Total Posts:71|Showing Posts:1-30|Last Page
Jump to topic:

Defending eliminative materialism

n7
Posts: 1,358
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/21/2015 4:21:27 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

Don't you mean epistemologically zombies>
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/21/2015 4:26:41 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

A person with Anton Babinski syndrome may be wrong about the source of their experience, but that doesn't mean they aren't experiencing something very much like sight. The experience just isn't related to the outside world like they assume it is.
Smithereens
Posts: 5,512
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/21/2015 11:46:34 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/21/2015 4:21:27 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

Don't you mean epistemologically zombies>

No, he means ontologically. I'm interested in what you think about this though, being a nihilist. I take that you are a materialist, so what is your take on the OP?
Music composition contest: http://www.debate.org...
sdavio
Posts: 1,798
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 5:37:49 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

What is the difference between this argument and saying that we might be dreaming, or brains in a vat?
"Logic is the money of the mind." - Karl Marx
Smithereens
Posts: 5,512
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 6:27:53 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 5:37:49 AM, sdavio wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

What is the difference between this argument and saying that we might be dreaming, or brains in a vat?

Both your situations still supposes consciousness. EM is attempting to remove that, therefore it argues that conscious experience can exist without consciousness, just like sight perception can be perceived without actual sight.
Music composition contest: http://www.debate.org...
sdavio
Posts: 1,798
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 7:54:47 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 6:27:53 AM, Smithereens wrote:
At 1/22/2015 5:37:49 AM, sdavio wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

What is the difference between this argument and saying that we might be dreaming, or brains in a vat?

Both your situations still supposes consciousness. EM is attempting to remove that, therefore it argues that conscious experience can exist without consciousness, just like sight perception can be perceived without actual sight.

The brain in a vat has no eyes, so that is a sight experience without actual sight.

As for consciousness, I'm not sure what the difference is between "conscious experience" and "actual consciousness". What currently exists in me which I can differentiate from a living being with conscious experience but no consciousness? If there's no difference, then we're working with words that don't refer to anything.
"Logic is the money of the mind." - Karl Marx
n7
Posts: 1,358
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 12:27:11 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 7:54:47 AM, sdavio wrote:
At 1/22/2015 6:27:53 AM, Smithereens wrote:
At 1/22/2015 5:37:49 AM, sdavio wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

What is the difference between this argument and saying that we might be dreaming, or brains in a vat?

Both your situations still supposes consciousness. EM is attempting to remove that, therefore it argues that conscious experience can exist without consciousness, just like sight perception can be perceived without actual sight.

The brain in a vat has no eyes, so that is a sight experience without actual sight.

Not the point. The brain in a vat has sight experience, someone who accepts EM would say there isn't such a thing.
As for consciousness, I'm not sure what the difference is between "conscious experience" and "actual consciousness". What currently exists in me which I can differentiate from a living being with conscious experience but no consciousness? If there's no difference, then we're working with words that don't refer to anything.

EM says we are fundamentally like robots responding to the world and that our consciousness is an illusion of the brain. No such thing as "actual consciousness"
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
n7
Posts: 1,358
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 12:29:12 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/21/2015 4:26:41 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

A person with Anton Babinski syndrome may be wrong about the source of their experience, but that doesn't mean they aren't experiencing something very much like sight. The experience just isn't related to the outside world like they assume it is.

This is a good point. Are they really not experiencing something or are they just mistaken? Although the current hypothesis accepts no processing is happening in the visual cortex

http://books.google.com...
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 12:39:34 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 12:27:11 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/22/2015 7:54:47 AM, sdavio wrote:
At 1/22/2015 6:27:53 AM, Smithereens wrote:
At 1/22/2015 5:37:49 AM, sdavio wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

What is the difference between this argument and saying that we might be dreaming, or brains in a vat?

Both your situations still supposes consciousness. EM is attempting to remove that, therefore it argues that conscious experience can exist without consciousness, just like sight perception can be perceived without actual sight.

The brain in a vat has no eyes, so that is a sight experience without actual sight.

Not the point. The brain in a vat has sight experience, someone who accepts EM would say there isn't such a thing.
As for consciousness, I'm not sure what the difference is between "conscious experience" and "actual consciousness". What currently exists in me which I can differentiate from a living being with conscious experience but no consciousness? If there's no difference, then we're working with words that don't refer to anything.

EM says we are fundamentally like robots responding to the world and that our consciousness is an illusion of the brain. No such thing as "actual consciousness"

I wonder if such a hypothesis would be framed along the same lines as the emergent 'passing of time' in an eternalist world. Since for a god-like observer, the universe just exists static, yet from first-person perspective inside the universe, change is seen. The same for consciousness in a eliminative ontology maybe>
AnDoctuir
Posts: 11,060
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 12:56:09 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
Really notions of disproving consciousness etc. are quite dumb. I mean, it all comes down to stoner-type ponderings of '...but what **is** such and such?' We're not afforded answers, it's that simple. There **is** something mystical and transcendent about being. If you confine consciousness, then; if you put it down to such and such ... oh, but what is such and such? and we're right back where we started. And there is no final answer. And consciousness is the be-all and end-all of the **is**. Heck, it's not even possible to recreate; not for sure; because it is **the** subjective experience...

