Total Posts:14|Showing Posts:1-14
Jump to topic:

Economic Justification for War

tabularasa
Posts: 200
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
12/26/2014 9:54:54 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
Two states (A and B) border each other.

State A lacks a resource. The scarcity of this resource will cause the death of 500,000 citizens.

State B has enough of the resource to supply everyone in both states with the resource.

A makes war on B, wins, and gains access to the resource, saving 500,000 lives. 400,000 die in the war. I believe that based only upon these facts, the war may be justified. What say you?
1. I already googled it.

2. Give me an argument. Spell it out. "You're wrong," is not an argument.
Subutai
Posts: 3,262
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
12/27/2014 1:10:47 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
What about a trade?
I'm becoming less defined as days go by, fading away, and well you might say, I'm losing focus, kinda drifting into the abstract in terms of how I see myself.
tabularasa
Posts: 200
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
12/27/2014 1:48:02 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/27/2014 1:10:47 PM, Subutai wrote:
What about a trade?

I'm glad you mentioned that. There are so many possible permutations.

If A and B are inimical, and are competitors on several different levels, would it benefit B to trade with A?

If 400,000 die in the war, and 200,000 are citizens of B, then B would possibly do better to trade with A to prevent weakening its own population by 200,000. If the numerical inputs into the war equation indicate that the outcome of the war is uncertain, B would probably do better to trade with A. However, if B is almost certain it can win the war, and the states are traditionally inimical (and long time competitors philosophically and over resources), B should possibly fight the war, as long as the long term welfare of B will increase as a result of fighting and winning the war.

If A and B are traditionally inimical, then B might be remiss to trade with A. Such trade could strengthen A to the point that B loses leverage over A.

B could possibly trade with A just enough to prevent war, but little enough to still allow A to gradually weaken as a result of insufficient access to the resource. If A needs 100 units of the resource to prevent the deaths of the 500,000, and will go to war if it cannot obtain at least 50 units, then B could trade 60 units with A to prevent B from going to war with A. As long as the trade of the 60 units does not lessen B's total welfare to a greater extent than the war would, and the total welfare of A is weakened by not gaining access to the full 100 units, then B can retain leverage and prevent war. There are so many other possible inputs. The situation is not as simple as this model demonstrates.

Any other permutations you would like to add and demonstrate?
1. I already googled it.

2. Give me an argument. Spell it out. "You're wrong," is not an argument.
twocupcakes
Posts: 2,760
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
12/28/2014 8:50:37 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/27/2014 1:48:02 PM, tabularasa wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:10:47 PM, Subutai wrote:
What about a trade?


I'm glad you mentioned that. There are so many possible permutations.

If A and B are inimical, and are competitors on several different levels, would it benefit B to trade with A?

If 400,000 die in the war, and 200,000 are citizens of B, then B would possibly do better to trade with A to prevent weakening its own population by 200,000. If the numerical inputs into the war equation indicate that the outcome of the war is uncertain, B would probably do better to trade with A. However, if B is almost certain it can win the war, and the states are traditionally inimical (and long time competitors philosophically and over resources), B should possibly fight the war, as long as the long term welfare of B will increase as a result of fighting and winning the war.

If A and B are traditionally inimical, then B might be remiss to trade with A. Such trade could strengthen A to the point that B loses leverage over A.

B could possibly trade with A just enough to prevent war, but little enough to still allow A to gradually weaken as a result of insufficient access to the resource. If A needs 100 units of the resource to prevent the deaths of the 500,000, and will go to war if it cannot obtain at least 50 units, then B could trade 60 units with A to prevent B from going to war with A. As long as the trade of the 60 units does not lessen B's total welfare to a greater extent than the war would, and the total welfare of A is weakened by not gaining access to the full 100 units, then B can retain leverage and prevent war. There are so many other possible inputs. The situation is not as simple as this model demonstrates.

Any other permutations you would like to add and demonstrate?

If A really wanted the resources they will resources to get it.

The only reason they will not trade is if the price is so high that they would rather lose 200K people.

