Total Posts:93|Showing Posts:1-30|Last Page
Jump to topic:

Reverse MOA - disproves Christian God?

tejretics
Posts: 6,091
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 8:29:23 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
One of the most common arguments for God's existence is the modal ontological argument, which attempts to prove God via. Modal logic, albeit epistemologically.

This was strengthened mathematically by mathematician Godel, who uses axioms and theorems that render God's existence necessary epistemologically (NOT metaphysically), albeit oft committing ipse dixit, thus filled with bare assertions.

A re-formulation of the MOA is the reverse-MOA, that observes a single particle requiring a time-dependent Hamiltonian to perhaps, metaphysically, render God's existence impossible.

Nonetheless, the philosophical argument is flawed as it can be epistemologically applied anywhere but not metaphysically, but due to philosophical confusion between logic and epistemology, I tend not to use it in my "God Exists" debates unless to refute the positive MOA like Envisage does.

I have observed Bluesteel and Usernamesareannoying use it as a positive argument for atheism.

It takes the following structure:

P1: It is possible that a maximally great being does not exists.
P2: If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world.
P3: If a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.
P4: If a maximally great being does not exist in every possible world, then it does not exist in the actual world.
P5: If a maximally great being does not exist in the actual world, then a maximally great being does not exist.
C: Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist.

This can also replace "maximally great being" with "God", still has only one particle obeying a time-dependent Hamiltonian. Equations work nonetheless as follows (regardless of whether the Hamiltonian IS time-dependent - http://www.prism.gatech.edu...):

P1) `74;(W07;x) (Mx)
P2) `74;(~W07;x) (~Mx) X35; (`74;(~W07;x) (~Mx))
P3) `74;(~W07;x) (~Mx)X35; [] (~W07;x) (~Mx)
P4) [] (~W07;x) (~Mx) X35; (~W07;x) (~Mx)
P5) (~W07;x) (~Mx) X35; (~W07;x) (~Mx)
C) W56; (~W07;x) (Mx)

The above is a mathematical expression of Godel's theorems taken via. the reverse premise as an alternation of the MOA.

The below URL will lead you to an image demonstrating the following via. modal logic:

http://upload.wikimedia.org...

Explained furthermore via. Modal logic: "Thus it is possible that it will rain today if and only if it is not necessary that it will not rain today; and it is necessary that it will rain today if and only if it is not possible that it will not rain today." - the same negative premise is considered.

The ultimate question is - does this disprove the Christian God?
"Where justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance prevails, and where any one class is made to feel that society is an organized conspiracy to oppress, rob and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe." - Frederick Douglass
Philocat
Posts: 728
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 8:36:31 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
P3 is a contradiction.

Given that a 'maximally great being' is synonymous with 'greatest possible being', P3 also can be expressed as such:

P3: If the greatest possible being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.

Which is essentially saying:

'The greatest possible being is impossible'.

Yet this is a contradiction.

Reductio ad absurdum, the Reverse MOA is unsound.
Fkkize
Posts: 2,149
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 9:38:52 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 8:36:31 AM, Philocat wrote:
P3 is a contradiction.

Given that a 'maximally great being' is synonymous with 'greatest possible being', P3 also can be expressed as such:

P3: If the greatest possible being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.

Which is essentially saying:

'The greatest possible being is impossible'.
This is not a contradiction, first of all because even if it would say that a MGB is impossible it would be begging the question not contradict itself, secondly this is not what the premise says, neither the original one nor your reformulation:

P3: If the greatest possible being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world

This merely translates into (I won't attempt to make modal operators happen, it never works):
'possibly' ~ ('Existential quantification') (Mx) > ~ 'necessarily' ('Existential quantification') (Mx)

This is a simple change of modal quantifier and absolutely valid.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Philocat
Posts: 728
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 9:46:01 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 9:38:52 AM, Fkkize wrote:
At 5/2/2015 8:36:31 AM, Philocat wrote:
P3 is a contradiction.

Given that a 'maximally great being' is synonymous with 'greatest possible being', P3 also can be expressed as such:

P3: If the greatest possible being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.

