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Proof for God

dylancatlow
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7/25/2014 9:55:53 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
1. Reality = all and only that which is real.
2. The definition of reality is real.
3. Reality is therefore self-defining.
4. Since reality's definition excludes the unreal, it must be coherently self-defining.
5. Reality must provide itself with a real reason that its definition is X as opposed to Y else there would be no reason that reality is X and not Y, and thus no reason that reality isn't Y which means it could be Y which is a contradiction.
6. Reality is thus self-justifying.
7. Reality embodies the answers to all question.
8. Reality is self-configuring, self-justifying, self-distributed and self-modeling.
9. God exists.

This was my first attempt, so you have to be nice :)
bladerunner060
Posts: 7,126
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7/25/2014 11:24:10 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/25/2014 9:55:53 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
1. Reality = all and only that which is real.
2. The definition of reality is real.
3. Reality is therefore self-defining.
4. Since reality's definition excludes the unreal, it must be coherently self-defining.
5. Reality must provide itself with a real reason that its definition is X as opposed to Y else there would be no reason that reality is X and not Y, and thus no reason that reality isn't Y which means it could be Y which is a contradiction.
6. Reality is thus self-justifying.
7. Reality embodies the answers to all question.
8. Reality is self-configuring, self-justifying, self-distributed and self-modeling.
9. God exists.

This was my first attempt, so you have to be nice :)

2 is overly simplistic. The definition is only real in the sense that we can, using language create a word (reality), and understand what it represents.

5 is unjustified. There is no contradiction in the notion that X could be Y, but isn't--that's essentially the foundation of modal logic.

7 is false.

9 (the conclusion) does not follow.
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dylancatlow
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7/25/2014 11:30:43 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/25/2014 11:24:10 AM, bladerunner060 wrote:
At 7/25/2014 9:55:53 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
1. Reality = all and only that which is real.
2. The definition of reality is real.
3. Reality is therefore self-defining.
4. Since reality's definition excludes the unreal, it must be coherently self-defining.
5. Reality must provide itself with a real reason that its definition is X as opposed to Y else there would be no reason that reality is X and not Y, and thus no reason that reality isn't Y which means it could be Y which is a contradiction.
6. Reality is thus self-justifying.
7. Reality embodies the answers to all question.
8. Reality is self-configuring, self-justifying, self-distributed and self-modeling.
9. God exists.

This was my first attempt, so you have to be nice :)

2 is overly simplistic. The definition is only real in the sense that we can, using language create a word (reality), and understand what it represents.

By "the definition of reality", I mean "what is included in reality" i.e. what is real.


5 is unjustified. There is no contradiction in the notion that X could be Y, but isn't--that's essentially the foundation of modal logic.

If X could be Y, then there is no real reason that it isn't Y. But if there is no real reason that it isn't Y, then it could be Y (and Y is defined as what reality is not) which is a contradiction. Merely appealing to the existence of modal logic is not actually an argument.
dylancatlow
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7/25/2014 11:49:45 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
"If X could be Y, then there is no real reason that it isn't Y. But if there is no real reason that it isn't Y, then it could be Y"

I just realized that I repeat myself here. Anyway, I hope you understand my point.
dylancatlow
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7/25/2014 11:52:51 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
Let X be defined as what reality is, and let Y be defined as what reality is not. Reality must provide itself with a real reason that it is X and not Y, for if it didn't, there would be no real reason that it is not Y, and it would thus be possible for X to be Y (for reality to be not itself) which is contradictory.
Double_R
Posts: 4,886
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7/25/2014 9:50:36 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/25/2014 9:55:53 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
1. Reality = all and only that which is real.
2. The definition of reality is real.
3. Reality is therefore self-defining.
4. Since reality's definition excludes the unreal, it must be coherently self-defining.
5. Reality must provide itself with a real reason that its definition is X as opposed to Y else there would be no reason that reality is X and not Y, and thus no reason that reality isn't Y which means it could be Y which is a contradiction.
6. Reality is thus self-justifying.
7. Reality embodies the answers to all question.
8. Reality is self-configuring, self-justifying, self-distributed and self-modeling.
9. God exists.

This was my first attempt, so you have to be nice :)

5. You are talking about reality as if it were a being. Reality has no responsibilities and doesn't need to provide anything, so your or else scenario doesn't follow.

9. How on earth did you get from 8 to 9?
000ike
Posts: 11,196
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7/25/2014 10:09:01 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/25/2014 9:55:53 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
1. Reality = all and only that which is real.
2. The definition of reality is real.
3. Reality is therefore self-defining.
4. Since reality's definition excludes the unreal, it must be coherently self-defining.
5. Reality must provide itself with a real reason that its definition is X as opposed to Y else there would be no reason that reality is X and not Y, and thus no reason that reality isn't Y which means it could be Y which is a contradiction.
6. Reality is thus self-justifying.
7. Reality embodies the answers to all question.
8. Reality is self-configuring, self-justifying, self-distributed and self-modeling.
9. God exists.

