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Define Possibility!

Dazz
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1/20/2014 11:31:15 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
with examples.....
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phantom
Posts: 6,774
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1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.
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Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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1/21/2014 9:24:31 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
Or, if you grant that it is possible that all the information there is to know, is not known. Pretty modest possibility right? Well, this entails God doesn't exist, if it is possible, because if God existed, omniscience would hold in every world. Thus, if it is possible that all the information there is to know, is not known; Atheism entails.

I could go on, but there are tons of worlds I can conceive of that, if possible, entail this maximally great being cannot exist. So, just because a theist can conceive of a world that if possible, makes God exists, doesn't mean much. I can do the same with God not existing. So, this argument for theism is a dud.
zmikecuber
Posts: 4,093
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1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."
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DudeStop
Posts: 1,278
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1/21/2014 9:53:30 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

I definitely think he's a possibility, but I would define him as an unlikely one.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,255
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1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,255
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1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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1/22/2014 8:49:10 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?

Huh? I debate a lot of people, and I don't remember each one. To be honest, I haven't got the slightest idea what you are talking about...
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,255
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1/22/2014 8:55:32 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 8:49:10 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?

Huh? I debate a lot of people, and I don't remember each one. To be honest, I haven't got the slightest idea what you are talking about...

Your argument was that since it is conceivable the mind and body are not the same, they aren't, because equivalent entities cannot have different possibilities. I pointed out that this argument, by its own admission, asserts that something can be conceivable yet impossible (monism). Since the argument makes a conclusion based on the conceivability of dualism, its own conclusion defeats itself. Another way to look at it is: the argument only proves the possibility of different possibilities.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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1/22/2014 8:57:51 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 8:55:32 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:49:10 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?

Huh? I debate a lot of people, and I don't remember each one. To be honest, I haven't got the slightest idea what you are talking about...


Ya, these are two completely different arguments you are talking about here. The argument I am using against the MOA isn't even close to the argument I used for the mind being different than the body.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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1/22/2014 9:02:24 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 8:55:32 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:49:10 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?

Huh? I debate a lot of people, and I don't remember each one. To be honest, I haven't got the slightest idea what you are talking about...

Your argument was that since it is conceivable the mind and body are not the same, they aren't, because equivalent entities cannot have different possibilities. I pointed out that this argument, by its own admission, asserts that something can be conceivable yet impossible (monism). Since the argument makes a conclusion based on the conceivability of dualism, its own conclusion defeats itself. Another way to look at it is: the argument only proves the possibility of different possibilities.

I meant to quote you, but I quoted myself by accident.

The difference is that the MOA would be prima facie sound if there wasn't other things that seem just as conceivable which negate it. With the argument I presented for the mind and body being different, there isn't something just as conceivable which negates my conclusion. Thus, they are not the same argument.

Also, even if something impossible can be conceivable, you would have to prove it is impossible. Basically, if X is conceivable, it should be considered possible without a defeater. As philosopher Richard Swinburne notes, any claim could be rejected due to there maybe being hidden contradictions, but that is irrational. If something is conceivable, we should believe it is possible until a defeater for it arises.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,255
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1/22/2014 9:04:47 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 9:02:24 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:55:32 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:49:10 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?

Huh? I debate a lot of people, and I don't remember each one. To be honest, I haven't got the slightest idea what you are talking about...

Your argument was that since it is conceivable the mind and body are not the same, they aren't, because equivalent entities cannot have different possibilities. I pointed out that this argument, by its own admission, asserts that something can be conceivable yet impossible (monism). Since the argument makes a conclusion based on the conceivability of dualism, its own conclusion defeats itself. Another way to look at it is: the argument only proves the possibility of different possibilities.

I meant to quote you, but I quoted myself by accident.

The difference is that the MOA would be prima facie sound if there wasn't other things that seem just as conceivable which negate it. With the argument I presented for the mind and body being different, there isn't something just as conceivable which negates my conclusion. Thus, they are not the same argument.

Why is monism not conceivable? And if it is not, then for what reason did you post your argument in the first place?

Also, even if something impossible can be conceivable, you would have to prove it is impossible. Basically, if X is conceivable, it should be considered possible without a defeater. As philosopher Richard Swinburne notes, any claim could be rejected due to there maybe being hidden contradictions, but that is irrational. If something is conceivable, we should believe it is possible until a defeater for it arises.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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1/22/2014 9:21:12 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 9:04:47 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:02:24 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:55:32 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:49:10 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?

