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Strong PSR and Free Will

Envisage
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7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,251
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7/9/2014 8:30:31 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM, Envisage wrote:
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?

Premise 2 and 3 presuppose determinism. That is, they assume the reason (cause) for world 1 and 2 can be totally explained by world 0 (their prior state). Free will says this is not the case - that the explanation resides in the choice itself. Obviously, this implies neither determinism nor randomness, but rather self-determination.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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7/9/2014 8:37:44 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 8:30:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM, Envisage wrote:
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?

Premise 2 and 3 presuppose determinism. That is, they assume the reason (cause) for world 1 and 2 can be totally explained by world 0 (their prior state). Free will says this is not the case - that the explanation resides in the choice itself. Obviously, this implies neither determinism nor randomness, but rather self-determination.

Then this just asserts that the PSR is false... As there is no reason why a world should go to w1 state instead of w2...
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,251
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7/9/2014 8:39:34 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 8:37:44 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:30:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM, Envisage wrote:
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?

Premise 2 and 3 presuppose determinism. That is, they assume the reason (cause) for world 1 and 2 can be totally explained by world 0 (their prior state). Free will says this is not the case - that the explanation resides in the choice itself. Obviously, this implies neither determinism nor randomness, but rather self-determination.

Then this just asserts that the PSR is false... As there is no reason why a world should go to w1 state instead of w2...

No reason external to the state in question. Self-determinacy...that's what free will is all about.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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7/9/2014 8:41:36 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 8:39:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:37:44 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:30:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM, Envisage wrote:
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?

Premise 2 and 3 presuppose determinism. That is, they assume the reason (cause) for world 1 and 2 can be totally explained by world 0 (their prior state). Free will says this is not the case - that the explanation resides in the choice itself. Obviously, this implies neither determinism nor randomness, but rather self-determination.

Then this just asserts that the PSR is false... As there is no reason why a world should go to w1 state instead of w2...

No reason external to the state in question. Self-determinacy...that's what free will is all about.

Self-determination is a form of determination...

I.e. Prior states provide the SR for subsequent states. I can scream 'OUCH!' Because I poked myself, but the issue is what's the SR for me screaming OUCH! Instead of not reacting at all.

Self-determination doesn't do a thing to wiggle out of this.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,251
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7/9/2014 8:43:05 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 8:41:36 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:39:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:37:44 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:30:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM, Envisage wrote:
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?

Premise 2 and 3 presuppose determinism. That is, they assume the reason (cause) for world 1 and 2 can be totally explained by world 0 (their prior state). Free will says this is not the case - that the explanation resides in the choice itself. Obviously, this implies neither determinism nor randomness, but rather self-determination.

Then this just asserts that the PSR is false... As there is no reason why a world should go to w1 state instead of w2...

No reason external to the state in question. Self-determinacy...that's what free will is all about.

Self-determination is a form of determination...

I.e. Prior states provide the SR for subsequent states. I can scream 'OUCH!' Because I poked myself, but the issue is what's the SR for me screaming OUCH! Instead of not reacting at all.

Self-determination doesn't do a thing to wiggle out of this.

That's not self-determination; that's determinism.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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7/9/2014 8:44:05 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 8:43:05 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:41:36 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:39:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:37:44 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:30:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM, Envisage wrote:
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?

Premise 2 and 3 presuppose determinism. That is, they assume the reason (cause) for world 1 and 2 can be totally explained by world 0 (their prior state). Free will says this is not the case - that the explanation resides in the choice itself. Obviously, this implies neither determinism nor randomness, but rather self-determination.

Then this just asserts that the PSR is false... As there is no reason why a world should go to w1 state instead of w2...

No reason external to the state in question. Self-determinacy...that's what free will is all about.

Self-determination is a form of determination...

I.e. Prior states provide the SR for subsequent states. I can scream 'OUCH!' Because I poked myself, but the issue is what's the SR for me screaming OUCH! Instead of not reacting at all.

Self-determination doesn't do a thing to wiggle out of this.

That's not self-determination; that's determinism.

Self-determination is a subset of determinism.....
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,251
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7/9/2014 8:45:34 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 8:44:05 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:43:05 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:41:36 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:39:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:37:44 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:30:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM, Envisage wrote:
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?

Premise 2 and 3 presuppose determinism. That is, they assume the reason (cause) for world 1 and 2 can be totally explained by world 0 (their prior state). Free will says this is not the case - that the explanation resides in the choice itself. Obviously, this implies neither determinism nor randomness, but rather self-determination.