This was my first attempt, so you have to be nice :)

My problem with Langan is his assumption that conclusions such as this can even be ascertained a priori.

To pick up where I left off on my point regarding evolution - the way in which we think is configured around survival and not absolute truth, so surely there are limits to our comprehension of the universe. It makes sense, then, that serious advancements in our understanding of the universe would be facilitated only by empirical clues.
"A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly with the chain of their own ideas" - Michel Foucault
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,245
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7/26/2014 9:56:56 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/25/2014 10:09:01 PM, 000ike wrote:
At 7/25/2014 9:55:53 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
1. Reality = all and only that which is real.
2. The definition of reality is real.
3. Reality is therefore self-defining.
4. Since reality's definition excludes the unreal, it must be coherently self-defining.
5. Reality must provide itself with a real reason that its definition is X as opposed to Y else there would be no reason that reality is X and not Y, and thus no reason that reality isn't Y which means it could be Y which is a contradiction.
6. Reality is thus self-justifying.
7. Reality embodies the answers to all question.
8. Reality is self-configuring, self-justifying, self-distributed and self-modeling.
9. God exists.

This was my first attempt, so you have to be nice :)

My problem with Langan is his assumption that conclusions such as this can even be ascertained a priori.

These quotes should help clarify where Langan is coming from:

There are several kinds of "theory". The CTMU is certainly a theory in the general sense that it is a descriptive or explanatory function T which takes the universe U as an argument: T = T(U). However, instead of employing logical deduction to derive theorems from axioms, it employs logical induction to derive the overall structure of reality from certain necessary properties thereof (which are themselves deduced from the facts of existence and perception). That is, it derives the unique structure capable of manifesting all of the required properties.

Logical induction does not have to assume the uniformity of nature; it can be taken for granted that nature is uniformly logical. For if nature were anywhere illogical, then it would be inconsistent, and could not be coherently perceived or conceived. But if something cannot be coherently perceived or conceived, then it cannot be recognized as reality, and has no place in a theory of reality. So for theoretical purposes, reality exhibits logical homogeneity, and logical induction thus escapes Hume's problem of empirical induction. (Q.E.D.)

In theoretically (cognitively) connecting perceptual reality in an explanatory causal network, one can't always progress by short obvious steps; sometimes one must plunge into an ocean of non-testability in order to come up with a superior testable description on the far shore (think of this kind of insight as analogous to irreducible complexity, but often followed by a simplificative "refolding stage"). In other words, it is not always easy to distinguish (empirically fruitful) science from nonscience as science progresses; one must rely on logic and mathematics in the "blind spots" between islands of perceptibility.

The scientific value of the CTMU resides largely in the fact that within its framework, certain logical truths can be regarded as scientific truths (as opposed to tentatively-confirmed scientific hypotheses).

The CTMU elevates empirical induction to the model-theoretic level of reasoning, thus circumventing the problem of induction.


To pick up where I left off on my point regarding evolution - the way in which we think is configured around survival and not absolute truth, so surely there are limits to our comprehension of the universe. It makes sense, then, that serious advancements in our understanding of the universe would be facilitated only by empirical clues.
000ike
Posts: 11,196
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7/26/2014 10:59:21 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 9:56:56 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2014 10:09:01 PM, 000ike wrote:

My problem with Langan is his assumption that conclusions such as this can even be ascertained a priori.

These quotes should help clarify where Langan is coming from:

There are several kinds of "theory". The CTMU is certainly a theory in the general sense that it is a descriptive or explanatory function T which takes the universe U as an argument: T = T(U). However, instead of employing logical deduction to derive theorems from axioms, it employs logical induction to derive the overall structure of reality from certain necessary properties thereof (which are themselves deduced from the facts of existence and perception). That is, it derives the unique structure capable of manifesting all of the required properties.

Logical induction does not have to assume the uniformity of nature; it can be taken for granted that nature is uniformly logical. For if nature were anywhere illogical, then it would be inconsistent, and could not be coherently perceived or conceived. But if something cannot be coherently perceived or conceived, then it cannot be recognized as reality, and has no place in a theory of reality. So for theoretical purposes, reality exhibits logical homogeneity, and logical induction thus escapes Hume's problem of empirical induction. (Q.E.D.)

In theoretically (cognitively) connecting perceptual reality in an explanatory causal network, one can't always progress by short obvious steps; sometimes one must plunge into an ocean of non-testability in order to come up with a superior testable description on the far shore (think of this kind of insight as analogous to irreducible complexity, but often followed by a simplificative "refolding stage"). In other words, it is not always easy to distinguish (empirically fruitful) science from nonscience as science progresses; one must rely on logic and mathematics in the "blind spots" between islands of perceptibility.

The scientific value of the CTMU resides largely in the fact that within its framework, certain logical truths can be regarded as scientific truths (as opposed to tentatively-confirmed scientific hypotheses).

The CTMU elevates empirical induction to the model-theoretic level of reasoning, thus circumventing the problem of induction.



