The Instigator
Ajabi
Pro (for)
Losing
0 Points
The Contender
tejretics
Con (against)
Winning
7 Points

This House Asserts Ontology Necessitates God's Existence!

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after 1 vote the winner is...
tejretics
Voting Style: Open Point System: Select Winner
Started: 10/21/2015 Category: Philosophy
Updated: 1 year ago Status: Post Voting Period
Viewed: 1,646 times Debate No: 81248
Debate Rounds (4)
Comments (39)
Votes (1)

 

Ajabi

Pro

Shalom Aleichem!

The idea of this debate started with me contacting Tejretics for a debate. Given a list of topics he believed that the best topic to discuss is the Ontological Argument. I believe I should mention the Spirit of the Motion is whether the study of Being, with relation to the studies of Ideas can make God a necessary conception.

There are some rules which both parties must accept:

1. The first round for Tejretics is acceptance only, and to share any pleasantries. He accepts the definitions, and rules set herein.

2. The onus rests on the Proposition who must show that there is a logically sound Ontological Argument.

3. The order of the debate is such that the maximum limit is 10, 000 characters, there fwill be 72 hours given to post an argument. I do ask, of those who vote, to please provide strong reasons for debate explaining the decision on each point. This is of course only a humble request.

4. Any and all sources must be linked, and a referencing number should be provided in the argument. Sources must have paginations cited.

5. All the respective definitions may be taken from the Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy or any other well reputed text such as A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, or A Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant. These definitions of course can be debated.

6. No deconstructional semantics, trolling, semi-trolling, pseudo-trolling, patatoes or tomatoes.

Here are some of the fundamental definitions:

1. God: God is a trasncendental, sentient, creator, diety who goes beyond the limits of empirical cognition. He is distinct from the Universe, and possess the qualities of excellence and greatness.

2. Ontology: Ontology is the study of Being where one tries to prove phenomenon from a completely rational perspective, starting out with nothing but the conceptualization of a Being.

3. Necessitates: Makes necessary, when I talk about necessitating God I make it clear that the argument must prove that God exists.
tejretics

Con

I accept.
Debate Round No. 1
Ajabi

Pro

Pax Tecum!

The Blind Lovers

Allow me to tell you a story; an endearing story of two lovers. One was born without ears, and the other without eyes. As you can imagine this dulled down their sex life quite a bit. Other than their obvious marital problems (yes they were married like good religious people are) they also had some other issues I'd like to discuss.

Now you see the deaf lover was the most beautiful man alive (after yours truly of course) while the blind lover had the best voice. Both lovers were, however, unable to connect on the level of sight and sound. Since both of them were also born this way they can't even imagine the qualities of the other. Had, let us say, the blind one once had the capacity to see, we could use comparison and illustration to help him picture his lover. Similarly had the deaf one, once been auditory we could tell him by comparison how coarse or thin his lover's voice is, and describe his singing style. Both, while unable to actually experience their lovers in this sensory regard, could come close by imagining it. Much like Solon imagines Justin Beiber putting his [Censored by airmax1227] in Solon's [Censored by airmax1227].

Would it not be odd though if the blind one *did* in fact have some sort of visual image, no matter how vague. With it, he could easily create multiple new images by comparison. What would we have to conclude in such a scenario though? How is it that this person has a conception, without having the faculty for receiving it?

This, only slightly mock story, is a good analogy to our current argument. We as humans are born with certain sensory abilities (taste, smell, sight, etc.), alongside a mind which is capable of imagination, and reason. God on the other hand, is by His nature transcendent and above physical inception. There is no experimental way to verify God, but it seems obvious that we in fact do have a conception of God. After all how else would the word "God" even be meaningful?! Our thesis here is to then study whether this thought of God has been formed by imagination, or is it something far more complex.

Always practise safe sex kids...goats' arses are full of bacteria

Just as before sex with humans (or animals *cough* Utah *cough*) we should use condoms (unless you want trouble for the next 18 years, 9 months) similarly before delving into this philosophy, it would be wise to go over some basic truth elements which are self-evident. These are however extremely important pre-requisites and should be read with carefulness.

1. Everything that exists in itself (the beauty of the deaf man as it is) is subjectivised (that it is interpreted in a particular way) when it is felt (by sensation) to some degree (the beauty of the deaf man as I may perceive it), for this is the nature of the mind. All ideas in cognition, therefore, which have arrived via sensation are to some degree, no matter how little, subjective. This also means that pure or universal ideas (like those of maths and logic) are not sensational ideas.

2. All ideas then are not "things-as-they-are" but rather are "representations of Objects". These representations can be subjective (this or that is beautiful; how beautiful; the beauty of the deaf man) or they can be objective (2+2=4; a=a; the deaf man exists).

3. There clearly exist ideas which are not universal, but are also not empirical or from memory (such as the idea of a unicorn or a spaghetti monster). This means that there must exist a faculty of the mind capable of making subjective ideas (as in not universally applicable), and let us call this faculty 'Imagination'. All of these ideas though clearly require other ideas and are built by various connections, for how else do we arrive at these fantasies? All of our fantasies have limits of senses (we may experience various tastes, sounds) which may in turn arouse feelings but nothing more. This means we cannot fantasize concepts which are universal or completely devoid of sensations. What, dare I say, is the taste of a square? Or the feel of a square-circle?

4. From the above principles we may then infer that universal principles are not a result of the faculty of imagination (or at least we can't form new universal concepts, we can mix subjective concepts with a universal concept to make some new images). However we humans can develop new universal ideas (any new idea in mathematics or logic or philosophy) so there must be a faculty, similar to Imagination, but one which follows a series of apodictic (or set truth rules) to create thoughts: let us name this faculty Reason.

5. Since the classification of objective-universal and subjective-particular ideas has been covered, as well as true and false ideas, we have no other category of ideas to explain. By this we may conclude that no other "original" faculty (a faculty which produces new ideas/conceptions) exists. We then have Sensation (Empirical - True to a large degree); Imagination (Fantasy - False (or can't be verified as true by this faculty alone)); and Reason (Logical - True by its nature). With only the last being the one capable of dealing exclusively with universal ideas.

6. By no combination and then division are we capable of coming up with universal ideas; we can only do so by evolving universal ideas or combining them (but we require them before-hand). So we may calculate the area of a square, or the derivative of an equation but cannot forcefully combine concepts creating a square-circle. So any ideas of combined universal ideas we possess cannot be through any human faculty.

