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Are Mental Properties Brain Properties?

Magic8000
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1/14/2014 12:30:27 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
Well, Solipsism is conceivable. And in a Solipsist universe only minds can exist, not any material properties. So, by modal logic, it seems to me that mental properties are not brain properties.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.

"So Magic8000 believes Einstein was a proctologist who was persuaded by the Government and Hitler to fabricate the Theory of Relativity"- GWL-CPA
phantom
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1/14/2014 1:09:02 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 12:30:27 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
Well, Solipsism is conceivable. And in a Solipsist universe only minds can exist, not any material properties. So, by modal logic, it seems to me that mental properties are not brain properties.

Huh?
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
Magic8000
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1/14/2014 1:12:00 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 1:09:02 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 12:30:27 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
Well, Solipsism is conceivable. And in a Solipsist universe only minds can exist, not any material properties. So, by modal logic, it seems to me that mental properties are not brain properties.

Huh?

Dude, what?
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.

"So Magic8000 believes Einstein was a proctologist who was persuaded by the Government and Hitler to fabricate the Theory of Relativity"- GWL-CPA
phantom
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1/14/2014 1:14:01 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 1:12:00 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:09:02 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 12:30:27 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
Well, Solipsism is conceivable. And in a Solipsist universe only minds can exist, not any material properties. So, by modal logic, it seems to me that mental properties are not brain properties.

Huh?

Dude, what?

Explain your reasoning.
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
Magic8000
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1/14/2014 1:16:42 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 1:14:01 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:12:00 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:09:02 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 12:30:27 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
Well, Solipsism is conceivable. And in a Solipsist universe only minds can exist, not any material properties. So, by modal logic, it seems to me that mental properties are not brain properties.

Huh?

Dude, what?

Explain your reasoning.

It's modal logic. The mind can conceivably exist in a Solipsist world. But, if our minds are just a property of the brain, then we shouldn't be able to conceive of this.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.

"So Magic8000 believes Einstein was a proctologist who was persuaded by the Government and Hitler to fabricate the Theory of Relativity"- GWL-CPA
phantom
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1/14/2014 1:26:53 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 1:16:42 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:14:01 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:12:00 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:09:02 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 12:30:27 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
Well, Solipsism is conceivable. And in a Solipsist universe only minds can exist, not any material properties. So, by modal logic, it seems to me that mental properties are not brain properties.

Huh?

Dude, what?

Explain your reasoning.

It's modal logic. The mind can conceivably exist in a Solipsist world.

I'll let this be assumed.

But, if our minds are just a property of the brain, then we shouldn't be able to conceive of this.

This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

I'm guessing the latter is closer to the mark.
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
Magic8000
Posts: 975
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1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 1:26:53 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:16:42 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:14:01 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:12:00 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:09:02 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 12:30:27 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
Well, Solipsism is conceivable. And in a Solipsist universe only minds can exist, not any material properties. So, by modal logic, it seems to me that mental properties are not brain properties.

Huh?

Dude, what?

Explain your reasoning.

It's modal logic. The mind can conceivably exist in a Solipsist world.

I'll let this be assumed.

But, if our minds are just a property of the brain, then we shouldn't be able to conceive of this.

This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world. I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I'm guessing the latter is closer to the mark.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.

"So Magic8000 believes Einstein was a proctologist who was persuaded by the Government and Hitler to fabricate the Theory of Relativity"- GWL-CPA
phantom
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1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
Magic8000
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1/14/2014 1:47:45 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.

If we could conceive of a physical mind, we could doubt the mind. Since all physical things are doubtable. We can doubt the brain all we want. But not the mind.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.

"So Magic8000 believes Einstein was a proctologist who was persuaded by the Government and Hitler to fabricate the Theory of Relativity"- GWL-CPA
phantom
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1/14/2014 1:52:49 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 1:47:45 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.

If we could conceive of a physical mind, we could doubt the mind. Since all physical things are doubtable. We can doubt the brain all we want. But not the mind.

And how come immaterial things escape doubt whereas all things physical do not?

What's wrong with doubt anyways?
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
Magic8000
Posts: 975
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1/14/2014 2:02:19 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 1:52:49 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:47:45 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.

If we could conceive of a physical mind, we could doubt the mind. Since all physical things are doubtable. We can doubt the brain all we want. But not the mind.

