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Continental/Analytic Philosophy

socialpinko
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9/27/2014 1:12:33 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
What is the source of the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? Is it, as many Anglo-American philosophers would say, the difference between those who use logic and reason to find Truth among our world and ourselves?- as against the charlatans who mask their relativism and epistemic nihilism behind clunky jargon and useless neologisms? Or rather, as some Continental philosophers would say, between those who admit of the situatedness of their position and who would not be so careless as to allow themselves to think they'd have the advantage of peaking behind the 'discursive' curtain?

The longstanding debate between the two general strands of philosophical thought finds it's most obvious expression in the "debates" between American analytic philosopher John Searle and French deconstructionist Jacques Derrida (a great portion of which is recorded in Derrida's book "Limited Inc." btw). Searle alleged that Derrida hid his incoherent and irrational line of thinking behind obscurantist neologisms and obfuscatory wordplay, whereas Derrida asserted that Searle exhibited a pretense to knowledge when operated under the assumption that we could neutrally investigate the metaphysics of the world without paying attention to our necessary situatedness within the discursive reality of the text.

I think Foucault correctly grasped the differences (and sources of the apparent mutual incompatibility between the two) at the end of a lecture on Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment" in '83:

"Let's say that in his major critical ouvre-that of the three Critiques and above all the firt Critique Kant set out and founded that tradition of critical philosophy which posed the conditions of the possibility of a true knowledge. And we can say that the whole part of modern philosophy since the nineteenth century presented itself and developed from this as the analytic of truth. This is the form of philosophy that you now find in the form of, say, Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy.

But within modern and contemporary philosophy there s another type of question, of critical questioning whose birth we see precisely in the question of Augklarung or in Kant's text on the Revolution. This other critical tradition does not pose the question of the conditions of possibility of a true knowledge; it asks the question: What is present reality? What is the present field of our experiences? What is the present field of possible experiences? Here is is not a question of the analytic of truth but involves what could be called an ontology of the present, of present reality, an ontology of modernity, and ontology of ourselves.

It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is this latter form of philosophy, which from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber, and so on, has founded a form of reflection to which, of course I link myself insofar as I can."

So then, it finds its genesis in Kant, the philosopher of modernity par excellence. Whereas Kant's Critiques investigated the possibilities of setting the conditions for true knowledge, his work also drew attention to the necessity of understanding our condition within it's localized context, not to be diminished or hidden behind an idealized abstraction.

Are these two foundations always incompatible? Does the possibility exist for a"free play" between the two? And if so, to what degree?
: At 9/29/2014 10:55:59 AM, imabench wrote:
: : At 9/29/2014 9:43:46 AM, kbub wrote:
: :
: : DDO should discredit support of sexual violence at any time and in every way.
:
: I disagree.
socialpinko
Posts: 10,458
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9/27/2014 11:44:13 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
No one?
: At 9/29/2014 10:55:59 AM, imabench wrote:
: : At 9/29/2014 9:43:46 AM, kbub wrote:
: :
: : DDO should discredit support of sexual violence at any time and in every way.
:
: I disagree.
Raisor
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9/27/2014 7:31:17 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
I'm not very familiar with the Analytic tradition, as an amateur the continental stuff tends to be more interesting and fun, so I guess my input will be pretty limited.

I don't really understand the division as being very significant beyond the areas of interest the schools have. This is what Foucault says in quoted passage in the OP, but I don't see why the areas of interest are mutually exclusive or why a "choice" needs to be made. The example that comes to mind is Heidegger's theory of mind vs. the sort of intentionality Searle defends. Searle can disparage Heidegger, but ultimately he is engaging a continental theory of mind and addressing the arguments put forth. It isn't like the two schools are on different planets- they are able to interact and clearly do influence each other.

Obviously the two schools interact. No modern ethicist or political philosopher can ignore Marx, Nietzsche, or Weber. Habermas is another that comes to mind as being influential across the continental/analytic divide.

I guess a "choice" is required if you really want to buy into some more radical project like Kierkegaard or Rorty or (depending on interpretation) Nietzsche. But even here its just a question of whose arguments you find compelling. From a personal standpoint, I recently read something that falls more in the analytical tradition on virtue ethics that I found pretty compelling, but at one point I caught myself thinking "man this argument really depends on the existence of a coherent/unified Self- am I convinced of that?" So I guess there's an example of how a continental critique sort of undermined my reading of an analytical text.

So I don't know a lot about the distinction between the two, I'm sure someone with a more rigorous/formal background will have something more competent to say, but I've never really seen the two as so radically different. The claims of both traditions interact and I find myself drawing on both traditions when I think about what arguments I find compelling.
HououinKyouma
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9/27/2014 8:19:47 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 9/27/2014 1:12:33 AM, socialpinko wrote:
What is the source of the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? Is it, as many Anglo-American philosophers would say, the difference between those who use logic and reason to find Truth among our world and ourselves?- as against the charlatans who mask their relativism and epistemic nihilism behind clunky jargon and useless neologisms? Or rather, as some Continental philosophers would say, between those who admit of the situatedness of their position and who would not be so careless as to allow themselves to think they'd have the advantage of peaking behind the 'discursive' curtain?

