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In defense of the modal ontological argument

dylancatlow
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11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.

Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

Good luck breaking that stalemate.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And vice versa, assuming God possibly doesn't exist, contradicting the premise "It is possible that God exists" wouldn't be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

Keep trying...
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And vice versa, assuming God possibly doesn't exist, contradicting the premise "It is possible that God exists" wouldn't be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

Keep trying...

This only works if God is impossible. If God isn't impossible, it fails, and that's precisely what the MOA says.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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11/6/2014 4:51:42 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
There is only 1 premise with information in each of the arguments, the whole point of presenting the reverse argument is to show that essentially the same reasoning gives a diametrically opposite conclusion.

1. It is possible God exists
2. It is possible God does not exist

Why prefer one statement over the other? Essentially zero justification is given for this, especially given that half the apologists I see trying to use it deliberately leave 'possible' undefined, and that the argument uses a very specific definition of it.
Envisage
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11/6/2014 4:53:04 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying....
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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11/6/2014 4:53:49 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying...
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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11/6/2014 4:54:51 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 4:53:04 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying....

God is necessary if God isn't impossible. That's the point of the MOA.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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11/6/2014 4:55:53 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 4:53:49 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying...

It's not as if I don't realize what you're trying to do.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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11/6/2014 4:56:28 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 4:54:51 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:53:04 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying....

God is necessary if God isn't impossible. That's the point of the MOA.

God is impossible if God isn't necessary. That is the point of the reverse MOA.
Envisage
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11/6/2014 4:57:49 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 4:55:53 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:53:49 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying...

It's not as if I don't realize what you're trying to do.

You are going around in circles. Realise that it presents a stalemate in the argument until either of the possibility premises is demonstrated true. Good luck with that.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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11/6/2014 4:57:54 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 4:56:28 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:54:51 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:53:04 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying....

God is necessary if God isn't impossible. That's the point of the MOA.

God is impossible if God isn't necessary. That is the point of the reverse MOA.

Yes, I realize that. The deciding factor is whether God is possible or impossible.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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11/6/2014 4:59:40 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 4:57:54 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:56:28 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:54:51 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:53:04 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying....

God is necessary if God isn't impossible. That's the point of the MOA.

God is impossible if God isn't necessary. That is the point of the reverse MOA.

Yes, I realize that. The deciding factor is whether God is possible or impossible.

And necessary or possibly not.

They are all modally equivilent.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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11/6/2014 5:01:51 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 4:59:40 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:57:54 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:56:28 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:54:51 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:53:04 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying....

God is necessary if God isn't impossible. That's the point of the MOA.

God is impossible if God isn't necessary. That is the point of the reverse MOA.

Yes, I realize that. The deciding factor is whether God is possible or impossible.

And necessary or possibly not.

They are all modally equivilent.

No, it would be "necessary exists" or "necessarily doesn't exist". Remember, if God possibly doesn't exist, then he doesn't exist.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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11/6/2014 5:02:22 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 4:57:54 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:56:28 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:54:51 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:53:04 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying....

God is necessary if God isn't impossible. That's the point of the MOA.

God is impossible if God isn't necessary. That is the point of the reverse MOA.

Yes, I realize that. The deciding factor is whether God is possible or impossible.

Because only one premise in each of the arguments has any information, neither are actually arguments for or against gods, they are just modal equivalent statements. To say it is possible that 2+2=4 is equivalent to saying it's necessary 2+2=4. The arguments don't demonstrate anything except a convoluted load of logic masturbation.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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11/6/2014 5:04:16 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 5:01:51 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:59:40 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:57:54 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:56:28 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:54:51 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:53:04 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying....

God is necessary if God isn't impossible. That's the point of the MOA.

God is impossible if God isn't necessary. That is the point of the reverse MOA.

Yes, I realize that. The deciding factor is whether God is possible or impossible.

And necessary or possibly not.

They are all modally equivilent.

No, it would be "necessary exists" or "necessarily doesn't exist". Remember, if God possibly doesn't exist, then he doesn't exist.

I am only using your own words. If you think this post actually refutes my post then it also refutes your own post before that. The argument is not an argument, move into better ones....
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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11/6/2014 5:06:29 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 5:02:22 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:57:54 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:56:28 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:54:51 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:53:04 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying....

God is necessary if God isn't impossible. That's the point of the MOA.

God is impossible if God isn't necessary. That is the point of the reverse MOA.

Yes, I realize that. The deciding factor is whether God is possible or impossible.

Because only one premise in each of the arguments has any information, neither are actually arguments for or against gods, they are just modal equivalent statements. To say it is possible that 2+2=4 is equivalent to saying it's necessary 2+2=4. The arguments don't demonstrate anything except a convoluted load of logic masturbation.