As for B, not only do they lose people by not trading. But, B also lose out on all the $ (or whatever A trades) they would get if they sold it to A.

B can still have the upper hand on A by charging them a high price. But not high enough for war.
twocupcakes
Posts: 2,760
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
12/28/2014 8:50:37 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/27/2014 1:48:02 PM, tabularasa wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:10:47 PM, Subutai wrote:
What about a trade?


I'm glad you mentioned that. There are so many possible permutations.

If A and B are inimical, and are competitors on several different levels, would it benefit B to trade with A?

If 400,000 die in the war, and 200,000 are citizens of B, then B would possibly do better to trade with A to prevent weakening its own population by 200,000. If the numerical inputs into the war equation indicate that the outcome of the war is uncertain, B would probably do better to trade with A. However, if B is almost certain it can win the war, and the states are traditionally inimical (and long time competitors philosophically and over resources), B should possibly fight the war, as long as the long term welfare of B will increase as a result of fighting and winning the war.

If A and B are traditionally inimical, then B might be remiss to trade with A. Such trade could strengthen A to the point that B loses leverage over A.

B could possibly trade with A just enough to prevent war, but little enough to still allow A to gradually weaken as a result of insufficient access to the resource. If A needs 100 units of the resource to prevent the deaths of the 500,000, and will go to war if it cannot obtain at least 50 units, then B could trade 60 units with A to prevent B from going to war with A. As long as the trade of the 60 units does not lessen B's total welfare to a greater extent than the war would, and the total welfare of A is weakened by not gaining access to the full 100 units, then B can retain leverage and prevent war. There are so many other possible inputs. The situation is not as simple as this model demonstrates.

Any other permutations you would like to add and demonstrate?

If A really wanted the resources they will resources to get it.

The only reason they will not trade is if the price is so high that they would rather lose 200K people.

As for B, not only do they lose people by not trading. But, B also lose out on all the $ (or whatever A trades) they would get if they sold it to A.

B can still have the upper hand on A by charging them a high price. But not high enough for war.
tabularasa
Posts: 200
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
12/30/2014 1:13:41 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/28/2014 8:50:37 AM, twocupcakes wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:48:02 PM, tabularasa wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:10:47 PM, Subutai wrote:
What about a trade?


I'm glad you mentioned that. There are so many possible permutations.

If A and B are inimical, and are competitors on several different levels, would it benefit B to trade with A?

If 400,000 die in the war, and 200,000 are citizens of B, then B would possibly do better to trade with A to prevent weakening its own population by 200,000. If the numerical inputs into the war equation indicate that the outcome of the war is uncertain, B would probably do better to trade with A. However, if B is almost certain it can win the war, and the states are traditionally inimical (and long time competitors philosophically and over resources), B should possibly fight the war, as long as the long term welfare of B will increase as a result of fighting and winning the war.

If A and B are traditionally inimical, then B might be remiss to trade with A. Such trade could strengthen A to the point that B loses leverage over A.

B could possibly trade with A just enough to prevent war, but little enough to still allow A to gradually weaken as a result of insufficient access to the resource. If A needs 100 units of the resource to prevent the deaths of the 500,000, and will go to war if it cannot obtain at least 50 units, then B could trade 60 units with A to prevent B from going to war with A. As long as the trade of the 60 units does not lessen B's total welfare to a greater extent than the war would, and the total welfare of A is weakened by not gaining access to the full 100 units, then B can retain leverage and prevent war. There are so many other possible inputs. The situation is not as simple as this model demonstrates.

Any other permutations you would like to add and demonstrate?

If A really wanted the resources they will resources to get it.

The only reason they will not trade is if the price is so high that they would rather lose 200K people.

As for B, not only do they lose people by not trading. But, B also lose out on all the $ (or whatever A trades) they would get if they sold it to A.

B can still have the upper hand on A by charging them a high price. But not high enough for war.

Excellent point.
1. I already googled it.

