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Some Thoughts on the Afterlife

phantom
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5/13/2013 12:14:28 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
Something I've been considering for a while, so I thought I would post it here.

To start off, I think we can assume that the existence of identity is necessary for the afterlife. Otherwise, we're just talking about the continuation of energy and matter, which is obviously not the kind of afterlife I'm talking about. Your personhood began to exist when you began to live, but the matter and energy that make you up existed long before and will exist long after you, as a person, die. Identity can be defined, with room for change, as the part about consciousness and self-awareness that makes a person a unique entity, the "person" part of the individual. Memory, personality and appearance aren't part of identity. Hindus, for example, believe a person lives on by reincarnation even though he loses his past memory and character.

If there is such a thing as identity, if there's such a thing as "you" or "I" beyond just a bundle of perceptions like all Hume could find, that identity must be brought about by the state of your mind. So given the unique state of your mind, a unique conscious identity that belongs to you arises. There is a difference between yours and my conscious experience, and that difference must be explained physically. Consciousness is brought about by the mind, so the difference can be explained by the difference between your mind and my mind. The difference between our consciousness is the material formation of each of our minds. This should lead to the conclusion that, taking all sets of properties that make up your mind, spatial and intrinsic, your unique consciousness is formed. Therefore, if we have all these exact properties that make up the mind more than once, the same person should exist more than once.

However, that might question whether we can get the exact mind twice. In one sense we can't but the way in which we can't is likely unimportant. Nevertheless, here is how it's impossible. Every atom and neuron is unique given it's spatial differences to other atoms and neurons. Even if all intrinsic properties are the same in two atoms, we can differentiate between one and the other. Atom 1 is not atom 2. Their spatial properties and past existence both differ. If we numbered all atoms in the universe, that would be an easy way to point out that they are all unique. However, this seems hardly important. How could this matter to the production of consciousness and identity? Likely it shouldn't matter whether the atoms that make up my mind are from one set or the other, just as long as there's no intrinsic difference between them and that their arrangement is just the same in forming my mind. What I mean is that we can conceive of two minds. The minds are identical in every way except that mind 1 is made up of different atoms than mind 2. However, the atoms that make up mind 1 hold no intrinsic difference to that of the atoms in mind 2. This can extend to neurons. As stated, there's no reason to believe that the difference between mind 1 and 2 should lead to a difference in identity. There is a difference, but the difference is minor. So now we can conclude that an exact replica of someones mind cannot occur. However, fortunately for us, the variations are unsubstantial. The differences aren't relevant to what induces consciousness from them. Consciousness is formed by the properties of the mind but only some of the properties. While two different hypothetical minds might have different properties, the difference might not be a kind which matters in regards to whether both minds are of the same person, the same conscious entity.

So now what? Well, what happens if an exact copy of your mind (minus the mentioned variations) forms some time in the future? Let's assume the multiverse exists, or that time and the formation life will never end. Some time after you die, a mind will form in a life with the exact properties of your own, the only differences being the minor ones I already discussed. Is that mind you? Are you reborn and your identity continued? If a multiverse exists, it's essentially inevitable that exact copies of me would exist elsewhere at a future or past point in time. So, since they're exact, are they not me? Something seems to be wrong if you assume identity exists in an individual yet also say a persons identity does not continue on in another life when that life is exactly the same as the other. Also, you have to ask the question, what would happen when (for it seems inevitable given time and/or a multiverse) two of the exact same configurations of your current mind exist at the same time? Would your consciousness exist in both? Seems implausible to consider that happening. How could the same "person" exist in two different people and what could that possibly be like? However, I think it's also puzzling to consider how it could not be the case. Why can't my identity continue on if an exact replica of my mind exists after die? It's exactly the same, so shouldn't it by the exact same person as well? But then that gives rise to the same question of what would happen when this occurs in two individuals at the same time. How could your consciousness exist in both? If it can't, doesn't that dispel the notion that it can ever exist in another being?

What would follow from that though? If it can't exist in another being; if the hypothesis is false, it almost seems to lead to the conclusion that identity is an illusion, as Hume so thought possible. Absurdities seem to follow from identity being an actual thing that might make it more plausible it doesn't actually exist. On the other hand, it might lead to believe in a less pessimistic conclusion that there's more to consciousness than its material form, a substance dualist view, for example. If the former, that's a little depressing. If the latter, well, most dualist positions entail the afterlife anyway!
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
Zaradi
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5/13/2013 12:28:41 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
I'm gonna be honest: as much as I love reading your posts, you text wall'd me here.
Want to debate? Pick a topic and hit me up! - http://www.debate.org...
The_Fool_on_the_hill
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5/13/2013 1:09:10 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
The Fool: Ah hem.
But what is the necessary condition for there to be Something Being assumed?
"The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another." G. W. F. HEGEL
phantom
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5/13/2013 7:28:38 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 5/13/2013 12:28:41 AM, Zaradi wrote:
I'm gonna be honest: as much as I love reading your posts, you text wall'd me here.