7. By the definitions set in the rules God is transcendental and thereby above the faculty of sensation. He also possess the qualities of greatness and excellence. All qualities, regardless of their being positive and negative, are in themselves universal, and are only "understood" as subjective concepts. We do not know what "goodness" is outside of an example of such.

Thus by wearing our condom we are protected from disease which would lead us to self delusion. Before you go on, think on these individual points, do they not make sense? Are they not certainly true? Think of them without any prejudices before moving forward and form a decision on the points.

Pot + Steroids = God

Let's start with the mellow pot. Let us lay out our argument in premise-conclusion before we explain its various tiers. For this we'll use a logical formula where we show an assumption is contradictory to prove the opposite.

Assm: God does not exist.
Lem 1: The idea of God is false (is a fantasy).
Lem 2: The idea of God has been imagined*.
*By virtue of our above principles where false ideas or unprovable ideas are solely from the Imagination faculty.
Lem 3: [By virtue of Lem 1 &2 and above principles] The idea of God has been formed by combining other ideas, is subjective, and is limited by sense parameters.
Lem 4: Lem 3 is false.
Con 1: God does not exist is a false statement.
Con 2: God exists is a true statement.

The argument is based on some of the basic truths we read above and some other details which we may explain now. Thereby we come to the Steroid section where we will elucidate the concepts presented here and show our conclusions beyond any doubt. We started with an asserted assumption, and so I will show each principle in turn. The brackets refer to the principles above.

Lem 1. This is self-evident. If an Object-in-Itself does not exist as Reality, then obviously its representation in a fantasy and is not true. By true we mean that its truth-marker (the object) is false and the idea does not represent reality. [2][3]

Lem 2. This is a bit tricky, but do not be deceived. Instead of imagination we could say fantasy or any other word. We have simply defined this faculty as Imagination [3]. We also know that this is the only faculty which gives false or unprovable ideas [5][6], and thereby if an idea is false or a fantasy, then it must be an idea of Imagination.

Lem 3. This is also simply a definition, one that we have shown is necessarily characteristic of such a faculty. [1][3][4]

Lem 4. *pulls up socks* This is the one we have to focus a bit more energy on. We need to deal with two concepts: God's being, and His qualities, and show the inherent connection of these two elements. First of all God, by definition, cannot be imagined [6] because all Imagination is bound by sense parameters, whilst God is not [3][4][5][7]. This also makes sense because unlike a "pink unicorn" which has a distinctive shape and color and sound which can be explained and communicated and can be imagined as a similar concept by all, God has no taste, smell, shape that we can comprehend and the word "God" is only made coherent by understanding Him through His qualities and His Being. Precisely because He is not understood through sensible thoughts (just as pure math and logic are not (no smell of 2+2=4)) He could not have been Imagined due to principles already explained above. [3][4]

This is aided by the fact that we say that God possess absolute greatness and excellence, as part of His essence. It is not that God is good because He does great or good deeds, but His essence is that of the universal concepts of excellence and grace [7]. We are not justifying God through only these principles (as the classic Ontological argument) but skilfully showing its truth by first, independently, of Being through an impossibility of cognition through Imagination. [7]

You see what this argument shows is that with a correct understanding of the human mind, and of God's essence, His existence is shown ontologically by His very definition. By differentiating Being and Essence and showing the universality of both (they are by definition universal) and thereby they cannot be imagined, which means they are not fantasies, we show that the idea of His existence cannot be false, but is rather innate and true. I only ask that readers remember the above principles well.

Thus an all excellent God exists.
tejretics

Con

Introduction

Pro has the full BoP to uphold that "ontology necessitates God's existence." Let's first analyze his burden. Pro's burden is to prove that ontology makes the existence of God "necessary." Necessary existence -- in the modal sense -- refers to existence in all possible worlds. What is a "possible world?" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains, “Most of us also believe that things, as a whole, needn't have been just as they are. Rather, things might have been different in countless ways, both trivial and profound. History, from the very beginning, could have unfolded quite other than it did in fact: The matter constituting a distant star might never have organized well enough to give light; species that survived might just as well have died off; battles won might have been lost; children born might never have been conceived and children never conceived might otherwise have been born. In any case, no matter how things had gone they would still have been part of a single, maximally inclusive, all-encompassing situation, a single world. Intuitively, then, the actual world . . . is . . . one among many possible worlds.” [1]


According to S5 modal logic, if (and only if) A exists in any possible world B, it is metaphysically possible for A to exist. If A exists in one or more (but not all) possible worlds, then we can say -- A and ~A are both metaphysically possible. The world that we exist in -- in which “objective existence” is possible -- is referred to as the “actual world,” represented as ‘M’. If A exists in the actual world, but not in all possible worlds (one or more), then A is “contingently existent.” Only if A exists in all possible worlds -- including the actual world -- is A “necessarily existent,” where it is impossible for A to be false. That is necessary existence. [2]

Thus, it is insufficient if Pro demonstrates the existence of God in the actual world. Pro must be able to demonstrate the existence of God as necessary, as result of ontology.

Citations

Pro doesn’t have any sources. All 7 of Pro’s references are not cited. There is no accessible reference given by Pro. As such, I have to treat every argument of Pro’s -- every statement -- a bare assertion.


What is God?

The “God” as defined in Round 1 is very unclear. It is a vague definition. Let me analyze each of God’s attributes, and attempt to make a coherent formation as to what “God” is.


Transcendent - This definition is stressed upon. To be “transcendent” entails the question: transcendent to what? I can only presume Pro means transcendent to reality, which means God is separate from all of reality, therefore is not physical.

Sentient - “Sentience” refers to the ability to feel or perceive subjectively. The God that Pro talks of, thus, should be able to feel/perceive in a subjective sense. Once more, a question entails: feels/perceives what? There must be something besides God transcendent to the universe for the idea of God as described to be coherent.

Excellence/Greatness - Both of these terms seem subjective. But all subjective terms require a standard: God cannot be “great,” unless God is compared with something else that is seen as being “less great,” or “less excellent.” But God is transcendent, therefore cannot have a standard within the universe. Once more, Pro has to demonstrate a being apart from this singular deity sans the universe.

