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The Moral Argument

Fkkize
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4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
William Lane Craig often uses the moral argument for the existence of God:

P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
P2) Objective moral values do exist.
C) Therefor God exists.

The question now is, what is meant by objective moral values?
WLCs response to the Euthyphro is that it a false dilemma, because God is the good. This means that objective moral values are Gods nature and the argument becomes:

P1) If God does not exist, God's nature does not exist.
P2) God's nature does exist.
C) Therefore God exists.

Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
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: space contradicts logic
sdavio
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4/21/2015 7:03:37 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM, Fkkize wrote:
Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?

All deductive arguments are circular in the sense you're talking about. The conclusions are supposed to express the same thing as the premises, that's why it's convincing.
"Logic is the money of the mind." - Karl Marx
Fkkize
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4/21/2015 7:54:48 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 7:03:37 AM, sdavio wrote:
At 4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM, Fkkize wrote:
Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?

All deductive arguments are circular in the sense you're talking about. The conclusions are supposed to express the same thing as the premises, that's why it's convincing.

The conclusion is of course to be derivable by the premises, that does not mean that every argument is circular.

P1) If I like something I should buy it.
P2) I like chocolate.
C) Therefore I should buy chocolate.

Merely stating that I like chocolate does not by definition of the word alone mean that I will buy it, I need P1) to arive at the conclusion.
However saying Gods nature exists allready entails that God exists, since there cannot be one without the other.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Otokage
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4/21/2015 10:20:32 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM, Fkkize wrote:
William Lane Craig often uses the moral argument for the existence of God:

P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
P2) Objective moral values do exist.
C) Therefor God exists.

The question now is, what is meant by objective moral values?
WLCs response to the Euthyphro is that it a false dilemma, because God is the good. This means that objective moral values are Gods nature and the argument becomes:

P1) If God does not exist, God's nature does not exist.
P2) God's nature does exist.
C) Therefore God exists.

Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?

The problem with the moral argument is generaly that P2 is seen as false by its detractors.
Fkkize
Posts: 2,149
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4/21/2015 10:28:23 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 10:20:32 AM, Otokage wrote:
At 4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM, Fkkize wrote:
William Lane Craig often uses the moral argument for the existence of God:

P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
P2) Objective moral values do exist.
C) Therefor God exists.

The question now is, what is meant by objective moral values?
WLCs response to the Euthyphro is that it a false dilemma, because God is the good. This means that objective moral values are Gods nature and the argument becomes:

P1) If God does not exist, God's nature does not exist.
P2) God's nature does exist.
C) Therefore God exists.

Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?

The problem with the moral argument is generaly that P2 is seen as false by its detractors.

By internet atheists surely, but many ethicists would deny P1). Thats not to say that I would not P2), too ... and P1).
Those were just some thoughts I had while walking home.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Otokage
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4/21/2015 10:36:03 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 10:28:23 AM, Fkkize wrote:
At 4/21/2015 10:20:32 AM, Otokage wrote:
At 4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM, Fkkize wrote:
William Lane Craig often uses the moral argument for the existence of God:

P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
P2) Objective moral values do exist.
C) Therefor God exists.

The question now is, what is meant by objective moral values?
WLCs response to the Euthyphro is that it a false dilemma, because God is the good. This means that objective moral values are Gods nature and the argument becomes:

P1) If God does not exist, God's nature does not exist.
P2) God's nature does exist.
C) Therefore God exists.

Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?

The problem with the moral argument is generaly that P2 is seen as false by its detractors.

By internet atheists surely, but many ethicists would deny P1). Thats not to say that I would not P2), too ... and P1).
Those were just some thoughts I had while walking home.

Not sure about the distinction between internet atheists and regular atheists. Is there something different between them apart for the inability of the later to use the internet? :)

And about what you have just said, I don't really understand. Do you deny P1 and P2? Or do you think they are correct?
popculturepooka
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4/21/2015 10:52:28 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM, Fkkize wrote:
William Lane Craig often uses the moral argument for the existence of God:

P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
P2) Objective moral values do exist.
C) Therefor God exists.

The question now is, what is meant by objective moral values?
WLCs response to the Euthyphro is that it a false dilemma, because God is the good. This means that objective moral values are Gods nature and the argument becomes:

P1) If God does not exist, God's nature does not exist.
P2) God's nature does exist.
C) Therefore God exists.

Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?

No.

You're confusing semantics with ontology. He doesn't *mean* by "objective moral values and duties" "God's nature". He's only positing identicality. I.e. moral duties/obligations are identical to God's commands.