We wonder at ourselves rather than the world, because we contain the world. Might as well ask 'but what is existence?' as 'what is consciousness?'.
AnDoctuir
Posts: 11,060
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 12:58:43 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
This wiki is awesome if just for those two concepts in the introduction ('time out of time' and 'everywhen'): http://en.wikipedia.org...
Sidewalker
Posts: 3,713
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 3:24:55 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

I've never understood how people can attempt to explain something by claiming it doesn't exist, "it is just an illusion" is not explanatory.
"It is one of the commonest of mistakes to consider that the limit of our power of perception is also the limit of all there is to perceive." " C. W. Leadbeater
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 3:27:42 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 12:29:12 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:26:41 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

A person with Anton Babinski syndrome may be wrong about the source of their experience, but that doesn't mean they aren't experiencing something very much like sight. The experience just isn't related to the outside world like they assume it is.

This is a good point. Are they really not experiencing something or are they just mistaken? Although the current hypothesis accepts no processing is happening in the visual cortex

http://books.google.com...

What sounds more plausible: that these people don't know when they're experiencing something and when they're not, or that scientists have come across an experience which they are, as of yet, unable to tie to some process in the brain? The brain is still far too mysterious for scientists to be making such claims.
Sidewalker
Posts: 3,713
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 3:29:02 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 6:27:53 AM, Smithereens wrote:
At 1/22/2015 5:37:49 AM, sdavio wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

What is the difference between this argument and saying that we might be dreaming, or brains in a vat?

Both your situations still supposes consciousness. EM is attempting to remove that, therefore it argues that conscious experience can exist without consciousness, just like sight perception can be perceived without actual sight.

The phrase "conscious experience can exist without consciousness" is meaningless, it makes no sense at all.
"It is one of the commonest of mistakes to consider that the limit of our power of perception is also the limit of all there is to perceive." " C. W. Leadbeater
Sidewalker
Posts: 3,713
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 3:32:21 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 12:27:11 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/22/2015 7:54:47 AM, sdavio wrote:
At 1/22/2015 6:27:53 AM, Smithereens wrote:
At 1/22/2015 5:37:49 AM, sdavio wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

What is the difference between this argument and saying that we might be dreaming, or brains in a vat?

Both your situations still supposes consciousness. EM is attempting to remove that, therefore it argues that conscious experience can exist without consciousness, just like sight perception can be perceived without actual sight.

The brain in a vat has no eyes, so that is a sight experience without actual sight.

Not the point. The brain in a vat has sight experience, someone who accepts EM would say there isn't such a thing.
As for consciousness, I'm not sure what the difference is between "conscious experience" and "actual consciousness". What currently exists in me which I can differentiate from a living being with conscious experience but no consciousness? If there's no difference, then we're working with words that don't refer to anything.

EM says we are fundamentally like robots responding to the world and that our consciousness is an illusion of the brain. No such thing as "actual consciousness"

EM is the illusion, it attributes explanatory power to the word illusion but there is nothing there.
"It is one of the commonest of mistakes to consider that the limit of our power of perception is also the limit of all there is to perceive." " C. W. Leadbeater
n7
Posts: 1,358
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 4:48:21 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 3:27:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2015 12:29:12 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:26:41 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

A person with Anton Babinski syndrome may be wrong about the source of their experience, but that doesn't mean they aren't experiencing something very much like sight. The experience just isn't related to the outside world like they assume it is.

This is a good point. Are they really not experiencing something or are they just mistaken? Although the current hypothesis accepts no processing is happening in the visual cortex

http://books.google.com...

What sounds more plausible: that these people don't know when they're experiencing something and when they're not, or that scientists have come across an experience which they are, as of yet, unable to tie to some process in the brain? The brain is still far too mysterious for scientists to be making such claims.

I would tend to agree that they would be experiencing something, but are mistaken.

I would think an EM would respond with it being simpler than actual experience and backed by current science. It would be less ad hoc to claim they are being tricked into believing they can see.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
n7
Posts: 1,358
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 4:54:03 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 3:24:55 PM, Sidewalker wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

I've never understood how people can attempt to explain something by claiming it doesn't exist, "it is just an illusion" is not explanatory.