Huh? I debate a lot of people, and I don't remember each one. To be honest, I haven't got the slightest idea what you are talking about...

Your argument was that since it is conceivable the mind and body are not the same, they aren't, because equivalent entities cannot have different possibilities. I pointed out that this argument, by its own admission, asserts that something can be conceivable yet impossible (monism). Since the argument makes a conclusion based on the conceivability of dualism, its own conclusion defeats itself. Another way to look at it is: the argument only proves the possibility of different possibilities.

I meant to quote you, but I quoted myself by accident.

The difference is that the MOA would be prima facie sound if there wasn't other things that seem just as conceivable which negate it. With the argument I presented for the mind and body being different, there isn't something just as conceivable which negates my conclusion. Thus, they are not the same argument.


Why is monism not conceivable?

What do you mean by monism? You mean, the view that the brain and the mind are the exact same? Well, this is inconceivable because mental states are acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection, and brain states are not acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection. As Sam Harris notes:

"There is nothing about introspection that leads you to sense that your subjectivity is at all dependent or even related to voltage changes and chemical reactions going on inside your head. You can drop acid, you can meditate for a year, you can do whatever you want to perterbe your nervous system, you can feel yourself to be one with the universe, and at no point in that transformation do you get a glimpse that there is a hundred trillion neurons in your head, or synapses in your head that are doing anything." - Sam Harris

Since there is a difference between mental states and brain states (one is acknowledged by introspection, the other is not), they cannot be the same. There cannot be differences between A and B, if A actually is B.

And if it is not, then for what reason did you post your argument in the first place?

To show that if you can conceive of your mind existing in a different body, without any logical or metaphysical absurdities, then this entails the mind is not the same as the body. If you try to conceive of your mental life being the exact same as your brain, it does lead to absurdities.


Also, even if something impossible can be conceivable, you would have to prove it is impossible. Basically, if X is conceivable, it should be considered possible without a defeater. As philosopher Richard Swinburne notes, any claim could be rejected due to there maybe being hidden contradictions, but that is irrational. If something is conceivable, we should believe it is possible until a defeater for it arises.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,255
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1/22/2014 9:29:56 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 9:21:12 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:04:47 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:02:24 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:55:32 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:49:10 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

This lack of delineation constantly causes confusion in the ontological argument for God's existence because people confuse God existing in possible worlds with God existing because of an error in judgement. In other words, it could be ontologically true that God as a supremely perfect, powerful and good being exists in no possible worlds. However it could at the same time be an epistemological possibility that such a being exists because our level of knowledge doesn't allow us to be sure. Therefore, when people say if it's possible God exists, then God exists, they need to be aware of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?

Huh? I debate a lot of people, and I don't remember each one. To be honest, I haven't got the slightest idea what you are talking about...

Your argument was that since it is conceivable the mind and body are not the same, they aren't, because equivalent entities cannot have different possibilities. I pointed out that this argument, by its own admission, asserts that something can be conceivable yet impossible (monism). Since the argument makes a conclusion based on the conceivability of dualism, its own conclusion defeats itself. Another way to look at it is: the argument only proves the possibility of different possibilities.

I meant to quote you, but I quoted myself by accident.

The difference is that the MOA would be prima facie sound if there wasn't other things that seem just as conceivable which negate it. With the argument I presented for the mind and body being different, there isn't something just as conceivable which negates my conclusion. Thus, they are not the same argument.


Why is monism not conceivable?

What do you mean by monism? You mean, the view that the brain and the mind are the exact same? Well, this is inconceivable because mental states are acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection, and brain states are not acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection. As Sam Harris notes:

"There is nothing about introspection that leads you to sense that your subjectivity is at all dependent or even related to voltage changes and chemical reactions going on inside your head. You can drop acid, you can meditate for a year, you can do whatever you want to perterbe your nervous system, you can feel yourself to be one with the universe, and at no point in that transformation do you get a glimpse that there is a hundred trillion neurons in your head, or synapses in your head that are doing anything." - Sam Harris

Let me get this straight: are you saying that the argument is predicated on the validity of its own conclusion? That would render the argument utterly useless!


Since there is a difference between mental states and brain states (one is acknowledged by introspection, the other is not), they cannot be the same. There cannot be differences between A and B, if A actually is B.

And if it is not, then for what reason did you post your argument in the first place?