And how come immaterial things escape doubt whereas all things physical do not?

What's wrong with doubt anyways?

Matter can't escape doubt because we can always think of it as an illusion. We can conceive of everything being a product of our imagination. I never said anything was wrong with doubt
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.

"So Magic8000 believes Einstein was a proctologist who was persuaded by the Government and Hitler to fabricate the Theory of Relativity"- GWL-CPA
phantom
Posts: 6,774
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1/14/2014 2:15:11 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 2:02:19 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:52:49 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:47:45 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.

If we could conceive of a physical mind, we could doubt the mind. Since all physical things are doubtable. We can doubt the brain all we want. But not the mind.

And how come immaterial things escape doubt whereas all things physical do not?

What's wrong with doubt anyways?

Matter can't escape doubt because we can always think of it as an illusion. We can conceive of everything being a product of our imagination.

This doesn't explain why the immaterial mind cannot be doubted.

I never said anything was wrong with doubt

Then why is there any significance in the fact that the material mind can be doubted?
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
Juan_Pablo
Posts: 2,052
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1/14/2014 2:20:43 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
Yes. If all mental properties derive from the brain then they must necessarily be brain properties.

I do not believe the mind can be liberated from the brain that encases ( or "creates" ) it. If anyone were to claim that they physically liberated a person's mind from his brain, I would be one of the first to claim that the mind is in fact a copy and not the original.
Magic8000
Posts: 975
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1/14/2014 2:27:54 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 2:15:11 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:02:19 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:52:49 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:47:45 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.

If we could conceive of a physical mind, we could doubt the mind. Since all physical things are doubtable. We can doubt the brain all we want. But not the mind.

And how come immaterial things escape doubt whereas all things physical do not?

What's wrong with doubt anyways?

Matter can't escape doubt because we can always think of it as an illusion. We can conceive of everything being a product of our imagination.

This doesn't explain why the immaterial mind cannot be doubted.

Why does this matter? If you keep asking why, you'll eventually get to an answerable question. But not knowing why an immaterial mind can't be doubted doesn't matter.

I never said anything was wrong with doubt

Then why is there any significance in the fact that the material mind can be doubted?

Because it means our minds are not material.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.

"So Magic8000 believes Einstein was a proctologist who was persuaded by the Government and Hitler to fabricate the Theory of Relativity"- GWL-CPA
phantom
Posts: 6,774
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1/14/2014 2:32:25 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 2:27:54 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:15:11 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:02:19 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:52:49 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:47:45 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.

If we could conceive of a physical mind, we could doubt the mind. Since all physical things are doubtable. We can doubt the brain all we want. But not the mind.

And how come immaterial things escape doubt whereas all things physical do not?

What's wrong with doubt anyways?

Matter can't escape doubt because we can always think of it as an illusion. We can conceive of everything being a product of our imagination.

This doesn't explain why the immaterial mind cannot be doubted.

Why does this matter? If you keep asking why, you'll eventually get to an answerable question. But not knowing why an immaterial mind can't be doubted doesn't matter.

What?? You assume the immaterial mind cannot be doubted and I contest it and all you say is, it doesn't matter why? If the material mind can be doubted so can the immaterial. Please explain why this is not the case.


I never said anything was wrong with doubt

Then why is there any significance in the fact that the material mind can be doubted?

Because it means our minds are not material.

Doubt means uncertainty. Being uncertain of the material mind does not mean it doesn't exist.
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
Magic8000
Posts: 975
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1/14/2014 2:41:52 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 2:32:25 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:27:54 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:15:11 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:02:19 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:52:49 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:47:45 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.

If we could conceive of a physical mind, we could doubt the mind. Since all physical things are doubtable. We can doubt the brain all we want. But not the mind.

And how come immaterial things escape doubt whereas all things physical do not?

What's wrong with doubt anyways?

Matter can't escape doubt because we can always think of it as an illusion. We can conceive of everything being a product of our imagination.

This doesn't explain why the immaterial mind cannot be doubted.

Why does this matter? If you keep asking why, you'll eventually get to an answerable question. But not knowing why an immaterial mind can't be doubted doesn't matter.