Water is H20 (as in it is identical to H2O) but they don't MEAN the same thing.

The morning star IS the evening star but they don't MEAN the same thing.
At 10/3/2016 11:49:13 PM, thett3 wrote:
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Fkkize
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4/21/2015 10:54:19 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 10:36:03 AM, Otokage wrote:
At 4/21/2015 10:28:23 AM, Fkkize wrote:
At 4/21/2015 10:20:32 AM, Otokage wrote:
At 4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM, Fkkize wrote:
William Lane Craig often uses the moral argument for the existence of God:

P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
P2) Objective moral values do exist.
C) Therefor God exists.

The question now is, what is meant by objective moral values?
WLCs response to the Euthyphro is that it a false dilemma, because God is the good. This means that objective moral values are Gods nature and the argument becomes:

P1) If God does not exist, God's nature does not exist.
P2) God's nature does exist.
C) Therefore God exists.

Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?

The problem with the moral argument is generaly that P2 is seen as false by its detractors.

By internet atheists surely, but many ethicists would deny P1). Thats not to say that I would not P2), too ... and P1).
Those were just some thoughts I had while walking home.

Not sure about the distinction between internet atheists and regular atheists. Is there something different between them apart for the inability of the later to use the internet? :)

Well many don't know the arguments for subjectivism, in professional ethics moral objectivism is the prevailing view.

And about what you have just said, I don't really understand. Do you deny P1 and P2? Or do you think they are correct?

I deny both :)
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Fkkize
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4/21/2015 11:39:29 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 10:52:28 AM, popculturepooka wrote:

You're confusing semantics with ontology. He doesn't *mean* by "objective moral values and duties" "God's nature". He's only positing identicality. I.e. moral duties/obligations are identical to God's commands[2].

Water is H20 (as in it is identical to H2O) but they don't MEAN the same thing.

The morning star IS the evening star but they don't MEAN the same thing.[1]

[1]Of course they differ in sense but they are identical in reference. Which does not discredit my point, identity is always based on reference, not sense.
The morning star and the evening star have differing senses but the same reference.
5*2 and 10 have different senses but the are identical in reference, that is why we use '=' (identity) in mathematics.

"the theistic view is that these qualities are good because they are found in God"s nature."
http://www.reasonablefaith.org...

[2] 'Objective moral value' is a term that refers to one of Gods attributes which is entailed by the definition of God, so to say that P2) Objective moral values exist is to say that an attribute of God exists. An attribute of something cannot exist without the something, hence my point stands.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
popculturepooka
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4/21/2015 11:57:32 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 11:39:29 AM, Fkkize wrote:

[1]Of course they differ in sense but they are identical in reference. Which does not discredit my point, identity is always based on reference, not sense.
The morning star and the evening star have differing senses but the same reference.
5*2 and 10 have different senses but the are identical in reference, that is why we use '=' (identity) in mathematics.

"the theistic view is that these qualities are good because they are found in God"s nature."
http://www.reasonablefaith.org...

[2] 'Objective moral value' is a term that refers to one of Gods attributes which is entailed by the definition of God, so to say that P2) Objective moral values exist is to say that an attribute of God exists. An attribute of something cannot exist without the something, hence my point stands.

No, your point doesn't stand.

"Q: '2. How should the proponent of the moral argument define "right" and "wrong?" The first premise of the moral argument maintains that if God did not exist, neither would objective moral values exist. Furthermore, you define "objective moral values" as values that are right or wrong irregardless of what anyone else believes. Hence, it seems to me, the truth of the first premise depends on what is meant by "right" and "wrong." Elsewhere, you define "right" and "wrong" in terms of God's commands. But if the proponent of the moral argument defines "right" and "wrong" in this way, the argument becomes question-begging...'

A: Your second question confuses moral semantics with moral ontology. The Divine Command theorist does not define moral values or duties at all; rather he asks for their ontological foundation. We can accept the customary understanding of moral terms like "good, "right," "wrong," etc. with equanimity. We"re not making a semantic claim about the meaning of moral terms. Rather we are trying to explain their objective foundation. Similarly, the naturalist is not pressing a semantic claim about the definition of words but is offering a different foundation for values and duties than the theist. The question is, which moral theory is more plausible?"

Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org...