To pick up where I left off on my point regarding evolution - the way in which we think is configured around survival and not absolute truth, so surely there are limits to our comprehension of the universe. It makes sense, then, that serious advancements in our understanding of the universe would be facilitated only by empirical clues.

There is some circularity in the use of pure reason to justify the universality of pure reason. At best, such an argument would prove that logic is self-contained and nonlogic is incomprehensible. My point (that is not addressed by your quotes) which I want you to address, is the fact that evolution contextualizes our analytical faculties, making them contingent on circumstances irrelevant (or only indirectly relevant) to the truth.

I feel like I'm talking to a bot using an algorithm for conversation. Please stop pseudo-quoting Langan (as the absence of quotes and citations errs on complete plagiarism) and respond to the point I raised.
"A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly with the chain of their own ideas" - Michel Foucault
dylancatlow
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7/26/2014 11:08:58 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 10:59:21 AM, 000ike wrote:
At 7/26/2014 9:56:56 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2014 10:09:01 PM, 000ike wrote:

My problem with Langan is his assumption that conclusions such as this can even be ascertained a priori.

These quotes should help clarify where Langan is coming from:

There are several kinds of "theory". The CTMU is certainly a theory in the general sense that it is a descriptive or explanatory function T which takes the universe U as an argument: T = T(U). However, instead of employing logical deduction to derive theorems from axioms, it employs logical induction to derive the overall structure of reality from certain necessary properties thereof (which are themselves deduced from the facts of existence and perception). That is, it derives the unique structure capable of manifesting all of the required properties.

Logical induction does not have to assume the uniformity of nature; it can be taken for granted that nature is uniformly logical. For if nature were anywhere illogical, then it would be inconsistent, and could not be coherently perceived or conceived. But if something cannot be coherently perceived or conceived, then it cannot be recognized as reality, and has no place in a theory of reality. So for theoretical purposes, reality exhibits logical homogeneity, and logical induction thus escapes Hume's problem of empirical induction. (Q.E.D.)

In theoretically (cognitively) connecting perceptual reality in an explanatory causal network, one can't always progress by short obvious steps; sometimes one must plunge into an ocean of non-testability in order to come up with a superior testable description on the far shore (think of this kind of insight as analogous to irreducible complexity, but often followed by a simplificative "refolding stage"). In other words, it is not always easy to distinguish (empirically fruitful) science from nonscience as science progresses; one must rely on logic and mathematics in the "blind spots" between islands of perceptibility.

The scientific value of the CTMU resides largely in the fact that within its framework, certain logical truths can be regarded as scientific truths (as opposed to tentatively-confirmed scientific hypotheses).

The CTMU elevates empirical induction to the model-theoretic level of reasoning, thus circumventing the problem of induction.



To pick up where I left off on my point regarding evolution - the way in which we think is configured around survival and not absolute truth, so surely there are limits to our comprehension of the universe. It makes sense, then, that serious advancements in our understanding of the universe would be facilitated only by empirical clues.

There is some circularity in the use of pure reason to justify the universality of pure reason. At best, such an argument would prove that logic is self-contained and nonlogic is incomprehensible. My point (that is not addressed by your quotes) which I want you to address, is the fact that evolution contextualizes our analytical faculties, making them contingent on circumstances irrelevant (or only indirectly relevant) to the truth.


The point is that this circularity is justified by the definition of truth itself (truth is the standard against which its own validity can be determined). Our brains are the products of evolution, but to claim that they are incapable of discerning absolute truth amounts to self-contradiction. All statements aim at absolute truth whether or not their content is absolute (e.g. a statement which claims "we might know X" amounts to "it is absolutely true that we might know X"). Thus, an argument to the effect that something cannot be known because it is based on the assumption we can know undermines its own medium and is therefore false.

I feel like I'm talking to a bot using an algorithm for conversation. Please stop pseudo-quoting Langan (as the absence of quotes and citations errs on complete plagiarism) and respond to the point I raised.

Sorry lol. I just thought that since your question had to do with Langan, it made sense to quote Langan himself (he is, after all, his best advocate).
9spaceking
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7/26/2014 11:10:23 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 11:08:58 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/26/2014 10:59:21 AM, 000ike wrote:
At 7/26/2014 9:56:56 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2014 10:09:01 PM, 000ike wrote:

My problem with Langan is his assumption that conclusions such as this can even be ascertained a priori.

These quotes should help clarify where Langan is coming from:

There are several kinds of "theory". The CTMU is certainly a theory in the general sense that it is a descriptive or explanatory function T which takes the universe U as an argument: T = T(U). However, instead of employing logical deduction to derive theorems from axioms, it employs logical induction to derive the overall structure of reality from certain necessary properties thereof (which are themselves deduced from the facts of existence and perception). That is, it derives the unique structure capable of manifesting all of the required properties.