Sorry... :P
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
phantom
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5/13/2013 7:29:20 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 5/13/2013 1:09:10 AM, The_Fool_on_the_hill wrote:
The Fool: Ah hem.
But what is the necessary condition for there to be Something Being assumed?

I don't understand the question. Could you rephrase it?
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
phantom
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5/13/2013 7:30:03 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 5/13/2013 8:28:17 AM, Idiot wrote:
This is funny.

What's funny?
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
bossyburrito
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5/13/2013 7:55:08 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
It really depends on how strictly you define the "self". If you define the "self" as that which arises from a few particular atoms arranged in a particular way, an "afterlife" couldn't exist. If that was the definition used, you would only be "you" at that one moment of time, that one "snapshot" of reality, because of the constant changing of the properties of atoms. Position in space and position in time are both characteristics of atoms, as an atom could not exist outside of "reality" (outside of the basic laws of logic).

You could not define the "self" as the qualities of the phenomena of consciousness itself, no matter how it is brought about, because one of those very qualities would be how it was brought about. You cannot separate them.
#UnbanTheMadman

"Some will sell their dreams for small desires
Or lose the race to rats
Get caught in ticking traps
And start to dream of somewhere
To relax their restless flight
Somewhere out of a memory of lighted streets on quiet nights..."

~ Rush
philochristos
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5/13/2013 8:14:07 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
I'm a substance dualist, and I have frequently used a line or reasoning similar to your own to argue with Jehovah's Witnesses who deny that we have an immaterial self capable of disembodied existence. They believe that when you die, you cease to exist, but that Jehovah's remembers you perfectly so that at the resurrection, he can bring you back into existence.

But think it's impossible for anything to cease to exist and to come back into existence at a later time. Assuming a materialist view of a person, the mind is just a product of the brain. It would follow that if you create another brain with all the same properties (except location), then an identical mind would emerge with all the same thoughts, feelings, memories, personality, etc. But obviously, two different people can't be the same person. One would have to be a replica.

Suppose that Tom exists, and that at some point during Tom's life, God creates a perfect replica of Tom (let's call the replica Tom'). Assuming God did a perfect job of it, Tom' could not tell that he had just been created. He'd have the same memories Tom has and would think he WAS Tom. But he'd still just be a replica of Tom. He wouldn't be Tom himself.

Now, suppose that instead of God creating Tom' during Tom's life, he instead waits until Tom dies to do the exact same thing. Well, it seems to me that if Tom' is not Tom when Tom is still living, then he wouldn't be Tom just because God waited until Tom died to create Tom'. If he's a replica before Tom dies, then he'd be a replica if he came after Tom's death as well.

Here's another thought experiment. Suppose Tom dies, and God remembers Tom perfectly, but instead of bringing bringing one Tom back into existence at the resurrection, he brings 12 of them into existence with his perfect memory. Well, obviously 12 people cannot be 1 person, so at least 11 of these are replicas. And if the 12th is made exactly like the 11, then it's a replica as well. IN fact, none of them are the original. Now, if God decided not to make the 11, that wouldn't cause the one to actually be Tom. It would make no difference to the identity of the one whether the other 11 existed or not.

So it seems obvious to me that it's impossible for somebody to cease to exist, then to come back into existence. And that's the problem with Star Trek type transporters. I used this argument in my debate with Heineken, but unfortunately, some of the voters didn't understand the argument.

http://www.debate.org...

I think it's an air-tight argument. The only way it's possible for a person to cease to exist, then to come back into existence, is if some kind of substance dualism is true. Assuming materialism (which I did in the debate), it's impossible.
"Not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education." ~Aristotle

"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it." ~Aristotle
The_Fool_on_the_hill
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5/13/2013 8:56:52 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
The Fool: What is absolutly true if something is being assumed.?

