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Physicalism a necessity?

n7
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5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
Came up with this while reading a paragraph in a David Kelly book.

It's an epistemological argument that attempts to show a non-mental reality exists and physicalism is true.

In a nut shell, how can one go about proving the existence of the mind? One could start out stating facts about the mental or about the non-mental. However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist. Descartes said I think, therefore I am. However "I am" refers to the mind, so his argument boils down to "I have mental events, therefore mental events exists." Justification for the mental is mental.

Or take the idea that in order to doubt the mind you have to have the mental event of doubt. This is akin to saying in order to have a mental event (doubt) you must have a mind. This doesn't prove doubt exists, just that if there is mental events there is a mind. The only evidence for a mind one can give is from assertions about the mind, which is circular.

Therefore, in order to have any good philosophy of mind you have to admit non-mental facts exists. This leads us to physicalism. If the mind and body are two separate entities, then facts about one are irrelevant to facts about the other. If the second horn is true, then facts about the non-mental are relevant to facts about the mental and if you know enough about the non-mental you would see the mental exists. This is what physicalism claims.

I suppose one could state the existence of the mind by itself is axiomatic, but to defend that claim you have to appeal to your experiences, which assumes the mental exists.

I don't know if this is any good. Thoughts?
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Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
Fkkize
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5/27/2015 3:24:50 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
Came up with this while reading a paragraph in a David Kelly book.

It's an epistemological argument that attempts to show a non-mental reality exists and physicalism is true.

In a nut shell, how can one go about proving the existence of the mind? One could start out stating facts about the mental or about the non-mental. However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist. Descartes said I think, therefore I am. However "I am" refers to the mind, so his argument boils down to "I have mental events, therefore mental events exists." Justification for the mental is mental.

Or take the idea that in order to doubt the mind you have to have the mental event of doubt. This is akin to saying in order to have a mental event (doubt) you must have a mind. This doesn't prove doubt exists, just that if there is mental events there is a mind. The only evidence for a mind one can give is from assertions about the mind, which is circular.

Therefore, in order to have any good philosophy of mind you have to admit non-mental facts exists. This leads us to physicalism. If the mind and body are two separate entities, then facts about one are irrelevant to facts about the other.
I think a more thorough refutation of substance dualism is needed but other than that I think it is pretty solid.

If the second horn is true, then facts about the non-mental are relevant to facts about the mental and if you know enough about the non-mental you would see the mental exists. This is what physicalism claims.

I suppose one could state the existence of the mind by itself is axiomatic, but to defend that claim you have to appeal to your experiences, which assumes the mental exists.

I don't know if this is any good. Thoughts?
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
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: space contradicts logic
popculturepooka
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5/27/2015 3:43:00 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
Came up with this while reading a paragraph in a David Kelly book.

It's an epistemological argument that attempts to show a non-mental reality exists and physicalism is true.

In a nut shell, how can one go about proving the existence of the mind? One could start out stating facts about the mental or about the non-mental. However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist. Descartes said I think, therefore I am. However "I am" refers to the mind, so his argument boils down to "I have mental events, therefore mental events exists." Justification for the mental is mental.

Or take the idea that in order to doubt the mind you have to have the mental event of doubt. This is akin to saying in order to have a mental event (doubt) you must have a mind. This doesn't prove doubt exists, just that if there is mental events there is a mind. The only evidence for a mind one can give is from assertions about the mind, which is circular.

Therefore, in order to have any good philosophy of mind you have to admit non-mental facts exists. This leads us to physicalism. If the mind and body are two separate entities, then facts about one are irrelevant to facts about the other. If the second horn is true, then facts about the non-mental are relevant to facts about the mental and if you know enough about the non-mental you would see the mental exists. This is what physicalism claims.

I suppose one could state the existence of the mind by itself is axiomatic, but to defend that claim you have to appeal to your experiences, which assumes the mental exists.

I don't know if this is any good. Thoughts?

This strikes as attacking the wrong target - anti-physicalist arguments aren't about proving the mind exists (that's a given). They are about proving what sort of thing the mind is (i.e. a physical or non-physical particular).
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zmikecuber
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5/27/2015 5:02:47 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
Came up with this while reading a paragraph in a David Kelly book.

It's an epistemological argument that attempts to show a non-mental reality exists and physicalism is true.

In a nut shell, how can one go about proving the existence of the mind? One could start out stating facts about the mental or about the non-mental. However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist. Descartes said I think, therefore I am. However "I am" refers to the mind, so his argument boils down to "I have mental events, therefore mental events exists." Justification for the mental is mental.

Or take the idea that in order to doubt the mind you have to have the mental event of doubt. This is akin to saying in order to have a mental event (doubt) you must have a mind. This doesn't prove doubt exists, just that if there is mental events there is a mind. The only evidence for a mind one can give is from assertions about the mind, which is circular.