Relevance

When it comes to actually proving that ontology necessitates God’s existence, I found Pro’s argument to be lacking of relevance, and being quite weak. The argument that leads to the conclusion can be formalized:

P1. ???
P2. Ontology proves the existence of God in the actual world
C. Therefore, ontology necessitates God’s existence

There is no plausible way in which P2 entails the conclusion, and only P2 is defended. The reductio ad absurdum, therefore, fails to affirm the resolution in any way.

Cognitivism of God

What does “having a conception of God” mean? Pro is very unclear -- of course we can conceive of “God,” just as we can conceive of a Flying Spaghetti Monster. But it seems Pro is meaning a deeper form of “conception,” which involves something beyond people telling others tales. No human would have conceived of a Flying Spaghetti Monster had other humans not spread the idea. Pro seems to claim that the same is true with God. Pro’s warrant -- if humans do not intrinsically conceive of God, then the idea of God would be meaningless. The argument is basically:

P1) If humans do not intrinsically conceive of God, the idea of God would be meaningless
P2) ???
C. Humans intrinsically conceive of God

Pro fails to fill the sizable gap between the first premise and the conclusion. Pro fails to justify that the term “God” is actually coherent, and fails to account for theological non-cognitivism as a position. As long as non-cognitivism is logically possible, this premise fails. I will now defend theological non-cognitivism, thus significantly weakening Pro’s argument. All attributes of God are secondary and relational attributes. God is defined as being a “transcendent, sentient deity who goes beyond the limits of empirical cognition, possessing excellence and greatness.” All of these attributes are secondary attributes or relational attributes.

Take, for example, the idea of a rabbit. A person doesn’t know what a rabbit is. So, he asks the other person, “What is a rabbit?” The other person replies, “40 lbs.” A rabbit being without any attributes except the relational attribute “40lbs” is an incoherent entity. A rabbit which has only that definition is incoherent, therefore attributing existence to it is impossible. For a rabbit to have any coherence, it would have to be clearly defined, with the structure of it from fur, muscles, tissue, organs, its characteristic epiglottis, etc. The same can’t be done with God -- since then God can be imagined. All God is defined as is equivalent to a rabbit being “40 lbs.” It lacks any cognitivism. [3]

Ad infinitum

Pro’s reductio ad absurdum would prove the existence of not one, but an infinite regression of transcendent entities. This is demonstrated in my counter reductio ad absurdum:

A: The idea of any entity that cannot be imagined is true (assumption)
1) The idea of transcendent entity ‘B’, which cannot be imagined, is true
2) The idea of transcendent entity ‘C’, which cannot be imagined, is true
Infinity) The idea of entity “...” which cannot be imagined is true
P1) There is an infinite regression of entities which cannot be imagined
P2) An infinite regression of entities is incoherent
C. A entails a contradiction, therefore A is false

1, 2, ∞, and P1 all follow from A. Most philosophers agree that P1 is true. An “actual infinite” is metaphysically incoherent, as demonstrated by Hilbert’s Hotel and similar paradoxes. [4] Thus, the argument is false (since A is false).

R: Ontological Argument

Now, onto the actual ontological argument. I have objections to some of the lemmas, that I shall outline below.

“Lem. 1: The idea of God . . . is a fantasy.”

Pro is very unclear as to what they mean by “fantasy.” There’s no coherent definition given to me, by either Pro or by any encyclopedias/dictionaries of philosophy. Until Pro brings some coherence to this lemma, it remains meaningless, as far as the debate is concerned.

“Lem. 2: The idea of God has been imagined.”

The lemma basically attempts to defend the proposition: If A is false, then A is imagined. This is false. Consider the idea that “colorless green ideas sleep furiously.” It is false (incoherent), but it isn’t necessarily imaginative. We can’t imagine the idea, but we know it is (1) an idea, and (2) false. There are multiple other ideas that are false, but not necessarily imaginative. Otherwise, the premise would basically be: All simple ideas are true (considering the fourth premise, which states simple ideas can’t be imagined). Incoherent ideas escape that proposition. A being that I deem to be “40 lbs” can’t be imagined, but doesn’t exist. Similarly, an entity “zxc,” defined as “abc,” does not exist, but cannot be imagined.

“Lem. 4: Lemma 3 is false.”

Imagination can yield ideas independent of senses. What is “imagination?” “To imagine something is to form a particular sort of mental representation of that thing. Imagining is typically distinguished from mental states such as perceiving, remembering and believing in that imagining S does not require (that the subject consider) S to be or have been the case, whereas the contrasting states do. It is distinguished from mental states such as desiring or anticipating in that imagining S does not require that the subject wish or expect S to be the case, whereas the contrasting states do. It is also sometimes distinguished from mental states such as conceiving and supposing, on the grounds that imagining S requires some sort of quasi-sensory or positive representation of S, whereas the contrasting states do not.” [5] Thus, the idea of 5+7=12 or i is actually imagined, since there is some positive representation of 5+7=11. Similarly, atoms are imagined, despite the fact that our sensory experience does not intervene within it.

The argument fails for the above reasons. Vote Con.

--


Sources:

1. http://goo.gl...

2. http://goo.gl...

3. http://goo.gl...

4. https://goo.gl...

5. http://plato.stanford.edu...
Debate Round No. 2
Ajabi

Pro

This debate has (quicker than is normal) been reduced to a series of misunderstandings. Rather than any form of engaging argumentation, this has become a mess. I shall, in my round try to show why, whilst I will also justify my argument against the Hon. Con's attacks and semantics.

To explain my order, in each category, a summary of Con's points are denoted by "Rubric (Rb)" followed by a number, and in that order they are answered. Each sub-answers of a Rb will be denoted by "Epicheirima (Ep)". Each rebuttal is denoted as "S" for ease.

For the sake of consistency I ask that: a. all propositions not attakced by my opponent be taken as correct; b. my opponent cannot make new attacks in the next round (as it is the last), and he must only keep to these. I shall in my last round mention all the principles not attacked by my opponent.

S1. Dogs can fly, ergo the moon is made of cheese: Definitions & Modal Logic

Rb 1.
Necessity is to be defined as by modal logic, specifically understood through S5 Lewisian Modal Logic.