I think we can assume

ergo, Sum
"The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another." G. W. F. HEGEL
The_Fool_on_the_hill
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5/13/2013 9:01:57 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
The Fool: That is. The Observer.,.
"The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another." G. W. F. HEGEL
The_Fool_on_the_hill
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5/13/2013 9:26:40 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
phantom: Your personhood began to exist when you began to live, but the matter and energy that make you up existed long before and will exist long after you, as a person, die.

The Fool: This is a baseless claim, for we never get at the matter, nor has anyone seen, smelt, felt, nore touched or heard any energy, but we know its there, but it is not from the common senses. We see things effected by it as we do gravity but we Never See It.

We simply give things the TERM "personhood" as we see socially Fit. For They create many terms for themselves, and when they don"t see it fit. They taketh away the "Terms". But what was Termed so, a thing itself is not the TERMS we give it. And who is it that taketh away. Personhoods. NONSENSE. That just begs the very question..

phantom: Identity can be defined, with room for change, as the part about consciousness and self-awareness that makes a person a unique entity, the "person" part of the individual.

The Fool: Only Terms can be defined. They are just Names: Tags, symbols. Images. For I have tried many times to define myself as "wise" but the more and more I tried, the more and more foolish I proved myself to be. So I accepted what I am as I am. Identity is not suppose to be changing. But it Is by changing constantly that I remain the same.

You are thinking of social Identity which is more of WHO you are, In relation to OTHER people. But That is not the same as WHAT you are?

phantom: Memory, personality and appearance aren't part of identity. Hindus, for example, believe a person lives on by reincarnation even though he loses his past memory and character.

Phantom: If there is such a thing as identity, if there's such a thing as "you" or "I" beyond just a bundle of perceptions like all Hume could find, that identity must be brought about by the state of your mind.

The Fool: Hume is a Naive Empiricist, For he looks outwards for himself, like a dog chasing his tail does he, in a circle. I like him, like that, he is more entertaining that way.

We have all had the Humian Experience, Its called having a floaty on your EYE.
What happens when you try and look at it directly?
Have you ever tried to chase it and end up in frustration?
But those to chase after it, will never catch. But it wouldn"t keep running away on you if you didn't chase it.

1:1

But let me ask you this, Phantom.

Do you see a center of a circle with your eyes?

Even in a Sphere of ignorance you can't lose yourself for you are always in the same place.

What holds a bundle to together?

Where does it all connect?

The NEXUS = I = Cogito
"The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another." G. W. F. HEGEL
phantom
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5/14/2013 7:00:35 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
I'll respond to you peeps when my exams are over.
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
Sower4GS
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5/20/2013 12:45:05 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
You know what I think? You probably don't. Well good news, my Master Yahusha tells us to be led by His Ruach (Spirit) so I will let YHWH tell you.