"But there is one last thing that one should also say. When he makes charges of meaninglessness and unintelligibility, he is talking about semantics. Semantics is the study of meaning. But divine command theory is not a semantical theory about the meaning of the English word "good." It is an ontological or metaphysical theory about the grounding of moral values, and it identifies the good with God himself. God is the ultimate source and paradigm of moral values. But that is not a semantic claim. That is not saying that the English word "good" means "applied to the character of God" or "commanded by God" or something of that sort. Rather, the divine command theorist semantically uses the word "good" in the same way that other ethicists who speak English use the word. He is not giving any different semantic content to that. So the claim that to speak of goodness in this case is unintelligible or meaningless is just a category mistake. He is talking semantics here instead of ontology.

The difficulty is " and I think he plays on this " is that goodness is one of these primitives that really ultimately can't be defined. It is a sort of primitive property or quality that can't be reductively defined in terms of anything else. There are many other notions like that that philosophers would say are primitive or fundamental or foundational concepts. So in that sense semantically you can't get beyond just affirming that something is good. For example, you can't say that to be good means to be conducive to human flourishing or to be good means to be in accord with God's nature or something of that sort. Those are failures of semantic theories. Goodness is a primitive, foundational, ultimately undefinable property in terms of non-value terms. But that doesn't mean to say that God is good on divine command theory where God is the good is therefore somehow meaningless. It is a meaningful claim. The theist is not offering a different definition of the word "good."}

Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org...

"Notice that the DCT Adams defends is ontological rather than semantic: it is a claim that moral obligations are in fact identical with divine commands, not a claim that "moral obligations" has the same meaning as "divine commands." On his account, the meaning of "moral obligation" is fixed by the role this concept plays in our language. That role includes such facts as these: Moral obligations must be motivating and objective. They also must provide a basis for critical evaluation of other types of obligations, and they must be such that someone who violates a moral obligation is appropriately subject to blame. Adams argues that it is divine commands that best satisfy these desiderata. God's existence thus provides the best explanation of moral obligations. "

http://plato.stanford.edu...

And Criag leans heavily on Adams for espousing his version of DCT.

"Singer construes divine command theory as claiming "the very meaning of "good" is nothing other than "what God approves."" It appears then that Singer characterises divine command theory as a theory about the meaning of the evaluative term "good"; however, this is a caricature.

Few, if any, notable defenders of divine command theory propose it as a theory about the meaning of the term "good". This is demonstrated by examining the literature of those contemporary theists who do defend versions of the theory. A notable, contemporary defender of divine command theory is Robert Adams. In Divine Command Ethics Modified Again and later in his monograph Finite and Infinite Good, Adams puts forward the view that "ethical wrongness is (i.e., is identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God".[iv] [Emphasis original]

Note two things here; firstly, Adams does not offer a theory about "the good" but explicitly limits his theory to deontological properties such as wrongness. Secondly, his theory is not about the meaning of terms; rather it is a metaphysical claim about identity.

This last distinction is important. Contemporary philosophy of language offers several examples of this distinction between two terms having the same meaning and two things being identical. One of the most famous is the relationship between water and H20. Water is H20. This is a claim of identity. The liquid on earth that we call water is hydrogen hydroxide. However, this is not a claim of meaning. The claim that water is H20 is not an analytic truth that is true in virtue of the meaning of the words, rather it is a claim discovered by empirical investigation. Moreover, a competent language user could refer to water and understand the meaning of this term without needing to know about the atomic structure H20. Similar examples are available with such claims as "the morning star is the evening star" or "Superman is Clark Kent." In each case, we have a statement of identity that is distinct from the claim that two words have the same meaning. Adams then explicitly denies he is proposing the position Singer attributes to modern theists."

http://www.mandm.org.nz...
At 10/3/2016 11:49:13 PM, thett3 wrote:
BLACK LIVES MATTER!
Otokage
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4/21/2015 11:59:14 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 10:54:19 AM, Fkkize wrote:
At 4/21/2015 10:36:03 AM, Otokage wrote:
At 4/21/2015 10:28:23 AM, Fkkize wrote:
At 4/21/2015 10:20:32 AM, Otokage wrote:
At 4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM, Fkkize wrote:
William Lane Craig often uses the moral argument for the existence of God:

P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
P2) Objective moral values do exist.
C) Therefor God exists.

The question now is, what is meant by objective moral values?
WLCs response to the Euthyphro is that it a false dilemma, because God is the good. This means that objective moral values are Gods nature and the argument becomes:

P1) If God does not exist, God's nature does not exist.
P2) God's nature does exist.
C) Therefore God exists.

Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?

The problem with the moral argument is generaly that P2 is seen as false by its detractors.

By internet atheists surely, but many ethicists would deny P1). Thats not to say that I would not P2), too ... and P1).
Those were just some thoughts I had while walking home.

Not sure about the distinction between internet atheists and regular atheists. Is there something different between them apart for the inability of the later to use the internet? :)

Well many don't know the arguments for subjectivism, in professional ethics moral objectivism is the prevailing view.

And about what you have just said, I don't really understand. Do you deny P1 and P2? Or do you think they are correct?

I deny both :)

ok :)
sdavio
Posts: 1,801
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4/21/2015 12:43:35 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 7:54:48 AM, Fkkize wrote:
Merely stating that I like chocolate does not by definition of the word alone mean that I will buy it, I need P1) to arive at the conclusion.
However saying Gods nature exists allready entails that God exists, since there cannot be one without the other.

The sense is different, while the reference isn't. The argument is, I suppose, designed to be convincing to those people who believe in objective morality, but don't consider it necessarily a part of God. Only after seeing the arguments and being convinced will the two become identical in sense.
"Logic is the money of the mind." - Karl Marx
Graincruncher
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4/21/2015 1:12:58 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM, Fkkize wrote:
William Lane Craig often uses the moral argument for the existence of God:

P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
P2) Objective moral values do exist.
C) Therefor God exists.

The question now is, what is meant by objective moral values?
WLCs response to the Euthyphro is that it a false dilemma, because God is the good. This means that objective moral values are Gods nature and the argument becomes:

P1) If God does not exist, God's nature does not exist.
P2) God's nature does exist.
C) Therefore God exists.

Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?

It's terrible from start to finish.

1) It is perfectly valid to reject the assumption that good is god's nature. This isn't explicitly included in the argument, which makes the objection less easy to recognise.
2) Many people would reject the premise (again, unstated within the argument) that objective morality exists.
Fkkize
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4/21/2015 3:57:30 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 11:57:32 AM, popculturepooka wrote:

No, your point doesn't stand.

"Q: '2. How should the proponent of the moral argument define "right" and "wrong?" The first premise of the moral argument maintains that if God did not exist, neither would objective moral values exist. Furthermore, you define "objective moral values" as values that are right or wrong irregardless of what anyone else believes. Hence, it seems to me, the truth of the first premise depends on what is meant by "right" and "wrong." Elsewhere, you define "right" and "wrong" in terms of God's commands. But if the proponent of the moral argument defines "right" and "wrong" in this way, the argument becomes question-begging...'

A: Your second question confuses moral semantics with moral ontology. The Divine Command theorist does not define moral values or duties at all; rather he asks for their ontological foundation. We can accept the customary understanding of moral terms like "good, "right," "wrong," etc. with equanimity. We"re not making a semantic claim about the meaning of moral terms. Rather we are trying to explain their objective foundation. Similarly, the naturalist is not pressing a semantic claim about the definition of words but is offering a different foundation for values and duties than the theist. The question is, which moral theory is more plausible?"


Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org...

"But there is one last thing that one should also say. When he makes charges of meaninglessness and unintelligibility, he is talking about semantics. Semantics is the study of meaning. But divine command theory is not a semantical theory about the meaning of the English word "good." It is an ontological or metaphysical theory about the grounding of moral values, and it identifies the good with God himself. God is the ultimate source and paradigm of moral values. But that is not a semantic claim. That is not saying that the English word "good" means "applied to the character of God" or "commanded by God" or something of that sort. Rather, the divine command theorist semantically uses the word "good" in the same way that other ethicists who speak English use the word. He is not giving any different semantic content to that. So the claim that to speak of goodness in this case is unintelligible or meaningless is just a category mistake. He is talking semantics here instead of ontology.

The difficulty is " and I think he plays on this " is that goodness is one of these primitives that really ultimately can't be defined. It is a sort of primitive property or quality that can't be reductively defined in terms of anything else. There are many other notions like that that philosophers would say are primitive or fundamental or foundational concepts. So in that sense semantically you can't get beyond just affirming that something is good. For example, you can't say that to be good means to be conducive to human flourishing or to be good means to be in accord with God's nature or something of that sort. Those are failures of semantic theories. Goodness is a primitive, foundational, ultimately undefinable property in terms of non-value terms. But that doesn't mean to say that God is good on divine command theory where God is the good is therefore somehow meaningless. It is a meaningful claim. The theist is not offering a different definition of the word "good."}


Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org...