Logical induction does not have to assume the uniformity of nature; it can be taken for granted that nature is uniformly logical. For if nature were anywhere illogical, then it would be inconsistent, and could not be coherently perceived or conceived. But if something cannot be coherently perceived or conceived, then it cannot be recognized as reality, and has no place in a theory of reality. So for theoretical purposes, reality exhibits logical homogeneity, and logical induction thus escapes Hume's problem of empirical induction. (Q.E.D.)

In theoretically (cognitively) connecting perceptual reality in an explanatory causal network, one can't always progress by short obvious steps; sometimes one must plunge into an ocean of non-testability in order to come up with a superior testable description on the far shore (think of this kind of insight as analogous to irreducible complexity, but often followed by a simplificative "refolding stage"). In other words, it is not always easy to distinguish (empirically fruitful) science from nonscience as science progresses; one must rely on logic and mathematics in the "blind spots" between islands of perceptibility.

The scientific value of the CTMU resides largely in the fact that within its framework, certain logical truths can be regarded as scientific truths (as opposed to tentatively-confirmed scientific hypotheses).

The CTMU elevates empirical induction to the model-theoretic level of reasoning, thus circumventing the problem of induction.



To pick up where I left off on my point regarding evolution - the way in which we think is configured around survival and not absolute truth, so surely there are limits to our comprehension of the universe. It makes sense, then, that serious advancements in our understanding of the universe would be facilitated only by empirical clues.

There is some circularity in the use of pure reason to justify the universality of pure reason. At best, such an argument would prove that logic is self-contained and nonlogic is incomprehensible. My point (that is not addressed by your quotes) which I want you to address, is the fact that evolution contextualizes our analytical faculties, making them contingent on circumstances irrelevant (or only indirectly relevant) to the truth.


The point is that this circularity is justified by the definition of truth itself (truth is the standard against which its own validity can be determined). Our brains are the products of evolution, but to claim that they are incapable of discerning absolute truth amounts to self-contradiction. All statements aim at absolute truth whether or not their content is absolute (e.g. a statement which claims "we might know X" amounts to "it is absolutely true that we might know X"). Thus, an argument to the effect that something cannot be known because it is based on the assumption we can know undermines its own medium and is therefore false.


I feel like I'm talking to a bot using an algorithm for conversation. Please stop pseudo-quoting Langan (as the absence of quotes and citations errs on complete plagiarism) and respond to the point I raised.

Sorry lol. I just thought that since your question had to do with Langan, it made sense to quote Langan himself (he is, after all, his best advocate).
I can see where your thoughts are coming from.
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dylancatlow
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7/26/2014 11:34:56 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 10:59:21 AM, 000ike wrote:
At 7/26/2014 9:56:56 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2014 10:09:01 PM, 000ike wrote:

My problem with Langan is his assumption that conclusions such as this can even be ascertained a priori.

These quotes should help clarify where Langan is coming from:

There are several kinds of "theory". The CTMU is certainly a theory in the general sense that it is a descriptive or explanatory function T which takes the universe U as an argument: T = T(U). However, instead of employing logical deduction to derive theorems from axioms, it employs logical induction to derive the overall structure of reality from certain necessary properties thereof (which are themselves deduced from the facts of existence and perception). That is, it derives the unique structure capable of manifesting all of the required properties.

Logical induction does not have to assume the uniformity of nature; it can be taken for granted that nature is uniformly logical. For if nature were anywhere illogical, then it would be inconsistent, and could not be coherently perceived or conceived. But if something cannot be coherently perceived or conceived, then it cannot be recognized as reality, and has no place in a theory of reality. So for theoretical purposes, reality exhibits logical homogeneity, and logical induction thus escapes Hume's problem of empirical induction. (Q.E.D.)

In theoretically (cognitively) connecting perceptual reality in an explanatory causal network, one can't always progress by short obvious steps; sometimes one must plunge into an ocean of non-testability in order to come up with a superior testable description on the far shore (think of this kind of insight as analogous to irreducible complexity, but often followed by a simplificative "refolding stage"). In other words, it is not always easy to distinguish (empirically fruitful) science from nonscience as science progresses; one must rely on logic and mathematics in the "blind spots" between islands of perceptibility.

The scientific value of the CTMU resides largely in the fact that within its framework, certain logical truths can be regarded as scientific truths (as opposed to tentatively-confirmed scientific hypotheses).

The CTMU elevates empirical induction to the model-theoretic level of reasoning, thus circumventing the problem of induction.



To pick up where I left off on my point regarding evolution - the way in which we think is configured around survival and not absolute truth, so surely there are limits to our comprehension of the universe. It makes sense, then, that serious advancements in our understanding of the universe would be facilitated only by empirical clues.

There is some circularity in the use of pure reason to justify the universality of pure reason.

Truth and reality are really synonymous. If something is true, then it is (is real). The universality of pure reason simply means that everything that is true (exists) is true.