2. Give me an argument. Spell it out. "You're wrong," is not an argument.
TryingToBeOpenMinded
Posts: 201
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
12/30/2014 8:00:44 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/30/2014 1:13:41 PM, tabularasa wrote:
At 12/28/2014 8:50:37 AM, twocupcakes wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:48:02 PM, tabularasa wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:10:47 PM, Subutai wrote:
What about a trade?


I'm glad you mentioned that. There are so many possible permutations.

If A and B are inimical, and are competitors on several different levels, would it benefit B to trade with A?

If 400,000 die in the war, and 200,000 are citizens of B, then B would possibly do better to trade with A to prevent weakening its own population by 200,000. If the numerical inputs into the war equation indicate that the outcome of the war is uncertain, B would probably do better to trade with A. However, if B is almost certain it can win the war, and the states are traditionally inimical (and long time competitors philosophically and over resources), B should possibly fight the war, as long as the long term welfare of B will increase as a result of fighting and winning the war.

If A and B are traditionally inimical, then B might be remiss to trade with A. Such trade could strengthen A to the point that B loses leverage over A.

B could possibly trade with A just enough to prevent war, but little enough to still allow A to gradually weaken as a result of insufficient access to the resource. If A needs 100 units of the resource to prevent the deaths of the 500,000, and will go to war if it cannot obtain at least 50 units, then B could trade 60 units with A to prevent B from going to war with A. As long as the trade of the 60 units does not lessen B's total welfare to a greater extent than the war would, and the total welfare of A is weakened by not gaining access to the full 100 units, then B can retain leverage and prevent war. There are so many other possible inputs. The situation is not as simple as this model demonstrates.

Any other permutations you would like to add and demonstrate?

If A really wanted the resources they will resources to get it.

The only reason they will not trade is if the price is so high that they would rather lose 200K people.

As for B, not only do they lose people by not trading. But, B also lose out on all the $ (or whatever A trades) they would get if they sold it to A.

B can still have the upper hand on A by charging them a high price. But not high enough for war.

Excellent point.

This is a philosophical question, not an economic one. Same exact questions asked in my Philosophy 101 course in college. Sometimes, you can't even rationalize saving 100 lives if you're going to affirmatively kill one person.
tabularasa
Posts: 200
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
12/30/2014 8:12:25 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/30/2014 8:00:44 PM, TryingToBeOpenMinded wrote:
At 12/30/2014 1:13:41 PM, tabularasa wrote:
At 12/28/2014 8:50:37 AM, twocupcakes wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:48:02 PM, tabularasa wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:10:47 PM, Subutai wrote:
What about a trade?


I'm glad you mentioned that. There are so many possible permutations.

If A and B are inimical, and are competitors on several different levels, would it benefit B to trade with A?

If 400,000 die in the war, and 200,000 are citizens of B, then B would possibly do better to trade with A to prevent weakening its own population by 200,000. If the numerical inputs into the war equation indicate that the outcome of the war is uncertain, B would probably do better to trade with A. However, if B is almost certain it can win the war, and the states are traditionally inimical (and long time competitors philosophically and over resources), B should possibly fight the war, as long as the long term welfare of B will increase as a result of fighting and winning the war.

If A and B are traditionally inimical, then B might be remiss to trade with A. Such trade could strengthen A to the point that B loses leverage over A.

B could possibly trade with A just enough to prevent war, but little enough to still allow A to gradually weaken as a result of insufficient access to the resource. If A needs 100 units of the resource to prevent the deaths of the 500,000, and will go to war if it cannot obtain at least 50 units, then B could trade 60 units with A to prevent B from going to war with A. As long as the trade of the 60 units does not lessen B's total welfare to a greater extent than the war would, and the total welfare of A is weakened by not gaining access to the full 100 units, then B can retain leverage and prevent war. There are so many other possible inputs. The situation is not as simple as this model demonstrates.

Any other permutations you would like to add and demonstrate?

If A really wanted the resources they will resources to get it.

The only reason they will not trade is if the price is so high that they would rather lose 200K people.