The longstanding debate between the two general strands of philosophical thought finds it's most obvious expression in the "debates" between American analytic philosopher John Searle and French deconstructionist Jacques Derrida (a great portion of which is recorded in Derrida's book "Limited Inc." btw). Searle alleged that Derrida hid his incoherent and irrational line of thinking behind obscurantist neologisms and obfuscatory wordplay, whereas Derrida asserted that Searle exhibited a pretense to knowledge when operated under the assumption that we could neutrally investigate the metaphysics of the world without paying attention to our necessary situatedness within the discursive reality of the text.

I think Foucault correctly grasped the differences (and sources of the apparent mutual incompatibility between the two) at the end of a lecture on Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment" in '83:

"Let's say that in his major critical ouvre-that of the three Critiques and above all the firt Critique Kant set out and founded that tradition of critical philosophy which posed the conditions of the possibility of a true knowledge. And we can say that the whole part of modern philosophy since the nineteenth century presented itself and developed from this as the analytic of truth. This is the form of philosophy that you now find in the form of, say, Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy.

But within modern and contemporary philosophy there s another type of question, of critical questioning whose birth we see precisely in the question of Augklarung or in Kant's text on the Revolution. This other critical tradition does not pose the question of the conditions of possibility of a true knowledge; it asks the question: What is present reality? What is the present field of our experiences? What is the present field of possible experiences? Here is is not a question of the analytic of truth but involves what could be called an ontology of the present, of present reality, an ontology of modernity, and ontology of ourselves.

It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is this latter form of philosophy, which from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber, and so on, has founded a form of reflection to which, of course I link myself insofar as I can."

So then, it finds its genesis in Kant, the philosopher of modernity par excellence. Whereas Kant's Critiques investigated the possibilities of setting the conditions for true knowledge, his work also drew attention to the necessity of understanding our condition within it's localized context, not to be diminished or hidden behind an idealized abstraction.

Are these two foundations always incompatible? Does the possibility exist for a"free play" between the two? And if so, to what degree?

I would have to say that the main difference between analytic philosophers and continental ones is that the former tend to make inquiries of a scientific nature, such as, what is the source of our moral feelings, what is the nature of language, and so on, and who reject systematic philosophies, and who think philosophy should be about clarifying thought, like Nietzsche (who could be counted as being in both camps), Ayer, Searle. Continental philosophy when it is something serious is more like social criticism and is often insightful and useful, like for example, Camus or Leo Strauss or Adorno. But then there are the charlatans like Heidegger and Foucault and Derrida who made and make a living out of writing obscure books filled with jargon that make big problems of small ones or in some cases invent them.
"Here the ways of men part: if you wish to strive for peace of soul and pleasure, then believe; if you wish to be a devotee of truth, then inquire." F. Nietzsche.

"Freedom is always freedom for the one who thinks differently." R. Luxemburg.

"The principle of the masochistic left is that, in general, two blacks make a white, half a loaf is the same as no bread." G. Orwell, paraphrase.

"Islamophobia is a word created by fascists, used by cowards, to manipulate morons". Andrew Cummins.
Raisor
Posts: 4,459
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9/27/2014 8:56:51 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 9/27/2014 8:19:47 PM, HououinKyouma wrote:
At 9/27/2014 1:12:33 AM, socialpinko wrote:
What is the source of the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? Is it, as many Anglo-American philosophers would say, the difference between those who use logic and reason to find Truth among our world and ourselves?- as against the charlatans who mask their relativism and epistemic nihilism behind clunky jargon and useless neologisms? Or rather, as some Continental philosophers would say, between those who admit of the situatedness of their position and who would not be so careless as to allow themselves to think they'd have the advantage of peaking behind the 'discursive' curtain?

The longstanding debate between the two general strands of philosophical thought finds it's most obvious expression in the "debates" between American analytic philosopher John Searle and French deconstructionist Jacques Derrida (a great portion of which is recorded in Derrida's book "Limited Inc." btw). Searle alleged that Derrida hid his incoherent and irrational line of thinking behind obscurantist neologisms and obfuscatory wordplay, whereas Derrida asserted that Searle exhibited a pretense to knowledge when operated under the assumption that we could neutrally investigate the metaphysics of the world without paying attention to our necessary situatedness within the discursive reality of the text.

I think Foucault correctly grasped the differences (and sources of the apparent mutual incompatibility between the two) at the end of a lecture on Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment" in '83:

"Let's say that in his major critical ouvre-that of the three Critiques and above all the firt Critique Kant set out and founded that tradition of critical philosophy which posed the conditions of the possibility of a true knowledge. And we can say that the whole part of modern philosophy since the nineteenth century presented itself and developed from this as the analytic of truth. This is the form of philosophy that you now find in the form of, say, Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy.

But within modern and contemporary philosophy there s another type of question, of critical questioning whose birth we see precisely in the question of Augklarung or in Kant's text on the Revolution. This other critical tradition does not pose the question of the conditions of possibility of a true knowledge; it asks the question: What is present reality? What is the present field of our experiences? What is the present field of possible experiences? Here is is not a question of the analytic of truth but involves what could be called an ontology of the present, of present reality, an ontology of modernity, and ontology of ourselves.

It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is this latter form of philosophy, which from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber, and so on, has founded a form of reflection to which, of course I link myself insofar as I can."

So then, it finds its genesis in Kant, the philosopher of modernity par excellence. Whereas Kant's Critiques investigated the possibilities of setting the conditions for true knowledge, his work also drew attention to the necessity of understanding our condition within it's localized context, not to be diminished or hidden behind an idealized abstraction.