I feel like I'm talking to a bot using an algorithm for conversation. Please stop pseudo-quoting Langan (as the absence of quotes and citations errs on complete plagiarism) and respond to the point I raised.
000ike
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7/26/2014 12:31:56 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 11:08:58 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/26/2014 10:59:21 AM, 000ike wrote:

To pick up where I left off on my point regarding evolution - the way in which we think is configured around survival and not absolute truth, so surely there are limits to our comprehension of the universe. It makes sense, then, that serious advancements in our understanding of the universe would be facilitated only by empirical clues.

There is some circularity in the use of pure reason to justify the universality of pure reason. At best, such an argument would prove that logic is self-contained and nonlogic is incomprehensible. My point (that is not addressed by your quotes) which I want you to address, is the fact that evolution contextualizes our analytical faculties, making them contingent on circumstances irrelevant (or only indirectly relevant) to the truth.


The point is that this circularity is justified by the definition of truth itself (truth is the standard against which its own validity can be determined). Our brains are the products of evolution, but to claim that they are incapable of discerning absolute truth amounts to self-contradiction. All statements aim at absolute truth whether or not their content is absolute (e.g. a statement which claims "we might know X" amounts to "it is absolutely true that we might know X"). Thus, an argument to the effect that something cannot be known because it is based on the assumption we can know undermines its own medium and is therefore false.

I'm advocating for a distinction between incomprehensibility and impossibility - two concepts inelegantly conflated by the argument you've proposed. So this has less to do with restrictions on knowledge than it does restrictions on certainty. Logic is self-justifying, but concomitantly, its syntax for justification requires consistency with an external truth (i.e the sun is hot because it's sustained by exothermic chemical reactions vs. the sun is hot because the sun is hot). Therefore, when we attempt to justify the syntax of logic itself a paradox arises - as though we are to use illogic to justify logic. Here lies the limitation of reason whereupon the system it uses to vindicate all propositions cannot be used to vindicate itself.

The phrase "this circularity is justified" alone betrays the logic you're defending and is tantamount to "this contradiction is justified" in that both are fallacious and make no sense. Axioms compose the outer wall of logic, but are assumed true because all is incomprehensible without them. This assumption, however, does not entail an ignorance of the problem thus described, but inclusion of it through a reduction in maximum certainty.

For this reason, the conclusion of your post is invalid (via logic itself), and must be amended to the following: "an argument to the effect that something cannot be known ... is therefore incomprehensible or apparently false." ALL things are uncertain.

However, there are degrees of certainty which vary depending on the consistency of the claim with other independent conduits of information. This is why I think Langan needs some empirical basis to his theory. FINALLY (lol I'm almost done), a conclusion of such immense cosmological importance - one that professes to include all that is and all that can be - confers unto the human wit a degree of certainty and validity it does not possess. And so his conclusions are not trustworthy if determined a priori.
"A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly with the chain of their own ideas" - Michel Foucault
000ike
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7/26/2014 12:42:19 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
it should, moreover, be understood that this objection ONLY applies to langan because of the nature of his theory and the nature of his justification ... which attempts to unearth truths so fundamental to existence itself. No other theory or pronouncement lays claim to this degree certainty.

In a way, this might be an objection to all Theories of Everything.
"A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly with the chain of their own ideas" - Michel Foucault
dylancatlow
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7/26/2014 12:59:01 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 12:31:56 PM, 000ike wrote:
At 7/26/2014 11:08:58 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/26/2014 10:59:21 AM, 000ike wrote:

To pick up where I left off on my point regarding evolution - the way in which we think is configured around survival and not absolute truth, so surely there are limits to our comprehension of the universe. It makes sense, then, that serious advancements in our understanding of the universe would be facilitated only by empirical clues.

There is some circularity in the use of pure reason to justify the universality of pure reason. At best, such an argument would prove that logic is self-contained and nonlogic is incomprehensible. My point (that is not addressed by your quotes) which I want you to address, is the fact that evolution contextualizes our analytical faculties, making them contingent on circumstances irrelevant (or only indirectly relevant) to the truth.


The point is that this circularity is justified by the definition of truth itself (truth is the standard against which its own validity can be determined). Our brains are the products of evolution, but to claim that they are incapable of discerning absolute truth amounts to self-contradiction. All statements aim at absolute truth whether or not their content is absolute (e.g. a statement which claims "we might know X" amounts to "it is absolutely true that we might know X"). Thus, an argument to the effect that something cannot be known because it is based on the assumption we can know undermines its own medium and is therefore false.

I'm advocating for a distinction between incomprehensibility and impossibility - two concepts inelegantly conflated by the argument you've proposed. So this has less to do with restrictions on knowledge than it does restrictions on certainty. Logic is self-justifying, but concomitantly, its syntax for justification requires consistency with an external truth (i.e the sun is hot because it's sustained by exothermic chemical reactions vs. the sun is hot because the sun is hot). Therefore, when we attempt to justify the syntax of logic itself a paradox arises - as though we are to use illogic to justify logic. Here lies the limitation of reason whereupon the system it uses to vindicate all propositions cannot be used to vindicate itself.