As for B, not only do they lose people by not trading. But, B also lose out on all the $ (or whatever A trades) they would get if they sold it to A.

B can still have the upper hand on A by charging them a high price. But not high enough for war.

Excellent point.

This is a philosophical question, not an economic one. Same exact questions asked in my Philosophy 101 course in college. Sometimes, you can't even rationalize saving 100 lives if you're going to affirmatively kill one person.

It is both.
1. I already googled it.

2. Give me an argument. Spell it out. "You're wrong," is not an argument.
wrichcirw
Posts: 11,196
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/11/2015 8:31:20 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/27/2014 1:48:02 PM, tabularasa wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:10:47 PM, Subutai wrote:
What about a trade?


I'm glad you mentioned that. There are so many possible permutations.

If A and B are inimical, and are competitors on several different levels, would it benefit B to trade with A?

If 400,000 die in the war, and 200,000 are citizens of B, then B would possibly do better to trade with A to prevent weakening its own population by 200,000. If the numerical inputs into the war equation indicate that the outcome of the war is uncertain, B would probably do better to trade with A. However, if B is almost certain it can win the war, and the states are traditionally inimical (and long time competitors philosophically and over resources), B should possibly fight the war, as long as the long term welfare of B will increase as a result of fighting and winning the war.

You've materially changed the scenario here. You've already stated the B will lose the war...there is no "almost certain [B] can win the war", it is going to lose.

Per your numbers in the scenario, even if all of the casualties of the war were born by A, it would still be worth it for A to wage war.

If A and B are traditionally inimical, then B might be remiss to trade with A. Such trade could strengthen A to the point that B loses leverage over A.

B could possibly trade with A just enough to prevent war, but little enough to still allow A to gradually weaken as a result of insufficient access to the resource. If A needs 100 units of the resource to prevent the deaths of the 500,000, and will go to war if it cannot obtain at least 50 units, then B could trade 60 units with A to prevent B from going to war with A. As long as the trade of the 60 units does not lessen B's total welfare to a greater extent than the war would, and the total welfare of A is weakened by not gaining access to the full 100 units, then B can retain leverage and prevent war. There are so many other possible inputs. The situation is not as simple as this model demonstrates.

The only relevant question is whether or not A can sustain fewer deaths through trade with B. As we don't know how many deaths A would sustain in a war with B, the question is unanswerable.

Any other permutations you would like to add and demonstrate?
At 8/9/2013 9:41:24 AM, wrichcirw wrote:
If you are civil with me, I will be civil to you. If you decide to bring unreasonable animosity to bear in a reasonable discussion, then what would you expect other than to get flustered?
tabularasa
Posts: 200
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/11/2015 9:53:42 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/11/2015 8:31:20 PM, wrichcirw wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:48:02 PM, tabularasa wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:10:47 PM, Subutai wrote:
What about a trade?


I'm glad you mentioned that. There are so many possible permutations.

If A and B are inimical, and are competitors on several different levels, would it benefit B to trade with A?

If 400,000 die in the war, and 200,000 are citizens of B, then B would possibly do better to trade with A to prevent weakening its own population by 200,000. If the numerical inputs into the war equation indicate that the outcome of the war is uncertain, B would probably do better to trade with A. However, if B is almost certain it can win the war, and the states are traditionally inimical (and long time competitors philosophically and over resources), B should possibly fight the war, as long as the long term welfare of B will increase as a result of fighting and winning the war.

You've materially changed the scenario here. You've already stated the B will lose the war...there is no "almost certain [B] can win the war", it is going to lose.

Per your numbers in the scenario, even if all of the casualties of the war were born by A, it would still be worth it for A to wage war.

If A and B are traditionally inimical, then B might be remiss to trade with A. Such trade could strengthen A to the point that B loses leverage over A.