To show that if you can conceive of your mind existing in a different body, without any logical or metaphysical absurdities, then this entails the mind is not the same as the body. If you try to conceive of your mental life being the exact same as your brain, it does lead to absurdities.



Also, even if something impossible can be conceivable, you would have to prove it is impossible. Basically, if X is conceivable, it should be considered possible without a defeater. As philosopher Richard Swinburne notes, any claim could be rejected due to there maybe being hidden contradictions, but that is irrational. If something is conceivable, we should believe it is possible until a defeater for it arises.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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1/22/2014 9:35:40 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 9:29:56 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:21:12 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:04:47 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:02:24 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:55:32 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:49:10 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

e of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?

Huh? I debate a lot of people, and I don't remember each one. To be honest, I haven't got the slightest idea what you are talking about...

Your argument was that since it is conceivable the mind and body are not the same, they aren't, because equivalent entities cannot have different possibilities. I pointed out that this argument, by its own admission, asserts that something can be conceivable yet impossible (monism). Since the argument makes a conclusion based on the conceivability of dualism, its own conclusion defeats itself. Another way to look at it is: the argument only proves the possibility of different possibilities.

I meant to quote you, but I quoted myself by accident.

The difference is that the MOA would be prima facie sound if there wasn't other things that seem just as conceivable which negate it. With the argument I presented for the mind and body being different, there isn't something just as conceivable which negates my conclusion. Thus, they are not the same argument.


Why is monism not conceivable?

What do you mean by monism? You mean, the view that the brain and the mind are the exact same? Well, this is inconceivable because mental states are acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection, and brain states are not acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection. As Sam Harris notes:

"There is nothing about introspection that leads you to sense that your subjectivity is at all dependent or even related to voltage changes and chemical reactions going on inside your head. You can drop acid, you can meditate for a year, you can do whatever you want to perterbe your nervous system, you can feel yourself to be one with the universe, and at no point in that transformation do you get a glimpse that there is a hundred trillion neurons in your head, or synapses in your head that are doing anything." - Sam Harris


Let me get this straight: are you saying that the argument is predicated on the validity of its own conclusion? That would render the argument utterly useless!

Perhaps. This is why I tend to use the introspective argument for the mind being different than the brain now, rather than the conceivability argument. Not because the conceivability argument is unsound (I think that all arguments in this regard beg the question, but that isn't always fallacious), but it causes confusion.



Since there is a difference between mental states and brain states (one is acknowledged by introspection, the other is not), they cannot be the same. There cannot be differences between A and B, if A actually is B.

And if it is not, then for what reason did you post your argument in the first place?

To show that if you can conceive of your mind existing in a different body, without any logical or metaphysical absurdities, then this entails the mind is not the same as the body. If you try to conceive of your mental life being the exact same as your brain, it does lead to absurdities.



Also, even if something impossible can be conceivable, you would have to prove it is impossible. Basically, if X is conceivable, it should be considered possible without a defeater. As philosopher Richard Swinburne notes, any claim could be rejected due to there maybe being hidden contradictions, but that is irrational. If something is conceivable, we should believe it is possible until a defeater for it a
dylancatlow
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1/22/2014 9:40:07 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 9:35:40 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:29:56 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:21:12 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:04:47 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:02:24 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:55:32 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:49:10 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

e of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?

Huh? I debate a lot of people, and I don't remember each one. To be honest, I haven't got the slightest idea what you are talking about...

Your argument was that since it is conceivable the mind and body are not the same, they aren't, becau different possibilities.

I meant to quote you, but I quoted myself by accident.

The difference is that the MOA would be prima facie sound if there wasn't other things that seem just as conceivable which negate it. With the argument I presented for the mind and body being different, there isn't something just as conceivable which negates my conclusion. Thus, they are not the same argument.


Why is monism not conceivable?

What do you mean by monism? You mean, the view that the brain and the mind are the exact same? Well, this is inconceivable because mental states are acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection, and brain states are not acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection. As Sam Harris notes:

"There is nothing about introspection that leads you to sense that your subjectivity is at all dependent or even related to voltage changes and chemical reactions going on inside your head. You can drop acid, you can meditate for a year, you can do whatever you want to perterbe your nervous system, you can feel yourself to be one with the universe, and at no point in that transformation do you get a glimpse that there is a hundred trillion neurons in your head, or synapses in your head that are doing anything." - Sam Harris


Let me get this straight: are you saying that the argument is predicated on the validity of its own conclusion? That would render the argument utterly useless!