Which is essentially saying:

'The greatest possible being is impossible'.
This is not a contradiction, first of all because even if it would say that a MGB is impossible it would be begging the question not contradict itself, secondly this is not what the premise says, neither the original one nor your reformulation:

P3: If the greatest possible being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world

This merely translates into (I won't attempt to make modal operators happen, it never works):
'possibly' ~ ('Existential quantification') (Mx) > ~ 'necessarily' ('Existential quantification') (Mx)

This is a simple change of modal quantifier and absolutely valid.

It is a contradiction, because the 'greatest possible being' is possible by definition. Hence if the argument entails the proposition that the greatest possible being is not possible, then this is a contradiction.

Premise 3 states, in more or less terms, that the greatest possible being is not possible. This is a contradiction and so the argument is unsound.
Fkkize
Posts: 2,149
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 10:04:10 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 9:46:01 AM, Philocat wrote:

It is a contradiction, because the 'greatest possible being' is possible by definition. Hence if the argument entails the proposition that the greatest possible being is not possible, then this is a contradiction.

Premise 3 states, in more or less terms, that the greatest possible being is not possible. This is a contradiction and so the argument is unsound.

But this premise does not say "it is not possible that x", all it says is that "it is possible that not x". The first denotes impossibility, the latter contingency.

Alvin Plantiga said:
"If such a being exists, it would be impossible for it to exist contingently. Necessary existence would be a required attribute for such a being"

But a world where naturalism is true is a perfectly possible world, therefore the existence of God would be contingent, not necessary. Using S5 in the same way the original MOA uses it we arrive at a stalemate.
We have one argument proving and one argument disproving the existence of God and prima facie no reason to prefer one over the other.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
tejretics
Posts: 6,091
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 11:11:29 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 8:36:31 AM, Philocat wrote:
P3 is a contradiction.

Given that a 'maximally great being' is synonymous with 'greatest possible being', P3 also can be expressed as such:

P3: If the greatest possible being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.

Which is essentially saying:

'The greatest possible being is impossible'.

Yet this is a contradiction.

Reductio ad absurdum, the Reverse MOA is unsound.

"Maximally great" is not "greatest *possible*". Here, when I say "maximally great", I mean powerful, intelligent, transcendent etc.
"Where justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance prevails, and where any one class is made to feel that society is an organized conspiracy to oppress, rob and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe." - Frederick Douglass
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 11:29:32 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 8:29:23 AM, tejretics wrote:
One of the most common arguments for God's existence is the modal ontological argument, which attempts to prove God via. Modal logic, albeit epistemologically.

This was strengthened mathematically by mathematician Godel, who uses axioms and theorems that render God's existence necessary epistemologically (NOT metaphysically), albeit oft committing ipse dixit, thus filled with bare assertions.

A re-formulation of the MOA is the reverse-MOA, that observes a single particle requiring a time-dependent Hamiltonian to perhaps, metaphysically, render God's existence impossible.

Nonetheless, the philosophical argument is flawed as it can be epistemologically applied anywhere but not metaphysically, but due to philosophical confusion between logic and epistemology, I tend not to use it in my "God Exists" debates unless to refute the positive MOA like Envisage does.

I have observed Bluesteel and Usernamesareannoying use it as a positive argument for atheism.

It takes the following structure:

P1: It is possible that a maximally great being does not exists.
P2: If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world.
P3: If a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.
P4: If a maximally great being does not exist in every possible world, then it does not exist in the actual world.
P5: If a maximally great being does not exist in the actual world, then a maximally great being does not exist.
C: Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist.

This can also replace "maximally great being" with "God", still has only one particle obeying a time-dependent Hamiltonian. Equations work nonetheless as follows (regardless of whether the Hamiltonian IS time-dependent - http://www.prism.gatech.edu...):

P1) `74;(W07;x) (Mx)
P2) `74;(~W07;x) (~Mx) X35; (`74;(~W07;x) (~Mx))
P3) `74;(~W07;x) (~Mx)X35; [] (~W07;x) (~Mx)
P4) [] (~W07;x) (~Mx) X35; (~W07;x) (~Mx)
P5) (~W07;x) (~Mx) X35; (~W07;x) (~Mx)
C) W56; (~W07;x) (Mx)

The above is a mathematical expression of Godel's theorems taken via. the reverse premise as an alternation of the MOA.