Ep 1. My opponent cannot furnish his own definition of "necessity" (choosing that of the formal-logic modal sense). He accepted this debate, with its rules as outlined in Round 1, where necessity was defined as "Makes necessary, when I talk about necessitating God I make it clear that the argument must prove that God exists." This means that the debate only focuses on "God existing" while not making a distinction of "this or that possible world".

Ep 2. It is clear that Con does not have any sense of Modal Logic. Not to be rude, but it is slightly comical that Con mentions S5 since the S5 system (through Axiom K, T) actually proves that if something is "necessary in one possible world, hence it is necessary in all possible worlds"(1) In fact the quote Con provides is actually the argument justifying this axiom. The reasoning he quotes is the informal reasoning speaking against the contradictory of the S5 system. The system actually says that if I prove the existence of God in any one "possible" world then I prove the existence of God (or any other universal proposition) in every possible world.(2) This is also shown in Con's own citation in the 6th part: "Possible World Semantics".

S2. Where's Waldo: Citations

Rb 1. Pro does not give any references to the citations given denoted in "[]".

Ep 1. A careful reading of my argument will show that all citations as "[]" are in-argument citations and refer to the 7 principles I give in the pre-requisites. In the previous round, the last line before the explanations of the lemma reads: "The brackets refer to the principles above." I apologize if this was not clear. Citations of "()" have been referenced to outside sources. In fact unlike Con who has simply linked entire articles (and as S1 would suggest without reading them) all my citations include the exact place where I want readers to look.

S3. Wer ist Gott?

Rb 1. The definition provided of God is vague, with a follow up explanation of the definition according to Con.

Ep 1. I feel I should mention that this definition was given to Con before the debate started and he should have objected to it before accepting the debate. In fact, Con insisted on having the definition the way it is present right now.

Ep 2. It is depressing that my "principles" were not engaged with at all, and Con seems to want to run a parallel case; I ask the voters to take this into consideration. By transcendence I have already specified [7] that God is transcendent of the "physical" not of "all reality" as Con asserts. This is the definition of transcendence used in all of philosophy.(3)

Ep 3. Con must justify his controversial statement that "sentience refers to the ability to perceive subjectively". Sentience simply entails intelligence which is defined as being able to perceive, and manipulate those perceptions. God, by His definition, would possess universal sentience. He would perceive the entire universe, as it actually is and not in a subjective manner.

Ep 4. As I have mentioned in [7], humans are limited to think of qualities in terms of comparison, as humans think of math using symbols. These are weaknesses of the human minds, but qualities in their "essence" have a distinct definition: it is not necessary for humans to be able to understand it. These essences, like all definitions and essences are by their nature concrete. My opponent seems to be a solipisist and deny any mind-independent reality, something he will have to prove. This is agreed upon, near unanimously, by all philosophers.(4)

S4. Straw and Hay: Relevance

Rb 1.
Pro's argument is not relevant, and goes from existence in "actuality" to existence in "possibility"

Ep 1. This argument is a convulated one, and does not make much sense to me. In any case the problem of "actuality" and "possibility" was answered in S1. This argument is a red herring and in fact "it" has no relevance in this debate.

S5. Why is a raven like a writing desk?: Cognitivism of God

Rb 1. Pro is unclear by what "conception of God" means and fails to prove "that the term "God" is actually coherent".

Rb 2. A reduction of what seems to be Pro's argument is presented; Pro's argument is not valid (as in the premises do not justify the conclusion) for there is a "sizeable gap" in the argument.

Rb 3. The conception of a "flying spaghetti monster" is similar.

Ep 1. It seems to me that Con has completely over looked the entirety of my principles. He has not engaged my argument by directly quoting even once. In fact his entire round is full of strawman's and this is no exception. The conception of God as pointed out by [1][2][7] is the "representation of the object" here being God. The coherent of the term is shown by it meaning meaningful, for incoherent terms (such as 3jwepfkn) are not meaningful, as also Wittgenstein's 4th thesis proves.(5)

Ep 2. The reduction of mya argument is a straw-man. Again my argument has been presented as a deductive argument in my round as per the rules of formal logic(2b.). The explanation of connection has also been strenghtened by my analysis and epecially by my connecting principles[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]. Con fails to show why this is a valid reduction...

Ep 3. I already mentioned why a spaghetti monster (or my example of a unicorn) is not a valid analogy.[1][3][4][5] I also showed this in Lem 4. Again as per our understanding of Imagination [2][3], a unicorn or a monster has a visual image, a taste, a smell which can be communicated. These representations are bound by sense experience while God by definition is not. You cannot compare apples with oranges...or in this case celery.

S6. To Infinity & Beyond: Ad Infinitum

Rb 1.
Pro's argument would prove the existence of an infinity of such beings, which is impossible.

Ep 1. I ask the readers not to be fooled by Con's style. His argument depends on the assertion that my argument proves multiple beings, not the way he has phrased it. It is true, indeed I admit it, that my argument can prove a number of beings (possibly infinite) who fulfill the criteria listed in my argument as presented in the previous round. Mainly that a. their idea exists in cognition, b. said idea cannot be imagined. And why oh why should it not? After all a deductive argument is meant to be universal. If a conception exists in cognition and could not be imagined then, by God, it is true!

Ep 2. This still doesn't prove Con's argument. My argument simply allows any idea which fills the requirement to prove itself as true, there is no evidence to suggest that an infinite number of such ideas exist. In fact. my opponent wants to suggest that no such ideas exist...It is a funny time indeed. In fact I dare Con to name 4 such transcendental ideas or dieties which do not contradict each other. He won't be able to. Just because something is possible does not mean it necessarily happens. Con's argument is invalid.

Ep 3. By now the honest reader would have noted that Con has given a lot of assertions, but has not actually engaged with me, nor has he actually proven anything. Even this argument he leaves to be proven by a citation. This is not how debates work, he cannot simply citate "[4]" but must write down the argument in support of his rebuttal.

SR. The Argument Itself: the Ontological Argument

Rb 1.
Pro is unclear in defining "fantasy".

Rb 2. Pro defends the proposition: "if A is false, then A is imagined"

Rb 3. Pro claims: "all simple ideas are true"

Rb 4. "A being I deem "40 lbs" can't be imagined, but doesn't exist" - Pro claims it should

Rb 5. Con provides a definition of "Imagination" and then states that "5+7=11" is actually imagined.