Are these two foundations always incompatible? Does the possibility exist for a"free play" between the two? And if so, to what degree?

I would have to say that the main difference between analytic philosophers and continental ones is that the former tend to make inquiries of a scientific nature, such as, what is the source of our moral feelings, what is the nature of language, and so on, and who reject systematic philosophies, and who think philosophy should be about clarifying thought, like Nietzsche (who could be counted as being in both camps), Ayer, Searle. Continental philosophy when it is something serious is more like social criticism and is often insightful and useful, like for example, Camus or Leo Strauss or Adorno. But then there are the charlatans like Heidegger and Foucault and Derrida who made and make a living out of writing obscure books filled with jargon that make big problems of small ones or in some cases invent them.

Derrida is a charlatan - I disagree but at least understand where you are coming from

Foucault is a charlatan - I guess you are just lumping him in for the extent of his claims about power in social relations, but it is totally unfair to call him a charlatan

Heidegger is a charlatan - You are embarrassing yourself.
socialpinko
Posts: 10,458
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9/28/2014 2:04:41 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 9/27/2014 8:19:47 PM, HououinKyouma wrote:
At 9/27/2014 1:12:33 AM, socialpinko wrote:
What is the source of the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? Is it, as many Anglo-American philosophers would say, the difference between those who use logic and reason to find Truth among our world and ourselves?- as against the charlatans who mask their relativism and epistemic nihilism behind clunky jargon and useless neologisms? Or rather, as some Continental philosophers would say, between those who admit of the situatedness of their position and who would not be so careless as to allow themselves to think they'd have the advantage of peaking behind the 'discursive' curtain?

The longstanding debate between the two general strands of philosophical thought finds it's most obvious expression in the "debates" between American analytic philosopher John Searle and French deconstructionist Jacques Derrida (a great portion of which is recorded in Derrida's book "Limited Inc." btw). Searle alleged that Derrida hid his incoherent and irrational line of thinking behind obscurantist neologisms and obfuscatory wordplay, whereas Derrida asserted that Searle exhibited a pretense to knowledge when operated under the assumption that we could neutrally investigate the metaphysics of the world without paying attention to our necessary situatedness within the discursive reality of the text.

I think Foucault correctly grasped the differences (and sources of the apparent mutual incompatibility between the two) at the end of a lecture on Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment" in '83:

"Let's say that in his major critical ouvre-that of the three Critiques and above all the firt Critique Kant set out and founded that tradition of critical philosophy which posed the conditions of the possibility of a true knowledge. And we can say that the whole part of modern philosophy since the nineteenth century presented itself and developed from this as the analytic of truth. This is the form of philosophy that you now find in the form of, say, Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy.

But within modern and contemporary philosophy there s another type of question, of critical questioning whose birth we see precisely in the question of Augklarung or in Kant's text on the Revolution. This other critical tradition does not pose the question of the conditions of possibility of a true knowledge; it asks the question: What is present reality? What is the present field of our experiences? What is the present field of possible experiences? Here is is not a question of the analytic of truth but involves what could be called an ontology of the present, of present reality, an ontology of modernity, and ontology of ourselves.

It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is this latter form of philosophy, which from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber, and so on, has founded a form of reflection to which, of course I link myself insofar as I can."

So then, it finds its genesis in Kant, the philosopher of modernity par excellence. Whereas Kant's Critiques investigated the possibilities of setting the conditions for true knowledge, his work also drew attention to the necessity of understanding our condition within it's localized context, not to be diminished or hidden behind an idealized abstraction.

Are these two foundations always incompatible? Does the possibility exist for a"free play" between the two? And if so, to what degree?

I would have to say that the main difference between analytic philosophers and continental ones is that the former tend to make inquiries of a scientific nature, such as, what is the source of our moral feelings, what is the nature of language, and so on, and who reject systematic philosophies, and who think philosophy should be about clarifying thought, like Nietzsche (who could be counted as being in both camps), Ayer, Searle. Continental philosophy when it is something serious is more like social criticism and is often insightful and useful, like for example, Camus or Leo Strauss or Adorno. But then there are the charlatans like Heidegger and Foucault and Derrida who made and make a living out of writing obscure books filled with jargon that make big problems of small ones or in some cases invent them.

Okay I can see how, given his reputation on this side of the Atlantic, people unfamiliar with Derrida would say that. I disagree but at least it's not a shot out of left field. Saying that about Heidegger or Foucault on the other hand is just something I can't even wrap my head around.
: At 9/29/2014 10:55:59 AM, imabench wrote:
: : At 9/29/2014 9:43:46 AM, kbub wrote:
: :
: : DDO should discredit support of sexual violence at any time and in every way.
:
: I disagree.
HououinKyouma
Posts: 1,030
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9/28/2014 7:50:47 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 9/27/2014 8:56:51 PM, Raisor wrote:
At 9/27/2014 8:19:47 PM, HououinKyouma wrote:
At 9/27/2014 1:12:33 AM, socialpinko wrote:
What is the source of the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? Is it, as many Anglo-American philosophers would say, the difference between those who use logic and reason to find Truth among our world and ourselves?- as against the charlatans who mask their relativism and epistemic nihilism behind clunky jargon and useless neologisms? Or rather, as some Continental philosophers would say, between those who admit of the situatedness of their position and who would not be so careless as to allow themselves to think they'd have the advantage of peaking behind the 'discursive' curtain?