Perhaps. This is why I tend to use the introspective argument for the mind being different than the brain now, rather than the conceivability argument. Not because the conceivability argument is unsound (I think that all arguments in this regard beg the question, but that isn't always fallacious), but it causes confusion.


No, not perhaps. Any argument that relies on its own conclusion is unnecessary. That's some about which there can be no doubt in any rational mind.



Since there is a difference between mental states and brain states (one is acknowledged by introspection, the other is not), they cannot be the same. There cannot be differences between A and B, if A actually is B.

And if it is not, then for what reason did you post your argument in the first place?

To show that if you can conceive of your mind existing in a different body, without any logical or metaphysical absurdities, then this entails the mind is not the same as the body. If you try to conceive of your mental life being the exact same as your brain, it does lead to absurdities.



Also, even if something impossible can be conceivable, you would have to prove it is impossible. Basically, if X is conceivable, it should be considered possible without a defeater. As philosopher Richard Swinburne notes, any claim could be rejected due to there maybe being hidden contradictions, but that is irrational. If something is conceivable, we should believe it is possible until a defeater for it a
Rational_Thinker9119
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1/22/2014 9:40:21 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
Well, I shouldn't say all beg the question, but with regards to the philosophy of mind it is hard not to. I mean, to argue for what the mind is, you have to use the word mind. But, to use the word mind presupposes that you know what it is. Thus, even using the word presupposes it is material or immaterial.

I think the introspective argument is the best way to make the distinction. If mental states were brain states, then it follows that when you do introspection, you are doing neuroscience. Since this is false (we didn't even know what neurons were until the 1800's), then our human mental states are not the same as our human brain states.
Rational_Thinker9119
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1/22/2014 9:41:43 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 9:40:07 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:35:40 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:29:56 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:21:12 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:04:47 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:02:24 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:55:32 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:49:10 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Take the statement, "it is possible aliens exist". Now let's presume for sake of discussion that aliens do not exist. The statement is true in the epistemological sense and false in the ontological sense. As far as our knowledge is concerned, aliens might exist. They don't, but we still have reason to believe it possible; therefore they might exist. The statement is ontologically incorrect because as ontological facts, the two statements, "aliens might exist", and "aliens do not exist" are both contradictory. In other words, ontological possibilities have nothing to do with our knowledge. An example of an ontological possibility would be, "it's possible that the dice will land on six three times in a row." (Let's just ignore determinism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

e of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.

The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is that there are worlds that seem just as possible as a world with God, but if these worlds are possible; God cannot exist. Such as, a world with no omnipotence. That world seems just as possible as a world with God (if not more modest). However, if God existed, there would be omnipotence in every world. Thus, if there is no omnipotence in one world, then God cannot exist. So, we can run modal arguments for Atheism in this regard (which is exactly what philosopher Ryan Stringer did).

This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?

Huh? I debate a lot of people, and I don't remember each one. To be honest, I haven't got the slightest idea what you are talking about...

Your argument was that since it is conceivable the mind and body are not the same, they aren't, becau different possibilities.

I meant to quote you, but I quoted myself by accident.

The difference is that the MOA would be prima facie sound if there wasn't other things that seem just as conceivable which negate it. With the argument I presented for the mind and body being different, there isn't something just as conceivable which negates my conclusion. Thus, they are not the same argument.


Why is monism not conceivable?

What do you mean by monism? You mean, the view that the brain and the mind are the exact same? Well, this is inconceivable because mental states are acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection, and brain states are not acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection. As Sam Harris notes:

"There is nothing about introspection that leads you to sense that your subjectivity is at all dependent or even related to voltage changes and chemical reactions going on inside your head. You can drop acid, you can meditate for a year, you can do whatever you want to perterbe your nervous system, you can feel yourself to be one with the universe, and at no point in that transformation do you get a glimpse that there is a hundred trillion neurons in your head, or synapses in your head that are doing anything." - Sam Harris


Let me get this straight: are you saying that the argument is predicated on the validity of its own conclusion? That would render the argument utterly useless!

Perhaps. This is why I tend to use the introspective argument for the mind being different than the brain now, rather than the conceivability argument. Not because the conceivability argument is unsound (I think that all arguments in this regard beg the question, but that isn't always fallacious), but it causes confusion.


No, not perhaps. Any argument that relies on its own conclusion is unnecessary. That's some about which there can be no doubt in any rational mind.

Any rational mind knows that circular reasoning isn't always fallacious.