Ep 1. I feel like my round went unread. In my principles [3][4] I explicitly defined imagination and fantasy.

Ep 2. Con makes another strawman, I only talk about "ideas" not the entirety of possible As. The example given is not of an idea, but of a proposition.

Ep 3. I don't recall using the term "simple idea" at all. Con will have to define his terms for me to be able to respond.

Ep 4. Con makes a logical mistake. I stated that "all imaginative ideas are false or unprovable" not that "all false or unprovable ideas are imaginative". The both are not equivalent.

Ep 5. I gave the logic of my definition of imagination in my principles [3], Con gives no reason why we should accept his instead, and appeals to authority. In fact his definition supports my case because it states: "S requires some sort of quasi-sensory or positive representation of S". So Con admits that imagination requires some form of sensory perception...? That would concede the debate...

(1)https://en.wikipedia.org...(modal_logic) [Please look at the "Applications" section for the quote from Platinga]
(2)Introduction to Logic by Harry J. Gensler; Modal Logic Chapter; b.Propositional Logic
(3)http://tinyurl.com...;
(4)https://en.wikipedia.org...;
(5)Tractus-Logico by Ludwig Wittgenstein; Main Thesis 4 (also found in wikipedia here: https://en.wikipedia.org...)
tejretics

Con

I'm dropping the semantics on "necessary."

Consistency

(1) "[A]ll propositions not attacked by my opponent . . . [are] taken as correct" - I agree with this, assuming I don't address those propositions in this round either, since this is Round 3 - therefore I can argue in this round (this isn't the final round).

(2) "[M]y opponent cannot make new [arguments] in the next round . . . as it is the last . . . he must only keep to these" - Round 4 is the last round, not this one, therefore I am free to make new arguments in this round. I don't need to "only keep to these," as this is *not* the last round, as Pro asserts.

What is God?

"I feel I should mention that this definition was given to Con before the debate started and he should have objected to it before accepting the debate. In fact, Con insisted on having the definition the way it is present right now."

> I'm not objecting to the definition. The definition is vague - I am *expanding* on the vague definition, since it's quite unclear what some of the terms mean.

"It is depressing that my principles were not engaged with at all, and Con seems to want to run a parallel case; I ask the voters to take this into consideration."

> I can still implicitly engage the principles in this round -- it is not the last round, allowing me to do so. Further, the only principle that I find to be a bare assertion is Principle 7, since it isn't clearly justified.

> I concede the definition of "transcendence," as God being transcendent from the physical.

"Con must justify his controversial statement that 'sentience refers to the ability to perceive subjectively'. Sentience simply entails intelligence which is defined as being able to perceive, and manipulate those perceptions. God, by His definition, would possess universal sentience. He would perceive the entire universe, as it actually is and not in a subjective manner."

> The definition of sentience is "the ability to feel, perceive, or experience subjectively." [1] I have already justified this. But Pro's definition seems to match mine anyway -- perceiving the objective universe is a subjective form of perception. This isn't really that relevant.

"[H]umans are limited to think of qualities in terms of comparison, as humans think of math using symbols. These are weaknesses of the human minds, but qualities in their "essence" have a distinct definition: it is not necessary for humans to be able to understand it. These essences, like all definitions and essences are by their nature concrete. My opponent seems to be a solipisist and deny any mind-independent reality, something he will have to prove. This is agreed upon, near unanimously, by all philosophers."

> All of this -- and point 7 -- is a bare assertion. Pro gives us no reason to actually believe that "excellence" and "greatness" have objective definitions. Further, if we buy this, we can also buy claims such as "the laws of logic are limited to human cognition, but there are things beyond cognition," et cetera and negate all logic. Such a kritik is explicitly prohibited by Rule 6, since this basically deconstructs all of logic, thus is "deconstructional" in nature.

Cognitivism of God

Pro's subdivisions that try to make a tl;dr of my argument are straw-men. Let me address this individually.

"A reduction of what seems to be Pro's argument is presented; Pro's argument is not valid (as in the premises do not justify the conclusion) for there is a "sizeable gap" in the argument."

> This is not a reduction of *Pro's entire argument,* this is what justifications have been given for the claim "we . . . have a conception of God." There is a sizable gap in the justification of *that,* not the entire argument.

"The conception of a "flying spaghetti monster" is similar."

> Straw-man. I did not claim the conception of FSM is similar to God -- I said it is *not similar.* I said, it's obvious that conception is beyond merely thinking of that being, it is intrinsic conception: humans don't have such a conception of an FSM. I used the FSM as an example of something we "conceive of" without intrinsically conceiving of it.

Furthermore:

> Pro *drops* non-cognitivism. All he says is "incoherent terms . . . are not meaningful." But the proposition "colorless green ideas sleep furiously" has meaning, but is still incoherent. Similarly, I argue that God has as much meaning as a rabbit defined as "4 lbs." Pro *drops* this.

Ad infinitum

This isn't a rebuttal -- this is an *offensive argument* against the structure of Pro's argumentation. This is addressed as though it is circular, but this argument is meant to attack the conclusion; it is an offense, not a defense. With this, I'm trying to prove (1) Pro's argument entails infinite entities, (2) infinite entities cannot exist, (3) therefore Pro's argument is false.

"My argument simply allows any idea which fills the requirement to prove itself as true, there is no evidence to suggest that an infinite number of such ideas exist."

> Error. Pro's argument would *necessitate* infinite such entities. Consider the following:

1) The idea of God #1 is true, as it cannot be imagined, thus is not false
2) Apply reductio once more: the idea of God #2 is true
Infinity) Et cetera

"[W]rite down the argument in support of . . . [the] rebuttal."

> Pro fails to warrant why I must do so.

> I will do so, nonetheless. Hilbert's Hotel basically states that successive addition to an infinite is impossible. Take, for example, a hotel. There are infinite rooms in the hotel. Infinite people come to the hotel to stay. This entails two propositions:

a. All rooms in the hotel are filled [infinite rooms, equal number of people]
b. There are infinite empty rooms in the hotel

(A) and (B) entail a contraction, therefore infinity is contradictory.

--

Now, onto the actual argument.

“Con makes another strawman, I only talk about "ideas" not the entirety of possible As. The example given is not of an idea, but of a proposition.”

