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Truth-makers and Modal logic.

n7
Posts: 1,360
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5/23/2015 5:25:22 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
I listened to something along these lines recently, it proposes an interesting dilemma.

Basically a truth maker is something that makes something true (obviously). What makes it true that the cup is on the table? Because there's a state of the affairs in the actual world where the cup is on the table. This is the correspondence theory of truth, it seems to be the most intuitive theory, but when thinking about modal logic it brings up an interesting problem.

What makes it true that the cup might have been on the floor? There isn't a state of affairs that makes that true, that statement doesn't seem to correspond to reality. So, either the statement has no truth-maker therefore TRIV modal logic implies and nothing is really possible. There is no possible worlds, only one necessary one. Or perhaps there is a truth-maker. There is a state of affairs where the cup is on the floor. Not in this state, but another. Modal realism is therefore implied.

Is there a way out of this without adopting some sort of coherence theory of truth?
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Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
Surrealism
Posts: 265
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5/23/2015 11:14:42 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/23/2015 5:25:22 PM, n7 wrote:
I listened to something along these lines recently, it proposes an interesting dilemma.

Basically a truth maker is something that makes something true (obviously). What makes it true that the cup is on the table? Because there's a state of the affairs in the actual world where the cup is on the table. This is the correspondence theory of truth, it seems to be the most intuitive theory, but when thinking about modal logic it brings up an interesting problem.

What makes it true that the cup might have been on the floor? There isn't a state of affairs that makes that true, that statement doesn't seem to correspond to reality. So, either the statement has no truth-maker therefore TRIV modal logic implies and nothing is really possible. There is no possible worlds, only one necessary one. Or perhaps there is a truth-maker. There is a state of affairs where the cup is on the floor. Not in this state, but another. Modal realism is therefore implied.

Is there a way out of this without adopting some sort of coherence theory of truth?

Adopt Pragmatism?
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n7
Posts: 1,360
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5/23/2015 11:27:21 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/23/2015 11:14:42 PM, Surrealism wrote:
At 5/23/2015 5:25:22 PM, n7 wrote:
I listened to something along these lines recently, it proposes an interesting dilemma.

Basically a truth maker is something that makes something true (obviously). What makes it true that the cup is on the table? Because there's a state of the affairs in the actual world where the cup is on the table. This is the correspondence theory of truth, it seems to be the most intuitive theory, but when thinking about modal logic it brings up an interesting problem.

What makes it true that the cup might have been on the floor? There isn't a state of affairs that makes that true, that statement doesn't seem to correspond to reality. So, either the statement has no truth-maker therefore TRIV modal logic implies and nothing is really possible. There is no possible worlds, only one necessary one. Or perhaps there is a truth-maker. There is a state of affairs where the cup is on the floor. Not in this state, but another. Modal realism is therefore implied.

Is there a way out of this without adopting some sort of coherence theory of truth?

Adopt Pragmatism?

Maybe, but I could never make sense of what Pragmatism is trying to say. It's true because it works? What's that suppose to mean? What is required for something to "work"?
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Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
Surrealism
Posts: 265
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5/23/2015 11:39:28 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/23/2015 11:27:21 PM, n7 wrote:
At 5/23/2015 11:14:42 PM, Surrealism wrote:
At 5/23/2015 5:25:22 PM, n7 wrote:
I listened to something along these lines recently, it proposes an interesting dilemma.

Basically a truth maker is something that makes something true (obviously). What makes it true that the cup is on the table? Because there's a state of the affairs in the actual world where the cup is on the table. This is the correspondence theory of truth, it seems to be the most intuitive theory, but when thinking about modal logic it brings up an interesting problem.

What makes it true that the cup might have been on the floor? There isn't a state of affairs that makes that true, that statement doesn't seem to correspond to reality. So, either the statement has no truth-maker therefore TRIV modal logic implies and nothing is really possible. There is no possible worlds, only one necessary one. Or perhaps there is a truth-maker. There is a state of affairs where the cup is on the floor. Not in this state, but another. Modal realism is therefore implied.

Is there a way out of this without adopting some sort of coherence theory of truth?

Adopt Pragmatism?

Maybe, but I could never make sense of what Pragmatism is trying to say. It's true because it works? What's that suppose to mean? What is required for something to "work"?

A truth statement works if you can treat it as true and use that in order to achieve something you desire.

