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Argument from personhood against idealism

n7
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5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
philosurfer
Posts: 17
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6/8/2014 12:50:36 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
I still like the ZOMBIE hypothetical(s) ... Consider a body without Mind ... but then try to consider Mind without a body. What would that look like or be or is that even a possibility?

A zombie is often considered as a "living dead" - which is curious - but still a body without Mind. A dead person - is a body without Mind - its a dead body.

A Mind without a body is very difficult; I would say more difficult.

I think the end result is there is no way to disassociate the Mind from a body. At least not yet.

So for me, any brand of Idealism if faulty.

I prefer the Simulation hypothesis more, or the derivatives of the Evil Genius theory.

But all have an infinite regress built within them. Where did God's mind come from, or, who build or is responsible for the simulation..? ect.
Toviyah
Posts: 88
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6/8/2014 2:39:30 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

If that is the case, then all the (monistic) idealist has to do is redefine what 'mind' means.
I also don't buy the "They must interact via a shared property" - You and I are 'interacting' through this forum, but I'm pretty sure we are separate entities.
n7
Posts: 1,360
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6/8/2014 7:44:00 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/8/2014 2:39:30 PM, Toviyah wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

If that is the case, then all the (monistic) idealist has to do is redefine what 'mind' means.

Define it as what? If the definition removes personhood, it would seem to be incoherent. It would mean statements like "There is a feeling of pain, but with no one feeling it" or "There is thinking, but no one is thinking" would be coherent. These are clearly self-contradictory.

I also don't buy the "They must interact via a shared property" - You and I are 'interacting' through this forum, but I'm pretty sure we are separate entities.

You misunderstood it. We interact through a shared property. In our case matter. We're not two separate substances.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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6/8/2014 11:39:57 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

Semantics. It almost reminds me of how bad my argument from temporal minds was lol
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.
n7
Posts: 1,360
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6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings? This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
zmikecuber
Posts: 4,083
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6/9/2014 4:18:05 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings? This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.

Aren't sensations/beliefs/desires, just different states the self is in?
"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."
n7
Posts: 1,360
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6/9/2014 4:37:45 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/9/2014 4:18:05 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings? This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.

Aren't sensations/beliefs/desires, just different states the self is in?

Yes. That is what I'm arguing.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
zmikecuber
Posts: 4,083
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6/9/2014 7:13:02 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/9/2014 4:37:45 PM, n7 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 4:18:05 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings? This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.

Aren't sensations/beliefs/desires, just different states the self is in?

Yes. That is what I'm arguing.

I'm not sure how I see the problem though. The self, and the sensations we feel aren't identical, but they're still the same "type" of thing, so can't they still interact?

Another point to make is that sensations or whatnot are not substances, or *things* themselves. They can't exist apart from a mind. Can you imagine the sensation of pain which is not being felt by a mind? Obviously not.

So I don't even see how these are two different things interacting. Furthermore, even if they are two different things, why can't they be two different things but the same *type* of thing?

But as it is, I don't think that sensations are substances. I think they're more like experiences or states that we ourselves are in.
"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."
n7
Posts: 1,360
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6/9/2014 7:43:18 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/9/2014 7:13:02 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 6/9/2014 4:37:45 PM, n7 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 4:18:05 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings? This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.

Aren't sensations/beliefs/desires, just different states the self is in?

Yes. That is what I'm arguing.

I'm not sure how I see the problem though. The self, and the sensations we feel aren't identical, but they're still the same "type" of thing, so can't they still interact?

Another point to make is that sensations or whatnot are not substances, or *things* themselves. They can't exist apart from a mind. Can you imagine the sensation of pain which is not being felt by a mind? Obviously not.

So I don't even see how these are two different things interacting. Furthermore, even if they are two different things, why can't they be two different things but the same *type* of thing?

But as it is, I don't think that sensations are substances. I think they're more like experiences or states that we ourselves are in.

I'm not saying the problem is sensations and the self interacting.i'm saying under idealism the mind and the self interact. So of course sensations are mental, but I'm saying the self isn't mental or mind.

Although it may be the case that under idealism mental events and actions must equal the self. Otherwise how are we different. There doesn't seem to be a difference between simple conscious awareness.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
zmikecuber
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6/9/2014 7:47:04 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/9/2014 7:43:18 PM, n7 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 7:13:02 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 6/9/2014 4:37:45 PM, n7 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 4:18:05 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings? This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.