The point is that either God is possible and therefore exists, or God is impossible and therefore doesn't exist. If God isn't impossible, then he exists. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with the MOA. The most you can do is disagree with the first premise.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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11/6/2014 5:09:19 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 5:06:29 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 5:02:22 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:57:54 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:56:28 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:54:51 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:53:04 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying....

God is necessary if God isn't impossible. That's the point of the MOA.

God is impossible if God isn't necessary. That is the point of the reverse MOA.

Yes, I realize that. The deciding factor is whether God is possible or impossible.

Because only one premise in each of the arguments has any information, neither are actually arguments for or against gods, they are just modal equivalent statements. To say it is possible that 2+2=4 is equivalent to saying it's necessary 2+2=4. The arguments don't demonstrate anything except a convoluted load of logic masturbation.

The point is that either God is possible and therefore exists, or God is impossible and therefore doesn't exist. If God isn't impossible, then he exists. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with the MOA. The most you can do is disagree with the first premise.

Lol, you want to continue going around this merry-go-around? You keep making comparisons between the conclusion of the reverse MOA, and the premise of the MOA. You don't seem to be presenting them in honest light.

If god isn't necessary, then he doesn't exist. Therefore there is nothing wrong with the reverse MOA.

The reverse MOA stands as an argument on it's own. Pragmatically it is used against the MOA, but it disproves God just find by itself... If you can demonstrate the first premise.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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11/6/2014 5:10:49 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 5:09:19 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 5:06:29 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 5:02:22 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:57:54 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:56:28 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:54:51 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:53:04 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying....

God is necessary if God isn't impossible. That's the point of the MOA.

God is impossible if God isn't necessary. That is the point of the reverse MOA.

Yes, I realize that. The deciding factor is whether God is possible or impossible.

Because only one premise in each of the arguments has any information, neither are actually arguments for or against gods, they are just modal equivalent statements. To say it is possible that 2+2=4 is equivalent to saying it's necessary 2+2=4. The arguments don't demonstrate anything except a convoluted load of logic masturbation.

The point is that either God is possible and therefore exists, or God is impossible and therefore doesn't exist. If God isn't impossible, then he exists. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with the MOA. The most you can do is disagree with the first premise.

Lol, you want to continue going around this merry-go-around? You keep making comparisons between the conclusion of the reverse MOA, and the premise of the MOA. You don't seem to be presenting them in honest light.

If god isn't necessary, then he doesn't exist. Therefore there is nothing wrong with the reverse MOA.

The reverse MOA stands as an argument on it's own. Pragmatically it is used against the MOA, but it disproves God just find by itself... If you can demonstrate the first premise.

I'm not even trying to defend the first premise. I'm only defending the validity of the MOA, not the soundness.
Envisage
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11/6/2014 5:13:25 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 5:10:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 5:09:19 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 5:06:29 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 5:02:22 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:57:54 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:56:28 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:54:51 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:53:04 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying....

God is necessary if God isn't impossible. That's the point of the MOA.

God is impossible if God isn't necessary. That is the point of the reverse MOA.

Yes, I realize that. The deciding factor is whether God is possible or impossible.

Because only one premise in each of the arguments has any information, neither are actually arguments for or against gods, they are just modal equivalent statements. To say it is possible that 2+2=4 is equivalent to saying it's necessary 2+2=4. The arguments don't demonstrate anything except a convoluted load of logic masturbation.

The point is that either God is possible and therefore exists, or God is impossible and therefore doesn't exist. If God isn't impossible, then he exists. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with the MOA. The most you can do is disagree with the first premise.

Lol, you want to continue going around this merry-go-around? You keep making comparisons between the conclusion of the reverse MOA, and the premise of the MOA. You don't seem to be presenting them in honest light.

If god isn't necessary, then he doesn't exist. Therefore there is nothing wrong with the reverse MOA.

The reverse MOA stands as an argument on it's own. Pragmatically it is used against the MOA, but it disproves God just find by itself... If you can demonstrate the first premise.

I'm not even trying to defend the first premise. I'm only defending the validity of the MOA, not the soundness.

That's not what is implied by the OP. Where does it say you are defending it's validity? If you wanted to do that you would have used modal logic and presented the axioms.

Moreover I haven't seen one source which depicts the reverse MOA as an attack on the validity of the MOA.

I call BS on your intentions.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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11/6/2014 5:19:31 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 5:13:25 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 5:10:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 5:09:19 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 5:06:29 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 5:02:22 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:57:54 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:56:28 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:54:51 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:53:04 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:49:49 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:46:29 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:42:06 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 11/6/2014 4:33:44 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.
P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.
P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.
C(1) It is impossible that God exists.


Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

And we cannot accept the MOA since the premise that "it is possible that God exists" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God necessarily exists , we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is necessarily. But this contradicts the first premise of the reverse argument, namely that God possibly non-existant. So the argument is not a valid refutation of the reverse modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the reverse modal ontological argument, which the reverse modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.