What?? You assume the immaterial mind cannot be doubted and I contest it and all you say is, it doesn't matter why? If the material mind can be doubted so can the immaterial. Please explain why this is not the case.

lol, I got the wrong context of "cannot". Anyway, a material mind can be doubted because we can think of matter as an illusion. But an immaterial mind would not have the property of matter and would mean it's not doubtable. This follows Leibniz' law.

I never said anything was wrong with doubt

Then why is there any significance in the fact that the material mind can be doubted?

Because it means our minds are not material.

Doubt means uncertainty. Being uncertain of the material mind does not mean it doesn't exist.

Being uncertian is a mental process. Being uncertian of a mind is a contradiction. If we could be uncertian of our minds, they would be material, but we can't be uncertian of our minds.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.

"So Magic8000 believes Einstein was a proctologist who was persuaded by the Government and Hitler to fabricate the Theory of Relativity"- GWL-CPA
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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1/14/2014 2:45:44 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 2:32:25 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:27:54 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:15:11 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:02:19 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:52:49 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:47:45 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.

If we could conceive of a physical mind, we could doubt the mind. Since all physical things are doubtable. We can doubt the brain all we want. But not the mind.

And how come immaterial things escape doubt whereas all things physical do not?

What's wrong with doubt anyways?

Matter can't escape doubt because we can always think of it as an illusion. We can conceive of everything being a product of our imagination.

This doesn't explain why the immaterial mind cannot be doubted.

To doubt the mind is self-refuting, because doubting is a mental action. Since a mind contains things like "thoughts" and "experiences" that material things don't have (you cannot 'weigh' my experience of redness, or split my pain in half like you can with material things like atoms), it is immaterial.

Basically, you can learn everything about the brain, but you can never explain my experience. The neurons that fire that cause me to experience blue, can all be explained, but we can never really know whether the blue I experience is the blue you experience, even if the neural activity in our brain is sufficiently similar.

This suggests that mental events are not material events,


Why does this matter? If you keep asking why, you'll eventually get to an answerable question. But not knowing why an immaterial mind can't be doubted doesn't matter.

What?? You assume the immaterial mind cannot be doubted and I contest it and all you say is, it doesn't matter why? If the material mind can be doubted so can the immaterial. Please explain why this is not the case.


I never said anything was wrong with doubt

Then why is there any significance in the fact that the material mind can be doubted?

Because it means our minds are not material.

Doubt means uncertainty. Being uncertain of the material mind does not mean it doesn't exist.

That is not what Magic was arguing though.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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1/14/2014 2:49:34 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 2:32:25 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:27:54 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:15:11 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:02:19 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:52:49 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:47:45 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.

If we could conceive of a physical mind, we could doubt the mind. Since all physical things are doubtable. We can doubt the brain all we want. But not the mind.

And how come immaterial things escape doubt whereas all things physical do not?

What's wrong with doubt anyways?

Matter can't escape doubt because we can always think of it as an illusion. We can conceive of everything being a product of our imagination.

This doesn't explain why the immaterial mind cannot be doubted.

Why does this matter? If you keep asking why, you'll eventually get to an answerable question. But not knowing why an immaterial mind can't be doubted doesn't matter.

What?? You assume the immaterial mind cannot be doubted and I contest it and all you say is, it doesn't matter why? If the material mind can be doubted so can the immaterial. Please explain why this is not the case.


I never said anything was wrong with doubt

Then why is there any significance in the fact that the material mind can be doubted?

Because it means our minds are not material.

Doubt means uncertainty. Being uncertain of the material mind does not mean it doesn't exist.

What Magic is saying is that if A and B are truly identical, then what is true for A is true for B. Thus, if the mind and the brain are the same, then what is true for the mind should be true for the brain. In some possible possible world, solipsism is true. This means, that in some possible world there exists a mind, without a brain in that possible world. However, we cannot say that the brain can exist in a possible world, without a brain in that possible world (that would be a contradiction).

Since there is something true for the mind, that is not true for the brain (which is "exists in some possible world without the brain existing in that possible world"), then they are not identical.
phantom
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1/14/2014 2:53:16 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 2:41:52 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:32:25 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:27:54 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:15:11 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:02:19 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:52:49 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:47:45 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.

If we could conceive of a physical mind, we could doubt the mind. Since all physical things are doubtable. We can doubt the brain all we want. But not the mind.