"Notice that the DCT Adams defends is ontological rather than semantic: it is a claim that moral obligations are in fact identical with divine commands, not a claim that "moral obligations" has the same meaning as "divine commands." On his account, the meaning of "moral obligation" is fixed by the role this concept plays in our language. That role includes such facts as these: Moral obligations must be motivating and objective. They also must provide a basis for critical evaluation of other types of obligations, and they must be such that someone who violates a moral obligation is appropriately subject to blame. Adams argues that it is divine commands that best satisfy these desiderata. God's existence thus provides the best explanation of moral obligations. "

http://plato.stanford.edu...

And Criag leans heavily on Adams for espousing his version of DCT.

"Singer construes divine command theory as claiming "the very meaning of "good" is nothing other than "what God approves."" It appears then that Singer characterises divine command theory as a theory about the meaning of the evaluative term "good"; however, this is a caricature.

Few, if any, notable defenders of divine command theory propose it as a theory about the meaning of the term "good". This is demonstrated by examining the literature of those contemporary theists who do defend versions of the theory. A notable, contemporary defender of divine command theory is Robert Adams. In Divine Command Ethics Modified Again and later in his monograph Finite and Infinite Good, Adams puts forward the view that "ethical wrongness is (i.e., is identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God".[iv] [Emphasis original]

Note two things here; firstly, Adams does not offer a theory about "the good" but explicitly limits his theory to deontological properties such as wrongness. Secondly, his theory is not about the meaning of terms; rather it is a metaphysical claim about identity.

http://www.mandm.org.nz...

First of all you can't have "The Divine Command theorist does not define moral values or duties at all" (WLC) and "Adams [...] explicitly limits his theory to deontological properties such as wrongness" at the same time.

You are affirming that God is the good, so I am no more making a semantic claim than Craig or Adams. Omnipotence/science/presence and being 'The Good' are all attributes of God so what else is 'moral' supposed to mean in this context other than to act in accordance with this attribute?

The only difference between the Platonist and the classical theist on this score is that the theist identifies the Good with God Himself
http://www.reasonablefaith.org...

For Plato knowledge of 'the Good' would not only tell you what to do, it would also be action directing, overriding contrary inclinations, i.e. evoke moral behaviour. Analogous to Plato actions would resemble a more or less imperfect shadow of 'the Good', so what is meant by 'objective moral value' other than a reflection of Gods nature as the Good?

P1) If God does not exist reflections of Gods nature do not exist.
P2) Reflections of Gods nature do exist.
P3) Therefore God exists.

For P2) to be true one must still presuppose the existence of God, hence the argument is begging the question.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Fkkize
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4/21/2015 3:57:59 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 1:12:58 PM, Graincruncher wrote:
At 4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM, Fkkize wrote:
William Lane Craig often uses the moral argument for the existence of God:

P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
P2) Objective moral values do exist.
C) Therefor God exists.

The question now is, what is meant by objective moral values?
WLCs response to the Euthyphro is that it a false dilemma, because God is the good. This means that objective moral values are Gods nature and the argument becomes:

P1) If God does not exist, God's nature does not exist.
P2) God's nature does exist.
C) Therefore God exists.

Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?

It's terrible from start to finish.

1) It is perfectly valid to reject the assumption that good is god's nature. This isn't explicitly included in the argument, which makes the objection less easy to recognise.
2) Many people would reject the premise (again, unstated within the argument) that objective morality exists.

Of course there might be other (maybe better) ways to object to it. Just because there are does not imply that my objection is terrible from start to finish.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Fkkize
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4/21/2015 3:58:11 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 11:55:23 AM, Benshapiro wrote:
Objective moral values and duties can't exist apart from God's nature.

Which is...a repetition of the argument?
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
SNP1
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4/21/2015 4:04:59 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
Problems with the moral arguement:
1) Objective moral values do not require a god.
2) Evidence better supports moral nihilism or relativist than moral realism.
#TheApatheticNihilistPartyofAmerica
#WarOnDDO
Fkkize
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4/21/2015 4:25:27 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 4:04:59 PM, SNP1 wrote:
Problems with the moral arguement:
1) Objective moral values do not require a god.
2) Evidence better supports moral nihilism or relativist than moral realism.