Act_17:31 because He has set a day on which He is going to judge the world in righteousness by a Man whom He has appointed,1 having given proof of this to all by raising Him from the dead." Footnote: 1See 10:42.
Act_17:32 And hearing of the resurrection of the dead, some indeed mocked, while others said, "We shall hear you again concerning this."
Act_20:9 And a certain young man, by name Eutuchos, was sitting in a window, being overpowered by a deep sleep. As Sha"ul kept on reasoning, he was overcome by sleep and fell down from the third storey, and was picked up dead.
Act_23:6 Now Sha"ul, perceiving that one part were Sadducees and the other Pharisees, cried out in the council, "Men, brothers, I am a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee, I am being judged concerning the expectation and resurrection of the dead!"
Act_24:15 having an expectation in Elohim, which they themselves also wait for, that there is to be a resurrection of the dead, both of the righteous and the unrighteous.
Act_24:21 other than for this one declaration which I cried out, standing among them, "Concerning the resurrection of the dead I am being judged by you today." "
Act_26:8 "Why is it considered "unbelievable" among you if Elohim raises the dead?
Act_26:23 that the Messiah would suffer, would be the first to rise from the dead, He would proclaim light to the people and to the gentiles."
Act_28:6 And expecting that he would swell up or suddenly fall down dead, they waited for a long time and saw no harm come to him, changing their minds they said that he was a mighty one.
Rom_1:4 who was designated Son of Elohim with power, according to the Set-apart Spirit, by the resurrection from the dead: יהושע Messiah, the Master of us,
Rom_4:17 as it has been written, "I have made you a father of many nations" " in the presence of Him whom he believed, even Elohim, who gives life to the dead and calls that which does not exist as existing,
Rom_4:19 And not having grown weak in belief, he did not consider his own body, already dead, being about a hundred years old, and the deadness of Sarah"s womb,
Rom_4:24 but also because of us, to whom it shall be reckoned, to us who believe in Him who raised up יהושע our Master from the dead,
Rom_6:4 We were therefore buried with Him through immersion into death, that as Messiah was raised from the dead by the esteem of the Father, so also we should walk in newness of life.
Rom_6:9 knowing that Messiah, having been raised from the dead, dies no more " death no longer rules over Him.
Rom_6:11 So you also, reckon yourselves to be dead indeed to sin, but alive to Elohim in Messiah יהושע our Master.
Rom_6:13 neither present your members as instruments of unrighteousness to sin, but present yourselves to Elohim as being alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of righteousness to Elohim.
Rom_7:4 So my brothers, you also were put to death to the Torah through the body of Messiah, for you to become another"s, the One who was raised from the dead, that we should bear fruit to Elohim.
Rom_7:8 But sin, having taken the occasion through the command, did work in me all sorts of covetousness. For apart from Torah sin is dead.
Rom_8:10 And if Messiah is in you, the body is truly dead on account of sin, but the Spirit is life on account of righteousness.
Rom_8:11 And if the Spirit of Him who raised יהושע from the dead dwells in you, He who raised Messiah from the dead shall also give life to your mortal bodies through His Spirit dwelling in you.
Rom_10:7 " "Who shall descend into the abyss?" " " that is, to bring Messiah up from the dead.
Rom_10:9 That if you confess with your mouth the Master יהושע and believe in your heart that Elohim has raised Him from the dead, you shall be saved.
Rom_11:15 For if their casting away is the restoration to favour of the world, what is their acceptance but life from the dead?
Rom_14:9 For unto this Messiah died and rose and lived again, to rule over both the dead and the living.
1Co_15:12 And if Messiah is proclaimed that He has been raised from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead?
1Co_15:13 And if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Messiah has not been raised.
1Co_15:15 and we are also found false witnesses of Elohim, because we have witnessed of Elohim that He raised up Messiah, whom He did not raise up, if then the dead are not raised.
1Co_15:16 For if the dead are not raised, then neither Messiah has been raised.
1Co_15:20 But now Messiah has been raised from the dead, and has become the first-fruit of those having fallen asleep.
1Co_15:21 For since death is through a man, resurrection of the dead is also through a Man.
1Co_15:29 Otherwise, what shall they do who are immersed for the dead, if the dead are not raised at all? Why indeed are they immersed for the dead?
1Co_15:32 If, as men do, I have fought with beasts at Ephesos, of what good is it to me? If the dead are not raised, "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die."
1Co_15:35 But someone might say, "How are the dead raised up? And with what body do they come?"
1Co_15:42 So also is the resurrection of the dead: it is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption;
1Co_15:52 in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed.
2Co_1:9 Indeed, we had the sentence of death in ourselves, that we should not trust in ourselves but in Elohim who raises the dead,
Gal_1:1 Sha"ul, an emissary " not from men, nor by a man, but by יהושע Messiah and Elohim the Father who raised Him from the dead "
Eph_1:20 which He wrought in the Messiah when He raised Him from the dead and seated Him at His right hand in the heavenlies,
Eph_2:1 And you were dead in trespasses and sins,1 Footnote: 1v.5 and 5:14, Mt. 8:22, Rom. 8:6, Col. 2:13, 1 Tim. 5:6, 1 John 3:14, Rev. 3:1.
Eph_2:5 even when we were dead in trespasses, made us alive together with Messiah " by favour you have been saved "
Eph_5:14 That is why He says, "Wake up, you who sleep, and arise from the dead, and Messiah shall shine on you."
Php_3:11 if somehow I might attain to the resurrection from the dead.
Col_1:18 And He is the Head of the body, the assembly, who is the beginning, the first-born from the dead, that He might become the One who is first in all.
Col_2:12 having been buried with Him in immersion, in which you also were raised with Him through the belief in the working of Elohim, who raised Him from the dead.
Col_2:13 And you, being dead in your trespasses1 and the uncircumcision of your flesh, He has made alive together with Him, having forgiven you all trespasses, Footnote: 1Eph. 2:1.
1Th_1:10 and to wait for His Son from the heavens, whom He raised from the dead, יהושע, who is delivering us from the wrath to come.
1Th_4:16 Because the Master Himself shall come down from heaven with a shout, with the voice of a chief messenger, and with the trumpet of Elohim, and the dead in Messiah shall rise first.