Then this just asserts that the PSR is false... As there is no reason why a world should go to w1 state instead of w2...

No reason external to the state in question. Self-determinacy...that's what free will is all about.

Self-determination is a form of determination...

I.e. Prior states provide the SR for subsequent states. I can scream 'OUCH!' Because I poked myself, but the issue is what's the SR for me screaming OUCH! Instead of not reacting at all.

Self-determination doesn't do a thing to wiggle out of this.

That's not self-determination; that's determinism.

Self-determination is a subset of determinism.....

Not if by "determinism", we mean when things are caused by something prior or external to it.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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7/9/2014 8:50:29 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 8:45:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:44:05 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:43:05 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:41:36 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:39:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:37:44 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:30:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM, Envisage wrote:
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?

Premise 2 and 3 presuppose determinism. That is, they assume the reason (cause) for world 1 and 2 can be totally explained by world 0 (their prior state). Free will says this is not the case - that the explanation resides in the choice itself. Obviously, this implies neither determinism nor randomness, but rather self-determination.

Then this just asserts that the PSR is false... As there is no reason why a world should go to w1 state instead of w2...

No reason external to the state in question. Self-determinacy...that's what free will is all about.

Self-determination is a form of determination...

I.e. Prior states provide the SR for subsequent states. I can scream 'OUCH!' Because I poked myself, but the issue is what's the SR for me screaming OUCH! Instead of not reacting at all.

Self-determination doesn't do a thing to wiggle out of this.

That's not self-determination; that's determinism.

Self-determination is a subset of determinism.....

Not if by "determinism", we mean when things are caused by something prior or external to it.

I struggle to see how 'self-determination' gets around the problem I have set. Where does the SR come in for both w1 and w2 to be logically possible worlds.

Since if the SR exists for w1, then why isn't w2=w1, if w2 as described has the same SR as w1.

I.e. If the PSR is true, then the choosing process is also subject to the PSR, the best I see is just an ipsie dixit assertion...
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,251
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7/9/2014 9:03:59 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 8:50:29 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:45:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:44:05 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:43:05 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:41:36 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:39:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:37:44 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:30:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM, Envisage wrote:
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?

Premise 2 and 3 presuppose determinism. That is, they assume the reason (cause) for world 1 and 2 can be totally explained by world 0 (their prior state). Free will says this is not the case - that the explanation resides in the choice itself. Obviously, this implies neither determinism nor randomness, but rather self-determination.

Then this just asserts that the PSR is false... As there is no reason why a world should go to w1 state instead of w2...

No reason external to the state in question. Self-determinacy...that's what free will is all about.

Self-determination is a form of determination...

I.e. Prior states provide the SR for subsequent states. I can scream 'OUCH!' Because I poked myself, but the issue is what's the SR for me screaming OUCH! Instead of not reacting at all.

Self-determination doesn't do a thing to wiggle out of this.

That's not self-determination; that's determinism.

Self-determination is a subset of determinism.....

Not if by "determinism", we mean when things are caused by something prior or external to it.

I struggle to see how 'self-determination' gets around the problem I have set. Where does the SR come in for both w1 and w2 to be logically possible worlds.

Since if the SR exists for w1, then why isn't w2=w1, if w2 as described has the same SR as w1.

You're once again assuming that w0 completely determines the following state. w1 =/= w2 because they determined themselves independently of one another (or anything else for that matter). The explanation for why they did so (for why they chose one state over another) is contained in the states themselves. Since they are different states, they have different reasons, and therefore there is nothing which compelled them to choose the same as the other.


I.e. If the PSR is true, then the choosing process is also subject to the PSR, the best I see is just an ipsie dixit assertion...
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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7/9/2014 9:11:30 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 9:03:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:50:29 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:45:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:44:05 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:43:05 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:41:36 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:39:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:37:44 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:30:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM, Envisage wrote:
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?

Premise 2 and 3 presuppose determinism. That is, they assume the reason (cause) for world 1 and 2 can be totally explained by world 0 (their prior state). Free will says this is not the case - that the explanation resides in the choice itself. Obviously, this implies neither determinism nor randomness, but rather self-determination.

Then this just asserts that the PSR is false... As there is no reason why a world should go to w1 state instead of w2...

No reason external to the state in question. Self-determinacy...that's what free will is all about.