I am aware of such objections and I highly respect your opinion, so my actual question is what your thoughts on my objection are.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
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: space contradicts logic
SNP1
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4/21/2015 4:28:11 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 4:25:27 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 4/21/2015 4:04:59 PM, SNP1 wrote:
Problems with the moral arguement:
1) Objective moral values do not require a god.
2) Evidence better supports moral nihilism or relativist than moral realism.

I am aware of such objections and I highly respect your opinion, so my actual question is what your thoughts on my objection are.

WLC's version that you brought up is circular.
#TheApatheticNihilistPartyofAmerica
#WarOnDDO
Fkkize
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4/21/2015 4:30:42 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 4:28:11 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 4/21/2015 4:25:27 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 4/21/2015 4:04:59 PM, SNP1 wrote:
Problems with the moral arguement:
1) Objective moral values do not require a god.
2) Evidence better supports moral nihilism or relativist than moral realism.

I am aware of such objections and I highly respect your opinion, so my actual question is what your thoughts on my objection are.

WLC's version that you brought up is circular.

Thank you ;)
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Graincruncher
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4/22/2015 2:29:20 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 3:57:59 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 4/21/2015 1:12:58 PM, Graincruncher wrote:
At 4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM, Fkkize wrote:
William Lane Craig often uses the moral argument for the existence of God:

P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
P2) Objective moral values do exist.
C) Therefor God exists.

The question now is, what is meant by objective moral values?
WLCs response to the Euthyphro is that it a false dilemma, because God is the good. This means that objective moral values are Gods nature and the argument becomes:

P1) If God does not exist, God's nature does not exist.
P2) God's nature does exist.
C) Therefore God exists.

Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?

It's terrible from start to finish.

1) It is perfectly valid to reject the assumption that good is god's nature. This isn't explicitly included in the argument, which makes the objection less easy to recognise.
2) Many people would reject the premise (again, unstated within the argument) that objective morality exists.

Of course there might be other (maybe better) ways to object to it. Just because there are does not imply that my objection is terrible from start to finish.

No no, I agree with you. I was saying WLC's argument is terrible and highlighting why some people don't recognise it as such.
Sidewalker
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4/22/2015 6:36:59 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM, Fkkize wrote:
William Lane Craig often uses the moral argument for the existence of God:

P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
P2) Objective moral values do exist.
C) Therefor God exists.

The question now is, what is meant by objective moral values?
WLCs response to the Euthyphro is that it a false dilemma, because God is the good. This means that objective moral values are Gods nature and the argument becomes:

P1) If God does not exist, God's nature does not exist.
P2) God's nature does exist.
C) Therefore God exists.

Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?

I don't think P1 and P2 are valid, P1 presents a excluded middle false dichotomy, objective moral values can be demonstrated in ways that are not contingent on the existence of God.
"It is one of the commonest of mistakes to consider that the limit of our power of perception is also the limit of all there is to perceive." " C. W. Leadbeater
popculturepooka
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4/22/2015 9:38:07 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 3:57:30 PM, Fkkize wrote:

First of all you can't have "The Divine Command theorist does not define moral values or duties at all" (WLC) and "Adams [...] explicitly limits his theory to deontological properties such as wrongness" at the same time.


....yes you can. Because they aren't defining duties or moral values at all. Identity claims aren't definitions. Saying God is The Good (the "is" of identity) isn't saying what exactly The Good means or how we use the term.

You are affirming that God is the good, so I am no more making a semantic claim than Craig or Adams. Omnipotence/science/presence and being 'The Good' are all attributes of God so what else is 'moral' supposed to mean in this context other than to act in accordance with this attribute?


Mere identity claims DO NOT give semantic content. You're still missing the point of the distinction.

Figuring out what being moral means is moral semantics. If I say following God commands is right, it can still be meaningfully asked what it means to follow God's commands. What does "the good even mean or consist of (if anything). The first is an identity claim, the second is moral semantics.

The only difference between the Platonist and the classical theist on this score is that the theist identifies the Good with God Himself
http://www.reasonablefaith.org...

For Plato knowledge of 'the Good' would not only tell you what to do, it would also be action directing, overriding contrary inclinations, i.e. evoke moral behaviour. Analogous to Plato actions would resemble a more or less imperfect shadow of 'the Good', so what is meant by 'objective moral value' other than a reflection of Gods nature as the Good?


Yes, if I have knowledge of what doing the good means then that would motivate me.

If I have knowledge of "means" then I can, as a competent language user, refer to it and use the term. I don't need to know what H20 is in order to properly refer to use the word "water".