> This doesn’t significantly impact my argument. Let ‘A’ represent an idea, in that case. Thus, it isn’t a straw man.

> The example of “xghsx” is not a proposition -- it is an idea. This idea is incoherent, therefore is false, but can’t be imagined.

“I don't recall using the term "simple idea" at all. Con will have to define his terms for me to be able to respond.”

> I apologize for not defining “simple idea.” A “simple idea” is an idea that can’t be imagined.

“Con makes a logical mistake. I stated that "all imaginative ideas are false or unprovable" not that "all false or unprovable ideas are imaginative". The both are not equivalent.”

> Error: Pro does make the claim that “all false or unprovable ideas are imaginative.” Let me quote Pro from Round 2: “[F]alse ideas or unprovable ideas are solely from the Imagination faculty.” Another quote: “All of these ideas though clearly require other ideas and are built by various connections, for how else do we arrive at these fantasies? All of our fantasies have limits of senses (we may experience various tastes, sounds) which may in turn arouse feelings but nothing more. This means we cannot fantasize concepts which are universal or completely devoid of sensations.” Pro also claims that “[imagination] is the only faculty which gives false or unprovable ideas.”

“I gave the logic of my definition of imagination in my principles, Con gives no reason why we should accept his instead, and appeals to authority. In fact his definition supports my case because it states: "S requires some sort of quasi-sensory or positive representation of S". So Con admits that imagination requires some form of sensory perception...? That would concede the debate.”

> A “positive representation” does not equal a sensory perception. A positive representation merely means some way of conceiving S as a body, e.g. imagining the color green, or imagining an atom. When we “imagine an atom,” we don’t require sensory perception.

> Pro doesn’t give any reason to think God can’t be imagined outside of their definition. Pro just defines imagination in principle 3, without justifying it.

Conclusion: Pro *drops* the actual “40lbs” and non-cognitivism argument, which is key to the essential premise of Pro’s that concludes “God is an idea in cognition.” I have shown that the idea of God is meaningless, but Pro merely picks parts of this argument of his choosing (e.g. the irrelevant bit about the FSM) and tries to refute it.

Therefore, vote Con.

1. https://en.wikipedia.org...
Debate Round No. 3
Ajabi

Pro

I thank Tej for his round. Let "Pv" denote positive notes.

SP. Memoirs and Notes

Pv 1.
I ask that the readers read the debate as an organic work, and connect the rounds to the previous ones. In this let us remember that Teja admits to using "semantics" (against rule 6) and quoted references (Modal S5 logic) without understanding the concept or even reading his own source which agrees with me. He also did this with his definition of "imagination" as I will elaborate again. He is clearly hiding behind sources.

Pv 2. Similarly there are many arguments with Con drops such as: the majority of my principles other than the definition of "imagination" (though he no longer claims it is vague or questions "fantasy") and parts of my 7th principle. As such my other principles ought to be taken as de facto true. Another concession is the deductive nature of the argument.

Pv 3. An important aspect is the debate of "simple ideas". Con has defined, on my request, simple ideas as "ideas that cannot be imagined" while he states in his original round that my argument should be (to avoid contradiction): "Otherwise, the premise would basically be:" " All simple ideas are true (considering the fourth premise, which states simple ideas can’t be imagined)." This means Con wants my argument to read: "Ideas that cannot be imagined are true" and admits that this avoids any contradiction regarding his imagination rebuttals. A careful reading of my argument shows that this is exactly what I said. Con has, himself shown, that his rebuttal was based on a straw-man, for what he says my argument should read as to avoid contradiction is exactly what my argument reads as. This effectively concedes the majority of most of Con's arguments as I shall point out below.

Pv 4. Con has, in his round, given references, not to support his argument as they should be used but rather as external parts of his argument. This is not the way references are given, and arguments should be self-sufficient with references only used to elucidate. He mentions "Hilbert's Hotel" without explaining it or how it applies in his argument just as he gave definitions without showing their relevance.

Pv 5. Con concedes the definition of "transcendence" as I gave it. Also Lem 4. has not been attacked which means Con agrees to it, and the explanation and connections made therein ought to be taken as true (for they were not objected to).

Pv 6. A principle of logic states that if A then B cannot be written as not A, then not B. In example: if good grades, then a psp does not logically entail that bad grades = no psp. Parents could take pity on the child, after all. Similarly "false ideas are from imagination" and "imagination leads to false and subjective ideas" does in no way entail that all false ideas are imagined, it states that all false ideas in cognition are imagined. If something is not in cognition i.e.. that it is not meaningful, then it is not a subject of the mind and has no relation to it. All ideas that are in cognition are meaningful (they make sense) even if they are false as I showed in my round, and by giving further reference to Wittgenstein's 4th thesis which was not attacked by Con.

Pv 7. Let's understand a definition. Let the definition be: "S requires some sort of quasi-sensory or positive representation of S". Surely if someone explains this as (as Con does in the last round): "A positive representation merely means some way of conceiving S as a body, e.g. imagining the color green, or imagining an atom." then this means that S is understood or represented through (I quote) "a body". Is this not congruent to saying that all ideas of Imagination clearly require other ideas and (as I say in [3] my original definition): 'we cannot fantasize concepts which are universal or completely devoid of sensations." By the earlier Pv 3. & this Con *has* conceded the definition of imagination, which was essential to his entire case. This only proves that Con's case is, as I have said, self-contradictory and muddled.

Pv 8. Con completely drops the argument entitled "Relevance" which seems logical since it based itself on the misinterpretation of logic as detailed above. [Pv 1.][S1]

I have re-stated these principles for the ease of the readers and myself. We ought to see the debate as a whole, for only then can progress be made. By using these principles in my (what would seem to be short) refutations below I hope to address Con's arguments as they have been presented in both rounds and engage successfully. I do not wish to misrepresent Con's arguments and for this reason I have spent space to do this. The refutations may seem short because I will quote the principles above as the fundamental theses and only connect them below. Lastly since a debate (even if Pro has the BoP) is based on appraising arguments of both sides, I hope the Hon. Readers will take the concessions and paradoxes of Con's case above into consideration. I hope in this I have not upset Con, I have the utmost respect for his as a debater, I hope only to evolve this debate to better elucidate both positions. The above principle are also positive attacks Con must answer independently.

S3.1 Wer ist Gott?