By its very definition, logic is self-proving. We don't need to "start out with non-logic" and then derive logic from it. Indeed, there is no need to prove logic, although we can if we want to. If we do, however, we must admit that our proof is based on logic itself, and that logic is self-proving and was never actually necessary to prove.


The phrase "this circularity is justified" alone betrays the logic you're defending and is tantamount to "this contradiction is justified" in that both are fallacious and make no sense. Axioms compose the outer wall of logic, but are assumed true because all is incomprehensible without them. This assumption, however, does not entail an ignorance of the problem thus described, but inclusion of it through a reduction in maximum certainty.

For this reason, the conclusion of your post is invalid (via logic itself), and must be amended to the following: "an argument to the effect that something cannot be known ... is therefore incomprehensible or apparently false." ALL things are uncertain.

I need merely point out that this is contradictory. If all things are uncertain, then we cannot be certain that all things are uncertain.


However, there are degrees of certainty which vary depending on the consistency of the claim with other independent conduits of information. This is why I think Langan needs some empirical basis to his theory.

It is empirically confirmed, it's just not predicated on the observation of those predictions.

FINALLY (lol I'm almost done), a conclusion of such immense cosmological importance - one that professes to include all that is and all that can be - confers unto the human wit a degree of certainty and validity it does not possess. And so his conclusions are not trustworthy if determined a priori.

Knowing things "A priori" has received a bad reputation simply because people in the past claimed to know things when really they were just making unverified assumptions. Indeed, it does not follow logically that Aristotle's theories, for example, were necessarily true, or that the earth is flat, etc.
dylancatlow
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7/26/2014 1:04:09 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 12:31:56 PM, 000ike wrote:
At 7/26/2014 11:08:58 AM, dylancatlow wrote:

Logic is self-justifying, but concomitantly, its syntax for justification requires consistency with an external truth (i.e the sun is hot because it's sustained by exothermic chemical reactions vs. the sun is hot because the sun is hot).

If logic is self-justifying, and if "justifying is based on logic", then obviously the justification itself is self-justifying.
dylancatlow
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7/26/2014 1:13:56 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
In other words, it would only be a problem that logic is circular if it were false. But logic is designed such that if it were false, it wouldn't be logic. Logic is true by definition.
000ike
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7/26/2014 1:14:57 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 1:04:09 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/26/2014 12:31:56 PM, 000ike wrote:
At 7/26/2014 11:08:58 AM, dylancatlow wrote:

Logic is self-justifying, but concomitantly, its syntax for justification requires consistency with an external truth (i.e the sun is hot because it's sustained by exothermic chemical reactions vs. the sun is hot because the sun is hot).

If logic is self-justifying, and if "justifying is based on logic", then obviously the justification itself is self-justifying.

wrong phrase - what intended to convey was that logic does not allow you to think outside of its system (as such would be absurd). I was still forming my thoughts as I was writing and forgot to patch up loose ends such as that.

So you can strike that statement from the record. My response to the previous post is forthcoming.
"A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly with the chain of their own ideas" - Michel Foucault
dylancatlow
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7/26/2014 1:17:04 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 1:14:57 PM, 000ike wrote:
At 7/26/2014 1:04:09 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/26/2014 12:31:56 PM, 000ike wrote:
At 7/26/2014 11:08:58 AM, dylancatlow wrote:

Logic is self-justifying, but concomitantly, its syntax for justification requires consistency with an external truth (i.e the sun is hot because it's sustained by exothermic chemical reactions vs. the sun is hot because the sun is hot).

If logic is self-justifying, and if "justifying is based on logic", then obviously the justification itself is self-justifying.

wrong phrase - what intended to convey was that logic does not allow you to think outside of its system (as such would be absurd). I was still forming my thoughts as I was writing and forgot to patch up loose ends such as that.

Logic is the theory of truth, and truth is the theory of what it. "Outside of logic" is thus not a possible state in which logic could be false in.


So you can strike that statement from the record. My response to the previous post is forthcoming.
000ike
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7/26/2014 1:28:31 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 12:59:01 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
If all things are uncertain, then we cannot be certain that all things are uncertain.

I don't believe this makes sense. The contradiction here is purely semanic, as there is no conceptual meaning to certainty of uncertainty. A state of being is immediately accessible to the being involved - it begs no further inquiry for its existence is self-evident (for example, you may not be able to adequately verbalize what you're feeling you know EXACTLY what it feels like because you're feeling it). Uncertainty is a state that comprises your experience as a being - as a thing that exists. This is the standard by which certainty of all other knowledge is judged. If this certainty can be assessed for certainty then the concept collapses and ceases to mean anything. Logic on the other hand, is not a feeling or a state but a way in which information is derived, assessed and understood. Essentially, we cannot no absolutely what IS... but we can know absolutely what APPEARS to be

Sorry to cut off your other responses. I'll just post my rebuttal here.
At the heart of our disagreement is the belief that self-justification is a legitimate thing. I'm not sure what the basis is of your argument is but the basis of mine is the established fallacy of circular reasoning (in this case, logic is true because premise X is true, because premise X is logical). You argue that logic demands no such further inquiry similar to the way I've stated that certainty demands no further inquiry, but like I stated certainty is a state whose truth is judged by the presence of that state, which is known only to the individual involved, as it is component to his VERY EXISTENCE, thus a state of certainty is tautologically certain. This is the only exception to the principle regarding external justification. Logic is of a totally different nature because it doesn't deal with appearances but fact. What appears is what appears, but what appears may not be fact and what is fact may not be what appears.