The longstanding debate between the two general strands of philosophical thought finds it's most obvious expression in the "debates" between American analytic philosopher John Searle and French deconstructionist Jacques Derrida (a great portion of which is recorded in Derrida's book "Limited Inc." btw). Searle alleged that Derrida hid his incoherent and irrational line of thinking behind obscurantist neologisms and obfuscatory wordplay, whereas Derrida asserted that Searle exhibited a pretense to knowledge when operated under the assumption that we could neutrally investigate the metaphysics of the world without paying attention to our necessary situatedness within the discursive reality of the text.

I think Foucault correctly grasped the differences (and sources of the apparent mutual incompatibility between the two) at the end of a lecture on Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment" in '83:

"Let's say that in his major critical ouvre-that of the three Critiques and above all the firt Critique Kant set out and founded that tradition of critical philosophy which posed the conditions of the possibility of a true knowledge. And we can say that the whole part of modern philosophy since the nineteenth century presented itself and developed from this as the analytic of truth. This is the form of philosophy that you now find in the form of, say, Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy.

But within modern and contemporary philosophy there s another type of question, of critical questioning whose birth we see precisely in the question of Augklarung or in Kant's text on the Revolution. This other critical tradition does not pose the question of the conditions of possibility of a true knowledge; it asks the question: What is present reality? What is the present field of our experiences? What is the present field of possible experiences? Here is is not a question of the analytic of truth but involves what could be called an ontology of the present, of present reality, an ontology of modernity, and ontology of ourselves.

It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is this latter form of philosophy, which from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber, and so on, has founded a form of reflection to which, of course I link myself insofar as I can."

So then, it finds its genesis in Kant, the philosopher of modernity par excellence. Whereas Kant's Critiques investigated the possibilities of setting the conditions for true knowledge, his work also drew attention to the necessity of understanding our condition within it's localized context, not to be diminished or hidden behind an idealized abstraction.

Are these two foundations always incompatible? Does the possibility exist for a"free play" between the two? And if so, to what degree?

I would have to say that the main difference between analytic philosophers and continental ones is that the former tend to make inquiries of a scientific nature, such as, what is the source of our moral feelings, what is the nature of language, and so on, and who reject systematic philosophies, and who think philosophy should be about clarifying thought, like Nietzsche (who could be counted as being in both camps), Ayer, Searle. Continental philosophy when it is something serious is more like social criticism and is often insightful and useful, like for example, Camus or Leo Strauss or Adorno. But then there are the charlatans like Heidegger and Foucault and Derrida who made and make a living out of writing obscure books filled with jargon that make big problems of small ones or in some cases invent them.

Derrida is a charlatan - I disagree but at least understand where you are coming from

Foucault is a charlatan - I guess you are just lumping him in for the extent of his claims about power in social relations, but it is totally unfair to call him a charlatan


All right, about the first two: Derrida is a charlatan for self-evident reasons, as for Foucault, I stopped taking him seriously after I read his main work and realized that his reasoning was faulty, his evidence cherry-picked, and his conclusions widely exaggerated, even when he had stretched the argument as far as he possibly could. And I don't mean this only about his power theory, that is the most acceptable part of his work, but his theories of mental illness and his socio-political theories are disgusting.

Heidegger is a charlatan - You are embarrassing yourself.

Well, I do not know why I should be embarrassed. Heidegger's work contains a few good points and refutations of Cartesian philosophy, specially of Cartesian theories about consciousness and the mind, and he has a few good meditations concerning a few other subjects, but for the most part Heidegger invented problems where there were none, most of his existential thinking strikes as being like that, to me he was just one more romantic agrarian conservative, nothing more than that. I agree with Popper who said that Heidegger's ouvre (at least for the most part, a qualifier that Popper did not extend) should be banned from departments of philosophy and that philosophers should stop talking about him in the awed tones that one has come to expect.

That does not mean that there are no useful or credible continental philosophers, just that the three most vaunted ones are charlatans.
"Here the ways of men part: if you wish to strive for peace of soul and pleasure, then believe; if you wish to be a devotee of truth, then inquire." F. Nietzsche.

"Freedom is always freedom for the one who thinks differently." R. Luxemburg.

"The principle of the masochistic left is that, in general, two blacks make a white, half a loaf is the same as no bread." G. Orwell, paraphrase.

"Islamophobia is a word created by fascists, used by cowards, to manipulate morons". Andrew Cummins.
HououinKyouma
Posts: 1,030
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9/28/2014 7:57:33 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 9/28/2014 2:04:41 PM, socialpinko wrote:
At 9/27/2014 8:19:47 PM, HououinKyouma wrote:
At 9/27/2014 1:12:33 AM, socialpinko wrote:
What is the source of the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? Is it, as many Anglo-American philosophers would say, the difference between those who use logic and reason to find Truth among our world and ourselves?- as against the charlatans who mask their relativism and epistemic nihilism behind clunky jargon and useless neologisms? Or rather, as some Continental philosophers would say, between those who admit of the situatedness of their position and who would not be so careless as to allow themselves to think they'd have the advantage of peaking behind the 'discursive' curtain?

The longstanding debate between the two general strands of philosophical thought finds it's most obvious expression in the "debates" between American analytic philosopher John Searle and French deconstructionist Jacques Derrida (a great portion of which is recorded in Derrida's book "Limited Inc." btw). Searle alleged that Derrida hid his incoherent and irrational line of thinking behind obscurantist neologisms and obfuscatory wordplay, whereas Derrida asserted that Searle exhibited a pretense to knowledge when operated under the assumption that we could neutrally investigate the metaphysics of the world without paying attention to our necessary situatedness within the discursive reality of the text.