The below URL will lead you to an image demonstrating the following via. modal logic:


http://upload.wikimedia.org...

Explained furthermore via. Modal logic: "Thus it is possible that it will rain today if and only if it is not necessary that it will not rain today; and it is necessary that it will rain today if and only if it is not possible that it will not rain today." - the same negative premise is considered.

The ultimate question is - does this disprove the Christian God?

The Christian God doesn't have to be a necessary being - so no.
Philocat
Posts: 728
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 11:39:37 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 10:04:10 AM, Fkkize wrote:
At 5/2/2015 9:46:01 AM, Philocat wrote:

It is a contradiction, because the 'greatest possible being' is possible by definition. Hence if the argument entails the proposition that the greatest possible being is not possible, then this is a contradiction.

Premise 3 states, in more or less terms, that the greatest possible being is not possible. This is a contradiction and so the argument is unsound.

But this premise does not say "it is not possible that x", all it says is that "it is possible that not x". The first denotes impossibility, the latter contingency.

Alvin Plantiga said:
"If such a being exists, it would be impossible for it to exist contingently. Necessary existence would be a required attribute for such a being"

But a world where naturalism is true is a perfectly possible world, therefore the existence of God would be contingent, not necessary. Using S5 in the same way the original MOA uses it we arrive at a stalemate.
We have one argument proving and one argument disproving the existence of God and prima facie no reason to prefer one over the other.

It is though, the latter part of P3 explicitly says:

'then it does not exist in every possible world'

Which is saying that it is impossible.

At 5/2/2015 11:11:29 AM, tejretics wrote:
At 5/2/2015 8:36:31 AM, Philocat wrote:
P3 is a contradiction.

Given that a 'maximally great being' is synonymous with 'greatest possible being', P3 also can be expressed as such:

P3: If the greatest possible being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.

Which is essentially saying:

'The greatest possible being is impossible'.

Yet this is a contradiction.

Reductio ad absurdum, the Reverse MOA is unsound.

"Maximally great" is not "greatest *possible*". Here, when I say "maximally great", I mean powerful, intelligent, transcendent etc.

If a being is 'maximally great' then it is great to the maximum possible extent. This is just expressing 'greatest possible being' in different words.
tejretics
Posts: 6,091
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 11:40:41 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 11:39:37 AM, Philocat wrote:
At 5/2/2015 10:04:10 AM, Fkkize wrote:
At 5/2/2015 9:46:01 AM, Philocat wrote:

It is a contradiction, because the 'greatest possible being' is possible by definition. Hence if the argument entails the proposition that the greatest possible being is not possible, then this is a contradiction.

Premise 3 states, in more or less terms, that the greatest possible being is not possible. This is a contradiction and so the argument is unsound.

But this premise does not say "it is not possible that x", all it says is that "it is possible that not x". The first denotes impossibility, the latter contingency.

Alvin Plantiga said:
"If such a being exists, it would be impossible for it to exist contingently. Necessary existence would be a required attribute for such a being"

But a world where naturalism is true is a perfectly possible world, therefore the existence of God would be contingent, not necessary. Using S5 in the same way the original MOA uses it we arrive at a stalemate.
We have one argument proving and one argument disproving the existence of God and prima facie no reason to prefer one over the other.

It is though, the latter part of P3 explicitly says:

'then it does not exist in every possible world'

Which is saying that it is impossible.

At 5/2/2015 11:11:29 AM, tejretics wrote:
At 5/2/2015 8:36:31 AM, Philocat wrote:
P3 is a contradiction.

Given that a 'maximally great being' is synonymous with 'greatest possible being', P3 also can be expressed as such:

P3: If the greatest possible being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.