And how come immaterial things escape doubt whereas all things physical do not?

What's wrong with doubt anyways?

Matter can't escape doubt because we can always think of it as an illusion. We can conceive of everything being a product of our imagination.

This doesn't explain why the immaterial mind cannot be doubted.

Why does this matter? If you keep asking why, you'll eventually get to an answerable question. But not knowing why an immaterial mind can't be doubted doesn't matter.

What?? You assume the immaterial mind cannot be doubted and I contest it and all you say is, it doesn't matter why? If the material mind can be doubted so can the immaterial. Please explain why this is not the case.

lol, I got the wrong context of "cannot". Anyway, a material mind can be doubted because we can think of matter as an illusion. But an immaterial mind would not have the property of matter and would mean it's not doubtable. This follows Leibniz' law.

Immaterial minds would have different properties. I don't see why they could not be marked as a possible illusion as well.

Either way, so what if the material mind can be doubted? That does not mean it doesn't exist.

I never said anything was wrong with doubt

Then why is there any significance in the fact that the material mind can be doubted?

Because it means our minds are not material.

Doubt means uncertainty. Being uncertain of the material mind does not mean it doesn't exist.

Being uncertian is a mental process. Being uncertian of a mind is a contradiction.

No it's not. Disbelieving in your mind is plausibly a contradiction, but disbelieving in the certainty of the mind is not.

If we could be uncertian of our minds, they would be material, but we can't be uncertian of our minds.

We can be uncertain of anything, regardless of whether or mind is immaterial or not.
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
phantom
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1/14/2014 2:58:48 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 2:45:44 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:32:25 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:27:54 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:15:11 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:02:19 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:52:49 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:47:45 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.

If we could conceive of a physical mind, we could doubt the mind. Since all physical things are doubtable. We can doubt the brain all we want. But not the mind.

And how come immaterial things escape doubt whereas all things physical do not?

What's wrong with doubt anyways?

Matter can't escape doubt because we can always think of it as an illusion. We can conceive of everything being a product of our imagination.

This doesn't explain why the immaterial mind cannot be doubted.

To doubt the mind is self-refuting, because doubting is a mental action.

Doubt merely means there might be some mistake. I don't trust my brain well enough to believe there is no possibility of mistake in my assuming the existence of the mind. All certainties fall subject to infinite regress, circular reasoning or unproven assumptions.

Since a mind contains things like "thoughts" and "experiences" that material things don't have (you cannot 'weigh' my experience of redness, or split my pain in half like you can with material things like atoms), it is immaterial.

This is an entirely different argument. You're pointing out problems with materialism that I already agree with. I'm not even a materialist.


Basically, you can learn everything about the brain, but you can never explain my experience. The neurons that fire that cause me to experience blue, can all be explained, but we can never really know whether the blue I experience is the blue you experience, even if the neural activity in our brain is sufficiently similar.

Again, not material to the specific debate. I agree with this.


This suggests that mental events are not material events,

Yep.


Why does this matter? If you keep asking why, you'll eventually get to an answerable question. But not knowing why an immaterial mind can't be doubted doesn't matter.

What?? You assume the immaterial mind cannot be doubted and I contest it and all you say is, it doesn't matter why? If the material mind can be doubted so can the immaterial. Please explain why this is not the case.


I never said anything was wrong with doubt

Then why is there any significance in the fact that the material mind can be doubted?

Because it means our minds are not material.

Doubt means uncertainty. Being uncertain of the material mind does not mean it doesn't exist.

That is not what Magic was arguing though.

The definition of doubt or the latter sentence?
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
phantom
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1/14/2014 2:59:41 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
Done for now. I'll reply latter to the rest.
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
Rational_Thinker9119
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1/14/2014 3:04:41 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 2:58:48 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:45:44 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:32:25 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:27:54 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:15:11 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:02:19 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:52:49 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:47:45 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.

If we could conceive of a physical mind, we could doubt the mind. Since all physical things are doubtable. We can doubt the brain all we want. But not the mind.

And how come immaterial things escape doubt whereas all things physical do not?

What's wrong with doubt anyways?

Matter can't escape doubt because we can always think of it as an illusion. We can conceive of everything being a product of our imagination.

This doesn't explain why the immaterial mind cannot be doubted.

