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Property dualism and biological naturalism

socialpinko
Posts: 10,458
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5/12/2012 8:08:03 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
Can anyone explain the difference?

Biological naturalism is a theory of mind proposed by John Searle arguing that mental phenomenon (consciousness, thoughts, etc.) are causally related to the physical functions of the brain. Basically that the mind itself is a byproduct of purely physical processes. On the other hand Searle argues that the ontological qualities of the mind (which are first person-ness and subjectivity) are not reducible to those physical processes which cause them (which are necessarily third person and objective).

For example we can't properly reduce the color red to the specific wavelengths which cause the perception of it without totally losing sight of what we originally sought to explain which is the feeling of the perception of the color red. From this, Searle posits that the mind and the body are ontologically separate. My question is, how is this a different view from property dualism? Searle seems to be adamant that they're different positions but I don't see wherein tue difference lies.
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popculturepooka
Posts: 7,927
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5/12/2012 8:17:28 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
FWIW, I can't explain the difference. I think, no matter how much he insists otherwise, he is a property dualist.
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socialpinko
Posts: 10,458
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5/13/2012 3:28:23 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 5/12/2012 8:17:28 PM, popculturepooka wrote:
FWIW, I can't explain the difference. I think, no matter how much he insists otherwise, he is a property dualist.

I'm starting to think that too. Both purport that one overarching substance constitute what makes up the world, though there are two separate properties within it. I'm not entirely familiar with property dualism but the difference might lie within the fact that Searle conceives that mental properties arise as higher-order properties from physical ones whereas property dualism doesn't appear to necessarily make that distinction.... at least from what I can see. BN and PD both admit of ontological differences between the two types of properties, but it appears BN makes a causal connection between the two which PD doesn't necessarily make.
: At 9/29/2014 10:55:59 AM, imabench wrote:
: : At 9/29/2014 9:43:46 AM, kbub wrote:
: :
: : DDO should discredit support of sexual violence at any time and in every way.
:
: I disagree.
The_Fool_on_the_hill
Posts: 6,071
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5/13/2012 3:43:43 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 5/12/2012 8:08:03 PM, socialpinko wrote:
Can anyone explain the difference?

Biological naturalism is a theory of mind proposed by John Searle arguing that mental phenomenon (consciousness, thoughts, etc.) are causally related to the physical functions of the brain. Basically that the mind itself is a byproduct of purely physical processes. On the other hand Searle argues that the ontological qualities of the mind (which are first person-ness and subjectivity) are not reducible to those physical processes which cause them (which are necessarily third person and objective).

For example we can't properly reduce the color red to the specific wavelengths which cause the perception of it without totally losing sight of what we originally sought to explain which is the feeling of the perception of the color red. From this, Searle posits that the mind and the body are ontologically separate. My question is, how is this a different view from property dualism? Searle seems to be adamant that they're different positions but I don't see wherein tue difference lies.

The Fool: That is pretty much my position, but I would call mind an epistemological dualistm. Property or rather substance dualism is that the mind is a independent substance from that of the body, these of course is refuted by the fact that there is interaction, between mind and body.

So its a property monism claim in that the universe is made of one interacting substance, but that entities of mind cannot be further reduced to physical explainations. For example we experience the sensation of emotions. But yet they are not spatio-temporal relations like all physical experiences. I may point to some firing nerves, on a brain which may cause or correlate to the sensations of a emotion, but these are both post-processing experiences.

One is the sensation of emotion and one is the sensation of seeing nerves fire. That is they are two difference sensations. So we may say one is the cause of another. or even a that there is a biconditional relationship such as A<->B when one changes the other changes, but not A=B for these the experience would have to be exactly the same.
"The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another." G. W. F. HEGEL
The_Fool_on_the_hill
Posts: 6,071
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5/13/2012 4:13:35 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
But as for the epistemilogical differences which is my position, is the difference between the types of knowledge, all physical explanations are theoritical, for as Hume argued, each moment can be the disconfirming incident. But as Descartes says I cannot doubt that my mind exist. For any awarness at all presupposed it. That is we could never be wrong that we are feelin or having and experience its self-evident and pre-linguistical, but I can be fooled by my senses.

"I have noticed that the senses are sometimes deceptive; and it is a mark of prudence never to place our complete trust in those who have deceived us even once. " Rene Descartes
"The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another." G. W. F. HEGEL