Which is essentially saying:

'The greatest possible being is impossible'.

Yet this is a contradiction.

Reductio ad absurdum, the Reverse MOA is unsound.

"Maximally great" is not "greatest *possible*". Here, when I say "maximally great", I mean powerful, intelligent, transcendent etc.

If a being is 'maximally great' then it is great to the maximum possible extent. This is just expressing 'greatest possible being' in different words.

I didn't mean that as 'maximally great'. I *meant* powerful, intelligent, transcendent, etc. :p
"Where justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance prevails, and where any one class is made to feel that society is an organized conspiracy to oppress, rob and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe." - Frederick Douglass
Fkkize
Posts: 2,149
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 1:06:42 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 11:39:37 AM, Philocat wrote:

It is though, the latter part of P3 explicitly says:

'then it does not exist in every possible world'

Which is saying that it is impossible.

Just as the original MOA says "if it is possible that x then it is necessary that X".
Which is saying that "it is the case that X" (due to S5).

You are basically pointing to the absurd implications of using definitions that include necessities in modal logic. If you don't like the reverse MOA you should not like the regular MOA either.

All an opponent of the MOA has to show is that the MGB definition is incoherent, which is simply done by proposing that a world in which naturalism is true is possible:

P1) If God exist then he exists in every possible world. (From the original MOA)
P2) It is possible that naturalism is true. (Premise)
P3) If there is some world in which naturalism is true then God does not exist in every possible world. (Since there would be at least one possible world without God)
P4) If God does not exist in every possible world then God does not exist. (P1 Transposition)
P5) If it is possible that naturalism is true then God does not exist. (P3, P4 Hypothetical Syllogism)
C) God does not exist (P2, P5 Modus Ponens)

This might make the core idea clearer.
Unless you can show that it is not possible that naturalism is true, i.e., it is incoherent, then this argument obliterates the MOA.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Yassine
Posts: 2,617
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 4:13:48 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 8:29:23 AM, tejretics wrote:
One of the most common arguments for God's existence is the modal ontological argument, which attempts to prove God via. Modal logic, albeit epistemologically.

This was strengthened mathematically by mathematician Godel, who uses axioms and theorems that render God's existence necessary epistemologically (NOT metaphysically), albeit oft committing ipse dixit, thus filled with bare assertions.

A re-formulation of the MOA is the reverse-MOA, that observes a single particle requiring a time-dependent Hamiltonian to perhaps, metaphysically, render God's existence impossible.

Nonetheless, the philosophical argument is flawed as it can be epistemologically applied anywhere but not metaphysically, but due to philosophical confusion between logic and epistemology, I tend not to use it in my "God Exists" debates unless to refute the positive MOA like Envisage does.

I have observed Bluesteel and Usernamesareannoying use it as a positive argument for atheism.

It takes the following structure:

P1: It is possible that a maximally great being does not exists.
P2: If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world.
P3: If a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.
P4: If a maximally great being does not exist in every possible world, then it does not exist in the actual world.
P5: If a maximally great being does not exist in the actual world, then a maximally great being does not exist.
C: Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist.

- Dude?!!!!!!! WAT?!!!

This can also replace "maximally great being" with "God", still has only one particle obeying a time-dependent Hamiltonian. Equations work nonetheless as follows (regardless of whether the Hamiltonian IS time-dependent - http://www.prism.gatech.edu...):

P1) `74;(W07;x) (Mx)
P2) `74;(~W07;x) (~Mx) X35; (`74;(~W07;x) (~Mx))
P3) `74;(~W07;x) (~Mx)X35; [] (~W07;x) (~Mx)
P4) [] (~W07;x) (~Mx) X35; (~W07;x) (~Mx)
P5) (~W07;x) (~Mx) X35; (~W07;x) (~Mx)
C) W56; (~W07;x) (Mx)

The above is a mathematical expression of Godel's theorems taken via. the reverse premise as an alternation of the MOA.

The below URL will lead you to an image demonstrating the following via. modal logic:


http://upload.wikimedia.org...