It would explain things by dissolving the problem. Ludwig Wittgenstein gave the analogy of releasing the fly out of the bottle. Instead of trying to make the fly comfortable (solving the problem) you release it (dissolve the problem). EM wouldn't have any problem of consciousness, it wouldn't have answer the problems with dualism nor regular materialism.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 5:47:40 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 4:48:21 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/22/2015 3:27:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2015 12:29:12 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:26:41 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

A person with Anton Babinski syndrome may be wrong about the source of their experience, but that doesn't mean they aren't experiencing something very much like sight. The experience just isn't related to the outside world like they assume it is.

This is a good point. Are they really not experiencing something or are they just mistaken? Although the current hypothesis accepts no processing is happening in the visual cortex

http://books.google.com...

What sounds more plausible: that these people don't know when they're experiencing something and when they're not, or that scientists have come across an experience which they are, as of yet, unable to tie to some process in the brain? The brain is still far too mysterious for scientists to be making such claims.

I would tend to agree that they would be experiencing something, but are mistaken.

I would think an EM would respond with it being simpler than actual experience and backed by current science. It would be less ad hoc to claim they are being tricked into believing they can see.

What does "simpler than actual experience" mean?
popculturepooka
Posts: 7,924
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 6:07:25 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 4:54:03 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/22/2015 3:24:55 PM, Sidewalker wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

I've never understood how people can attempt to explain something by claiming it doesn't exist, "it is just an illusion" is not explanatory.

It would explain things by dissolving the problem. Ludwig Wittgenstein gave the analogy of releasing the fly out of the bottle. Instead of trying to make the fly comfortable (solving the problem) you release it (dissolve the problem). EM wouldn't have any problem of consciousness, it wouldn't have answer the problems with dualism nor regular materialism.

But if the fly is worth keeping that kind of defeats the point.
At 10/3/2016 11:49:13 PM, thett3 wrote:
BLACK LIVES MATTER!
AnDoctuir
Posts: 11,060
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 6:12:50 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
There is no dissolving the problem. Elementary particles are just as bewildering as what they make up. And then consciousness is the apex of existence.
AnDoctuir
Posts: 11,060
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 6:20:57 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
An error in sensory input and being a philosophical zombie aren't the same, by the way. The question asked in the Hard Problem is essentially 'Why the illusion?" You can't just say "Look, someone thought they could see, but they couldn't." Still the illusion. Consciousness is something other than the basic mechanics of cause and effect (which humans could theoretically operate by - unfeeling).
AnDoctuir
Posts: 11,060
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 6:29:41 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 6:20:57 PM, AnDoctuir wrote:
An error in sensory input and being a philosophical zombie aren't the same, by the way. The question asked in the Hard Problem is essentially 'Why the illusion?" You can't just say "Look, someone thought they could see, but they couldn't." Still the illusion. Consciousness is something other than the basic mechanics of cause and effect (which humans could theoretically operate by - unfeeling).

Actually, I guess you have a point, lol. Forgot what thread I was in.

You still have to answer to what the pain etc. actually is, then, though. Eliminative materialism yadda yadda.
n7
Posts: 1,358
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 6:30:38 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 5:47:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2015 4:48:21 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/22/2015 3:27:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2015 12:29:12 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:26:41 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

A person with Anton Babinski syndrome may be wrong about the source of their experience, but that doesn't mean they aren't experiencing something very much like sight. The experience just isn't related to the outside world like they assume it is.

This is a good point. Are they really not experiencing something or are they just mistaken? Although the current hypothesis accepts no processing is happening in the visual cortex

http://books.google.com...

What sounds more plausible: that these people don't know when they're experiencing something and when they're not, or that scientists have come across an experience which they are, as of yet, unable to tie to some process in the brain? The brain is still far too mysterious for scientists to be making such claims.

I would tend to agree that they would be experiencing something, but are mistaken.

I would think an EM would respond with it being simpler than actual experience and backed by current science. It would be less ad hoc to claim they are being tricked into believing they can see.

What does "simpler than actual experience" mean?

Simpler than them actually experiencing something
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 6:31:41 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 6:30:38 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/22/2015 5:47:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2015 4:48:21 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/22/2015 3:27:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2015 12:29:12 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:26:41 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

A person with Anton Babinski syndrome may be wrong about the source of their experience, but that doesn't mean they aren't experiencing something very much like sight. The experience just isn't related to the outside world like they assume it is.

This is a good point. Are they really not experiencing something or are they just mistaken? Although the current hypothesis accepts no processing is happening in the visual cortex

http://books.google.com...

What sounds more plausible: that these people don't know when they're experiencing something and when they're not, or that scientists have come across an experience which they are, as of yet, unable to tie to some process in the brain? The brain is still far too mysterious for scientists to be making such claims.

I would tend to agree that they would be experiencing something, but are mistaken.

I would think an EM would respond with it being simpler than actual experience and backed by current science. It would be less ad hoc to claim they are being tricked into believing they can see.

What does "simpler than actual experience" mean?