P1) If God does not exist reflections of Gods nature do not exist.
P2) Reflections of Gods nature do exist.
P3) Therefore God exists.

For P2) to be true one must still presuppose the existence of God, hence the argument is begging the question.

Still missing the point because The Good doesn't MEAN God's nature.
At 10/3/2016 11:49:13 PM, thett3 wrote:
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Fkkize
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4/22/2015 10:00:42 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/22/2015 9:38:07 AM, popculturepooka wrote:
At 4/21/2015 3:57:30 PM, Fkkize wrote:

First of all you can't have "The Divine Command theorist does not define moral values or duties at all" (WLC) and "Adams [...] explicitly limits his theory to deontological properties such as wrongness" at the same time.


....yes you can. Because they aren't defining duties or moral values at all.
Ok I see my mistake here.

Identity claims aren't definitions. Saying God is The Good (the "is" of identity) isn't saying what exactly The Good means or how we use the term.

You are affirming that God is the good, so I am no more making a semantic claim than Craig or Adams. Omnipotence/science/presence and being 'The Good' are all attributes of God so what else is 'moral' supposed to mean in this context other than to act in accordance with this attribute?


Mere identity claims DO NOT give semantic content. You're still missing the point of the distinction.

Figuring out what being moral means is moral semantics. If I say following God commands is right, it can still be meaningfully asked what it means to follow God's commands. What does "the good even mean or consist of (if anything). The first is an identity claim, the second is moral semantics.

The only difference between the Platonist and the classical theist on this score is that the theist identifies the Good with God Himself
http://www.reasonablefaith.org...

For Plato knowledge of 'the Good' would not only tell you what to do, it would also be action directing, overriding contrary inclinations, i.e. evoke moral behaviour. Analogous to Plato actions would resemble a more or less imperfect shadow of 'the Good', so what is meant by 'objective moral value' other than a reflection of Gods nature as the Good?


Yes, if I have knowledge of what doing the good means then that would motivate me.

If I have knowledge of "means" then I can, as a competent language user, refer to it and use the term. I don't need to know what H20 is in order to properly refer to use the word "water".

P1) If God does not exist reflections of Gods nature do not exist.
P2) Reflections of Gods nature do exist.
P3) Therefore God exists.

For P2) to be true one must still presuppose the existence of God, hence the argument is begging the question.

Still missing the point because The Good doesn't MEAN God's nature.

Before I write anything else I would like you to give me a coherent definition of 'objective moral value' that does not in some way relate to Gods nature as the good as it would to the platonic good.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
dhardage
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4/22/2015 11:46:30 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/21/2015 4:12:36 AM, Fkkize wrote:
William Lane Craig often uses the moral argument for the existence of God:

P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
P2) Objective moral values do exist.
C) Therefor God exists.

The question now is, what is meant by objective moral values?
WLCs response to the Euthyphro is that it a false dilemma, because God is the good. This means that objective moral values are Gods nature and the argument becomes:

P1) If God does not exist, God's nature does not exist.
P2) God's nature does exist.
C) Therefore God exists.

Which is completely circular, since the nature of this divine being allready includes goodness and existence, hence P2) basically says 'God exists'.

Any thoughts?

In the original argument, P1 is invalid since there is no demonstrable link between God and anything objective and it presupposes God must exist. Continuing, P2 is not demonstrable without a definition of 'objective morality' and it is my view the no morality is objective so I reject P2.

In the second version P1 is valid, presupposing that God exists. P2 also presupposes God exists so the argument is viciously circular. It is essentially saying God exists because God exists and is therefore not logically sound.
popculturepooka
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4/23/2015 10:16:51 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/22/2015 10:00:42 AM, Fkkize wrote:
At 4/22/2015 9:38:07 AM, popculturepooka wrote:
At 4/21/2015 3:57:30 PM, Fkkize wrote:

First of all you can't have "The Divine Command theorist does not define moral values or duties at all" (WLC) and "Adams [...] explicitly limits his theory to deontological properties such as wrongness" at the same time.


....yes you can. Because they aren't defining duties or moral values at all.
Ok I see my mistake here.

Identity claims aren't definitions. Saying God is The Good (the "is" of identity) isn't saying what exactly The Good means or how we use the term.

You are affirming that God is the good, so I am no more making a semantic claim than Craig or Adams. Omnipotence/science/presence and being 'The Good' are all attributes of God so what else is 'moral' supposed to mean in this context other than to act in accordance with this attribute?


Mere identity claims DO NOT give semantic content. You're still missing the point of the distinction.