Explained furthermore via. Modal logic: "Thus it is possible that it will rain today if and only if it is not necessary that it will not rain today; and it is necessary that it will rain today if and only if it is not possible that it will not rain today." - the same negative premise is considered.

The ultimate question is - does this disprove the Christian God?
Current Debates:

Islam is not a religion of peace vs. @ Lutonator:
* http://www.debate.org...
Yassine
Posts: 2,617
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 4:16:12 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 11:29:32 AM, Envisage wrote:

The Christian God doesn't have to be a necessary being - so no.

- He didn't argue from a necessary being premise, he argued from a maximally great being, with a rather invalid argument!
Current Debates:

Islam is not a religion of peace vs. @ Lutonator:
* http://www.debate.org...
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 4:18:32 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 4:16:12 PM, Yassine wrote:
At 5/2/2015 11:29:32 AM, Envisage wrote:

The Christian God doesn't have to be a necessary being - so no.

- He didn't argue from a necessary being premise, he argued from a maximally great being, with a rather invalid argument!

True, that's yet another problem with the argument. Maximal greatness doesn't entail metaphysical necessity - it's a purely subjective term.

For the MOA and reverse MOA to be valid, then God needs to be defined as a modally necessary being of some form otherwise premise 3 is false.
Yassine
Posts: 2,617
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 4:30:32 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 4:18:32 PM, Envisage wrote:

True, that's yet another problem with the argument. Maximal greatness doesn't entail metaphysical necessity - it's a purely subjective term.

For the MOA and reverse MOA to be valid, then God needs to be defined as a modally necessary being of some form otherwise premise 3 is false.

- For the MOA, it would still be valid nonetheless.

- For the reverse MOA, whatever that is, arguing from a necessary being is pointless, & dubious. Here:
P1. It is possible that a necessary being does not exist.
=> This premise uses metaphysical possibility & epistemological possibility interchangeably! & even if that weren't true, the Cosmological Argument entailing the necessary being would have to be outright false before we can even consider that P1 is true.
=> Another issue is that is it even appropriate to propose such a premise, can a necessary being be contingent to possibility?! Is this really even appropriate to ask?

- I don't know, this whole thing sounds dubious to be.

Btw, welcome back ;)
Current Debates:

Islam is not a religion of peace vs. @ Lutonator:
* http://www.debate.org...
Fkkize
Posts: 2,149
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 4:33:08 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 4:18:32 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 5/2/2015 4:16:12 PM, Yassine wrote:
At 5/2/2015 11:29:32 AM, Envisage wrote:

The Christian God doesn't have to be a necessary being - so no.

- He didn't argue from a necessary being premise, he argued from a maximally great being, with a rather invalid argument!

True, that's yet another problem with the argument. Maximal greatness doesn't entail metaphysical necessity - it's a purely subjective term.

For the MOA and reverse MOA to be valid, then God needs to be defined as a modally necessary being of some form otherwise premise 3 is false.
People who use this argument most of the time neither include the definition of God that is required nor do they understand the technicalities behind it. The definition used by Plantinga of course includes necessary existence.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 4:36:16 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 4:30:32 PM, Yassine wrote:
At 5/2/2015 4:18:32 PM, Envisage wrote:

True, that's yet another problem with the argument. Maximal greatness doesn't entail metaphysical necessity - it's a purely subjective term.

For the MOA and reverse MOA to be valid, then God needs to be defined as a modally necessary being of some form otherwise premise 3 is false.

- For the MOA, it would still be valid nonetheless.

No it wouldn't. Premise 3 doesn't hold otherwise, since possible world semantics presupposes modal logic (and in this case, the s5 axiomatic system).

- For the reverse MOA, whatever that is, arguing from a necessary being is pointless, & dubious. Here:
P1. It is possible that a necessary being does not exist.
=> This premise uses metaphysical possibility & epistemological possibility interchangeably!

Yep.

& even if that weren't true, the Cosmological Argument entailing the necessary being would have to be outright false before we can even consider that P1 is true.