Self-determination is a form of determination...

I.e. Prior states provide the SR for subsequent states. I can scream 'OUCH!' Because I poked myself, but the issue is what's the SR for me screaming OUCH! Instead of not reacting at all.

Self-determination doesn't do a thing to wiggle out of this.

That's not self-determination; that's determinism.

Self-determination is a subset of determinism.....

Not if by "determinism", we mean when things are caused by something prior or external to it.

I struggle to see how 'self-determination' gets around the problem I have set. Where does the SR come in for both w1 and w2 to be logically possible worlds.

Since if the SR exists for w1, then why isn't w2=w1, if w2 as described has the same SR as w1.


You're once again assuming that w0 completely determines the following state. w1 =/= w2 because they determined themselves independently of one another (or anything else for that matter). The explanation for why they did so (for why they chose one state over another) is contained in the states themselves. Since they are different states, they have different reasons, and therefore there is nothing which compelled them to choose the same as the other.


I.e. If the PSR is true, then the choosing process is also subject to the PSR, the best I see is just an ipsie dixit assertion...

Again, explain why the choice of w2 instead of w1 is made from w0, since you need to go from w0 to w1 or w2, and free will needs do explain it such that both are possible. Self-determinism of the end-state does nothing to solve how we get a choice to go to that state over another, it only provides the reason why that specific state is chosen over another.

We have w1 and w2, we cannot choose both, yet both need to be choosable. We need a reason why both choices are choosable in a way in which the other choice is not mandated.

Assuming the PSR, this seems flat-out contradictory. Even assuming indeterminism, it doesn't really make much for a 'choice' than rolling the dice to see which path you take.

Self-determinicity is an interesting idea for creation ex nihilo whilst maintaining the S-PSR, but I fail to see how it accounts for free-will.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,251
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7/9/2014 9:18:28 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 9:11:30 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 9:03:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:50:29 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:45:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:44:05 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:43:05 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:41:36 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:39:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:37:44 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:30:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM, Envisage wrote:
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?

Premise 2 and 3 presuppose determinism. That is, they assume the reason (cause) for world 1 and 2 can be totally explained by world 0 (their prior state). Free will says this is not the case - that the explanation resides in the choice itself. Obviously, this implies neither determinism nor randomness, but rather self-determination.

Then this just asserts that the PSR is false... As there is no reason why a world should go to w1 state instead of w2...

No reason external to the state in question. Self-determinacy...that's what free will is all about.

Self-determination is a form of determination...

I.e. Prior states provide the SR for subsequent states. I can scream 'OUCH!' Because I poked myself, but the issue is what's the SR for me screaming OUCH! Instead of not reacting at all.

Self-determination doesn't do a thing to wiggle out of this.

That's not self-determination; that's determinism.

Self-determination is a subset of determinism.....

Not if by "determinism", we mean when things are caused by something prior or external to it.

I struggle to see how 'self-determination' gets around the problem I have set. Where does the SR come in for both w1 and w2 to be logically possible worlds.

Since if the SR exists for w1, then why isn't w2=w1, if w2 as described has the same SR as w1.


You're once again assuming that w0 completely determines the following state. w1 =/= w2 because they determined themselves independently of one another (or anything else for that matter). The explanation for why they did so (for why they chose one state over another) is contained in the states themselves. Since they are different states, they have different reasons, and therefore there is nothing which compelled them to choose the same as the other.


I.e. If the PSR is true, then the choosing process is also subject to the PSR, the best I see is just an ipsie dixit assertion...

Again, explain why the choice of w2 instead of w1 is made from w0, since you need to go from w0 to w1 or w2,

It's not made from w0, but from from w2 and w1 respectively.

and free will needs do explain it such that both are possible. Self-determinism of the end-state does nothing to solve how we get a choice to go to that state over another, it only provides the reason why that specific state is chosen over another.

Self-determinism implies a bi-directionality of time. That is, we choose our next state at the time we make it, and then it is retrodicted so that it coherently relates to all consequent states.


We have w1 and w2, we cannot choose both, yet both need to be choosable. We need a reason why both choices are choosable in a way in which the other choice is not mandated.

Whatever we do choose, the reason we chose it coincides with what is chosen.


Assuming the PSR, this seems flat-out contradictory. Even assuming indeterminism, it doesn't really make much for a 'choice' than rolling the dice to see which path you take.