To doubt the mind is self-refuting, because doubting is a mental action.

Doubt merely means there might be some mistake. I don't trust my brain well enough to believe there is no possibility of mistake in my assuming the existence of the mind.

Don't you understand? Doubting the mind is logically inconsistent. Doubting is a mental action, which presupposes the mind. Therefore, if you admit that you can doubt, then you also admit that your mind has to exist. Thus, you cannot doubt it consistently. However, you can doubt all material. Thus, the mind is not material by deduction. Simple.

All certainties fall subject to infinite regress, circular reasoning or unproven assumptions.

No, I am certain that I experience.

"I think, therefore, I am" - Descartes


Since a mind contains things like "thoughts" and "experiences" that material things don't have (you cannot 'weigh' my experience of redness, or split my pain in half like you can with material things like atoms), it is immaterial.

This is an entirely different argument. You're pointing out problems with materialism that I already agree with. I'm not even a materialist.

Ok, so you agree with the conclusion, just not the path Magic described. I think the path Magic describes makes sense, it is just that it requires understanding of modal logic and Leibniz law. Without that, it is confusing.



Basically, you can learn everything about the brain, but you can never explain my experience. The neurons that fire that cause me to experience blue, can all be explained, but we can never really know whether the blue I experience is the blue you experience, even if the neural activity in our brain is sufficiently similar.

Again, not material to the specific debate. I agree with this.


This suggests that mental events are not material events,

Yep.


Why does this matter? If you keep asking why, you'll eventually get to an answerable question. But not knowing why an immaterial mind can't be doubted doesn't matter.

What?? You assume the immaterial mind cannot be doubted and I contest it and all you say is, it doesn't matter why? If the material mind can be doubted so can the immaterial. Please explain why this is not the case.


I never said anything was wrong with doubt

Then why is there any significance in the fact that the material mind can be doubted?

Because it means our minds are not material.

Doubt means uncertainty. Being uncertain of the material mind does not mean it doesn't exist.

That is not what Magic was arguing though.

The definition of doubt or the latter sentence?
Magic8000
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1/14/2014 3:05:59 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 2:53:16 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:41:52 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:32:25 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:27:54 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:15:11 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 2:02:19 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:52:49 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:47:45 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:42:47 PM, phantom wrote:
At 1/14/2014 1:34:05 PM, Magic8000 wrote:


This I don't get. Are you assuming minds in a solipsist world are the same as in this universe? Or that since solipsist minds are immaterial our material minds wouldn't be able to conceive of them?

Combination of the two. The mind is the mind. They are not different in a solipsist world.

That's just an assertion. Material minds are at least just as conceivable as immaterial ones. There can be different kinds of minds.

I'm saying since we can conceive of our minds in a solipsist world, they're immaterial. Because if our minds were material, we wouldn't be able to conceive of that.

I don't see why this is the case. It is not as if we are conceiving what it would be like to have an immaterial mind. Whatever ways you can say it would be like, a materialist would say the same would be true for a material mind. If our minds are immaterial, perhaps it's easy to conceive what it would be like, but if our minds are material, whatever conceptions we make of a solipsist mind are within the grasp of the material mind. Ergo, I don't think it proves anything.

If we could conceive of a physical mind, we could doubt the mind. Since all physical things are doubtable. We can doubt the brain all we want. But not the mind.

And how come immaterial things escape doubt whereas all things physical do not?

What's wrong with doubt anyways?

Matter can't escape doubt because we can always think of it as an illusion. We can conceive of everything being a product of our imagination.

This doesn't explain why the immaterial mind cannot be doubted.

Why does this matter? If you keep asking why, you'll eventually get to an answerable question. But not knowing why an immaterial mind can't be doubted doesn't matter.

What?? You assume the immaterial mind cannot be doubted and I contest it and all you say is, it doesn't matter why? If the material mind can be doubted so can the immaterial. Please explain why this is not the case.

lol, I got the wrong context of "cannot". Anyway, a material mind can be doubted because we can think of matter as an illusion. But an immaterial mind would not have the property of matter and would mean it's not doubtable. This follows Leibniz' law.

Immaterial minds would have different properties. I don't see why they could not be marked as a possible illusion as well.