B could possibly trade with A just enough to prevent war, but little enough to still allow A to gradually weaken as a result of insufficient access to the resource. If A needs 100 units of the resource to prevent the deaths of the 500,000, and will go to war if it cannot obtain at least 50 units, then B could trade 60 units with A to prevent B from going to war with A. As long as the trade of the 60 units does not lessen B's total welfare to a greater extent than the war would, and the total welfare of A is weakened by not gaining access to the full 100 units, then B can retain leverage and prevent war. There are so many other possible inputs. The situation is not as simple as this model demonstrates.

The only relevant question is whether or not A can sustain fewer deaths through trade with B. As we don't know how many deaths A would sustain in a war with B, the question is unanswerable.

Any other permutations you would like to add and demonstrate?

The question of who will win the war was not fully addressed. Any possibility may be discussed.
1. I already googled it.

2. Give me an argument. Spell it out. "You're wrong," is not an argument.
wrichcirw
Posts: 11,196
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/11/2015 9:56:13 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/11/2015 9:53:42 PM, tabularasa wrote:
At 1/11/2015 8:31:20 PM, wrichcirw wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:48:02 PM, tabularasa wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:10:47 PM, Subutai wrote:
What about a trade?


I'm glad you mentioned that. There are so many possible permutations.

If A and B are inimical, and are competitors on several different levels, would it benefit B to trade with A?

If 400,000 die in the war, and 200,000 are citizens of B, then B would possibly do better to trade with A to prevent weakening its own population by 200,000. If the numerical inputs into the war equation indicate that the outcome of the war is uncertain, B would probably do better to trade with A. However, if B is almost certain it can win the war, and the states are traditionally inimical (and long time competitors philosophically and over resources), B should possibly fight the war, as long as the long term welfare of B will increase as a result of fighting and winning the war.

You've materially changed the scenario here. You've already stated the B will lose the war...there is no "almost certain [B] can win the war", it is going to lose.

Per your numbers in the scenario, even if all of the casualties of the war were born by A, it would still be worth it for A to wage war.

If A and B are traditionally inimical, then B might be remiss to trade with A. Such trade could strengthen A to the point that B loses leverage over A.

B could possibly trade with A just enough to prevent war, but little enough to still allow A to gradually weaken as a result of insufficient access to the resource. If A needs 100 units of the resource to prevent the deaths of the 500,000, and will go to war if it cannot obtain at least 50 units, then B could trade 60 units with A to prevent B from going to war with A. As long as the trade of the 60 units does not lessen B's total welfare to a greater extent than the war would, and the total welfare of A is weakened by not gaining access to the full 100 units, then B can retain leverage and prevent war. There are so many other possible inputs. The situation is not as simple as this model demonstrates.

The only relevant question is whether or not A can sustain fewer deaths through trade with B. As we don't know how many deaths A would sustain in a war with B, the question is unanswerable.

Any other permutations you would like to add and demonstrate?

The question of who will win the war was not fully addressed. Any possibility may be discussed.

In your original scenario, you were clear:

A makes war on B, wins, and gains access to the resource

There is no possibility that B wins in how you drew up the scenario. If you change that you change the scenario.
At 8/9/2013 9:41:24 AM, wrichcirw wrote:
If you are civil with me, I will be civil to you. If you decide to bring unreasonable animosity to bear in a reasonable discussion, then what would you expect other than to get flustered?
tabularasa
Posts: 200
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/12/2015 10:21:26 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/11/2015 9:56:13 PM, wrichcirw wrote:
At 1/11/2015 9:53:42 PM, tabularasa wrote:
At 1/11/2015 8:31:20 PM, wrichcirw wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:48:02 PM, tabularasa wrote:
At 12/27/2014 1:10:47 PM, Subutai wrote:
What about a trade?


I'm glad you mentioned that. There are so many possible permutations.

If A and B are inimical, and are competitors on several different levels, would it benefit B to trade with A?

If 400,000 die in the war, and 200,000 are citizens of B, then B would possibly do better to trade with A to prevent weakening its own population by 200,000. If the numerical inputs into the war equation indicate that the outcome of the war is uncertain, B would probably do better to trade with A. However, if B is almost certain it can win the war, and the states are traditionally inimical (and long time competitors philosophically and over resources), B should possibly fight the war, as long as the long term welfare of B will increase as a result of fighting and winning the war.