Wtf. A cosmological argument has nothing to do with MOA.

=> Another issue is that is it even appropriate to propose such a premise, can a necessary being be contingent to possibility?! Is this really even appropriate to ask?

- I don't know, this whole thing sounds dubious to be.

You and me both. I mean, it is "logically possible" that Goldbach's conjecture is correct - It's impossible to say yes or no.

Btw, welcome back ;)

I'm not really back. I just succeeded in getting a job so I have a little time to burn.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 4:38:50 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 4:33:08 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 5/2/2015 4:18:32 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 5/2/2015 4:16:12 PM, Yassine wrote:
At 5/2/2015 11:29:32 AM, Envisage wrote:

The Christian God doesn't have to be a necessary being - so no.

- He didn't argue from a necessary being premise, he argued from a maximally great being, with a rather invalid argument!

True, that's yet another problem with the argument. Maximal greatness doesn't entail metaphysical necessity - it's a purely subjective term.

For the MOA and reverse MOA to be valid, then God needs to be defined as a modally necessary being of some form otherwise premise 3 is false.
People who use this argument most of the time neither include the definition of God that is required nor do they understand the technicalities behind it. The definition used by Plantinga of course includes necessary existence.

Even Plantinga knows it is a retarded argument (he has implicitly admitted as much)... Only people who are deliberately trying to disceive (such as WLC) or theists who really don't understand how modal logic and possible world semantics works bother defending it. Accordingly atheists should only defend the reverse as an illustrative tool against a theist who does use it IMO.
Fkkize
Posts: 2,149
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 4:40:51 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 4:38:50 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 5/2/2015 4:33:08 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 5/2/2015 4:18:32 PM, Envisage wrote:
At 5/2/2015 4:16:12 PM, Yassine wrote:
At 5/2/2015 11:29:32 AM, Envisage wrote:

The Christian God doesn't have to be a necessary being - so no.

- He didn't argue from a necessary being premise, he argued from a maximally great being, with a rather invalid argument!

True, that's yet another problem with the argument. Maximal greatness doesn't entail metaphysical necessity - it's a purely subjective term.

For the MOA and reverse MOA to be valid, then God needs to be defined as a modally necessary being of some form otherwise premise 3 is false.
People who use this argument most of the time neither include the definition of God that is required nor do they understand the technicalities behind it. The definition used by Plantinga of course includes necessary existence.

Even Plantinga knows it is a retarded argument (he has implicitly admitted as much)... Only people who are deliberately trying to disceive (such as WLC) or theists who really don't understand how modal logic and possible world semantics works bother defending it. Accordingly atheists should only defend the reverse as an illustrative tool against a theist who does use it IMO.

You are absolutely right on that.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Fkkize
Posts: 2,149
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 4:54:22 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 4:30:32 PM, Yassine wrote:
At 5/2/2015 4:18:32 PM, Envisage wrote:

True, that's yet another problem with the argument. Maximal greatness doesn't entail metaphysical necessity - it's a purely subjective term.

For the MOA and reverse MOA to be valid, then God needs to be defined as a modally necessary being of some form otherwise premise 3 is false.

- For the MOA, it would still be valid nonetheless.
Both have to use the same definition to be valid.

- For the reverse MOA, whatever that is, arguing from a necessary being is pointless, & dubious. Here:
P1. It is possible that a necessary being does not exist.
=> This premise uses metaphysical possibility & epistemological possibility interchangeably!
The regular MOA uses epistemic and metaphysical possibility interchangeably, too.

& even if that weren't true, the Cosmological Argument entailing the necessary being would have to be outright false before we can even consider that P1 is true.
First of all, proponents of a reverse MOA would also think of the CA as false, secondly one can safely ignore any CA's and simply use the argument I presented earlier in this thread.