Something immaterial could be doubted, just not all immaterial things. But, we can doubt all matter and since something is physical or non-physical, the mind is not physical. The only option left is immateral.

Either way, so what if the material mind can be doubted? That does not mean it doesn't exist.

I never said anything was wrong with doubt

Then why is there any significance in the fact that the material mind can be doubted?

Because it means our minds are not material.

Doubt means uncertainty. Being uncertain of the material mind does not mean it doesn't exist.

Being uncertian is a mental process. Being uncertian of a mind is a contradiction.

No it's not. Disbelieving in your mind is plausibly a contradiction, but disbelieving in the certainty of the mind is not.

This seems to be equivocation. The context of doubt, would mean non-existence. What do you mean disbelieving the certianty?

If we could be uncertian of our minds, they would be material, but we can't be uncertian of our minds.

We can be uncertain of anything, regardless of whether or mind is immaterial or not.

This is answered at the top of this reply.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.

"So Magic8000 believes Einstein was a proctologist who was persuaded by the Government and Hitler to fabricate the Theory of Relativity"- GWL-CPA
zmikecuber
Posts: 4,093
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1/14/2014 7:47:49 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 11:55:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Are mental states equivalent to the material states of the brain? Discuss...

Maybe. It seems that our beginning position should be "no" though.

You can understand *every* single thing about what happens physically when viewing colors. But this doesn't explain what colors look like. So I think our intuitive position should be that they're not identical, even if they are very very closely related.

Also, let's pretend that I make an exact copy of myself. Molecule for molecule, it's exactly the same. It acts the same, has the same physical processes in its brain, etc.

But it seems at least conceivably possible that this duplicate of me wouldn't have consciousness. This seems intuitively plausible. But if that's the case, then we're both physically the same. But one of us has sensation and awareness, and the other doesn't. This seems to be possible; Thus, mental states and brain states can't be the exact same thing. Or at least intuitively aren't.
"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."
zmikecuber
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1/14/2014 7:49:29 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
If mental properties and brain properties are the exact same thing, then science has alot of explaining to do. What I'm feeling doesn't seem physical at all; thus, I see the BOP on the materialist in this case.
"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."
Rational_Thinker9119
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1/14/2014 7:50:12 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 7:47:49 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/14/2014 11:55:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Are mental states equivalent to the material states of the brain? Discuss...

Maybe. It seems that our beginning position should be "no" though.

You can understand *every* single thing about what happens physically when viewing colors. But this doesn't explain what colors look like. So I think our intuitive position should be that they're not identical, even if they are very very closely related.

Agreed.

"Experiences are so radically different from anything else in the universe. My experience of blue is not the same as the brain state that gives rise to blue. My experience of a toothache, we know, is closely linked to some neurons in a part of my brain firing, but they are not the same thing... There is this huge explantatory gap between them." - Christof Koch (Neuroscientist)


Also, let's pretend that I make an exact copy of myself. Molecule for molecule, it's exactly the same. It acts the same, has the same physical processes in its brain, etc.

But it seems at least conceivably possible that this duplicate of me wouldn't have consciousness. This seems intuitively plausible. But if that's the case, then we're both physically the same. But one of us has sensation and awareness, and the other doesn't. This seems to be possible; Thus, mental states and brain states can't be the exact same thing. Or at least intuitively aren't.

I believe that in principle, material states cannot be mental state as this is a category error.
zmikecuber
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1/14/2014 7:53:20 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 7:50:12 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 7:47:49 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/14/2014 11:55:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Are mental states equivalent to the material states of the brain? Discuss...

Maybe. It seems that our beginning position should be "no" though.

You can understand *every* single thing about what happens physically when viewing colors. But this doesn't explain what colors look like. So I think our intuitive position should be that they're not identical, even if they are very very closely related.

Agreed.

"Experiences are so radically different from anything else in the universe. My experience of blue is not the same as the brain state that gives rise to blue. My experience of a toothache, we know, is closely linked to some neurons in a part of my brain firing, but they are not the same thing... There is this huge explantatory gap between them." - Christof Koch (Neuroscientist)


Good quote. Thanks for sharing.


Also, let's pretend that I make an exact copy of myself. Molecule for molecule, it's exactly the same. It acts the same, has the same physical processes in its brain, etc.