I can't be more explicit than this.
"A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly with the chain of their own ideas" - Michel Foucault
dylancatlow
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7/26/2014 1:41:13 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 1:28:31 PM, 000ike wrote:
At 7/26/2014 12:59:01 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
If all things are uncertain, then we cannot be certain that all things are uncertain.

I don't believe this makes sense. The contradiction here is purely semanic, as there is no conceptual meaning to certainty of uncertainty.

Then your sentence is purely semantic and has no meaning. But if it has no meaning, then why do you expect me to take it seriously...as something that is even identifiable. You can't have it both ways, Ike.

A state of being is immediately accessible to the being involved - it begs no further inquiry for its existence is self-evident (for example, you may not be able to adequately verbalize what you're feeling you know EXACTLY what it feels like because you're feeling it). Uncertainty is a state that comprises your experience as a being - as a thing that exists. This is the standard by which certainty of all other knowledge is judged. If this certainty can be assessed for certainty then the concept collapses and ceases to mean anything. Logic on the other hand, is not a feeling or a state but a way in which information is derived, assessed and understood. Essentially, we cannot no absolutely what IS... but we can know absolutely what APPEARS to be

We can be absolutely certain of truth itself.


Sorry to cut off your other responses. I'll just post my rebuttal here.
At the heart of our disagreement is the belief that self-justification is a legitimate thing.

If self-justification weren't a legitimate thing, then logic - the basis of justification - could not be used to justify its own ability to justify itself. But in that case logic wouldn't be true, which is a contradiction.

I'm not sure what the basis is of your argument is but the basis of mine is the established fallacy of circular reasoning (in this case, logic is true because premise X is true, because premise X is logical).

Circular reasoning can only be fallacious when an untrue (non-universal) premise proves itself (establishes itself as universal). You have not explained why circular reasoning is inherently flawed. In any case, without ciruclar reasoning, all statements would be subject to an infinite regress in which nothing could be justified, in which case the statement "circular reasoning is flawed" is not justified.

You argue that logic demands no such further inquiry similar to the way I've stated that certainty demands no further inquiry, but like I stated certainty is a state whose truth is judged by the presence of that state, which is known only to the individual involved, as it is component to his VERY EXISTENCE, thus a state of certainty is tautologically certain. This is the only exception to the principle regarding external justification. Logic is of a totally different nature because it doesn't deal with appearances but fact. What appears is what appears, but what appears may not be fact and what is fact may not be what appears.

I can't be more explicit than this.

What appears may not be fact, but you are essentially claiming that it cannot (in claiming that logic CANNOT prove itself), which means your own argument is no more justified.
000ike
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7/26/2014 2:05:18 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 1:41:13 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/26/2014 1:28:31 PM, 000ike wrote:
At 7/26/2014 12:59:01 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
If all things are uncertain, then we cannot be certain that all things are uncertain.

I don't believe this makes sense. The contradiction here is purely semanic, as there is no conceptual meaning to certainty of uncertainty.


Then your sentence is purely semantic and has no meaning. But if it has no meaning, then why do you expect me to take it seriously...as something that is even identifiable. You can't have it both ways, Ike.

Which sentence and how so?

We can be absolutely certain of truth itself.

I know you believe that, but it would be more constructive if you justified it.

If self-justification weren't a legitimate thing, then logic - the basis of justification - could not be used to justify its own ability to justify itself. But in that case logic wouldn't be true, which is a contradiction.

That's incorrect. In that case, logic wouldn't be provable/jusitifiable/verifiable. Logic doesn't become false.


I'm not sure what the basis is of your argument is but the basis of mine is the established fallacy of circular reasoning (in this case, logic is true because premise X is true, because premise X is logical).

Circular reasoning can only be fallacious when an untrue (non-universal) premise proves itself (establishes itself as universal). You have not explained why circular reasoning is inherently flawed. In any case, without ciruclar reasoning, all statements would be subject to an infinite regress in which nothing could be justified, in which case the statement "circular reasoning is flawed" is not justified.

Infinite regress is a problem that exists not one that must be vanquished via argumentative maneuvers. Logic does not need to be justified to be used - it can be used but with uncertainty. And lastly, circular reasoning is inherently flawed because one begins with an inquiry as to the truth of a proposition, presumes that the proposition is true, and then uses that presumption to justify the proposition. The inquiry was never completed. You could argue(as you already have) that no inquiry is required in the case of logic - and we'll continue our argument from there, but this idea of circular self-justification is completely absurd to me.