Good luck breaking that stalemate.

You didn't understand my point. God is either possible and thus necessarily exists, or he is impossible and therefore necessarily doesn't exist. Assuming that God is in fact possible, contradicting the premise that "It is possible that God doesn't exist" would not be an issue, since it would be false. It's really not that hard to understand.

And this only works if God is necessary. If God isn't necessary, it fails, and that's precisely what the reverse MOA says.

Keep trying....

God is necessary if God isn't impossible. That's the point of the MOA.

God is impossible if God isn't necessary. That is the point of the reverse MOA.

Yes, I realize that. The deciding factor is whether God is possible or impossible.

Because only one premise in each of the arguments has any information, neither are actually arguments for or against gods, they are just modal equivalent statements. To say it is possible that 2+2=4 is equivalent to saying it's necessary 2+2=4. The arguments don't demonstrate anything except a convoluted load of logic masturbation.

The point is that either God is possible and therefore exists, or God is impossible and therefore doesn't exist. If God isn't impossible, then he exists. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with the MOA. The most you can do is disagree with the first premise.

Lol, you want to continue going around this merry-go-around? You keep making comparisons between the conclusion of the reverse MOA, and the premise of the MOA. You don't seem to be presenting them in honest light.

If god isn't necessary, then he doesn't exist. Therefore there is nothing wrong with the reverse MOA.

The reverse MOA stands as an argument on it's own. Pragmatically it is used against the MOA, but it disproves God just find by itself... If you can demonstrate the first premise.

I'm not even trying to defend the first premise. I'm only defending the validity of the MOA, not the soundness.

That's not what is implied by the OP. Where does it say you are defending it's validity? If you wanted to do that you would have used modal logic and presented the axioms.


My only intention was to show that the MOA is not refuted by the fact that it can be reversed. The MOA and the reverse MOA stand or fall based on whether God is possible or impossible. If you didn't have an axe to grind, you might of realized this.

Moreover I haven't seen one source which depicts the reverse MOA as an attack on the validity of the MOA.

Ok?


I call BS on your intentions.
Wocambs
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11/6/2014 7:41:30 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.

'He's consistent' - irrelevant

P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.

This premise is a tautology, as I understand it

P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.

This is a non sequitur. 'If unicorns exist in some hypothetical conceptions of the nniverse, then they exist in all hypothetical conceptions of the universe'

P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.

This is a non sequitur. The actual conclusion is 'a world without God is unimaginable', which serves to illustrate how absurd P3 is.

P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.

Another tautology.

C(1): Therefore, God exists.

This is a non sequitor derived from non sequitors and trivial tautologies.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.

'i.e. a reality without God can be imagined'

P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.

'If you try to imagine a world without God, you break my definition of God, who is not only defined as existent, but as so fundamentally important that you can't even imagine a consistent world without his existence'

P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.

'If you could imagine a world in which God does not exist, then you can't believe that God is a feature of all hypothetical worlds'

P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.

'If you can't hypothesise God to be an element of all hypothetical worlds, then God is inconsistent'

C(1) It is impossible that God exists.

Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.
dylancatlow
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11/6/2014 8:04:16 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
Good Lord Almighty.

At 11/6/2014 7:41:30 PM, Wocambs wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.

'He's consistent' - irrelevant

P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.

This premise is a tautology, as I understand it


P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.

This is a non sequitur. 'If unicorns exist in some hypothetical conceptions of the nniverse, then they exist in all hypothetical conceptions of the universe'

God is supposed to be maximally great, which means if he exists in some possible world, then he exists in all possible worlds.


P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.

This is a non sequitur. The actual conclusion is 'a world without God is unimaginable', which serves to illustrate how absurd P3 is.

How could God not exist in the actual world if the actual world is one of the possible worlds that God exists in? The conclusion is "it's impossible for something to exist outside of God".


P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.

Another tautology.

C(1): Therefore, God exists.

This is a non sequitor derived from non sequitors and trivial tautologies.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.

'i.e. a reality without God can be imagined'

How can you be sure the reality you are imaging doesn't analytically imply God? God can be implicit in your reality without being made explicit.


P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.

'If you try to imagine a world without God, you break my definition of God, who is not only defined as existent, but as so fundamentally important that you can't even imagine a consistent world without his existence'

Yes, because in denying the existence of God in a particular universe, you are denying the existence of a being which is externally bounded, not God.


P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.

'If you could imagine a world in which God does not exist, then you can't believe that God is a feature of all hypothetical worlds'

P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.

'If you can't hypothesise God to be an element of all hypothetical worlds, then God is inconsistent'


C(1) It is impossible that God exists.

Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.
Wocambs
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11/6/2014 8:19:30 PM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 8:04:16 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
God is supposed to be maximally great, which means if he exists in some possible world, then he exists in all possible worlds.