If you made it through then pat yourself on the back because you are a trooper, and wiser too.
phantom
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5/26/2013 1:59:30 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 5/13/2013 7:55:08 PM, bossyburrito wrote:
It really depends on how strictly you define the "self". If you define the "self" as that which arises from a few particular atoms arranged in a particular way, an "afterlife" couldn't exist. If that was the definition used, you would only be "you" at that one moment of time, that one "snapshot" of reality, because of the constant changing of the properties of atoms. Position in space and position in time are both characteristics of atoms, as an atom could not exist outside of "reality" (outside of the basic laws of logic).

True, but if you take that definition, every hour thousands of different "you's" would exist and die, and you would not be the same person in any sense of the word 1 second ago. I'd be interested to see an argument for that definition, but I see no reason to hold it. The properties of atoms change all the time, but that only matters if the particular change in those particular properties are necessary for your distinct conscious identity. Every atom is different at any different time, but I don't see how that difference matters. Identity can still be retained even if the material components for that identity change.


You could not define the "self" as the qualities of the phenomena of consciousness itself, no matter how it is brought about, because one of those very qualities would be how it was brought about. You cannot separate them.

Not sure what you mean,
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
Rational_Thinker9119
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5/26/2013 2:20:54 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
I believe that our minds and consciousness are dependent on out brains. So once our brain stop fully working, there is no more mind and consciousness (if "x" is dependent on "y", then if "y" goes; so does "x"). It is not a pretty picture. Which is why it is emotionally understanding why someone would want to believe in an afterlife. There is no evidence of an afterlife. I see it as extremely unlikely, and based on wishful thinking. Nobody wants to do die (besides people who want to commit suicide but they are in the minority). Lets just believe it continues. We will be blissfully ignorant to the fact that we were wrong when we die, because we cannot know are wrong if we were dead. Thus, there is literally no reason not to believe in an afterlife, even though there probably is no afterlife. We go to heaven, bad guys go to hell. Might as well believe this before we perish as it is a nice picture.
phantom
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5/26/2013 9:03:14 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 5/13/2013 8:14:07 PM, philochristos wrote:
I'm a substance dualist, and I have frequently used a line or reasoning similar to your own to argue with Jehovah's Witnesses who deny that we have an immaterial self capable of disembodied existence. They believe that when you die, you cease to exist, but that Jehovah's remembers you perfectly so that at the resurrection, he can bring you back into existence.

Interesting. I didn't know that.

But think it's impossible for anything to cease to exist and to come back into existence at a later time. Assuming a materialist view of a person, the mind is just a product of the brain. It would follow that if you create another brain with all the same properties (except location), then an identical mind would emerge with all the same thoughts, feelings, memories, personality, etc. But obviously, two different people can't be the same person. One would have to be a replica.

Suppose that Tom exists, and that at some point during Tom's life, God creates a perfect replica of Tom (let's call the replica Tom'). Assuming God did a perfect job of it, Tom' could not tell that he had just been created. He'd have the same memories Tom has and would think he WAS Tom. But he'd still just be a replica of Tom. He wouldn't be Tom himself.

Kind of playing devils advocate here, but why exclude identity from the identical attributes in the copy? It would have all the same thoughts, feelings, memories and personality you say, but why not identity? From a materialist perspective, we assume that the material conditions of the brain bring about ones distinct identity. So for simplicities sake, let's say properties x, y and z determine Tom's unique identity. Given x, y and z we must have Tom. So if x, y and z also exist in the copy, Tom should exist as well. Not a new Tom, but the same Tom. If it's an exact copy, with all the same properties, why couldn't x, y and z be in the second mind? And why would x, y and z produce Tom in the first mind but not the second? Why would one set of properties lead to a the first time but b the second time?


Now, suppose that instead of God creating Tom' during Tom's life, he instead waits until Tom dies to do the exact same thing. Well, it seems to me that if Tom' is not Tom when Tom is still living, then he wouldn't be Tom just because God waited until Tom died to create Tom'. If he's a replica before Tom dies, then he'd be a replica if he came after Tom's death as well.

Here's another thought experiment. Suppose Tom dies, and God remembers Tom perfectly, but instead of bringing bringing one Tom back into existence at the resurrection, he brings 12 of them into existence with his perfect memory. Well, obviously 12 people cannot be 1 person, so at least 11 of these are replicas. And if the 12th is made exactly like the 11, then it's a replica as well. IN fact, none of them are the original. Now, if God decided not to make the 11, that wouldn't cause the one to actually be Tom. It would make no difference to the identity of the one whether the other 11 existed or not.