I think Foucault correctly grasped the differences (and sources of the apparent mutual incompatibility between the two) at the end of a lecture on Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment" in '83:

"Let's say that in his major critical ouvre-that of the three Critiques and above all the firt Critique Kant set out and founded that tradition of critical philosophy which posed the conditions of the possibility of a true knowledge. And we can say that the whole part of modern philosophy since the nineteenth century presented itself and developed from this as the analytic of truth. This is the form of philosophy that you now find in the form of, say, Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy.

But within modern and contemporary philosophy there s another type of question, of critical questioning whose birth we see precisely in the question of Augklarung or in Kant's text on the Revolution. This other critical tradition does not pose the question of the conditions of possibility of a true knowledge; it asks the question: What is present reality? What is the present field of our experiences? What is the present field of possible experiences? Here is is not a question of the analytic of truth but involves what could be called an ontology of the present, of present reality, an ontology of modernity, and ontology of ourselves.

It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is this latter form of philosophy, which from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber, and so on, has founded a form of reflection to which, of course I link myself insofar as I can."

So then, it finds its genesis in Kant, the philosopher of modernity par excellence. Whereas Kant's Critiques investigated the possibilities of setting the conditions for true knowledge, his work also drew attention to the necessity of understanding our condition within it's localized context, not to be diminished or hidden behind an idealized abstraction.

Are these two foundations always incompatible? Does the possibility exist for a"free play" between the two? And if so, to what degree?

I would have to say that the main difference between analytic philosophers and continental ones is that the former tend to make inquiries of a scientific nature, such as, what is the source of our moral feelings, what is the nature of language, and so on, and who reject systematic philosophies, and who think philosophy should be about clarifying thought, like Nietzsche (who could be counted as being in both camps), Ayer, Searle. Continental philosophy when it is something serious is more like social criticism and is often insightful and useful, like for example, Camus or Leo Strauss or Adorno. But then there are the charlatans like Heidegger and Foucault and Derrida who made and make a living out of writing obscure books filled with jargon that make big problems of small ones or in some cases invent them.

Okay I can see how, given his reputation on this side of the Atlantic, people unfamiliar with Derrida would say that. I disagree but at least it's not a shot out of left field. Saying that about Heidegger or Foucault on the other hand is just something I can't even wrap my head around.

I have yet to hear a clear reason as to why I should be bothered to take Derrida seriously. As to the other two, one of them (Foucault) distorted facts and cherry-picked evidence and demonstrated nothing but contempt for honest scholarship and widely exaggerated his conclusions, and the other one (Heidegger) made a few decent contributions in his early years and then went on to make up problems that simply did not exist.
"Here the ways of men part: if you wish to strive for peace of soul and pleasure, then believe; if you wish to be a devotee of truth, then inquire." F. Nietzsche.

"Freedom is always freedom for the one who thinks differently." R. Luxemburg.

"The principle of the masochistic left is that, in general, two blacks make a white, half a loaf is the same as no bread." G. Orwell, paraphrase.

"Islamophobia is a word created by fascists, used by cowards, to manipulate morons". Andrew Cummins.
socialpinko
Posts: 10,458
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9/29/2014 1:15:20 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 9/28/2014 7:57:33 PM, HououinKyouma wrote:
At 9/28/2014 2:04:41 PM, socialpinko wrote:
At 9/27/2014 8:19:47 PM, HououinKyouma wrote:
At 9/27/2014 1:12:33 AM, socialpinko wrote:
What is the source of the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? Is it, as many Anglo-American philosophers would say, the difference between those who use logic and reason to find Truth among our world and ourselves?- as against the charlatans who mask their relativism and epistemic nihilism behind clunky jargon and useless neologisms? Or rather, as some Continental philosophers would say, between those who admit of the situatedness of their position and who would not be so careless as to allow themselves to think they'd have the advantage of peaking behind the 'discursive' curtain?

The longstanding debate between the two general strands of philosophical thought finds it's most obvious expression in the "debates" between American analytic philosopher John Searle and French deconstructionist Jacques Derrida (a great portion of which is recorded in Derrida's book "Limited Inc." btw). Searle alleged that Derrida hid his incoherent and irrational line of thinking behind obscurantist neologisms and obfuscatory wordplay, whereas Derrida asserted that Searle exhibited a pretense to knowledge when operated under the assumption that we could neutrally investigate the metaphysics of the world without paying attention to our necessary situatedness within the discursive reality of the text.

I think Foucault correctly grasped the differences (and sources of the apparent mutual incompatibility between the two) at the end of a lecture on Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment" in '83:

"Let's say that in his major critical ouvre-that of the three Critiques and above all the firt Critique Kant set out and founded that tradition of critical philosophy which posed the conditions of the possibility of a true knowledge. And we can say that the whole part of modern philosophy since the nineteenth century presented itself and developed from this as the analytic of truth. This is the form of philosophy that you now find in the form of, say, Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy.

But within modern and contemporary philosophy there s another type of question, of critical questioning whose birth we see precisely in the question of Augklarung or in Kant's text on the Revolution. This other critical tradition does not pose the question of the conditions of possibility of a true knowledge; it asks the question: What is present reality? What is the present field of our experiences? What is the present field of possible experiences? Here is is not a question of the analytic of truth but involves what could be called an ontology of the present, of present reality, an ontology of modernity, and ontology of ourselves.