Charles Sanders Pierce gives the example of the hardness of diamonds. When you touch a diamond, it feels hard. Do you believe that diamonds are hard? Or do you believe that diamonds are soft, but just become hard when touched? If you mine diamonds, your actions don't really change based on which you believe. But as we have no possible application for diamonds being soft when not touched, we don't really have a reason to believe it. It doesn't work for us.
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Fkkize
Posts: 2,149
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5/24/2015 5:46:45 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/23/2015 5:25:22 PM, n7 wrote:
I listened to something along these lines recently, it proposes an interesting dilemma.

Basically a truth maker is something that makes something true (obviously). What makes it true that the cup is on the table? Because there's a state of the affairs in the actual world where the cup is on the table. This is the correspondence theory of truth, it seems to be the most intuitive theory, but when thinking about modal logic it brings up an interesting problem.

What makes it true that the cup might have been on the floor? There isn't a state of affairs that makes that true, that statement doesn't seem to correspond to reality. So, either the statement has no truth-maker therefore TRIV modal logic implies and nothing is really possible. There is no possible worlds, only one necessary one. Or perhaps there is a truth-maker. There is a state of affairs where the cup is on the floor. Not in this state, but another. Modal realism is therefore implied.

Is there a way out of this without adopting some sort of coherence theory of truth?
Yes, modal realism, fictionalism or hybridism of some sort is implied. I am not sure as to why this would make you reconsider the coherence theory, since your cup example only deals with modal metphysics.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Fkkize
Posts: 2,149
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5/24/2015 6:03:47 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
I am not sure as to why this would make you reconsider the coherence theory
*correspondence
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,251
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5/24/2015 6:42:26 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/23/2015 5:25:22 PM, n7 wrote:
I listened to something along these lines recently, it proposes an interesting dilemma.

What makes it true that the cup might have been on the floor? There isn't a state of affairs that makes that true, that statement doesn't seem to correspond to reality. So, either the statement has no truth-maker therefore TRIV modal logic implies and nothing is really possible. There is no possible worlds, only one necessary one. Or perhaps there is a truth-maker. There is a state of affairs where the cup is on the floor. Not in this state, but another. Modal realism is therefore implied.

The state of affairs is this: prior to the location of the cup being determined, there was nothing real to prevent reality from assuming a form in which the cup was on the floor. The fact that reality assumed a form in which the cup was on the table does not mean that it had to prior to doing so. In this sense, the state of affairs is really a lack of something i.e., reality embodies the lack of complete determinism.

Moreover, what makes you think alternative definitions of reality (possible worlds) have no basis in reality just because they have no physical representation? Since possible worlds are internally consistent, their "unreality" can only come from the outside. Thus, reality, in defining what it is, must also define what it is not. I.e., must establish other definitions of reality as potentials and not actualizations. Reality cannot just ignore the other definitions, because it's responsible for establishing what is real i.e., the reality of their non-actualization. In the absence of any reality i.e., in the absence of constraint and information, all potentials exist by default.
n7
Posts: 1,360
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5/25/2015 11:38:07 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/24/2015 6:42:26 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 5/23/2015 5:25:22 PM, n7 wrote:
I listened to something along these lines recently, it proposes an interesting dilemma.

What makes it true that the cup might have been on the floor? There isn't a state of affairs that makes that true, that statement doesn't seem to correspond to reality. So, either the statement has no truth-maker therefore TRIV modal logic implies and nothing is really possible. There is no possible worlds, only one necessary one. Or perhaps there is a truth-maker. There is a state of affairs where the cup is on the floor. Not in this state, but another. Modal realism is therefore implied.

The state of affairs is this: prior to the location of the cup being determined, there was nothing real to prevent reality from assuming a form in which the cup was on the floor. The fact that reality assumed a form in which the cup was on the table does not mean that it had to prior to doing so. In this sense, the state of affairs is really a lack of something i.e., reality embodies the lack of complete determinism.

So we can say things are possible before they happened. But what about things that have already or are currently happening? Before the cup is on the table it's true that it could be anywhere, but when it's already on there what makes it true that it might not have been there?
Moreover, what makes you think alternative definitions of reality (possible worlds) have no basis in reality just because they have no physical representation? Since possible worlds are internally consistent, their "unreality" can only come from the outside. Thus, reality, in defining what it is, must also define what it is not. I.e., must establish other definitions of reality as potentials and not actualizations. Reality cannot just ignore the other definitions, because it's responsible for establishing what is real i.e., the reality of their non-actualization. In the absence of any reality i.e., in the absence of constraint and information, all potentials exist by default.

They may have physical representation. The problem is with the seemingly absurdity of the idea. It bloats our ontology and seems unnecessary. That there exists a world where everything happened the same way except with cats seems hard to believe.

https://www.youtube.com...
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Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.