Aren't sensations/beliefs/desires, just different states the self is in?

Yes. That is what I'm arguing.

I'm not sure how I see the problem though. The self, and the sensations we feel aren't identical, but they're still the same "type" of thing, so can't they still interact?

Another point to make is that sensations or whatnot are not substances, or *things* themselves. They can't exist apart from a mind. Can you imagine the sensation of pain which is not being felt by a mind? Obviously not.

So I don't even see how these are two different things interacting. Furthermore, even if they are two different things, why can't they be two different things but the same *type* of thing?

But as it is, I don't think that sensations are substances. I think they're more like experiences or states that we ourselves are in.

I'm not saying the problem is sensations and the self interacting.i'm saying under idealism the mind and the self interact. So of course sensations are mental, but I'm saying the self isn't mental or mind.


Yes, the self is mental, or mind. However what you mean by "mind" here are sensations, and as I've argued, these are NOT substances. They're not things. They're states of being for a different thing... aka the self.

So the way "fear" relates to the person feeling it, is the same way "red" relates to a brick wall. One is a substance which can stand alone. The other is merely predicated of a substance, and is not a "thing" in itself.

Although it may be the case that under idealism mental events and actions must equal the self. Otherwise how are we different. There doesn't seem to be a difference between simple conscious awareness.

I disagree with that.... I think that there is a sort of "serial number" for every existent thing. That rabbit over there is different than the other one. My self is always ME, even if you erase my memory, put me on drugs, etc. The *substance* itself doesn't change.
"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."
n7
Posts: 1,360
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6/9/2014 8:42:37 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/9/2014 7:47:04 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 6/9/2014 7:43:18 PM, n7 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 7:13:02 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 6/9/2014 4:37:45 PM, n7 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 4:18:05 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings? This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.

Aren't sensations/beliefs/desires, just different states the self is in?

Yes. That is what I'm arguing.

I'm not sure how I see the problem though. The self, and the sensations we feel aren't identical, but they're still the same "type" of thing, so can't they still interact?

Another point to make is that sensations or whatnot are not substances, or *things* themselves. They can't exist apart from a mind. Can you imagine the sensation of pain which is not being felt by a mind? Obviously not.

So I don't even see how these are two different things interacting. Furthermore, even if they are two different things, why can't they be two different things but the same *type* of thing?

But as it is, I don't think that sensations are substances. I think they're more like experiences or states that we ourselves are in.

I'm not saying the problem is sensations and the self interacting.i'm saying under idealism the mind and the self interact. So of course sensations are mental, but I'm saying the self isn't mental or mind.


Yes, the self is mental, or mind. However what you mean by "mind" here are sensations, and as I've argued, these are NOT substances. They're not things. They're states of being for a different thing... aka the self.

So the way "fear" relates to the person feeling it, is the same way "red" relates to a brick wall. One is a substance which can stand alone. The other is merely predicated of a substance, and is not a "thing" in itself.

Ah, I see. Most like tp appeal to Locke's view. But you are saying something else that treads closely to the soul idea.
Although it may be the case that under idealism mental events and actions must equal the self. Otherwise how are we different. There doesn't seem to be a difference between simple conscious awareness.

I disagree with that.... I think that there is a sort of "serial number" for every existent thing. That rabbit over there is different than the other one. My self is always ME, even if you erase my memory, put me on drugs, etc. The *substance* itself doesn't change.
I think this is problematic. First, what is this serial number? How is it reducible to the mental? Second, what if my serial number and yours switch? My mind, consciousness, memory, ect would all remain the same, the only thing that would be different is the number. How would we even know? What difference would it make?
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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6/9/2014 9:37:51 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings?

My mind/ me contains thoughts and feelings. Both the mind, and thoughts and feelings are mental by definition. No problem.

This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

Switch that with:

"The mind is not a thought, the mind is not an action, the mind is not a feeling, the mind is something that things, acts, and suffers"

Both the mind and what the mind contains are both mental. No interaction problem.


This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

It is self-evidently question begging. What is rational thinker if not a mind? A material body with a mind? Ok, then you have just begged the question in favour of some position other than idealism.


Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

Pain is still mental, it is a conscious sensation. Ergo, if you changed my mind completely, then no, of course I still wouldn't feel that pain.


What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

No, because you have one mind, I have another.


What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

Yes, but they aren't the same people, just very similar. I can create a cup that looks exactly the same as the cup in front me, all the same make, same design... It doesn't matter though, they are still different cups.


The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.

Not to me.
zmikecuber
Posts: 4,083
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6/10/2014 9:13:58 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/9/2014 8:42:37 PM, n7 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 7:47:04 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 6/9/2014 7:43:18 PM, n7 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 7:13:02 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 6/9/2014 4:37:45 PM, n7 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 4:18:05 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings? This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.

Aren't sensations/beliefs/desires, just different states the self is in?

Yes. That is what I'm arguing.

I'm not sure how I see the problem though. The self, and the sensations we feel aren't identical, but they're still the same "type" of thing, so can't they still interact?

Another point to make is that sensations or whatnot are not substances, or *things* themselves. They can't exist apart from a mind. Can you imagine the sensation of pain which is not being felt by a mind? Obviously not.

So I don't even see how these are two different things interacting. Furthermore, even if they are two different things, why can't they be two different things but the same *type* of thing?

But as it is, I don't think that sensations are substances. I think they're more like experiences or states that we ourselves are in.

I'm not saying the problem is sensations and the self interacting.i'm saying under idealism the mind and the self interact. So of course sensations are mental, but I'm saying the self isn't mental or mind.


Yes, the self is mental, or mind. However what you mean by "mind" here are sensations, and as I've argued, these are NOT substances. They're not things. They're states of being for a different thing... aka the self.

So the way "fear" relates to the person feeling it, is the same way "red" relates to a brick wall. One is a substance which can stand alone. The other is merely predicated of a substance, and is not a "thing" in itself.

Ah, I see. Most like tp appeal to Locke's view. But you are saying something else that treads closely to the soul idea.

I suppose so...

Although it may be the case that under idealism mental events and actions must equal the self. Otherwise how are we different. There doesn't seem to be a difference between simple conscious awareness.

I disagree with that.... I think that there is a sort of "serial number" for every existent thing. That rabbit over there is different than the other one. My self is always ME, even if you erase my memory, put me on drugs, etc. The *substance* itself doesn't change.
I think this is problematic. First, what is this serial number? How is it reducible to the mental? Second, what if my serial number and yours switch? My mind, consciousness, memory, ect would all remain the same, the only thing that would be different is the number. How would we even know? What difference would it make?

I'm not sure how to answer those questions. However, the opposing view seems equally as problematic... am I the same person five minutes later when my mental state is different? What if you wipe my memory? What if you change my attitude? What if I forget my idenity and think I'm a chicken? Am I the same person or not?

I think we need to determine exactly *what* the self is. And it doesn't seem that the self is essentially a sort of "memory" or anythign like that. That all seems accidental to me. I suppose we'd have to distinguish between substantial and accidental changes to the self... and I happen to think that changes in location, sensation, memory, etc. are accidental.

If we don't view them as accidental as I do, we get an equally dissatisfying position.
"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."
n7
Posts: 1,360
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6/11/2014 11:28:36 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/9/2014 9:37:51 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings?

My mind/ me contains thoughts and feelings. Both the mind, and thoughts and feelings are mental by definition. No problem.

This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

Switch that with:

"The mind is not a thought, the mind is not an action, the mind is not a feeling, the mind is something that things, acts, and suffers"

Both the mind and what the mind contains are both mental. No interaction problem.


This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

It is self-evidently question begging. What is rational thinker if not a mind? A material body with a mind? Ok, then you have just begged the question in favour of some position other than idealism.


Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

Pain is still mental, it is a conscious sensation. Ergo, if you changed my mind completely, then no, of course I still wouldn't feel that pain.


What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

No, because you have one mind, I have another.


What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

Yes, but they aren't the same people, just very similar. I can create a cup that looks exactly the same as the cup in front me, all the same make, same design... It doesn't matter though, they are still different cups.


The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.

Not to me.

I don't have time to respond to everything, but it seems I took your view for a view of psychology continuity. There are still many problems with your view, like what's the difference between my mind and yours if not thoughts? And how would you know if they switched?
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
n7
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6/11/2014 11:30:11 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I disagree with that.... I think that there is a sort of "serial number" for every existent thing. That rabbit over there is different than the other one. My self is always ME, even if you erase my memory, put me on drugs, etc. The *substance* itself doesn't change.
I think this is problematic. First, what is this serial number? How is it reducible to the mental? Second, what if my serial number and yours switch? My mind, consciousness, memory, ect would all remain the same, the only thing that would be different is the number. How would we even know? What difference would it make?

I'm not sure how to answer those questions. However, the opposing view seems equally as problematic... am I the same person five minutes later when my mental state is different? What if you wipe my memory? What if you change my attitude? What if I forget my idenity and think I'm a chicken? Am I the same person or not?

I think we need to determine exactly *what* the self is. And it doesn't seem that the self is essentially a sort of "memory" or anythign like that. That all seems accidental to me. I suppose we'd have to distinguish between substantial and accidental changes to the self... and I happen to think that changes in location, sensatio

It could be a mix of psychological continuity and physical. Like the closest continuer view. Or David Lewis' Predurantism.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
Rational_Thinker9119
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6/11/2014 9:40:28 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/11/2014 11:28:36 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 9:37:51 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings?

My mind/ me contains thoughts and feelings. Both the mind, and thoughts and feelings are mental by definition. No problem.

This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

Switch that with:

"The mind is not a thought, the mind is not an action, the mind is not a feeling, the mind is something that things, acts, and suffers"

Both the mind and what the mind contains are both mental. No interaction problem.


This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

It is self-evidently question begging. What is rational thinker if not a mind? A material body with a mind? Ok, then you have just begged the question in favour of some position other than idealism.


Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

Pain is still mental, it is a conscious sensation. Ergo, if you changed my mind completely, then no, of course I still wouldn't feel that pain.


What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

No, because you have one mind, I have another.


What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

Yes, but they aren't the same people, just very similar. I can create a cup that looks exactly the same as the cup in front me, all the same make, same design... It doesn't matter though, they are still different cups.


The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.

Not to me.

I don't have time to respond to everything, but it seems I took your view for a view of psychology continuity. There are still many problems with your view, like what's the difference between my mind and yours if not thoughts? And how would you know if they switched?

The fact that you have a different mind than mind is what makes them different lol We could have all the same thoughts, but different minds, just like 2 cups can have the exact same design and color, but they are different cups.
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6/11/2014 9:49:48 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
You're engaging a semantics fallacy. If you wish to counter the idealism idea of a "mind" you have to use the idealism definition of "mind," by using the standard definition, you are not defeating the actual concept.
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6/11/2014 9:50:33 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/11/2014 9:49:48 PM, Ore_Ele wrote:
You're engaging a semantics fallacy. If you wish to counter the idealism idea of a "mind" you have to use the idealism definition of "mind," by using the standard definition, you are not defeating the actual concept.

ah, I see that others have already addressed this. Carry on.
"Wanting Red Rhino Pill to have gender"
n7
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6/12/2014 11:55:00 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/11/2014 9:40:28 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 6/11/2014 11:28:36 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 9:37:51 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings?

My mind/ me contains thoughts and feelings. Both the mind, and thoughts and feelings are mental by definition. No problem.

This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

Switch that with:

"The mind is not a thought, the mind is not an action, the mind is not a feeling, the mind is something that things, acts, and suffers"

Both the mind and what the mind contains are both mental. No interaction problem.


This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

It is self-evidently question begging. What is rational thinker if not a mind? A material body with a mind? Ok, then you have just begged the question in favour of some position other than idealism.


Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

Pain is still mental, it is a conscious sensation. Ergo, if you changed my mind completely, then no, of course I still wouldn't feel that pain.


What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

No, because you have one mind, I have another.


What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

Yes, but they aren't the same people, just very similar. I can create a cup that looks exactly the same as the cup in front me, all the same make, same design... It doesn't matter though, they are still different cups.


The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.

Not to me.

I don't have time to respond to everything, but it seems I took your view for a view of psychology continuity. There are still many problems with your view, like what's the difference between my mind and yours if not thoughts? And how would you know if they switched?

The fact that you have a different mind than mind is what makes them different lol We could have all the same thoughts, but different minds, just like 2 cups can have the exact same design and color, but they are different cups.

How is this not circular? Our minds are different because they're different. You're appealing to identity to account for identity. Why are the cups different? The cups are different because they are made up of different atoms and they are in different places in space. The cups aren't different because they're different. But you can't say our minds are different for the same reason, because minds aren't made up of atoms.

Also, what if only our souls, switched but nothing else? No break in consciousness, no break in thoughts, ect, just our identities. Nothing in our mental life at all changes. How would we even know?