It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is this latter form of philosophy, which from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber, and so on, has founded a form of reflection to which, of course I link myself insofar as I can."

So then, it finds its genesis in Kant, the philosopher of modernity par excellence. Whereas Kant's Critiques investigated the possibilities of setting the conditions for true knowledge, his work also drew attention to the necessity of understanding our condition within it's localized context, not to be diminished or hidden behind an idealized abstraction.

Are these two foundations always incompatible? Does the possibility exist for a"free play" between the two? And if so, to what degree?

I would have to say that the main difference between analytic philosophers and continental ones is that the former tend to make inquiries of a scientific nature, such as, what is the source of our moral feelings, what is the nature of language, and so on, and who reject systematic philosophies, and who think philosophy should be about clarifying thought, like Nietzsche (who could be counted as being in both camps), Ayer, Searle. Continental philosophy when it is something serious is more like social criticism and is often insightful and useful, like for example, Camus or Leo Strauss or Adorno. But then there are the charlatans like Heidegger and Foucault and Derrida who made and make a living out of writing obscure books filled with jargon that make big problems of small ones or in some cases invent them.

Okay I can see how, given his reputation on this side of the Atlantic, people unfamiliar with Derrida would say that. I disagree but at least it's not a shot out of left field. Saying that about Heidegger or Foucault on the other hand is just something I can't even wrap my head around.

I have yet to hear a clear reason as to why I should be bothered to take Derrida seriously.

Besides his contributions to literary theory, histories of Western thought, deconstructive project, etc. etc. of course.

As to the other two, one of them (Foucault) distorted facts and cherry-picked evidence and demonstrated nothing but contempt for honest scholarship and widely exaggerated his conclusions,

Examples, substantiation?

and the other one (Heidegger) made a few decent contributions in his early years and then went on to make up problems that simply did not exist.

This makes it seem as though you've never seriously interacted with Heidegger's work.
: At 9/29/2014 10:55:59 AM, imabench wrote:
: : At 9/29/2014 9:43:46 AM, kbub wrote:
: :
: : DDO should discredit support of sexual violence at any time and in every way.
:
: I disagree.
HououinKyouma
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9/29/2014 3:47:12 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 9/29/2014 1:15:20 AM, socialpinko wrote:
At 9/28/2014 7:57:33 PM, HououinKyouma wrote:
At 9/28/2014 2:04:41 PM, socialpinko wrote:
At 9/27/2014 8:19:47 PM, HououinKyouma wrote:
At 9/27/2014 1:12:33 AM, socialpinko wrote:
What is the source of the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? Is it, as many Anglo-American philosophers would say, the difference between those who use logic and reason to find Truth among our world and ourselves?- as against the charlatans who mask their relativism and epistemic nihilism behind clunky jargon and useless neologisms? Or rather, as some Continental philosophers would say, between those who admit of the situatedness of their position and who would not be so careless as to allow themselves to think they'd have the advantage of peaking behind the 'discursive' curtain?

The longstanding debate between the two general strands of philosophical thought finds it's most obvious expression in the "debates" between American analytic philosopher John Searle and French deconstructionist Jacques Derrida (a great portion of which is recorded in Derrida's book "Limited Inc." btw). Searle alleged that Derrida hid his incoherent and irrational line of thinking behind obscurantist neologisms and obfuscatory wordplay, whereas Derrida asserted that Searle exhibited a pretense to knowledge when operated under the assumption that we could neutrally investigate the metaphysics of the world without paying attention to our necessary situatedness within the discursive reality of the text.

I think Foucault correctly grasped the differences (and sources of the apparent mutual incompatibility between the two) at the end of a lecture on Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment" in '83:

"Let's say that in his major critical ouvre-that of the three Critiques and above all the firt Critique Kant set out and founded that tradition of critical philosophy which posed the conditions of the possibility of a true knowledge. And we can say that the whole part of modern philosophy since the nineteenth century presented itself and developed from this as the analytic of truth. This is the form of philosophy that you now find in the form of, say, Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy.

But within modern and contemporary philosophy there s another type of question, of critical questioning whose birth we see precisely in the question of Augklarung or in Kant's text on the Revolution. This other critical tradition does not pose the question of the conditions of possibility of a true knowledge; it asks the question: What is present reality? What is the present field of our experiences? What is the present field of possible experiences? Here is is not a question of the analytic of truth but involves what could be called an ontology of the present, of present reality, an ontology of modernity, and ontology of ourselves.

It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is this latter form of philosophy, which from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber, and so on, has founded a form of reflection to which, of course I link myself insofar as I can."

So then, it finds its genesis in Kant, the philosopher of modernity par excellence. Whereas Kant's Critiques investigated the possibilities of setting the conditions for true knowledge, his work also drew attention to the necessity of understanding our condition within it's localized context, not to be diminished or hidden behind an idealized abstraction.

Are these two foundations always incompatible? Does the possibility exist for a"free play" between the two? And if so, to what degree?

