses or community organizations from States. If I theorized any use of force in R3 I'm certainly ignorant of it and invite Con to point this out. Taxation (i.e., forced payment) is also a tenet of the State, however the voluntary nature of the above described community rules this out as well.

Con also concedes his pure conjecture in regards to crossing roads going up to one's driveway (since he didn't provide an R3 refutation) as well as the contention that road companies can simply charge whatever they want. His example that Dish Network changes their rates at some points completely ignores my point. I didn't argue that prices were always stable, only that companies don't usually have the kind of control over prices that Con claims i.e., being able to charge literally whatever they want. It's also unclear what the "name change" point actually means in the scope of this contention.


I would like to thank my opponent for this debate. Since this is the final round, I will use this only to address things brought up by my opponent in his R4 and to summarize. I will be addressing Pro's case and then only one section of my own.

==Pro's Case==

Public Choice

My opponent strawmans the argument here. I never claimed that centralization is "efficient forever" or will "never become inefficient." I merely showed some reasons that a larger, more centralized company has an efficiency advantage. My opponent never refuted any of these, and they never provided a single open market force that pushes them smaller. He did provide some examples of how our current system can bolster them up, but not a single open market force that holds them down.


Pro says that these are basically washes and that they don't favor a state. That is true, but these were never my arguments, these were my opponent's which have failed to show any benefit of anarchy.

==Con's Case==

Sub-street monopoly

I would like to start this section with this quote from my opponent, "If I theorized any use of force in R3 I'm certainly ignorant of it and invite Con to point this out."

Pro makes the argument that there is no "force" to pay the neighborhood ("As defined in R1, it holds an "aggressive monopoly" i.e., one held up by force or threat of force... however the voluntary nature of the above described community rules this out as well."), when there is the exact same force or threat of force that we all face with taxes. As presented, the roads paid and maintained by the homeowner's association (or neighborhood, or whatever name you want to give it) and the cost goes to the homeowners. Since the roads are a natural monopoly, the people that live there have a simple choice. Pay up or move out, the exact same choice that all current states give.

Pro also makes the claim that you don't have a choice at McDonalds (also brought up last round) so they can't be compared. The main difference is that you don't have private property inside the McDonalds, while your home is trapped inside the monopoly of the housing association (just like within state boarders).

Pro does bring some points up in private arbitration just last round that I will tie into this. "You don't have an original choice in which country you're born into." This also applies to a housing association. He also says "There's a much larger existential problem with relocating countries." Anarchy is much different than Miniarchy. With Anarchy, there is no "small enough" the simple notion of having to move, even if it is only a few blocks away is the same as 3,000 miles. If moving a few blocks away was "okay" then we'd be arguing about objections to miniarchism, rather than anarchism.

This is the most compelling objection, since the only provided solution is the basic layout of a state (albeit a very small state).

Since this is the only section that my opponent invited me to continue upon, I will be forced to let the rest go.
Debate Round No. 4
16 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 10 records.
Posted by tulle 3 years ago
Adding to favourites.
Posted by tvellalott 3 years ago
Flagging so I can read this later.
Posted by Zaradi 3 years ago
Since I never got around to voting on you and thett's debate, I'll try and fit reading this one and voting for it in somewhere. probably sometime in the afternoon tomorrow, or either late tomorrow. But tomorrow.
Posted by darkcity 3 years ago
Alan Moore-
"I believe that all other political states are in fact variations or outgrowths of a basic state of anarchy; after all, when you mention the idea of anarchy to most people they will tell you what a bad idea it is because the biggest gang would just take over. Which is pretty much how I see contemporary society. We live in a badly developed anarchist situation in which the biggest gang has taken over and have declared that it is not an anarchist situation " that it is a capitalist or a communist situation. But I tend to think that anarchy is the most natural form of politics for a human being to actually practice."
Posted by socialpinko 3 years ago
What in statism stops new unwarranted bigger States "happening"? Lol dumb question is dumb.
Posted by darkcity 3 years ago
Because what in Anarchism stops new unwanted power structures happening?
Posted by socialpinko 3 years ago
Where do you find such an assumption anywhere in AnCap theory might ask?
Posted by TheElderScroll 3 years ago
It is not clear to me what Anarcho-capitalism is. So far, it sounds exactly like "you are on your own" theory. Moreover. it seems that the theory is established on one particular assumption: Human beings are innerly benevolent.
Posted by darkcity 3 years ago
Market anarchy is very different from other forms of anarchism, therefore it is misleading to call the debate 'There are no compelling objections to anarchism', rather than 'There are no compelling objections to market anarchism'
Posted by socialpinko 3 years ago
I wonder how close to the deadline I should wait before I post my response?
4 votes have been placed for this debate. Showing 1 through 4 records.
Vote Placed by emospongebob527 3 years ago
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Reasons for voting decision: Counter.
Vote Placed by AlextheYounga 3 years ago
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Reasons for voting decision: There are objections to anarchism. There are objections to EVERY government or lack thereof. Anarchism would be one of the better forms of society. Pro could have gone more into how real harmful monopolies would never form. Pro had a more compelling argument.
Vote Placed by DeFool 3 years ago
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Reasons for voting decision: I could not get around the argument that Market Anarchism is simply replacing the Politician with the Company Boss. (see comments, but: these three archetypes also exist in the private market with only two small differences. Rather than "the voter" they have "the customer" and rather than "the politician" they have "the manager"). This, to my mind, negates most of the most impressive arguments presented by Pro. I counted this as a turn, because it was first presented by Pro (in his sourcing), and then used to destabilize his case. Pro responds by arguing that the private hierarchy is less centralized, but does not support this argument well. ("Under a free market (one without State policies such as the above), private firms would be smaller and thus more vulnerable to consumer pressures.") Obviously untrue, this argument requires substantial evidence as support.
Vote Placed by RoyLatham 3 years ago
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Reasons for voting decision: Unconvincing arguments from both sides. For example, Medicare is inefficient because there is little incentive to prevent fraud, costs are transferred to non-Medicare payers, and innovation is discouraged, but the points were not argued. This ran through the whole debate, with Con posing state monopoly as having great virtues over free markets. Pro did not effectively respond to the free rider problem applied to national defense, providing only amorphous notions of alternative ways of doing bundling. The resolution only demands one compelling objection and Con had that one. Con won the arguments regarding market forces on monopolies. The argument on streets was indecisive.