Essentially what I said. Yeah, it is a problem. I suppose one might argue that Tom would just exist in all 11 bodies, but that seems like a stretch.


So it seems obvious to me that it's impossible for somebody to cease to exist, then to come back into existence. And that's the problem with Star Trek type transporters. I used this argument in my debate with Heineken, but unfortunately, some of the voters didn't understand the argument.

http://www.debate.org...

Yeah, I remember that debate. You deserved a win.


I think it's an air-tight argument. The only way it's possible for a person to cease to exist, then to come back into existence, is if some kind of substance dualism is true. Assuming materialism (which I did in the debate), it's impossible.

I mostly agree, but I still find the idea possible, which is enough for me.
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
phantom
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5/26/2013 9:04:21 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 5/13/2013 8:56:52 PM, The_Fool_on_the_hill wrote:
The Fool: What is absolutly true if something is being assumed.?




I think we can assume



ergo, Sum

1. How is this relevant?

2. Why are you such a fan of Descartes?
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
philochristos
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5/27/2013 1:00:46 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 5/26/2013 9:03:14 PM, phantom wrote:
At 5/13/2013 8:14:07 PM, philochristos wrote:

Suppose that Tom exists, and that at some point during Tom's life, God creates a perfect replica of Tom (let's call the replica Tom'). Assuming God did a perfect job of it, Tom' could not tell that he had just been created. He'd have the same memories Tom has and would think he WAS Tom. But he'd still just be a replica of Tom. He wouldn't be Tom himself.

Kind of playing devils advocate here, but why exclude identity from the identical attributes in the copy? It would have all the same thoughts, feelings, memories and personality you say, but why not identity? From a materialist perspective, we assume that the material conditions of the brain bring about ones distinct identity. So for simplicities sake, let's say properties x, y and z determine Tom's unique identity. Given x, y and z we must have Tom. So if x, y and z also exist in the copy, Tom should exist as well. Not a new Tom, but the same Tom. If it's an exact copy, with all the same properties, why couldn't x, y and z be in the second mind? And why would x, y and z produce Tom in the first mind but not the second? Why would one set of properties lead to a the first time but b the second time?

What my thought experiment is meant to show is that properties like memory, thought, personality, etc., are not sufficient criteria for the preservation of personal identity. Since it's possible for two different persons to have an identical noetic structure and still not be the same person, something more is needed. What's needed, in my view, is continuity. What makes you the same person now as you were yesterday is that there have been no gaps in your existence. You've gained and lost memories, and maybe your personality has changed, but you're still the same person.

If Tom exists during some interval of time, and Tom' pops into existence somewhere else in the world and has no connection with Tom whatsoever, then Tom' is a different person. He's an exact duplicate of Tom, but he's not Tom himself. That's because there is no continuity between Tom and Tom' that would make Tom' be the person as Tom.

According to the indiscernibility of identicals if A and B have every property in common, then A and B are the same thing. If there's just one thing that's true about one that is not true about the other, then they are not the same thing.

So suppose Tom and Tom' both exist, and suppose they both have identical physical and mental structures. Why wouldn't they be the same person? Well, it's because there is something true of one that is not true of the other. For example:

1. Tom and Tom' are located in two different places.

2. From the moment Tom' comes into existence, they each begin to have different experiences.

3. Tom has actually existed longer than Tom' has existed.

Etc. etc.

Now, suppose that instead of God creating Tom' during Tom's life, he instead waits until Tom dies to do the exact same thing. Well, it seems to me that if Tom' is not Tom when Tom is still living, then he wouldn't be Tom just because God waited until Tom died to create Tom'. If he's a replica before Tom dies, then he'd be a replica if he came after Tom's death as well.

Here's another thought experiment. Suppose Tom dies, and God remembers Tom perfectly, but instead of bringing bringing one Tom back into existence at the resurrection, he brings 12 of them into existence with his perfect memory. Well, obviously 12 people cannot be 1 person, so at least 11 of these are replicas. And if the 12th is made exactly like the 11, then it's a replica as well. IN fact, none of them are the original. Now, if God decided not to make the 11, that wouldn't cause the one to actually be Tom. It would make no difference to the identity of the one whether the other 11 existed or not.

Essentially what I said. Yeah, it is a problem. I suppose one might argue that Tom would just exist in all 11 bodies, but that seems like a stretch.

It's not even possible that all eleven could be the same person since they would be located in 11 different places and would have unique experiences from that point on. If it's even possible for something to happen to A that does not happen to B, then A and B cannot be the same person.
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