Figuring out what being moral means is moral semantics. If I say following God commands is right, it can still be meaningfully asked what it means to follow God's commands. What does "the good even mean or consist of (if anything). The first is an identity claim, the second is moral semantics.

The only difference between the Platonist and the classical theist on this score is that the theist identifies the Good with God Himself
http://www.reasonablefaith.org...

For Plato knowledge of 'the Good' would not only tell you what to do, it would also be action directing, overriding contrary inclinations, i.e. evoke moral behaviour. Analogous to Plato actions would resemble a more or less imperfect shadow of 'the Good', so what is meant by 'objective moral value' other than a reflection of Gods nature as the Good?


Yes, if I have knowledge of what doing the good means then that would motivate me.

If I have knowledge of "means" then I can, as a competent language user, refer to it and use the term. I don't need to know what H20 is in order to properly refer to use the word "water".

P1) If God does not exist reflections of Gods nature do not exist.
P2) Reflections of Gods nature do exist.
P3) Therefore God exists.

For P2) to be true one must still presuppose the existence of God, hence the argument is begging the question.

Still missing the point because The Good doesn't MEAN God's nature.

Before I write anything else I would like you to give me a coherent definition of 'objective moral value' that does not in some way relate to Gods nature as the good as it would to the platonic good.

Objective moral values are just moral facts.

"Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value"moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. "

http://plato.stanford.edu...

"The moral realist contends that there are moral facts, so moral realism is a thesis in ontology, the study of what is. The ontological category "moral facts" includes both the descriptive moral judgment that is allegedly true of an individual, such as, "Sam is morally good," and the descriptive moral judgment that is allegedly true for all individuals such as, "Lying for personal gain is wrong."

http://www.iep.utm.edu...
At 10/3/2016 11:49:13 PM, thett3 wrote:
BLACK LIVES MATTER!
Fkkize
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4/23/2015 12:21:46 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 4/23/2015 10:16:51 AM, popculturepooka wrote:
At 4/22/2015 10:00:42 AM, Fkkize wrote:

Before I write anything else I would like you to give me a coherent definition of 'objective moral value' that does not in some way relate to Gods nature as the good as it would to the platonic good.

Objective moral values are just moral facts.

"Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value"moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. "

http://plato.stanford.edu...

"The moral realist contends that there are moral facts, so moral realism is a thesis in ontology, the study of what is. The ontological category "moral facts" includes both the descriptive moral judgment that is allegedly true of an individual, such as, "Sam is morally good," and the descriptive moral judgment that is allegedly true for all individuals such as, "Lying for personal gain is wrong."

http://www.iep.utm.edu...

The literature on metaethics is filled with varying definitions of what it means for values to be objective. A.W. Price once wrote an article solely devoted to capture and list some of the conceptions of 'objectivity' and 'value'.
http://www.jstor.org...

So I did a little more research:

When Craig talks about objective moral values he is means that "something is right or wrong independently of whether anybody believes it to be so." (Craig 1996)
Craig is "only interested in ontologically objective moral values" (Craig 1996)

Ontological Objectivity: An act is right or wrong because there are real properties (rightness and wrongness) that are inherited by that act.

Therefore:
P2) Ontologically objective moral (hereafter OOMV) values do exist.

"whereas moral values are grounded in God"s essential nature, our moral duties are grounded in His commands to us."
http://www.reasonablefaith.org...

Therefore:
P1) If 'OOMV exist' they are identical to 'An expression of God's essential nature exists' (p > (p=q))
P2) OOMV do exist. (P2) of Craig's argument) (p)
P3) 'OOMV exist' is identical to 'An expression of God's essential nature exists' (p=q)
P4) An expression of God's essential nature exists. (q) (2,3 Identity)
P5) The statement 'The essential nature of God exists' is identical to 'God exists' (q=s)
P6) If 'The essential nature of God exists' is identical to 'God exists' then 'OOMV exist' is identical to 'God exists' ((q=s) > (p=s))
P7) The statement 'OOMV exist' is identical to 'God exists' ((p=s))
C2) God exists (s) (2, 7 Identity; Craig's conclusion)

P8) If the conclusion of an argument is identical to one of it's premises the argument begs the question. ((p=s) > b)
P9) The conclusion C2) is identical to the premise P2) (p=s)
C3) Therefore the argument leading up to C2) begs the question. (b)

I know that I made some unnecessary steps, they serve to illustrate my point.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic