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I get laughed at for ontological arguments!

IEnglishman
Posts: 148
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12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?
Bulproof admits he's a troll http://www.debate.org... (see post 16). Do not feed.
headphonegut
Posts: 4,122
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12/12/2014 10:56:34 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
An ontological argument is more like proof of the word means proof of the idea means proof of its existence or something like that. What you present looks more like a deductive one.
crying to soldiers coming home to their dogs why do I torment myself with these videos?
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.
headphonegut
Posts: 4,122
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12/13/2014 3:24:31 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.

well I don't think he needs to. The problem arises from 3 to 4. I have no idea how he made that logical leap. It is unsubstantiated and we have no reason to believe it.
crying to soldiers coming home to their dogs why do I torment myself with these videos?
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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12/13/2014 3:29:14 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 3:24:31 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.

well I don't think he needs to. The problem arises from 3 to 4. I have no idea how he made that logical leap. It is unsubstantiated and we have no reason to believe it.

Which depends on the definition of "possible" used. It relies on a very specific definition of "possible" and "maximally great being" which makes the argument valid, but it also means that the first premise is completely different to what would it would appear prima facie. Especially to those people who do not understand modal logic, which I wager is 99% of people.
headphonegut
Posts: 4,122
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12/13/2014 3:45:17 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 3:29:14 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:24:31 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.

well I don't think he needs to. The problem arises from 3 to 4. I have no idea how he made that logical leap. It is unsubstantiated and we have no reason to believe it.

Which depends on the definition of "possible" used.

It relies on a very specific definition of "possible" and "maximally great being" which makes the argument valid

I have no reason to believe that this unsubstantiated claim is true.

Your argument is a specific definition will make an argument valid. Why?

but it also means that the first premise is completely different to what would it would appear prima facie. Especially to those people who do not understand modal logic, which I wager is 99% of people.

A definition is just to have a common understanding of something.
crying to soldiers coming home to their dogs why do I torment myself with these videos?
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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12/13/2014 3:58:40 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 3:45:17 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:29:14 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:24:31 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.

well I don't think he needs to. The problem arises from 3 to 4. I have no idea how he made that logical leap. It is unsubstantiated and we have no reason to believe it.

Which depends on the definition of "possible" used.

It relies on a very specific definition of "possible" and "maximally great being" which makes the argument valid

I have no reason to believe that this unsubstantiated claim is true.

Your argument is a specific definition will make an argument valid. Why?

You will have to learn modal logic first.

but it also means that the first premise is completely different to what would it would appear prima facie. Especially to those people who do not understand modal logic, which I wager is 99% of people.

A definition is just to have a common understanding of something.

If you are told a word and you use your common notion of what it means, then it seems more innocent than it really is. It becomes an underhanded fallacy of equivocation.

The easiest example to show this is:

1. Nothing is better than having a pot of gold
2. Having a carrot is better than nothing
C. Having a carrot is better than having a pot of gold

Notice that 'nothiing' is used with two different meanings here, which makes it invalid. A similar thing occurs in the MOA.
headphonegut
Posts: 4,122
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12/13/2014 4:08:02 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 3:58:40 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:45:17 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:29:14 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:24:31 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.

well I don't think he needs to. The problem arises from 3 to 4. I have no idea how he made that logical leap. It is unsubstantiated and we have no reason to believe it.

Which depends on the definition of "possible" used.

It relies on a very specific definition of "possible" and "maximally great being" which makes the argument valid

I have no reason to believe that this unsubstantiated claim is true.

Your argument is a specific definition will make an argument valid. Why?

You will have to learn modal logic first.

but it also means that the first premise is completely different to what would it would appear prima facie. Especially to those people who do not understand modal logic, which I wager is 99% of people.

A definition is just to have a common understanding of something.

If you are told a word and you use your common notion of what it means, then it seems more innocent than it really is. It becomes an underhanded fallacy of equivocation.

The easiest example to show this is:

1. Nothing is better than having a pot of gold
2. Having a carrot is better than nothing
C. Having a carrot is better than having a pot of gold

Notice that 'nothiing' is used with two different meanings here, which makes it invalid. A similar thing occurs in the MOA.

1 I have no reason to believe that learning modal Logic will reveal the answer to my question, and it is a nice way to dodge the question.

2. He isn't equivocating. No idea why you're even bring it up. He defines maximally great being btw.
crying to soldiers coming home to their dogs why do I torment myself with these videos?
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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12/13/2014 4:43:10 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 4:08:02 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:58:40 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:45:17 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:29:14 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:24:31 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.

well I don't think he needs to. The problem arises from 3 to 4. I have no idea how he made that logical leap. It is unsubstantiated and we have no reason to believe it.

Which depends on the definition of "possible" used.

It relies on a very specific definition of "possible" and "maximally great being" which makes the argument valid

I have no reason to believe that this unsubstantiated claim is true.

Your argument is a specific definition will make an argument valid. Why?

You will have to learn modal logic first.

but it also means that the first premise is completely different to what would it would appear prima facie. Especially to those people who do not understand modal logic, which I wager is 99% of people.

A definition is just to have a common understanding of something.

If you are told a word and you use your common notion of what it means, then it seems more innocent than it really is. It becomes an underhanded fallacy of equivocation.

The easiest example to show this is:

1. Nothing is better than having a pot of gold
2. Having a carrot is better than nothing
C. Having a carrot is better than having a pot of gold

Notice that 'nothiing' is used with two different meanings here, which makes it invalid. A similar thing occurs in the MOA.

1 I have no reason to believe that learning modal Logic will reveal the answer to my question, and it is a nice way to dodge the question.

Yes it is a nice way, since I am not going to teach you how possible world semantics, and Metaohysical possibility and necessity work. God is usually defined as a necessary being, that should be enough for you to do some research.

2. He isn't equivocating. No idea why you're even bring it up. He defines maximally great being btw.

I don't think he understands the MOA either, which is why I asked him to define 'possible'
headphonegut
Posts: 4,122
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12/13/2014 4:55:45 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 4:43:10 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 4:08:02 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:58:40 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:45:17 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:29:14 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:24:31 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.

well I don't think he needs to. The problem arises from 3 to 4. I have no idea how he made that logical leap. It is unsubstantiated and we have no reason to believe it.

Which depends on the definition of "possible" used.

It relies on a very specific definition of "possible" and "maximally great being" which makes the argument valid

I have no reason to believe that this unsubstantiated claim is true.

Your argument is a specific definition will make an argument valid. Why?

You will have to learn modal logic first.

but it also means that the first premise is completely different to what would it would appear prima facie. Especially to those people who do not understand modal logic, which I wager is 99% of people.

A definition is just to have a common understanding of something.

If you are told a word and you use your common notion of what it means, then it seems more innocent than it really is. It becomes an underhanded fallacy of equivocation.

The easiest example to show this is:

1. Nothing is better than having a pot of gold
2. Having a carrot is better than nothing
C. Having a carrot is better than having a pot of gold

Notice that 'nothiing' is used with two different meanings here, which makes it invalid. A similar thing occurs in the MOA.

1 I have no reason to believe that learning modal Logic will reveal the answer to my question, and it is a nice way to dodge the question.

Yes it is a nice way, since I am not going to teach you how possible world semantics, and Metaohysical possibility and necessity work. God is usually defined as a necessary being, that should be enough for you to do some research.

2. He isn't equivocating. No idea why you're even bring it up. He defines maximally great being btw.

I don't think he understands the MOA either, which is why I asked him to define 'possible'

I have zero interest in learning from you. And I have even less interest in researching it. If you can't provide a simple explanation in a subject you have knowledge about you either are lazy or don't understand it well enough yourself.

2. ok...
crying to soldiers coming home to their dogs why do I torment myself with these videos?
18Karl
Posts: 351
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12/13/2014 5:41:06 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

a priori existence. One of the most absurd things in the world.
praise the lord Chin Chin
Smithereens
Posts: 5,512
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12/13/2014 5:51:55 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 3:29:14 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:24:31 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.

well I don't think he needs to. The problem arises from 3 to 4. I have no idea how he made that logical leap. It is unsubstantiated and we have no reason to believe it.

Which depends on the definition of "possible" used. It relies on a very specific definition of "possible" and "maximally great being" which makes the argument valid, but it also means that the first premise is completely different to what would it would appear prima facie. Especially to those people who do not understand modal logic, which I wager is 99% of people.

'Possible' is used to refer to a given proposition where the function being true is the case in at least one possible world. That is to say, the statement is logically coherent, and is thus not necessarily not possible. To use modal logic, you must first understand how its semantics work. Modal logic always employs a set and a relation called the accessibility relation. The set can be described in terms of possible worlds, where a world cannot be an empty set. The accessibility relation describes entities in the set in relation to each other. 'The statement A can be true for any instance of B only.' In modal logic, A is possible for any instance of B only. This premise is a definition, it is inferred that if not B, then not A.

One of the things that this formulation of the ontological argument makes clear is that the accessibility relation is Euclidean and functional. The second premise only makes sense in this context. It is asserted that there exists a world in which G existing is true, and from there, we consider that G existing in our possible world is the case, only because G exists in a world accessible to ours. The argument concludes that the existence of G in an accessible world, which is the case due to G not being a necessarily impossible proposition. The definition of G creates the rest of the argument. A necessarily existing entity cannot exist in a single possible world in exclusion to an accessible world. Thus, since G exists in at least one possible world, G must exist in all possible worlds.
Music composition contest: http://www.debate.org...
Smithereens
Posts: 5,512
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12/13/2014 5:53:06 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 3:24:31 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.

well I don't think he needs to. The problem arises from 3 to 4. I have no idea how he made that logical leap. It is unsubstantiated and we have no reason to believe it.

seriously?
Music composition contest: http://www.debate.org...
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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12/13/2014 6:20:09 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 4:55:45 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 4:43:10 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 4:08:02 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:58:40 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:45:17 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:29:14 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:24:31 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.

well I don't think he needs to. The problem arises from 3 to 4. I have no idea how he made that logical leap. It is unsubstantiated and we have no reason to believe it.

Which depends on the definition of "possible" used.

It relies on a very specific definition of "possible" and "maximally great being" which makes the argument valid

I have no reason to believe that this unsubstantiated claim is true.

Your argument is a specific definition will make an argument valid. Why?

You will have to learn modal logic first.

but it also means that the first premise is completely different to what would it would appear prima facie. Especially to those people who do not understand modal logic, which I wager is 99% of people.

A definition is just to have a common understanding of something.

If you are told a word and you use your common notion of what it means, then it seems more innocent than it really is. It becomes an underhanded fallacy of equivocation.

The easiest example to show this is:

1. Nothing is better than having a pot of gold
2. Having a carrot is better than nothing
C. Having a carrot is better than having a pot of gold

Notice that 'nothiing' is used with two different meanings here, which makes it invalid. A similar thing occurs in the MOA.

1 I have no reason to believe that learning modal Logic will reveal the answer to my question, and it is a nice way to dodge the question.

Yes it is a nice way, since I am not going to teach you how possible world semantics, and Metaohysical possibility and necessity work. God is usually defined as a necessary being, that should be enough for you to do some research.

2. He isn't equivocating. No idea why you're even bring it up. He defines maximally great being btw.

I don't think he understands the MOA either, which is why I asked him to define 'possible'

I have zero interest in learning from you. And I have even less interest in researching it. If you can't provide a simple explanation in a subject you have knowledge about you either are lazy or don't understand it well enough yourself.

2. ok...

Check smithereen's post #12, which explains it. There simply isn't a simple answer because the argument packs in so many modal logic axioms and assumptions which only make sense if you understand the s5 modal logic system.

It's a pretty basic logical system in philosophy but it's something you need to read up on to understand why premises 2-5 are basically truisms if you are arguing from within the s5 system.
headphonegut
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12/13/2014 6:21:20 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 5:53:06 AM, Smithereens wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:24:31 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.

well I don't think he needs to. The problem arises from 3 to 4. I have no idea how he made that logical leap. It is unsubstantiated and we have no reason to believe it.

seriously?