For the argument that no inquiry is required, you can refer to my previous post regarding the distinction between certainty and logic - how one is a state of being and the other a system of comprehension.


What appears may not be fact, but you are essentially claiming that it cannot (in claiming that logic CANNOT prove itself), which means your own argument is no more justified.

You're saying that if I think logic cannot prove itself, and I arrived at that conclusion using logic, then I cannot prove that logic cannot prove itself.

Yes I can, as this is a matter of internal consistency. Thus, if logic is true (& my reasoning is correct) then logic cannot prove itself (even though it's still true) and if logic is not true (&my reasoning under that false system is correct) then logic cannot provide for its own justification AND is unjustified by whatever truth-determining system exists in its place.

Lastly Unjustified =/= false
"A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly with the chain of their own ideas" - Michel Foucault
dylancatlow
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7/26/2014 3:34:00 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 2:05:18 PM, 000ike wrote:
At 7/26/2014 1:41:13 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/26/2014 1:28:31 PM, 000ike wrote:
At 7/26/2014 12:59:01 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
If all things are uncertain, then we cannot be certain that all things are uncertain.

I don't believe this makes sense. The contradiction here is purely semanic, as there is no conceptual meaning to certainty of uncertainty.


Then your sentence is purely semantic and has no meaning. But if it has no meaning, then why do you expect me to take it seriously...as something that is even identifiable. You can't have it both ways, Ike.

Which sentence and how so?


Well, all of them. But I was referring to "The contradiction here is purely semanic, as there is no conceptual meaning to certainty of uncertainty."

We can be absolutely certain of truth itself.

I know you believe that, but it would be more constructive if you justified it.

If I justified it, I would merely be showing how it is self-evident. Thus, I don't need to. You must show how it is impossible for me to justify it without using it.


If self-justification weren't a legitimate thing, then logic - the basis of justification - could not be used to justify its own ability to justify itself. But in that case logic wouldn't be true, which is a contradiction.

That's incorrect. In that case, logic wouldn't be provable/jusitifiable/verifiable. Logic doesn't become false.

If logic isn't provable, then it can't be called "true". But if it can't be called true, then it isn't logic, which is a contradiction.



I'm not sure what the basis is of your argument is but the basis of mine is the established fallacy of circular reasoning (in this case, logic is true because premise X is true, because premise X is logical).

Circular reasoning can only be fallacious when an untrue (non-universal) premise proves itself (establishes itself as universal). You have not explained why circular reasoning is inherently flawed. In any case, without ciruclar reasoning, all statements would be subject to an infinite regress in which nothing could be justified, in which case the statement "circular reasoning is flawed" is not justified.

Infinite regress is a problem that exists not one that must be vanquished via argumentative maneuvers. Logic does not need to be justified to be used - it can be used but with uncertainty.

Uncertainty implies that it could be false, and "could" implies the logical possibility of. Since logic defines what is logically possible, this is a contradiction. When you say "it can be used with uncertainty" you are saying "it is true that logically isn't necessarily true".

And lastly, circular reasoning is inherently flawed because one begins with an inquiry as to the truth of a proposition, presumes that the proposition is true, and then uses that presumption to justify the proposition. The inquiry was never completed. You could argue(as you already have) that no inquiry is required in the case of logic - and we'll continue our argument from there, but this idea of circular self-justification is completely absurd to me.

"Flawed" implies that it could produce a false conclusion, and "false conclusion" is tautologically defined on truth itself. When you start with a self-evident premise (when you define truth) circular reasoning is basically a secondary (is effectively done afterward) and not a primary.


For the argument that no inquiry is required, you can refer to my previous post regarding the distinction between certainty and logic - how one is a state of being and the other a system of comprehension.


What appears may not be fact, but you are essentially claiming that it cannot (in claiming that logic CANNOT prove itself), which means your own argument is no more justified.

You're saying that if I think logic cannot prove itself, and I arrived at that conclusion using logic, then I cannot prove that logic cannot prove itself.

Yes I can, as this is a matter of internal consistency. Thus, if logic is true (& my reasoning is correct) then logic cannot prove itself (even though it's still true) and if logic is not true (&my reasoning under that false system is correct) then logic cannot provide for its own justification AND is unjustified by whatever truth-determining system exists in its place.

Lastly Unjustified =/= false
dylancatlow
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7/26/2014 3:49:14 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 12:42:19 PM, 000ike wrote:

I know you believe that, but it would be more constructive if you justified it.

If I were to justify logic, I would merely be showing that it is self-evident. So if it's possible to justify logic, then it is necessarily true. On the other hand, if it is not logically possible, then this "logical impossibility" requires that logic be true in order for it to be logically impossible as opposed to logically possible.
000ike
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7/26/2014 3:49:53 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 7/26/2014 3:34:00 PM, dylancatlow wrote:

If logic isn't provable, then it can't be called "true". But if it can't be called true, then it isn't logic, which is a contradiction.

it can't be known true. How is logic not logic if it isn't known true?
"A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly with the chain of their own ideas" - Michel Foucault