I would have to say that the main difference between analytic philosophers and continental ones is that the former tend to make inquiries of a scientific nature, such as, what is the source of our moral feelings, what is the nature of language, and so on, and who reject systematic philosophies, and who think philosophy should be about clarifying thought, like Nietzsche (who could be counted as being in both camps), Ayer, Searle. Continental philosophy when it is something serious is more like social criticism and is often insightful and useful, like for example, Camus or Leo Strauss or Adorno. But then there are the charlatans like Heidegger and Foucault and Derrida who made and make a living out of writing obscure books filled with jargon that make big problems of small ones or in some cases invent them.

Okay I can see how, given his reputation on this side of the Atlantic, people unfamiliar with Derrida would say that. I disagree but at least it's not a shot out of left field. Saying that about Heidegger or Foucault on the other hand is just something I can't even wrap my head around.

I have yet to hear a clear reason as to why I should be bothered to take Derrida seriously.

Besides his contributions to literary theory, histories of Western thought, deconstructive project, etc. etc. of course.


His contributions to literary theory have been, I would argue, detrimental, they helped to inaugurate the school of ressentiment in literary criticism and literary theory. As for the rest of his work it is nonsense from beginning to end, and I mean that quite literally, none of what he says makes sense.

As to the other two, one of them (Foucault) distorted facts and cherry-picked evidence and demonstrated nothing but contempt for honest scholarship and widely exaggerated his conclusions,

Examples, substantiation?


Well, to start with, his Madness and Civilization is filled with errors and selective selection of evidence. Foucault seems to see medieval Europe's treatment of the insane through the rosy eyes of literature and art, and then condemns the asylums of the age of reason while simultaneously failing to acknowledge all the work and effort of figures in the Enlightenment to begin treating the mentally ill with more respect and dignity and the maltreatment of the insane and mentally disabled by the churches in Europe in the Middle Ages. Foucault ignores all that in order to make his demagogic points.

and the other one (Heidegger) made a few decent contributions in his early years and then went on to make up problems that simply did not exist.

This makes it seem as though you've never seriously interacted with Heidegger's work.

I don't think that it is possible to interact seriously with Heidegger's work. I would be quite glad though if you could explain why I should take him seriously.
"Here the ways of men part: if you wish to strive for peace of soul and pleasure, then believe; if you wish to be a devotee of truth, then inquire." F. Nietzsche.

"Freedom is always freedom for the one who thinks differently." R. Luxemburg.

"The principle of the masochistic left is that, in general, two blacks make a white, half a loaf is the same as no bread." G. Orwell, paraphrase.

"Islamophobia is a word created by fascists, used by cowards, to manipulate morons". Andrew Cummins.
dylancatlow
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9/29/2014 4:06:13 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 9/29/2014 3:47:12 PM, HououinKyouma wrote:
At 9/29/2014 1:15:20 AM, socialpinko wrote:

I don't think that it is possible to interact seriously with Heidegger's work.

lol this.
socialpinko
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9/29/2014 4:08:05 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 9/29/2014 3:47:12 PM, HououinKyouma wrote:
At 9/29/2014 1:15:20 AM, socialpinko wrote:
At 9/28/2014 7:57:33 PM, HououinKyouma wrote:

I have yet to hear a clear reason as to why I should be bothered to take Derrida seriously.

Besides his contributions to literary theory, histories of Western thought, deconstructive project, etc. etc. of course.


His contributions to literary theory have been, I would argue, detrimental, they helped to inaugurate the school of ressentiment in literary criticism and literary theory.

Elaborate.

As for the rest of his work it is nonsense from beginning to end, and I mean that quite literally, none of what he says makes sense.

What points specifically would you categorize as nonsense?

As to the other two, one of them (Foucault) distorted facts and cherry-picked evidence and demonstrated nothing but contempt for honest scholarship and widely exaggerated his conclusions,

Examples, substantiation?


Well, to start with, his Madness and Civilization is filled with errors and selective selection of evidence. Foucault seems to see medieval Europe's treatment of the insane through the rosy eyes of literature and art, and then condemns the asylums of the age of reason while simultaneously failing to acknowledge all the work and effort of figures in the Enlightenment to begin treating the mentally ill with more respect and dignity and the maltreatment of the insane and mentally disabled by the churches in Europe in the Middle Ages.

That's an simplification of his treatment of medieval understanding of the insane. On yer other point, he didn't fail to acknowledge any of that. The book was specifically meant to analyze the ways in which these formations came into being and to read them in a different light. You know, geneology and all that jazz. If you disagree with his claims that's fine but it's simply erroneous to say that he simply ignored Enlightenment ways of thinking (since they, as it were, were the primary object of study). Moreover, that's his second book. It ignores his archeological analyses of discursive formations and the production of knowledges, ignores his work on disciplinary and, later, bio-power, fails to mentions the decade-plus project of his at the College de France (covering all of the above as well as studies in Ancient subjectivities, the shift in governmentality at the birth of capitalism, the genesis of social and psychological sciences, studies on truth telling in relation to power, etc.), as well as his work on sexuality and the production of identity.

Foucault ignores all that in order to make his demagogic points.

and the other one (Heidegger) made a few decent contributions in his early years and then went on to make up problems that simply did not exist.

This makes it seem as though you've never seriously interacted with Heidegger's work.