It was 3 am don't hurt me pls
crying to soldiers coming home to their dogs why do I torment myself with these videos?
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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12/13/2014 6:22:18 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 5:51:55 AM, Smithereens wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:29:14 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:24:31 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.

well I don't think he needs to. The problem arises from 3 to 4. I have no idea how he made that logical leap. It is unsubstantiated and we have no reason to believe it.

Which depends on the definition of "possible" used. It relies on a very specific definition of "possible" and "maximally great being" which makes the argument valid, but it also means that the first premise is completely different to what would it would appear prima facie. Especially to those people who do not understand modal logic, which I wager is 99% of people.

'Possible' is used to refer to a given proposition where the function being true is the case in at least one possible world. That is to say, the statement is logically coherent, and is thus not necessarily not possible. To use modal logic, you must first understand how its semantics work. Modal logic always employs a set and a relation called the accessibility relation. The set can be described in terms of possible worlds, where a world cannot be an empty set. The accessibility relation describes entities in the set in relation to each other. 'The statement A can be true for any instance of B only.' In modal logic, A is possible for any instance of B only. This premise is a definition, it is inferred that if not B, then not A.

One of the things that this formulation of the ontological argument makes clear is that the accessibility relation is Euclidean and functional. The second premise only makes sense in this context. It is asserted that there exists a world in which G existing is true, and from there, we consider that G existing in our possible world is the case, only because G exists in a world accessible to ours. The argument concludes that the existence of G in an accessible world, which is the case due to G not being a necessarily impossible proposition. The definition of G creates the rest of the argument. A necessarily existing entity cannot exist in a single possible world in exclusion to an accessible world. Thus, since G exists in at least one possible world, G must exist in all possible worlds.

I know this, send it to headphonegut.

On a separate topic, want to debate God's existance with me? I notice you advocate for several arguments for such in your previous debates. Let me know if you are interested in doing one. I also do a bunch of other topics (check my debate history to see if one picks your fancy).
headphonegut
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12/13/2014 6:46:52 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 5:51:55 AM, Smithereens wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:29:14 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 3:24:31 AM, headphonegut wrote:
At 12/13/2014 2:59:39 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

Define 'possible' and 'maximally great being' and that will become self-evident.

well I don't think he needs to. The problem arises from 3 to 4. I have no idea how he made that logical leap. It is unsubstantiated and we have no reason to believe it.

Which depends on the definition of "possible" used. It relies on a very specific definition of "possible" and "maximally great being" which makes the argument valid, but it also means that the first premise is completely different to what would it would appear prima facie. Especially to those people who do not understand modal logic, which I wager is 99% of people.

'Possible' is used to refer to a given proposition where the function being true is the case in at least one possible world. That is to say, the statement is logically coherent, and is thus not necessarily not possible. To use modal logic, you must first understand how its semantics work. Modal logic always employs a set and a relation called the accessibility relation. The set can be described in terms of possible worlds, where a world cannot be an empty set. The accessibility relation describes entities in the set in relation to each other. 'The statement A can be true for any instance of B only.' In modal logic, A is possible for any instance of B only. This premise is a definition, it is inferred that if not B, then not A.

One of the things that this formulation of the ontological argument makes clear is that the accessibility relation is Euclidean and functional. The second premise only makes sense in this context. It is asserted that there exists a world in which G existing is true, and from there, we consider that G existing in our possible world is the case, only because G exists in a world accessible to ours. The argument concludes that the existence of G in an accessible world, which is the case due to G not being a necessarily impossible proposition. The definition of G creates the rest of the argument. A necessarily existing entity cannot exist in a single possible world in exclusion to an accessible world. Thus, since G exists in at least one possible world, G must exist in all possible worlds.