Since there is a difference between mental states and brain states (one is acknowledged by introspection, the other is not), they cannot be the same. There cannot be differences between A and B, if A actually is B.

And if it is not, then for what reason did you post your argument in the first place?

To show that if you can conceive of your mind existing in a different body, without any logical or metaphysical absurdities, then this entails the mind is not the same as the body. If you try to conceive of your mental life being the exact same as your brain, it does lead to absurdities.



Also, even if something impossible can be conceivable, you would have to prove it is impossible. Basically, if X is conceivable, it should be considered possible without a defeater. As philosopher Richard Swinburne notes, any claim could be rejected due to there maybe being hidden contradictions, but that is irrational. If something is conceivable, we should believe it is p
Rational_Thinker9119
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1/22/2014 9:43:13 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
I don't use that conceivability argument anymore anyway. I think the best way to know that your mental states are not identical to your brain states is to do introspection.
Rational_Thinker9119
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1/22/2014 9:43:13 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
I don't use that conceivability argument anymore anyway. I think the best way to know that your mental states are not identical to your brain states is to do introspection.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,255
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1/22/2014 9:47:01 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 9:41:43 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:40:07 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:35:40 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:29:56 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:21:12 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:04:47 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:02:24 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:55:32 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:49:10 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Takminism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

e of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.


This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?

Huh? I debate a lot of people, and I don't remember each one. To be honest, I haven't got the slightest idea what you are talking about...

Your argument was that since it is conceivable the mind and body are not the same, they aren't, becau different possibilities.

I meant to quote you, but I quoted myself by accident.

The differst as conceivable which negates my conclusion. Thus, they are not the same argument.


Why is monism not conceivable?

What do you mean by monism? You mean, the view that the brain and the mind are the exact same? Well, this is inconceivable because mental states are acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection, and brain states are not acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection. As Sam Harris notes:

"There i


Let me get this straight: are you saying that the argument is predicated on the validity of its own conclusion? That would render the argument utterly useless!

Perhaps. This is why I tend to use the introspective argument for the mind being different than the brain now, rather than the conceivability argument. Not because the conceivability argument is unsound (I think that all arguments in this regard beg the question, but that isn't always fallacious), but it causes confusion.


No, not perhaps. Any argument that relies on its own conclusion is unnecessary. That's some about which there can be no doubt in any rational mind.

Any rational mind knows that circular reasoning isn't always fallacious.


All reasoning is circular. The 'problem' is that this argument is unnecessary, not that it is fallacious. This is essentially the argument: if dualism is true, dualism is true.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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1/22/2014 9:51:06 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 9:47:01 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:41:43 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:40:07 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:35:40 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:29:56 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:21:12 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:04:47 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:02:24 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:55:32 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:49:10 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Takminism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

e of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.


This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?

Huh? I debate a lot of people, and I don't remember each one. To be honest, I haven't got the slightest idea what you are talking about...

Your argument was that since it is conceivable the mind and body are not the same, they aren't, becau different possibilities.

I meant to quote you, but I quoted myself by accident.

The differst as conceivable which negates my conclusion. Thus, they are not the same argument.


Why is monism not conceivable?

What do you mean by monism? You mean, the view that the brain and the mind are the exact same? Well, this is inconceivable because mental states are acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection, and brain states are not acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection. As Sam Harris notes:

"There i


Let me get this straight: are you saying that the argument is predicated on the validity of its own conclusion? That would render the argument utterly useless!

Perhaps. This is why I tend to use the introspective argument for the mind being different than the brain now, rather than the conceivability argument. Not because the conceivability argument is unsound (I think that all arguments in this regard beg the question, but that isn't always fallacious), but it causes confusion.


No, not perhaps. Any argument that relies on its own conclusion is unnecessary. That's some about which there can be no doubt in any rational mind.

Any rational mind knows that circular reasoning isn't always fallacious.



All reasoning is circular. The 'problem' is that this argument is unnecessary, not that it is fallacious. This is essentially the argument: if dualism is true, dualism is true.