Self-determinicity is an interesting idea for creation ex nihilo whilst maintaining the S-PSR, but I fail to see how it accounts for free-will.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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7/9/2014 9:23:10 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 9:18:28 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 9:11:30 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 9:03:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:50:29 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:45:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:44:05 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:43:05 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:41:36 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:39:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:37:44 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:30:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM, Envisage wrote:
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?

Premise 2 and 3 presuppose determinism. That is, they assume the reason (cause) for world 1 and 2 can be totally explained by world 0 (their prior state). Free will says this is not the case - that the explanation resides in the choice itself. Obviously, this implies neither determinism nor randomness, but rather self-determination.

Then this just asserts that the PSR is false... As there is no reason why a world should go to w1 state instead of w2...

No reason external to the state in question. Self-determinacy...that's what free will is all about.

Self-determination is a form of determination...

I.e. Prior states provide the SR for subsequent states. I can scream 'OUCH!' Because I poked myself, but the issue is what's the SR for me screaming OUCH! Instead of not reacting at all.

Self-determination doesn't do a thing to wiggle out of this.

That's not self-determination; that's determinism.

Self-determination is a subset of determinism.....

Not if by "determinism", we mean when things are caused by something prior or external to it.

I struggle to see how 'self-determination' gets around the problem I have set. Where does the SR come in for both w1 and w2 to be logically possible worlds.

Since if the SR exists for w1, then why isn't w2=w1, if w2 as described has the same SR as w1.


You're once again assuming that w0 completely determines the following state. w1 =/= w2 because they determined themselves independently of one another (or anything else for that matter). The explanation for why they did so (for why they chose one state over another) is contained in the states themselves. Since they are different states, they have different reasons, and therefore there is nothing which compelled them to choose the same as the other.


I.e. If the PSR is true, then the choosing process is also subject to the PSR, the best I see is just an ipsie dixit assertion...

Again, explain why the choice of w2 instead of w1 is made from w0, since you need to go from w0 to w1 or w2,


It's not made from w0, but from from w2 and w1 respectively.

In w2 and w1 the choice is already made....

and free will needs do explain it such that both are possible. Self-determinism of the end-state does nothing to solve how we get a choice to go to that state over another, it only provides the reason why that specific state is chosen over another.

Self-determinism implies a bi-directionality of time. That is, we choose our next state at the time we make it, and then it is retrodicted so that it coherently relates to all consequent states.

You're saying past events change due to future choices? Seems a bit odd to imply the rewriting of history to provide the SR for a choice...


We have w1 and w2, we cannot choose both, yet both need to be choosable. We need a reason why both choices are choosable in a way in which the other choice is not mandated.


Whatever we do choose, the reason we chose it coincides with what is chosen.

Either this runs into the w1 or w2 choice dilemma, or is circular reasoning..


Assuming the PSR, this seems flat-out contradictory. Even assuming indeterminism, it doesn't really make much for a 'choice' than rolling the dice to see which path you take.

Self-determinicity is an interesting idea for creation ex nihilo whilst maintaining the S-PSR, but I fail to see how it accounts for free-will.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,251
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7/9/2014 9:23:31 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 9:11:30 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 9:03:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
Self-determinism of the end-state does nothing to solve how we get a choice to go to that state over another, it only provides the reason why that specific state is chosen over another.


I don't think you appreciate the meaning of "self-determinacy". The choice doesn't cause the state...the state is the choice.
Envisage
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7/9/2014 9:26:46 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 9:23:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 9:11:30 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 9:03:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
Self-determinism of the end-state does nothing to solve how we get a choice to go to that state over another, it only provides the reason why that specific state is chosen over another.


I don't think you appreciate the meaning of "self-determinacy". The choice doesn't cause the state...the state is the choice.

Admittedly I am ignorant of self-determinacy and only know much about it from Chris Lagens CTMU paper. I will do some reading and some back to this...
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,251
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7/9/2014 9:27:08 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 9:23:10 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 9:18:28 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 9:11:30 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 9:03:59 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:50:29 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:45:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:44:05 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:43:05 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:41:36 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:39:34 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:37:44 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 7/9/2014 8:30:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 7:14:53 AM, Envisage wrote:
I just had a thought... I have done zero research so I presume there is already stuff written about it.

Basically there seems to be an issue of the existence of free will if the Strong PSR is true. I will formulate my argument as follows:

w1 & w2 are possible worlds with identical CCF (conjunctive contingent fact) and identical physical/non physical states. Basically a carbon-copy of each other where the 'branching point' is when the conscious entity takes a choice from w0.