Oh I see (sorta). You made symbols and defined them and insert into my brain the delusion of formality? I take it you dance with could and attempt to undress the notion of possibility? tbh I feel like it's grasping at things. [other thoughts here]. Props for not using the word follows that must've been a bitch.
crying to soldiers coming home to their dogs why do I torment myself with these videos?
headphonegut
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12/13/2014 6:47:24 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
Yea I get what you mean now envisage.
crying to soldiers coming home to their dogs why do I torment myself with these videos?
headphonegut
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12/13/2014 6:48:07 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
and may I say thanks for not explaining it.
crying to soldiers coming home to their dogs why do I torment myself with these videos?
sdavio
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12/13/2014 7:05:37 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

"Maximally great" = "infinitely great" = the concept of 'size' doesn't even apply. This is not how the concept of size works. Sizes can only be evaluated by reference to other sizes. "Maximally great" is not a size, and hence it is not possible for there to be an existing being with the size called "maximally great".. because there is no limit on greatness so it's a nonsense designator.
"Logic is the money of the mind." - Karl Marx
Envisage
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12/13/2014 7:36:17 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 6:48:07 AM, headphonegut wrote:
and may I say thanks for not explaining it.

And you still didn't understand it. Thus why I told you to go learn modal logic. I have been more than helpful in giving you keywords and systems to look up. I am sorry that I haven't held your hand through the whole process and given you private tuition. I can lead a horse to water, but I can't make it drink, nor do I intend to try.

Why should I try, especially given you have demonstrated yourself to be a poptious arsehole this entire thread.
Double_R
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12/13/2014 11:20:23 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

I think it has been explained pretty well in this thread, but just in case it still seems unclear...

The argument depends on you not understanding what is meant by the word "possible". I trust that you understand the difference between something being practically possible, physically possible, and logically possible. Clearly, logically possible is the only one that can apply while being intelligible. So by plugging that in the error becomes apparent:

1. it is logically possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is logically possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some logically possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some logically possible world, he exists in all logically possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all logically possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists


#3 is clearly a non-sequitur. Conceiving of a world without a maximally great being is not a violation of the laws of logic, therefore a maximally great being does not exist in all logically possible worlds.

This is what Envisage was talking about when he said to define the terms first, then plug them in. It doesn't matter how you define them, the argument will not work.
Envisage
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12/13/2014 11:45:37 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 11:20:23 AM, Double_R wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

I think it has been explained pretty well in this thread, but just in case it still seems unclear...

The argument depends on you not understanding what is meant by the word "possible". I trust that you understand the difference between something being practically possible, physically possible, and logically possible. Clearly, logically possible is the only one that can apply while being intelligible. So by plugging that in the error becomes apparent:

1. it is logically possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is logically possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some logically possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some logically possible world, he exists in all logically possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all logically possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists


#3 is clearly a non-sequitur. Conceiving of a world without a maximally great being is not a violation of the laws of logic, therefore a maximally great being does not exist in all logically possible worlds.

This is what Envisage was talking about when he said to define the terms first, then plug them in. It doesn't matter how you define them, the argument will not work.

Logical possibility isn't enough anyway, you need to argue for metaphysical possibility, otherwise God remains abstract. Discovered identities make a good case for this. For example a good argument can be made that it is metaphysically necessarily that H2O is water, even though it might be logically possible for it not to be.

God is usually defined as a necessary being however, which is where the jump from 3 to 4 comes from, since a metaohysically necessary something exists in all possible cases, by definition.

If possible world semantics and the s5 modal logic system, and a necessary being definition of God is used though, then the only premise that can be contested is P1, the rest are as sound as 2+2 = 4.
Such
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12/13/2014 12:11:50 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 11:20:23 AM, Double_R wrote:

#3 is clearly a non-sequitur. Conceiving of a world without a maximally great being is not a violation of the laws of logic, therefore a maximally great being does not exist in all logically possible worlds.

This is what Envisage was talking about when he said to define the terms first, then plug them in. It doesn't matter how you define them, the argument will not work.

No, no, no. By definition, if a being is maximally great, then it exists in all worlds by necessity -- it is maximally great.

A maximally great being is logically rigorous, because it is simply an apex -- a given end of a spectrum. Because all worlds have a maximally great being (and, they do), does not mean that they share the same maximally great being.