But it seems at least conceivably possible that this duplicate of me wouldn't have consciousness. This seems intuitively plausible. But if that's the case, then we're both physically the same. But one of us has sensation and awareness, and the other doesn't. This seems to be possible; Thus, mental states and brain states can't be the exact same thing. Or at least intuitively aren't.

I believe that in principle, material states cannot be mental state as this is a category error.

It seems that the mind disproves, or at the very least, casts alot of doubt on hard materialism. But some naturalists supposedly think that there can be "immaterial" things that are still "natural" in a certain sense of the word. I find that to be rather interesting, since naturalism and materialism seem to be very similar.

It makes one wonder why materialism is so popular in the area of philosophy of mind and neuroscience...
"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."
Rational_Thinker9119
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1/14/2014 8:06:30 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/14/2014 7:53:20 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/14/2014 7:50:12 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 7:47:49 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/14/2014 11:55:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Are mental states equivalent to the material states of the brain? Discuss...

Maybe. It seems that our beginning position should be "no" though.

You can understand *every* single thing about what happens physically when viewing colors. But this doesn't explain what colors look like. So I think our intuitive position should be that they're not identical, even if they are very very closely related.

Agreed.

"Experiences are so radically different from anything else in the universe. My experience of blue is not the same as the brain state that gives rise to blue. My experience of a toothache, we know, is closely linked to some neurons in a part of my brain firing, but they are not the same thing... There is this huge explantatory gap between them." - Christof Koch (Neuroscientist)


Good quote. Thanks for sharing.


Also, let's pretend that I make an exact copy of myself. Molecule for molecule, it's exactly the same. It acts the same, has the same physical processes in its brain, etc.

But it seems at least conceivably possible that this duplicate of me wouldn't have consciousness. This seems intuitively plausible. But if that's the case, then we're both physically the same. But one of us has sensation and awareness, and the other doesn't. This seems to be possible; Thus, mental states and brain states can't be the exact same thing. Or at least intuitively aren't.

I believe that in principle, material states cannot be mental state as this is a category error.

It seems that the mind disproves, or at the very least, casts alot of doubt on hard materialism. But some naturalists supposedly think that there can be "immaterial" things that are still "natural" in a certain sense of the word. I find that to be rather interesting, since naturalism and materialism seem to be very similar.

Sure, but this thread is about mind states being the same as the brain states; whether naturalism is true or not doesn't really apply to this thread. But, technically speaking, it is possible to be a naturalist and believe in an immaterial mind, but then how does one define was is 'natural'?


It makes one wonder why materialism is so popular in the area of philosophy of mind and neuroscience...
popculturepooka
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1/14/2014 8:16:14 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
To the OP: No.

At 1/14/2014 7:53:20 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/14/2014 7:50:12 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/14/2014 7:47:49 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/14/2014 11:55:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Are mental states equivalent to the material states of the brain? Discuss...

Maybe. It seems that our beginning position should be "no" though.

You can understand *every* single thing about what happens physically when viewing colors. But this doesn't explain what colors look like. So I think our intuitive position should be that they're not identical, even if they are very very closely related.

Agreed.

"Experiences are so radically different from anything else in the universe. My experience of blue is not the same as the brain state that gives rise to blue. My experience of a toothache, we know, is closely linked to some neurons in a part of my brain firing, but they are not the same thing... There is this huge explantatory gap between them." - Christof Koch (Neuroscientist)


Good quote. Thanks for sharing.


Also, let's pretend that I make an exact copy of myself. Molecule for molecule, it's exactly the same. It acts the same, has the same physical processes in its brain, etc.

But it seems at least conceivably possible that this duplicate of me wouldn't have consciousness. This seems intuitively plausible. But if that's the case, then we're both physically the same. But one of us has sensation and awareness, and the other doesn't. This seems to be possible; Thus, mental states and brain states can't be the exact same thing. Or at least intuitively aren't.

I believe that in principle, material states cannot be mental state as this is a category error.

It seems that the mind disproves, or at the very least, casts alot of doubt on hard materialism. But some naturalists supposedly think that there can be "immaterial" things that are still "natural" in a certain sense of the word. I find that to be rather interesting, since naturalism and materialism seem to be very similar.

It makes one wonder why materialism is so popular in the area of philosophy of mind and neuroscience...

Because it's orthodoxy.
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