Rb 1.
Con accepts the definition of transcendence, and states he only disagrees with [7].

Rb 2. Con re-asserts that "sentience" implies "subjective perception" while stating Pro agrees.

Rb 3. Principle 7 is invalid, goes against rule 6, and deconstructs all of logic.

Ep 1. With "transcendence" now understood, [7] will be discussed below.

Ep 2. I do not agree with that in the least! As I show [S3;Ep3] God's perception would be objective, by definition. Con provides no evidence to the contrary, but this contention doesn't matter alot-here I agree with Con.

Ep 3. I don't see how rule 6 applies, I'm not throwing rotten tomatoes (their being thrown at me...ouch Wylted). Actually Con is trying to deconstruct all logic and state that the "laws of logic are limited to human cognition". As I show in [7][S3;Ep4](4) "humans may understand essence through comparison" but essence itself is objective. Con is trying to deny mind-independent reality. There is no engagement with my analysis, Con only makes assertions. After all "goodness-in-itself" is different from doing a good act, and essence by nature of any quality is objective (this is analytic and self evident).(4)

S5.1 Why is a raven like a writing desk?: Cognitivism of God

Rb 1.
Con re-asserts his reduction and states now there is a "gap" in "we have a conception of God".

Rb 2. Following the above Rb, Con states that humans do not have a conception of FSM and that it is an "intrinsic conception". Con gives a "proposition" which does not fit into Pro's model.

Rb 3. Con states that Pro drops this argument (and also again in the Conclusion)

Ep 1. Earlier [S5;Ep1][1][2][7] I already explain how "a conception of God" is coherent because the idea is meaningful. I especially explain this again, in depth, in Pv 6. above to which I would refer my readers. (The Wittgenstein part especially as well as [S5;Ep1][5]).

Ep 2. Con has not defined "intrinsic conception" now or before and so I really do not understand this point. A reading of Con's analysis will show each sentence contradicts the one earlier (especially in the preceding rounds).

Ep 3. I have answered all of Con's points (in the most efficient way possible...literally). His non-cognitivism bases itself on the "gap" in Rb1 which he never proved, but I have still enunciated on. [Pv 3.][Pv 7.] As for God being an "empty definition" I already show in Lem 4. (which was never analysed) that I discuss God's Being and Essence differently. This fulfills the onus of the definition of God agreed upon, of course I don't have to show we can think of God as we do of a rabbit, that would negate my whole case.

S6.1 To Infinity & Beyond: Ad Infinitum

Rb 1. Con clarifies his burden by stating it is his duty to show: "(1) Pro's argument entails infinite entities, (2) infinite entities cannot exist, (3) therefore Pro's argument is false."

Rb 2. A basic explanation of Hilbert's Hotel (where a. and b. are contradictory) and assertion that "Pro's argument *necessitates* infinite such beings".

Ep 1.
It's good that Con has clarified his burden for us, it is a heavy one. As anyone who reads this and then Con's argument can tell, he fails at both (1) and (3).

Ep 2. As I have already stated [S6;Ep1-3] Con doesn't elucidate his claims. The refutation I gave remains unchallenged and so works. I have again explain this above, and I refer to [Pv 4,6]. My argument "allows" as many beings who fulfill the criteria to exist, as all deductive arguments work. I asked Con to name a few such beings, he has not, for they would be self-contradictory. Con failed to address any of this.


SR.1 The Argument Itself: the Ontological Argument

Rb 1.
Con concedes his argument was originally a straw-man and amends "A" to only ideas. States that "xghsx" is not a proposition, it is an idea.

Rb 2. Defines "simple idea" and speaks more about imagination and its definition by quoting Pro.

Rb 3. Questions again why God cannot be imagined.

Ep 1. This functions on a logical inconsistency that I have detailed before in [SR] as well as now [Pv 6]. "xghsx" is not meaningful, and so not in our model.

Ep 2. As clearly shown in Pv 3. here Con concedes his entire case. There is detail in Pv 7.

Ep 3. It is not just definition, it is being. Con has conceded this by Rb 2. I have given detail in Pv 3. and Pv 7. as well as in [Lem 3,4] which was never answered. In fact the original, unchallenged principles [Pv 2.] still work [2][3][4][5].

The thesis stands.

P.S. I apologize for making all of you refer back again and again, but this proves to be efficient (for it makes the debate organic). I thank Con for a rigorous debate. I thank the voters and readers for their patience, I hope we have not bored you.

tejretics

Con

== Overviews ==

(1) I did not break the rules, since I didn't admit to using "deconstructional semantics." I did not use any of these *at all.* This is false. Discredit this assertion. (2) If I am able to refute any part of the argument, the argument fails. Thus, I needn't attack everything Pro has said in this debate. (3) I don't understand what Pro means. My imagination rebuttals would still stand if Pro justifies that "all that is not imagined is true." Pro just straw-mans me at this point. According to Pro, "[W]hat he says my argument should read as to avoid contradiction is exactly what my argument reads as." I didn't say *anything of the sort.* I said the argument *does* read like that. (4) I explained Hilbert's hotel clearly in Round 3. (5) I concede Lem. 4. (6) Once more, Pro fails to recall what I said. Pro *clearly* says, "False ideas or unprovable ideas are solely from the imagination faculty," and "All our fantasies have limits of senses." Pro defines "fantasy" as a "false thing," essentially. Which means, Pro *does* say that everything false is imaginative. (7) Pro is claiming that neutrinos, dark energy, and atoms are not devoid of sensations. Pro fails to justify this claim. (8) The "relevance" argument rested upon a modal definition of "necessary."

== Rebuttal ==

(1) Non-cognitivism

*So* many straw-men, at this point. I said the FSM is *not an intrinsic conception.* Pro keeps missing every time I mentioned "not." Also, I already defined what an "intrinsic conception" was: something that is conceived that is in cognition *independent of experience or word of mouth.* Further, my non-cognitivism does not depend on the gap. All my non-cognitivism depends on is God lacking any primary attributes, and only having relational or secondary attributes. Pro concedes that God lacks any primary attributes, and concedes that God is only as cognitively meaningful as a rabbit defined as "40lbs." Let me summarize the argument:

(A) Pro fails to justify that God is cognitively meaningful. That is the "gap" in the argument. I did mention that Pro just *assumes* God is meaningful and coherent. The argument in justification of the premise "we have a conception of God" is basically:

P1) If humans do not intrinsically conceive of God, the idea of God would be meaningless
P2) ???
C. Humans intrinsically conceive of God

The P2 is -- implicitly -- "the idea of God is not meaningless," since modus tollens is the only valid deductive way to continue this argument. Pro fails to justify that "God" is meaningful.