The argument makes complete sense. The leap here that people don't seem to be acknowledging is that there is some assumption that the "maximally great being" is automatically God.

Within the purview of corporeal life on Earth, humanity at large is the maximally great being.
Such
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12/13/2014 12:14:45 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 11:45:37 AM, Envisage wrote:

Logical possibility isn't enough anyway, you need to argue for metaphysical possibility, otherwise God remains abstract. Discovered identities make a good case for this. For example a good argument can be made that it is metaphysically necessarily that H2O is water, even though it might be logically possible for it not to be.

Explain this. Specifically, please do elaborate on how it's logically possible that H2O isn't water.

God is usually defined as a necessary being however, which is where the jump from 3 to 4 comes from, since a metaohysically necessary something exists in all possible cases, by definition.

I don't know if you understand Modal Logic as well as you think, but that aside for a moment -- please explain how God is defined as a necessary being.

If possible world semantics and the s5 modal logic system, and a necessary being definition of God is used though, then the only premise that can be contested is P1, the rest are as sound as 2+2 = 4.

If God is defined as a necessary being, then P1 cannot be contested with God considered the maximally great being.
Sidewalker
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12/13/2014 12:16:12 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

The fallacy is in thinking that abstractions like logical proofs have some kind ontological influence over reality, our mental constructs are not reality and we shouldn"t confuse the two as are very different things. Mathematics and deductive logic are deterministic, but that does not mean they determine reality, reality is not deterministic and it certainly has no obligation to ontologically conform to our thinking processes.

Defining a mental construct as having the quality of existence has no bearing on reality, it's just conceptual and it only applies to the definition, it doesn't prove anything about reality.
"It is one of the commonest of mistakes to consider that the limit of our power of perception is also the limit of all there is to perceive." " C. W. Leadbeater
Such
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12/13/2014 12:22:10 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 12:16:12 PM, Sidewalker wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

The fallacy is in thinking that abstractions like logical proofs have some kind ontological influence over reality, our mental constructs are not reality and we shouldn"t confuse the two as are very different things. Mathematics and deductive logic are deterministic, but that does not mean they determine reality, reality is not deterministic and it certainly has no obligation to ontologically conform to our thinking processes.

Defining a mental construct as having the quality of existence has no bearing on reality, it's just conceptual and it only applies to the definition, it doesn't prove anything about reality.

That's not a fallacy. I don't think he made any such argument -- at least, not yet. He simply stated a valid syllogism.

I don't think people are coming into this conversation with an open enough mind to acknowledge the truth about what they're reading. What he said wasn't laughable; it made sense.

Valid syllogisms don't define reality, of course, but they provide sound evidence for something within reality. Syllogisms can also provide substantive proof of something within reality, but only with the inclusion of other real things. This is the basis of forensics, for example.
Double_R
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12/13/2014 12:23:32 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 11:45:37 AM, Envisage wrote:
At 12/13/2014 11:20:23 AM, Double_R wrote:
At 12/12/2014 10:10:04 PM, IEnglishman wrote:
I don't understand what is wrong with the ontological argument for God's existence. In modern form it seems quite sound

1. it is possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, he exists in all possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists

Where is the fallacy?

I think it has been explained pretty well in this thread, but just in case it still seems unclear...

The argument depends on you not understanding what is meant by the word "possible". I trust that you understand the difference between something being practically possible, physically possible, and logically possible. Clearly, logically possible is the only one that can apply while being intelligible. So by plugging that in the error becomes apparent:

1. it is logically possible that a maximally great being (one who is morally perfect, omnipotent, and omnipresent) exists
2. if it is logically possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some logically possible world
3. if a maximally great being exists in some logically possible world, he exists in all logically possible worlds
4. if a maximally great being exists in all logically possible worlds, then he exists in the actual world
5. therefore a maximally great being exists


#3 is clearly a non-sequitur. Conceiving of a world without a maximally great being is not a violation of the laws of logic, therefore a maximally great being does not exist in all logically possible worlds.

This is what Envisage was talking about when he said to define the terms first, then plug them in. It doesn't matter how you define them, the argument will not work.