I don't think that it is possible to interact seriously with Heidegger's work. I would be quite glad though if you could explain why I should take him seriously

He's been hugely influential, not only in regards to the thinkers who came after him (Sartre, Gadamer, Strauss, etc.) but as to the fields of study which he opened up (phenomenological hermeneutics, fundamental ontology, a host of existential problematics and concepts). His work is difficult (certainly) but that doesn't preclude either a critical engagement with his thought or an appreciation of his influence and instrumentality in the formation of contemporary philosophical themes and issues.
: At 9/29/2014 10:55:59 AM, imabench wrote:
: : At 9/29/2014 9:43:46 AM, kbub wrote:
: :
: : DDO should discredit support of sexual violence at any time and in every way.
:
: I disagree.
HououinKyouma
Posts: 1,030
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10/1/2014 9:16:36 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 9/29/2014 4:08:05 PM, socialpinko wrote:
At 9/29/2014 3:47:12 PM, HououinKyouma wrote:
At 9/29/2014 1:15:20 AM, socialpinko wrote:
At 9/28/2014 7:57:33 PM, HououinKyouma wrote:

I have yet to hear a clear reason as to why I should be bothered to take Derrida seriously.

Besides his contributions to literary theory, histories of Western thought, deconstructive project, etc. etc. of course.


His contributions to literary theory have been, I would argue, detrimental, they helped to inaugurate the school of ressentiment in literary criticism and literary theory.

Elaborate.

Well, from my perspective of the thing, deconstruction is all nonsense in any case, but it allowed literary criticism to be politicized and turned into second-rate philosophy and social criticism.

As for the rest of his work it is nonsense from beginning to end, and I mean that quite literally, none of what he says makes sense.

What points specifically would you categorize as nonsense?

The whole thing. Obscurantism and pseudo-profundity are the center pieces of Derrida's work which, when analyzed a bit more deeply lead to nothing more than trivialities.

If you could impart to me the usefulness and richness of Derrida's work I would be more than grateful.


As to the other two, one of them (Foucault) distorted facts and cherry-picked evidence and demonstrated nothing but contempt for honest scholarship and widely exaggerated his conclusions,

Examples, substantiation?


Well, to start with, his Madness and Civilization is filled with errors and selective selection of evidence. Foucault seems to see medieval Europe's treatment of the insane through the rosy eyes of literature and art, and then condemns the asylums of the age of reason while simultaneously failing to acknowledge all the work and effort of figures in the Enlightenment to begin treating the mentally ill with more respect and dignity and the maltreatment of the insane and mentally disabled by the churches in Europe in the Middle Ages.

That's an simplification of his treatment of medieval understanding of the insane. On yer other point, he didn't fail to acknowledge any of that. The book was specifically meant to analyze the ways in which these formations came into being and to read them in a different light. You know, geneology and all that jazz. If you disagree with his claims that's fine but it's simply erroneous to say that he simply ignored Enlightenment ways of thinking (since they, as it were, were the primary object of study). Moreover, that's his second book. It ignores his archeological analyses of discursive formations and the production of knowledges, ignores his work on disciplinary and, later, bio-power, fails to mentions the decade-plus project of his at the College de France (covering all of the above as well as studies in Ancient subjectivities, the shift in governmentality at the birth of capitalism, the genesis of social and psychological sciences, studies on truth telling in relation to power, etc.), as well as his work on sexuality and the production of identity.


Well, I remember that I was shocked when I read his work on insanity, and his comments about the Enlightenment are all derisive. His earlier analysis of madness and psychosis and neurosis struck as somewhat similar. As for his later work about discourse and "all that jazz," I just cannot take seriously, very little of it makes sense, a lot of it is meaningless and quite a substantial amount are trivialities, and exaggerations -- his ideas on power and its relation to science, would be an example of the last one.


Foucault ignores all that in order to make his demagogic points.

and the other one (Heidegger) made a few decent contributions in his early years and then went on to make up problems that simply did not exist.

This makes it seem as though you've never seriously interacted with Heidegger's work.

I don't think that it is possible to interact seriously with Heidegger's work. I would be quite glad though if you could explain why I should take him seriously

He's been hugely influential, not only in regards to the thinkers who came after him (Sartre, Gadamer, Strauss, etc.) but as to the fields of study which he opened up (phenomenological hermeneutics, fundamental ontology, a host of existential problematics and concepts). His work is difficult (certainly) but that doesn't preclude either a critical engagement with his thought or an appreciation of his influence and instrumentality in the formation of contemporary philosophical themes and issues.

The philosophers that Heidegger influenced, with a few exceptions, are also charlatans. Sartre is the very definition of a pseudo-intellectual. As for your other points, phenomenology was developed by Husserl, and Heidegger was not his only disciple, and I have already granted that some of his earlier work is useful, as for hermeneutics is useful (to a degree) only in questions of literature, fundamental ontology is meaningless, existentialism is useful, to a degree, but it tends to become absurd as it begins to deal with non-problems. Heidegger's work is not difficult, it simply has horrible and obscurantist prose, specially his later work.

However, I see that we are deviating from the initial point, which asked us to meditate upon the differences between continental and analytical philosophers. I would be quite glad to converse about Hannah Arendt or the members of the Frankfurt school.
"Here the ways of men part: if you wish to strive for peace of soul and pleasure, then believe; if you wish to be a devotee of truth, then inquire." F. Nietzsche.

"Freedom is always freedom for the one who thinks differently." R. Luxemburg.

"The principle of the masochistic left is that, in general, two blacks make a white, half a loaf is the same as no bread." G. Orwell, paraphrase.

"Islamophobia is a word created by fascists, used by cowards, to manipulate morons". Andrew Cummins.