Perhaps you are right, it is unnecessary (but I don't use that particular argument anymore anyway, as I think there are better arguments). However, I think Idealism is true, not dualism. I think dualism is false because it is metaphysically impossible for material properties to interact with immaterial properties, with intentionality, that are "about" something. I think everything are mental states. So, I guess under Idealism, my brain states are mental states! But they are not my mental states that I discover or examine when doing introspection. What I meant to say is that our mental states are not our brain states. So while it is true that our brain states are mental states under Idealism, they are more primarily God's mental states. Thus, even of the mind and brain are both sorts of mental states, my argument for them not being identical still holds. I suppose I should have said my mental states are not my brain states, or your mental states are not your brain states. Because, yes, I believe that brain states are mental states.
Rational_Thinker9119
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1/22/2014 9:54:25 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
I think Materialism (the view that the brain and mind or the same, or both material) is false, and that Dualism (the view that the brain is material, and the mind is immaterial) is false. I adhere to Idealism (the view that mind is immaterial, and the brain is immaterial, and that everything is mind "stuff", or information).
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,255
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1/22/2014 10:05:25 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 1/22/2014 9:51:06 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:47:01 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:41:43 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:40:07 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:35:40 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:29:56 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:21:12 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:04:47 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 9:02:24 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:55:32 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:49:10 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:46:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:44:35 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:41:23 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2014 8:37:55 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:34:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 1/21/2014 9:19:08 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 1/21/2014 12:42:42 AM, phantom wrote:
There are two types of possibility. One is epistemological, the other is ontological, or metaphysical. Epistemology has to do with knowledge. Ontology has to do with being. Takminism for a moment and assume the dice is truly random) That's both ontologically and epistemologically true.

e of the crucial distinction between the two types of possibility.

That's not a definition, but that's what Google is for.


This is why the MOA is stupid. Sure, if we grant God is possible, he exists. But, if you grant that it is possible that there is no omnipotence; God doesn't exist.

Lol. You don't know how many atheists I've met who have said: "Sure, God is a possibility, but that doesn't mean he exists..."

Well, if they define God as a maximally great being, and are referring to metaphysical possibility, then, yes, that is pretty stupid of the Atheist to say that. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all of them.

However, for the reasons I have brought up, the MOA is a dumb argument. Why should we grant that God exists in some possible world, but not grant that in some possible world there is no omnipotence? Both seem conceivable, but they both cannot be true! One entails God exits, the other entails he doesn't.

Does this mean that you don't think the mind and body aren't the same anymore?

Where would you get that from? The Modal Ontological Argument is a completely different subject than the philosophy of mind. I am talking about the Modal Ontological Argument here, not the philosophy of mind per se.

That's exactly the same argument I used. Why does it apply here but not there?

Huh? I debate a lot of people, and I don't remember each one. To be honest, I haven't got the slightest idea what you are talking about...

Your argument was that since it is conceivable the mind and body are not the same, they aren't, becau different possibilities.

I meant to quote you, but I quoted myself by accident.

The differst as conceivable which negates my conclusion. Thus, they are not the same argument.


Why is monism not conceivable?

What do you mean by monism? You mean, the view that the brain and the mind are the exact same? Well, this is inconceivable because mental states are acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection, and brain states are not acknowledged by introspection when we engage in introspection. As Sam Harris notes:

"There i


Let me get this straight: are you saying that the argument is predicated on the validity of its own conclusion? That would render the argument utterly useless!

Perhaps. This is why I tend to use the introspective argument for the mind being different than the brain now, rather than the conceivability argument. Not because the conceivability argument is unsound (I think that all arguments in this regard beg the question, but that isn't always fallacious), but it causes confusion.


No, not perhaps. Any argument that relies on its own conclusion is unnecessary. That's some about which there can be no doubt in any rational mind.

Any rational mind knows that circular reasoning isn't always fallacious.



All reasoning is circular. The 'problem' is that this argument is unnecessary, not that it is fallacious. This is essentially the argument: if dualism is true, dualism is true.

Perhaps you are right, it is unnecessary (but I don't use that particular argument anymore anyway, as I think there are better arguments). However, I think Idealism is true, not dualism. I think dualism is false because it is metaphysically impossible for material properties to interact with immaterial properties, with intentionality, that are "about" something. I think everything are mental states. So, I guess under Idealism, my brain states are mental states! But they are not my mental states that I discover or examine when doing introspection. What I meant to say is that our mental states are not our brain states. So while it is true that our brain states are mental states under Idealism, they are more primarily God's mental states. Thus, even of the mind and brain are both sorts of mental states, my argument for them not being identical still holds. I suppose I should have said my mental states are not my brain states, or your mental states are not your brain states. Because, yes, I believe that brain states are mental states.

NO, not perhaps. The argument is forever irrelevant. Without a conclusion to match its own, the argument is not affirmed.