=> Another issue is that is it even appropriate to propose such a premise, can a necessary being be contingent to possibility?! Is this really even appropriate to ask?
The point of the original argument is to show that if it is possible (not incoherent) for a necessary being to exist then it actually exist. The point of the reverse version is to show that it also very possible that such a being does not exist in every possible world, therefore is incoherent and does not exist.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Yassine
Posts: 2,617
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 5:06:09 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 4:36:16 PM, Envisage wrote:

No it wouldn't. Premise 3 doesn't hold otherwise, since possible world semantics presupposes modal logic (and in this case, the s5 axiomatic system).

- Not necessarily. There is an ambiguous use of the word "possible" here, but the structure of P3 is valid regardless:
* P3. If a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.

Wtf. A cosmological argument has nothing to do with MOA.

- That's what I am saying, the formulation of this argument assumes that the CA is false, otherwise it is itself also false. That's not the case of (P1.) It is possible that a necessary being exists.
=> Here the only issue is that is it appropriate to propose such as premise in the first place or not, as we do not have to face the CA.
=> The argument is loaded semantically, it's better to get rid of the words & use signs instead, like in Godel's proof.

You and me both. I mean, it is "logically possible" that Goldbach's conjecture is correct - It's impossible to say yes or no.

- Hahahah! LoL.

I'm not really back. I just succeeded in getting a job so I have a little time to burn.

- Congratulation man! If you're interested in a debate, let me know.
Current Debates:

Islam is not a religion of peace vs. @ Lutonator:
* http://www.debate.org...
Yassine
Posts: 2,617
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 5:21:37 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 4:54:22 PM, Fkkize wrote:

The regular MOA uses epistemic and metaphysical possibility interchangeably, too.

- Which is why signs are the answer.

First of all, proponents of a reverse MOA would also think of the CA as false, secondly one can safely ignore any CA's and simply use the argument I presented earlier in this thread.

- The 'reverse' MOA is invalid, unless there is an assumption of MGB being identified with necessary being.
- The CA is not false, it may be said to be not meaningful, but it's not false! (I am speaking of the necessary being here).

The point of the original argument is to show that if it is possible (not incoherent) for a necessary being to exist then it actually exist. The point of the reverse version is to show that it also very possible that such a being does not exist in every possible world, therefore is incoherent and does not exist.

- It's not the same thing! One can do without assuming MGB = necessary being, the other (the reverse) can't.
Current Debates:

Islam is not a religion of peace vs. @ Lutonator:
* http://www.debate.org...
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 5:25:03 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
Wtf. A cosmological argument has nothing to do with MOA.

- That's what I am saying, the formulation of this argument assumes that the CA is false, otherwise it is itself also false. That's not the case of (P1.) It is possible that a necessary being exists.

I am confused. You are shoehorning in something that is irrelevant. i dont see how it can be possible relevant, since the definition of God upheld by virtually all cosmological argument I have seen are not equivalent to the one upheld by the MOA. Even if the reverse MOA is correct, then it doesn't follow that a CA is false.

=> Here the only issue is that is it appropriate to propose such as premise in the first place or not, as we do not have to face the CA.
=> The argument is loaded semantically, it's better to get rid of the words & use signs instead, like in Godel's proof.

Exactly.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 5:27:28 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
You keep saying "the" CA, but there is no "the" CA ... there are tens, maybe hundreds of cosmological arguments. So I have no idea what you are talking about.
Fkkize
Posts: 2,149
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 5:32:11 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 5:21:37 PM, Yassine wrote:
At 5/2/2015 4:54:22 PM, Fkkize wrote:

The regular MOA uses epistemic and metaphysical possibility interchangeably, too.

- Which is why signs are the answer.
Signs and a clarification of what kind of possibility is in question.

First of all, proponents of a reverse MOA would also think of the CA as false, secondly one can safely ignore any CA's and simply use the argument I presented earlier in this thread.

- The 'reverse' MOA is invalid, unless there is an assumption of MGB being identified with necessary being.
This is not an assumption, this is the definition Alvin Plantinga, the creator of the MOA, uses.

- The CA is not false, it may be said to be not meaningful, but it's not false! (I am speaking of the necessary being here).
What kind of CA are you talking about exactly?
The Kalam one? Unsound
The CA from contingency? Definetly unsound.