On another note, Sargon wanted me to tell you he has an email from Tim Maudlin that relates to your guy's debate on quantum physics.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
n7
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6/12/2014 11:59:00 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/11/2014 9:50:33 PM, Ore_Ele wrote:
At 6/11/2014 9:49:48 PM, Ore_Ele wrote:
You're engaging a semantics fallacy. If you wish to counter the idealism idea of a "mind" you have to use the idealism definition of "mind," by using the standard definition, you are not defeating the actual concept.

ah, I see that others have already addressed this. Carry on.
I have addressed it too. Also the argument has evolved.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
Rational_Thinker9119
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6/12/2014 8:29:26 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/12/2014 11:55:00 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/11/2014 9:40:28 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 6/11/2014 11:28:36 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 9:37:51 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings?

My mind/ me contains thoughts and feelings. Both the mind, and thoughts and feelings are mental by definition. No problem.

This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

Switch that with:

"The mind is not a thought, the mind is not an action, the mind is not a feeling, the mind is something that things, acts, and suffers"

Both the mind and what the mind contains are both mental. No interaction problem.


This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

It is self-evidently question begging. What is rational thinker if not a mind? A material body with a mind? Ok, then you have just begged the question in favour of some position other than idealism.


Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

Pain is still mental, it is a conscious sensation. Ergo, if you changed my mind completely, then no, of course I still wouldn't feel that pain.


What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

No, because you have one mind, I have another.


What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

Yes, but they aren't the same people, just very similar. I can create a cup that looks exactly the same as the cup in front me, all the same make, same design... It doesn't matter though, they are still different cups.


The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.

Not to me.

I don't have time to respond to everything, but it seems I took your view for a view of psychology continuity. There are still many problems with your view, like what's the difference between my mind and yours if not thoughts? And how would you know if they switched?

The fact that you have a different mind than mind is what makes them different lol We could have all the same thoughts, but different minds, just like 2 cups can have the exact same design and color, but they are different cups.

How is this not circular? Our minds are different because they're different. You're appealing to identity to account for identity. Why are the cups different? The cups are different because they are made up of different atoms and they are in different places in space. The cups aren't different because they're different. But you can't say our minds are different for the same reason, because minds aren't made up of atoms.

Then what makes the minds different isn't spacial or because of different atoms, it is because of different experience. If you had all the same thoughts as me, you would still only be experiencing the ones you have, and I would still only be experiencing the ones I have even though they are the same.


Also, what if only our souls, switched but nothing else?

This assumes there is more to us than just souls/ minds. How is that not begging the question?

No break in consciousness, no break in thoughts, ect, just our identities. Nothing in our mental life at all changes. How would we even know?

On another note, Sargon wanted me to tell you he has an email from Tim Maudlin that relates to your guy's debate on quantum physics.
n7
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6/13/2014 11:23:37 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/12/2014 8:29:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 6/12/2014 11:55:00 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/11/2014 9:40:28 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 6/11/2014 11:28:36 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 9:37:51 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 6/9/2014 10:51:52 AM, n7 wrote:
At 6/8/2014 11:41:03 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 5/14/2014 1:13:53 PM, n7 wrote:
I know there are some idealists who frequent this board and I want to see if they (or anyone else) can answer this argument. I've seen responses to the argument before, but really none put in this formulation.

Idealism says all is mind. Everything is a mental projection from God or us. Let's look at the definitions of "mind"

"the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought."

"a person's intellect."

" the part of a person that thinks, reasons, feels, and remembers"

"the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory"a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms"

We notice that these all include personhood. There is a being which has a mind

The Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid said "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

So we cannot have just minds. We must have beings with minds. A mind is a characteristic. However, we now have a convoluted and weird type of substance dualism. There is mind and being. Most idealists are very harsh on dualism and rightfully so. We can now bring up the problem of interaction for idealism. How can being and mind interact when they are two different things? They must interact via a shard property, but we cannot have anything else but minds because we need to have a monist ontology.

This seems to me that this makes the idealist position is self-refuting and thus false. Although, I suppose one could propose Humian ideas of identity, but this would be absurd.

The mind IS the being. The definitions all presuppose there is a body or something more grand that "has" the mind, but this just begs the question.

So you are thoughts and feelings?

My mind/ me contains thoughts and feelings. Both the mind, and thoughts and feelings are mental by definition. No problem.

This doesn't seem correct at all. As I quoted from Thomas Reid
"I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."