A. Free will exists (assumption)
P1. If free will exists, then there exists a w1 and a w2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).
P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence from w0
P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0
C. P4 entails a contradiction, and hence

P2 & P3 are just statements of the PSR, and P1 is just a modal description of free will (I would have chosen to do a or b at point 0), so the major contention is in P4. If both w1 and w2 have explanations, then the explanation for w2 must exist in w1, since they are carbon copy realities past the 'branching point'.

In other words, assuming the PSR means that it's impossible for free will to exist, since there no way for there to be a SR for one reality over another without entailing a contradiction.

Similarly, there is no way for even God to have free will, since each choice he makes is subject to the PSR, why make choice a over choice b, or no choice at all?

Premise 2 and 3 presuppose determinism. That is, they assume the reason (cause) for world 1 and 2 can be totally explained by world 0 (their prior state). Free will says this is not the case - that the explanation resides in the choice itself. Obviously, this implies neither determinism nor randomness, but rather self-determination.

Then this just asserts that the PSR is false... As there is no reason why a world should go to w1 state instead of w2...

No reason external to the state in question. Self-determinacy...that's what free will is all about.

Self-determination is a form of determination...

I.e. Prior states provide the SR for subsequent states. I can scream 'OUCH!' Because I poked myself, but the issue is what's the SR for me screaming OUCH! Instead of not reacting at all.

Self-determination doesn't do a thing to wiggle out of this.

That's not self-determination; that's determinism.

Self-determination is a subset of determinism.....

Not if by "determinism", we mean when things are caused by something prior or external to it.

I struggle to see how 'self-determination' gets around the problem I have set. Where does the SR come in for both w1 and w2 to be logically possible worlds.

Since if the SR exists for w1, then why isn't w2=w1, if w2 as described has the same SR as w1.


You're once again assuming that w0 completely determines the following state. w1 =/= w2 because they determined themselves independently of one another (or anything else for that matter). The explanation for why they did so (for why they chose one state over another) is contained in the states themselves. Since they are different states, they have different reasons, and therefore there is nothing which compelled them to choose the same as the other.


I.e. If the PSR is true, then the choosing process is also subject to the PSR, the best I see is just an ipsie dixit assertion...

Again, explain why the choice of w2 instead of w1 is made from w0, since you need to go from w0 to w1 or w2,


It's not made from w0, but from from w2 and w1 respectively.

In w2 and w1 the choice is already made....

What I'm saying is that w0 cannot account for either choice.


and free will needs do explain it such that both are possible. Self-determinism of the end-state does nothing to solve how we get a choice to go to that state over another, it only provides the reason why that specific state is chosen over another.

Self-determinism implies a bi-directionality of time. That is, we choose our next state at the time we make it, and then it is retrodicted so that it coherently relates to all consequent states.

You're saying past events change due to future choices? Seems a bit odd to imply the rewriting of history to provide the SR for a choice...

No, I'm saying the present is being determined by the future.



We have w1 and w2, we cannot choose both, yet both need to be choosable. We need a reason why both choices are choosable in a way in which the other choice is not mandated.


Whatever we do choose, the reason we chose it coincides with what is chosen.

Either this runs into the w1 or w2 choice dilemma, or is circular reasoning..


Self-determinacy is circular lol


Assuming the PSR, this seems flat-out contradictory. Even assuming indeterminism, it doesn't really make much for a 'choice' than rolling the dice to see which path you take.

Self-determinicity is an interesting idea for creation ex nihilo whilst maintaining the S-PSR, but I fail to see how it accounts for free-will.
dylancatlow
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7/9/2014 9:53:28 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
However, it should be noted that our actions aren't entirely attributable to our will. It's a blend between the laws of nature and our will.
dylancatlow
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7/9/2014 10:08:16 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/9/2014 9:18:28 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/9/2014 9:11:30 AM, Envisage wrote:


and free will needs do explain it such that both are possible. Self-determinism of the end-state does nothing to solve how we get a choice to go to that state over another, it only provides the reason why that specific state is chosen over another.

Self-determinism implies a bi-directionality of time. That is, we choose our next state at the time we make it, and then it is retrodicted so that it coherently relates to all consequent states.




In other words, part of our experience takes place within the near future. And yes, there is empirical evidence to back this up. Google "psi effects".