The point of the original argument is to show that if it is possible (not incoherent) for a necessary being to exist then it actually exist. The point of the reverse version is to show that it also very possible that such a being does not exist in every possible world, therefore is incoherent and does not exist.

- It's not the same thing! One can do without assuming MGB = necessary being, the other (the reverse) can't.
Umhh no, in order for P3) If it is possible that a MGB exist then it is necessary that a MGB exists to be valid, 'MGB' must be defined in a way such that S5 can be used, i.e., it must be defined as a necessary being.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Yassine
Posts: 2,617
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 5:47:21 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 5:25:03 PM, Envisage wrote:

I am confused. You are shoehorning in something that is irrelevant. i dont see how it can be possible relevant, since the definition of God upheld by virtually all cosmological argument I have seen are not equivalent to the one upheld by the MOA. Even if the reverse MOA is correct, then it doesn't follow that a CA is false.

- It does, by affirming the antecedent. For the reverse MOA to be valid, P3 has to be true, which entails MGB = necessary being, which entails that CA is false, for P1 is an assumption. The above formulation of the 'reverse' MOA is just bad, there might be others better articulated, but this one isn't.
- However, this is not the case of the MOA. As I said, the issue with the MOA is that it is even appropriate to assume or propose P1.

You keep saying "the" CA, but there is no "the" CA ... there are tens, maybe hundreds of cosmological arguments. So I have no idea what you are talking about.

- I am speaking of the deductive one, the one that entails the existence of a necessary being.
Current Debates:

Islam is not a religion of peace vs. @ Lutonator:
* http://www.debate.org...
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 5:54:50 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
You keep saying "the" CA, but there is no "the" CA ... there are tens, maybe hundreds of cosmological arguments. So I have no idea what you are talking about.

- I am speaking of the deductive one,

Doesn't help, virtually all of them are deductive in their presentation.

the one that entails the existence of a necessary being.

"Necessary" means two completely different things in these two arguments & axiomatic systems. A CA proves a different necessary being to the MOA.
Yassine
Posts: 2,617
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 5:59:21 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 5:54:50 PM, Envisage wrote:

Doesn't help, virtually all of them are deductive in their presentation.

- There is the one, the one from contingency, come on!

"Necessary" means two completely different things in these two arguments & axiomatic systems. A CA proves a different necessary being to the MOA.

- The MOA doesn't prove it, it assumes it. The whole idea is to move from a metaphysical proof to an epistemological proof.
=> Needless to say, signs are the answer.
Current Debates:

Islam is not a religion of peace vs. @ Lutonator:
* http://www.debate.org...
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 6:01:23 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 5:59:21 PM, Yassine wrote:
At 5/2/2015 5:54:50 PM, Envisage wrote:

Doesn't help, virtually all of them are deductive in their presentation.

- There is the one, the one from contingency, come on!

Took you long enough.

"Necessary" means two completely different things in these two arguments & axiomatic systems. A CA proves a different necessary being to the MOA.

- The MOA doesn't prove it, it assumes it. The whole idea is to move from a metaphysical proof to an epistemological proof.
=> Needless to say, signs are the answer.

You missed my point. The definitions of "necessary being" are not equivalent. Thus the MOA is irrelevant to the MOA on every level.
Yassine
Posts: 2,617
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
5/2/2015 6:06:03 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/2/2015 5:32:11 PM, Fkkize wrote:

Signs and a clarification of what kind of possibility is in question.

- That's open to interpretation after the fact.

What kind of CA are you talking about exactly?
The Kalam one? Unsound
The CA from contingency? Definetly unsound.

- Unsound =/= False.
=> Meaning, the MOA assumes the CA, & the reverse assumes that the CA is false.

Umhh no, in order for P3) If it is possible that a MGB exist then it is necessary that a MGB exists to be valid, 'MGB' must be defined in a way such that S5 can be used, i.e., it must be defined as a necessary being.

- I am speaking of metaphysical necessity here!
Current Debates:

Islam is not a religion of peace vs. @ Lutonator:
* http://www.debate.org...