Switch that with:

"The mind is not a thought, the mind is not an action, the mind is not a feeling, the mind is something that things, acts, and suffers"

Both the mind and what the mind contains are both mental. No interaction problem.


This isn't semantics or question begging, it's intuitive. When I refer to someone, I don't say that mind above me. I say the mind of Rationathinker.

It is self-evidently question begging. What is rational thinker if not a mind? A material body with a mind? Ok, then you have just begged the question in favour of some position other than idealism.


Furthermore, proposing the mind is the being presents some problems. For example, let's say you're tied up in a chair and going to be tortured by an idealist hater. The torture will be really bad, and you'd rather die. I come in and say I'm sympathetic to idealists, but I'm too weak to untie you or kill you myself. I know you accept the idea that mind = being, so I get an idea. I can use a machine to wipe your psychology. You will have an entirely new belief system, new thoughts, new desires, new memories, ect. Would you accept? Would you be dead and would the torture be given to some other person? It doesn't seem so, it seems like you would still feel the pain, but your mind is just different.

Pain is still mental, it is a conscious sensation. Ergo, if you changed my mind completely, then no, of course I still wouldn't feel that pain.


What if we were taking in a room and brainwashed into thinking we're both the prime minister of Australia? We have the same beliefs, memories, ect. What if for a few seconds we and the PM end up thinking the same thing at the same times. Does it follow that we are all one person?

No, because you have one mind, I have another.


What if you're being teleported, and the teleporter glitches, making two people like you? It seems like we now have two yous. But there is only one thing equal to you. If one gets a job as a car salesman and one doesn't you would be a car salesman and not a car salesman. That's contradictory.

Yes, but they aren't the same people, just very similar. I can create a cup that looks exactly the same as the cup in front me, all the same make, same design... It doesn't matter though, they are still different cups.


The idea that mind is the self seems wrong.

Not to me.

I don't have time to respond to everything, but it seems I took your view for a view of psychology continuity. There are still many problems with your view, like what's the difference between my mind and yours if not thoughts? And how would you know if they switched?

The fact that you have a different mind than mind is what makes them different lol We could have all the same thoughts, but different minds, just like 2 cups can have the exact same design and color, but they are different cups.

How is this not circular? Our minds are different because they're different. You're appealing to identity to account for identity. Why are the cups different? The cups are different because they are made up of different atoms and they are in different places in space. The cups aren't different because they're different. But you can't say our minds are different for the same reason, because minds aren't made up of atoms.

Then what makes the minds different isn't spacial or because of different atoms, it is because of different experience. If you had all the same thoughts as me, you would still only be experiencing the ones you have, and I would still only be experiencing the ones I have even though they are the same.

So you are experience, what happens when you go to sleep or become unconscious? Do you lose your identity? How are our experiences different? It seems like what we're trying to account fori n the first place is the personal identity of experiences.

Also, what if only our souls, switched but nothing else?

This assumes there is more to us than just souls/ minds. How is that not begging the question?

It's a reductio argument. I am assuming souls preserve identity, but they switch. I don't think assuming things like mental events exist too are question begging.
No break in consciousness, no break in thoughts, ect, just our identities. Nothing in our mental life at all changes. How would we even know?

On another note, Sargon wanted me to tell you he has an email from Tim Maudlin that relates to your guy's debate on quantum physics.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
dylancatlow
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6/13/2014 3:35:01 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/8/2014 12:50:36 PM, philosurfer wrote:
I still like the ZOMBIE hypothetical(s) ... Consider a body without Mind ... but then try to consider Mind without a body. What would that look like or be or is that even a possibility?

"A body" is mental by cognitive embedment. If a body were not a concept, we couldn't conceive of "body". Mind without the concept of body may be impossible to imagine, but once again, "body" is actually identical to its mental description. This thought experiment merely begs the question.
philosurfer
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6/13/2014 3:53:15 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 6/13/2014 3:35:01 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 6/8/2014 12:50:36 PM, philosurfer wrote:
I still like the ZOMBIE hypothetical(s) ... Consider a body without Mind ... but then try to consider Mind without a body. What would that look like or be or is that even a possibility?

"A body" is mental by cognitive embedment. If a body were not a concept, we couldn't conceive of "body". Mind without the concept of body may be impossible to imagine, but once again, "body" is actually identical to its mental description. This thought experiment merely begs the question.

Then we are talking about the same thing, in a way... You're just saying it slightly differently in essence ... So, on some level, we actually agree..