This doesn't make any sense. God is part of reality. You seem to be asking me to imagine a reality containing God where God is somehow greater than reality.

How could God not exist in the actual world if the actual world is one of the possible worlds that God exists in? The conclusion is "it's impossible for something to exist outside of God".

The 'possible worlds' are just hypotheses, aren't they?

How can you be sure the reality you are imaging doesn't analytically imply God? God can be implicit in your reality without being made explicit.

Because 'reality' is the sum of all facts and God is a proposed fact. You're trying to deduce the contents of a blank wooden crate by looking at it.

Yes, because in denying the existence of God in a particular universe, you are denying the existence of a being which is externally bounded, not God.

Are you trying to extol the virtues of analytic thinking or metaphysical speculation here Dylan? God can't exist outside of reality, as what is 'outside of reality' is by definition unreal, and that's a genuine analytic argument. I am not required to force myself to imagine God as existing in every hypothesis I come up with just because I accept, for the purpose of this argument, that genuine hypothetical realities can be thought of which feature God.
Envisage
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11/7/2014 2:18:33 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/6/2014 7:41:30 PM, Wocambs wrote:
At 11/6/2014 11:54:31 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
I've noticed that many people assume the modal ontological argument can be refuted by showing that the same reasoning it employs can be used to arrive at the exact opposite conclusion.

The modal ontological argument is as follows:

P(1): It is possible that God exists.

'He's consistent' - irrelevant

P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.

This premise is a tautology, as I understand it

P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.

This is a non sequitur. 'If unicorns exist in some hypothetical conceptions of the nniverse, then they exist in all hypothetical conceptions of the universe'

P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.

This is a non sequitur. The actual conclusion is 'a world without God is unimaginable', which serves to illustrate how absurd P3 is.

P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.

Another tautology.

C(1): Therefore, God exists.

This is a non sequitor derived from non sequitors and trivial tautologies.

The counterargument tries to reverse the reasoning by replacing "It is possible that God exists" with " It is possible that God does not exist", so we get something like:

P(1) It is possible that God does not exist, i.e. there is some possible world where God does not exist.

'i.e. a reality without God can be imagined'

P(2) God is defined as a necessary being, i.e. exists in all possible worlds.

'If you try to imagine a world without God, you break my definition of God, who is not only defined as existent, but as so fundamentally important that you can't even imagine a consistent world without his existence'

P(3) If there is one possible world where God does not exist, then there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds.

'If you could imagine a world in which God does not exist, then you can't believe that God is a feature of all hypothetical worlds'

P(4) If there is no possible world in which God exists in all possible worlds, then it is impossible that God exists.

'If you can't hypothesise God to be an element of all hypothetical worlds, then God is inconsistent'

C(1) It is impossible that God exists.

Since the premise that "it is possible that God does not exist" unavoidably leads to the conclusion that God cannot exist, we cannot accept this premise without first accepting the premise that God is impossible. But this contradicts the first premise of the original argument, namely that God is possible. So the counterargument is not a valid refutation of the modal ontological argument, since it can only be considered valid by rejecting the first premise of the modal ontological argument, which the modal ontological argument clearly doesn't do.

The argument relies on modal logic, and given the objections you are raising, you do not understand modal logic (since premise 2-5 are as sound as 2+2=4 within the axioms of the system).

I recommend checking out a couple of videos on modal logic first before tackling the argument, it shouldn't take more than half an hour-an hour
dylancatlow
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11/7/2014 2:20:48 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
This wasn't even meant to be a controversial topic. All I'm trying to point out is that the reverse modal ontological argument doesn't undermine the form of the MOA since it's working under the assumption that God is impossible, while the MOA isn't. In order to "reverse" the argument, you have to accept the premise that God is logically impossible.
Envisage
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11/7/2014 2:24:52 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/7/2014 2:20:48 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
This wasn't even meant to be a controversial topic. All I'm trying to point out is that the reverse modal ontological argument doesn't undermine the form of the MOA since it's working under the assumption that God is impossible, while the MOA isn't. In order to "reverse" the argument, you have to accept the premise that God is logically impossible.

And in order to "forward" the argument you have to accept the premise God is logically necessary.
dylancatlow
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11/7/2014 2:28:07 AM
Posted: 2 years ago
At 11/7/2014 2:24:52 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 11/7/2014 2:20:48 AM, dylancatlow wrote:
This wasn't even meant to be a controversial topic. All I'm trying to point out is that the reverse modal ontological argument doesn't undermine the form of the MOA since it's working under the assumption that God is impossible, while the MOA isn't. In order to "reverse" the argument, you have to accept the premise that God is logically impossible.

And in order to "forward" the argument you have to accept the premise God is logically necessary.

Of course. The question then becomes "is necessary existence possible?"