Logical possibility isn't enough anyway, you need to argue for metaphysical possibility, otherwise God remains abstract. Discovered identities make a good case for this. For example a good argument can be made that it is metaphysically necessarily that H2O is water, even though it might be logically possible for it not to be.

God is usually defined as a necessary being however, which is where the jump from 3 to 4 comes from, since a metaohysically necessary something exists in all possible cases, by definition.

If possible world semantics and the s5 modal logic system, and a necessary being definition of God is used though, then the only premise that can be contested is P1, the rest are as sound as 2+2 = 4.

I don't see how that underpins the case I just made I just made, or am I misunderstanding the point?

If the being in P1 is defined as necessary, then the argument still stops at P3.

I think that the case I made demonstrates why the argument fails, the rest is just invalid attempts by people trying to uphold the argument to add all sorts of layers to sift through so they can hide this fact. So while I understand that there is more to this then what I am putting out, I am was just trying to demonstrate the core problem with it.

If I failed to do so please enlighten me.
Double_R
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12/13/2014 12:33:01 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 12:11:50 PM, Such wrote:
At 12/13/2014 11:20:23 AM, Double_R wrote:

#3 is clearly a non-sequitur. Conceiving of a world without a maximally great being is not a violation of the laws of logic, therefore a maximally great being does not exist in all logically possible worlds.

This is what Envisage was talking about when he said to define the terms first, then plug them in. It doesn't matter how you define them, the argument will not work.

No, no, no. By definition, if a being is maximally great, then it exists in all worlds by necessity -- it is maximally great.

A maximally great being is logically rigorous, because it is simply an apex -- a given end of a spectrum. Because all worlds have a maximally great being (and, they do), does not mean that they share the same maximally great being.

The argument makes complete sense. The leap here that people don't seem to be acknowledging is that there is some assumption that the "maximally great being" is automatically God.

Within the purview of corporeal life on Earth, humanity at large is the maximally great being.

That's not the argument.

I am conceiving of a world with no beings. This is logically possible, so the assertion that a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds is false. If you define the being as necessary then it becomes a logical contradiction. But then all you have shown is that a necessary being and a being-less world contradict each other. That tells us nothing about reality, so the argument is useless. I can call the tooth fairy necessary, doesn't mean it exists.
Such
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12/13/2014 12:45:10 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/13/2014 12:33:01 PM, Double_R wrote:
At 12/13/2014 12:11:50 PM, Such wrote:
At 12/13/2014 11:20:23 AM, Double_R wrote:

#3 is clearly a non-sequitur. Conceiving of a world without a maximally great being is not a violation of the laws of logic, therefore a maximally great being does not exist in all logically possible worlds.

This is what Envisage was talking about when he said to define the terms first, then plug them in. It doesn't matter how you define them, the argument will not work.

No, no, no. By definition, if a being is maximally great, then it exists in all worlds by necessity -- it is maximally great.

A maximally great being is logically rigorous, because it is simply an apex -- a given end of a spectrum. Because all worlds have a maximally great being (and, they do), does not mean that they share the same maximally great being.

The argument makes complete sense. The leap here that people don't seem to be acknowledging is that there is some assumption that the "maximally great being" is automatically God.

Within the purview of corporeal life on Earth, humanity at large is the maximally great being.

That's not the argument.

I am conceiving of a world with no beings. This is logically possible, so the assertion that a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds is false. If you define the being as necessary then it becomes a logical contradiction. But then all you have shown is that a necessary being and a being-less world contradict each other. That tells us nothing about reality, so the argument is useless. I can call the tooth fairy necessary, doesn't mean it exists.

But, here's the thing. You can't conceive of a world with no beings, because that would require the possible acknowledgement of that world, and a world with no beings cannot be acknowledged, because there are no beings to acknowledge it.

So, it's actually functionally nonexistent. Mindfuck, right? I know. But, that's what makes logic fun.

Anyway, I don't understand how God is necessary either -- you have no contention from with with that. But, as far as the OP's argument is concerned regarding a maximally great being alone, I agree, and I haven't seen an argument from you that refutes it.