You've materially changed the scenario here. You've already stated the B will lose the war...there is no "almost certain [B] can win the war", it is going to lose.

Per your numbers in the scenario, even if all of the casualties of the war were born by A, it would still be worth it for A to wage war.

If A and B are traditionally inimical, then B might be remiss to trade with A. Such trade could strengthen A to the point that B loses leverage over A.

B could possibly trade with A just enough to prevent war, but little enough to still allow A to gradually weaken as a result of insufficient access to the resource. If A needs 100 units of the resource to prevent the deaths of the 500,000, and will go to war if it cannot obtain at least 50 units, then B could trade 60 units with A to prevent B from going to war with A. As long as the trade of the 60 units does not lessen B's total welfare to a greater extent than the war would, and the total welfare of A is weakened by not gaining access to the full 100 units, then B can retain leverage and prevent war. There are so many other possible inputs. The situation is not as simple as this model demonstrates.

The only relevant question is whether or not A can sustain fewer deaths through trade with B. As we don't know how many deaths A would sustain in a war with B, the question is unanswerable.

Any other permutations you would like to add and demonstrate?

The question of who will win the war was not fully addressed. Any possibility may be discussed.

In your original scenario, you were clear:

A makes war on B, wins, and gains access to the resource

There is no possibility that B wins in how you drew up the scenario. If you change that you change the scenario.

Yes. And then other permutations were invited. Any permutation is welcome.
1. I already googled it.

2. Give me an argument. Spell it out. "You're wrong," is not an argument.
Diqiucun_Cunmin
Posts: 2,710
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/17/2015 8:04:14 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/26/2014 9:54:54 PM, tabularasa wrote:
Two states (A and B) border each other.

State A lacks a resource. The scarcity of this resource will cause the death of 500,000 citizens.

State B has enough of the resource to supply everyone in both states with the resource.

A makes war on B, wins, and gains access to the resource, saving 500,000 lives. 400,000 die in the war. I believe that based only upon these facts, the war may be justified. What say you?

Firstly, you should have said the shortage, not scarcity, of the resource. Only free goods are non-scarce...

Secondly, the law of comparative advantage states that if each economy specialises in producing the good in which it has comparative advantage, the total output of all economies will increase. If they trade, assuming a mutually beneficial TOT, both countries must have a net gain. Conversely, if war is waged:
-War decreases the population and both the short- and long-run aggregate supply;
-War increases the percentage of government spending on the military and leads to a decrease in general quality of living,
-etc.

Of course, there will be gains such as increased employment and GDP from the extra military spending, but don't forget that also creates an inflationary gap without increasing the long-run aggregate supply. It creates no real gain in the long run.

Thus under the postulate of constrained maximisation, the two countries must trade. War is not justified.
The thing is, I hate relativism. I hate relativism more than I hate everything else, excepting, maybe, fibreglass powerboats... What it overlooks, to put it briefly and crudely, is the fixed structure of human nature. - Jerry Fodor

Don't be a stat cynic:
http://www.debate.org...

Response to conservative views on deforestation:
http://www.debate.org...

Topics I'd like to debate (not debating ATM): http://tinyurl.com...
MyDinosaurHands
Posts: 203
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/23/2015 8:38:46 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/26/2014 9:54:54 PM, tabularasa wrote:
Two states (A and B) border each other.

State A lacks a resource. The scarcity of this resource will cause the death of 500,000 citizens.

State B has enough of the resource to supply everyone in both states with the resource.

A makes war on B, wins, and gains access to the resource, saving 500,000 lives. 400,000 die in the war. I believe that based only upon these facts, the war may be justified. What say you?

Well yeah, if they weren't going to trade. When I saw this forum post's title, I thought this was going to be a little edgier. This is an insanely easy scenario to justify.
Guess what I used to type this..

Careful! Don't laugh too hard.