(B) Drop. I argued that (a) to be meaningful, one should have an adequate description, like that of a normal rabbit, and (b) God does not possess such a description; lacks any cognitive meaningfulness. All of this is completely dropped.

This is what I meant by "dropping the argument." Pro drops non-cognitivism's essence -- that God is not cognitively meaningful. He just focuses on the FSM, the gap, and other things that are irrelevant to the core of this argument. Extend these points. God is not cognitively meaningful, therefore humans lack conception of God.

(2) Ad infinitum

I did address the claim that Pro's argument just allows infinite entities. First, it was a bare assertion in itself. Second, we can just replace the word "God" with "God #2" and "God #3," and go on and on. The *same logic* applies to infinite of the same "God," since it would still deductively follow that ontology necessitates infinite gods. The argument:

Assm: God does not exist.
Lem 1: The idea of God is false (is a fantasy).
Lem 2: The idea of God has been imagined*.
*By virtue of our above principles where false ideas or unprovable ideas are solely from the Imagination faculty.
Lem 3: [By virtue of Lem 1 &2 and above principles] The idea of God has been formed by combining other ideas, is subjective, and is limited by sense parameters.
Lem 4: Lem 3 is false.
Con 1: God does not exist is a false statement.
Con 2: God exists is a true statement.

The same can be written with "God #2," who is a second entity with identical attributes, a third entity, and so on, until infinite "Gods" are achieved. (1) Infinity cannot exist. (2) By this argument, infinite gods exist. (3) The argument is false. Pro concedes (2), and I have defended (1), therefore the argument does not work.

(3) The argument

(A) Pro argues that "xghsx" is not meaningful, so is not in our model. I have demonstrated that *God is not meaningful,* a point that isn't even contested by Pro, and, thus, have demonstrated that God does not fit into this model either, and ontology doesn't necessitate God's existence.

(B) Pro still fails to justify that God is a simple idea. So even if all simple ideas are true, there's no reason to think it is impossible to imagine God.

== Conclusion ==

Pro drops non-cognitivism's offense, only addressing its impacts to the specific proposition I was also addressing. Pro also fails to justify that God is a simple idea.

For these reasons, vote Con.

[Note: I don't have much time for this round, and apologize for the briefness.]
Debate Round No. 4
39 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 10 records.
Posted by Insignifica 1 year ago
Insignifica
I don't know if you won or lost this specific debate, as it was too cluttered for me to get past the 3rd round. And yes, I realize this argument is somewhat differently presented from other versions of it, but it's generally the same idea.

Really, though, you should debate epistemology. I would have liked to see your verification principle debate with bsh1 finish out. Same to the epistemic nihilism one with Envisage.
Posted by whiteflame 1 year ago
whiteflame
Ajabi, you asserted that God is meaningful, but I had that to balance against Con's claim that meaning is derived from the ability to adequately describe something. When you're dropping that logic, it leaves me with two choices. Either I subvert that drop to your logic, which was at least addressed (albeit I think you won that exchange), or I give it to Con for the drop. In this case, I decided based on BoP. He introduced enough doubt that I couldn't realistically just buy your case with it present.
Posted by Ajabi 1 year ago
Ajabi
Also this is the first ddo has seen of *this* form of my argument.
Posted by Ajabi 1 year ago
Ajabi
It *is* flawed in the sense it is incomplete. I already know how, but *that* point was never raised.
I won this debate.
I clearly talked about how meaningful concepts differ from propositions and how all meaningful concepts are congitizable. As in they can enter cognition and be dealt with, with the operations we listed in [3]-[6].
You clearly don't get that.
Posted by Insignifica 1 year ago
Insignifica
Maybe you should stop debating the same flawed argument over and over again?

I very much enjoyed your epistemology-related debates. You should go back to doing those.
Posted by Ajabi 1 year ago
Ajabi
I'm so sick and tired of this site.
Posted by Insignifica 1 year ago
Insignifica
"Most of this debate is just a mess."

Yep
Posted by whiteflame 1 year ago
whiteflame
Bleh, one of my less detailed. Seriously, been incredibly busy, got through reading this about 30 minutes ago and started writing.
Posted by tejretics 1 year ago
tejretics
@whiteflame

Thanks so much for the vote and the detailed RFD; I'm going through it atm.
Posted by whiteflame 1 year ago
whiteflame
RFD (Pt. 1):

Alright, I have very little time to post this, but I"ll try to cover what I can.

First, the rules. My view is that Con did directly go against rule six, mainly on the basis that he chose to attack so many definitions and then drop them in the following round. Pro pointed out that several of these definitions were explicitly presented in the opening round, and I view them as distracting from the debate itself. Whether the point was to distract or merely to invite new lines of argumentation seems irrelevant to me when Con is actively conceding these definitions in R3 after challenging them in R2. Thus, the conduct point would go to Pro. However, as this is a Select Winner debate, it will only factor into my decision in two ways: a) if the semantics end up having a substantial effect on the outcome, they will be ignored in favor of Pro, and b) if the debate is really close and hinging on an issue that could swing either way, the voter will favor Pro on this basis.

Most of this debate is just a mess. All of the structural changes to how points were presented just made it more difficult to read, and while I understand why Pro dramatically changed his format in the final round, I disagree that it makes reading more efficient and is more organic to the debate. I think it would have paid dividends for him to just point to the key areas of disagreement, separate them into individual points, and argue them directly. Pointing out all the drops didn"t do much for him, as Con explains that Pro has to prove his entire argument true and not just its individual pieces. Yet Pro ends up spending a great deal of his final round pointing to drops that had long since become irrelevant to the outcome of the debate. Also, changing the titles of arguments in order to have a bit of fun actually ended up confusing me quite a bit as well.
1 votes has been placed for this debate.
Vote Placed by whiteflame 1 year ago
whiteflame
Ajabitejretics
Who won the debate:-Vote Checkmark
Reasons for voting decision: Given in comments.