Simpler than them actually experiencing something

So like memory?
n7
Posts: 1,358
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 6:33:50 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 6:20:57 PM, AnDoctuir wrote:
An error in sensory input and being a philosophical zombie aren't the same, by the way. The question asked in the Hard Problem is essentially 'Why the illusion?" You can't just say "Look, someone thought they could see, but they couldn't." Still the illusion. Consciousness is something other than the basic mechanics of cause and effect (which humans could theoretically operate by - unfeeling).

You've misunderstood the argument. I am not saying believing someone is experiencing something when the aren't means they're P-zombies. I am saying it refutes the idea the we cannot be wrong the there exists experience.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
n7
Posts: 1,358
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 6:34:20 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 6:31:41 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2015 6:30:38 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/22/2015 5:47:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2015 4:48:21 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/22/2015 3:27:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2015 12:29:12 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:26:41 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

A person with Anton Babinski syndrome may be wrong about the source of their experience, but that doesn't mean they aren't experiencing something very much like sight. The experience just isn't related to the outside world like they assume it is.

This is a good point. Are they really not experiencing something or are they just mistaken? Although the current hypothesis accepts no processing is happening in the visual cortex

http://books.google.com...

What sounds more plausible: that these people don't know when they're experiencing something and when they're not, or that scientists have come across an experience which they are, as of yet, unable to tie to some process in the brain? The brain is still far too mysterious for scientists to be making such claims.

I would tend to agree that they would be experiencing something, but are mistaken.

I would think an EM would respond with it being simpler than actual experience and backed by current science. It would be less ad hoc to claim they are being tricked into believing they can see.

What does "simpler than actual experience" mean?

Simpler than them actually experiencing something

So like memory?

I'm not sure what you mean.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
AnDoctuir
Posts: 11,060
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 6:38:18 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 6:33:50 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/22/2015 6:20:57 PM, AnDoctuir wrote:
An error in sensory input and being a philosophical zombie aren't the same, by the way. The question asked in the Hard Problem is essentially 'Why the illusion?" You can't just say "Look, someone thought they could see, but they couldn't." Still the illusion. Consciousness is something other than the basic mechanics of cause and effect (which humans could theoretically operate by - unfeeling).

You've misunderstood the argument. I am not saying believing someone is experiencing something when the aren't means they're P-zombies. I am saying it refutes the idea the we cannot be wrong the there exists experience.

An error in consciousness's computing of its own senses doesn't negate actual experience, though. Faulty experience is still experience.

(Actually, maybe I wasn't so befuddled as I thought, lol.)
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
1/22/2015 6:38:48 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 1/22/2015 6:34:20 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/22/2015 6:31:41 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2015 6:30:38 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/22/2015 5:47:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2015 4:48:21 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/22/2015 3:27:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/22/2015 12:29:12 PM, n7 wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:26:41 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 1/21/2015 4:12:24 PM, n7 wrote:
First off, no I am not an eliminative materialist. However if my argument below is correct, I think it can be made plausible.

The biggest problem with EM is the seemingly obvious fact that we have experiences and this is what the mind is. We cannot be wrong in the fact of our experiences. As Searle put it, the appearance of the mind is the object in question.

If we can be wrong about our the appearance of experience, then the above objection fails and EM is back in the fight. Evidence from victims of Anton"Babinski syndrome seems to show we can be wrong about appearance of experience. People who suffer from this believe they can see, but cannot.

http://en.wikipedia.org...
" Anton"Babinski syndrome, also known as visual anosognosia, is a rare symptom of brain damage occurring in the occipital lobe. Those who suffer from it are "cortically blind", but affirm, often quite adamantly and in the face of clear evidence of their blindness, that they are capable of seeing. Failing to accept being blind, the sufferer dismisses evidence of his condition and employs confabulation to fill in the missing sensory input."

This makes it possible for us to think we have experiences but really don't. We could think see, hear, and have conscious experience in the world, but are really ontologically zombies.

A person with Anton Babinski syndrome may be wrong about the source of their experience, but that doesn't mean they aren't experiencing something very much like sight. The experience just isn't related to the outside world like they assume it is.

This is a good point. Are they really not experiencing something or are they just mistaken? Although the current hypothesis accepts no processing is happening in the visual cortex

http://books.google.com...

What sounds more plausible: that these people don't know when they're experiencing something and when they're not, or that scientists have come across an experience which they are, as of yet, unable to tie to some process in the brain? The brain is still far too mysterious for scientists to be making such claims.

I would tend to agree that they would be experiencing something, but are mistaken.

I would think an EM would respond with it being simpler than actual experience and backed by current science. It would be less ad hoc to claim they are being tricked into believing they can see.

What does "simpler than actual experience" mean?

Simpler than them actually experiencing something

So like memory?

I'm not sure what you mean.

I'm trying to figure out what you're talking about.