Therefore, in order to have any good philosophy of mind you have to admit non-mental facts exists. This leads us to physicalism. If the mind and body are two separate entities, then facts about one are irrelevant to facts about the other. If the second horn is true, then facts about the non-mental are relevant to facts about the mental and if you know enough about the non-mental you would see the mental exists. This is what physicalism claims.

I suppose one could state the existence of the mind by itself is axiomatic, but to defend that claim you have to appeal to your experiences, which assumes the mental exists.

I don't know if this is any good. Thoughts?

This shows that (assuming it's a sound argument), epistemologically, if we want to have a good philosophy of mind, there must be non-mental facts. But how does that show that the mind is physical? All it shows is that there are *some* non-mental facts, and that these mental facts are episemologically more fundamental than mental facts. However, how does this show non-mental facts are *metaphysically* more fundamental than mental facts?
"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."
zmikecuber
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5/27/2015 5:05:14 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
Came up with this while reading a paragraph in a David Kelly book.

It's an epistemological argument that attempts to show a non-mental reality exists and physicalism is true.

In a nut shell, how can one go about proving the existence of the mind? One could start out stating facts about the mental or about the non-mental. However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist. Descartes said I think, therefore I am. However "I am" refers to the mind, so his argument boils down to "I have mental events, therefore mental events exists." Justification for the mental is mental.

Or take the idea that in order to doubt the mind you have to have the mental event of doubt. This is akin to saying in order to have a mental event (doubt) you must have a mind. This doesn't prove doubt exists, just that if there is mental events there is a mind. The only evidence for a mind one can give is from assertions about the mind, which is circular.

Therefore, in order to have any good philosophy of mind you have to admit non-mental facts exists. This leads us to physicalism. If the mind and body are two separate entities, then facts about one are irrelevant to facts about the other. If the second horn is true, then facts about the non-mental are relevant to facts about the mental and if you know enough about the non-mental you would see the mental exists. This is what physicalism claims.

I suppose one could state the existence of the mind by itself is axiomatic, but to defend that claim you have to appeal to your experiences, which assumes the mental exists.

I don't know if this is any good. Thoughts?

Also, couldn't this argument be made against any first-principle? Can't we say that the statement "A is A" is circular? Or that the LNC is circular? Or that "I exist" is circular?

That's not to say that the argument doesn't work. I just don't see how you can say the statement "I exist" is circular, or question begging, but other basic principles are not. It seems that, if *anything* is a first principle, "I exist" would be the most basic first principle.
"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."
n7
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5/27/2015 5:51:00 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/27/2015 3:43:00 PM, popculturepooka wrote:
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
Came up with this while reading a paragraph in a David Kelly book.

It's an epistemological argument that attempts to show a non-mental reality exists and physicalism is true.

In a nut shell, how can one go about proving the existence of the mind? One could start out stating facts about the mental or about the non-mental. However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist. Descartes said I think, therefore I am. However "I am" refers to the mind, so his argument boils down to "I have mental events, therefore mental events exists." Justification for the mental is mental.

Or take the idea that in order to doubt the mind you have to have the mental event of doubt. This is akin to saying in order to have a mental event (doubt) you must have a mind. This doesn't prove doubt exists, just that if there is mental events there is a mind. The only evidence for a mind one can give is from assertions about the mind, which is circular.

Therefore, in order to have any good philosophy of mind you have to admit non-mental facts exists. This leads us to physicalism. If the mind and body are two separate entities, then facts about one are irrelevant to facts about the other. If the second horn is true, then facts about the non-mental are relevant to facts about the mental and if you know enough about the non-mental you would see the mental exists. This is what physicalism claims.

I suppose one could state the existence of the mind by itself is axiomatic, but to defend that claim you have to appeal to your experiences, which assumes the mental exists.

I don't know if this is any good. Thoughts?

This strikes as attacking the wrong target - anti-physicalist arguments aren't about proving the mind exists (that's a given). They are about proving what sort of thing the mind is (i.e. a physical or non-physical particular).

I understand. This is pointing out an epistemological flaw in a dualist position based on the existence of the mind.
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Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
n7
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5/27/2015 5:54:00 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/27/2015 5:05:14 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
Came up with this while reading a paragraph in a David Kelly book.

It's an epistemological argument that attempts to show a non-mental reality exists and physicalism is true.

In a nut shell, how can one go about proving the existence of the mind? One could start out stating facts about the mental or about the non-mental. However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist. Descartes said I think, therefore I am. However "I am" refers to the mind, so his argument boils down to "I have mental events, therefore mental events exists." Justification for the mental is mental.

Or take the idea that in order to doubt the mind you have to have the mental event of doubt. This is akin to saying in order to have a mental event (doubt) you must have a mind. This doesn't prove doubt exists, just that if there is mental events there is a mind. The only evidence for a mind one can give is from assertions about the mind, which is circular.

Therefore, in order to have any good philosophy of mind you have to admit non-mental facts exists. This leads us to physicalism. If the mind and body are two separate entities, then facts about one are irrelevant to facts about the other. If the second horn is true, then facts about the non-mental are relevant to facts about the mental and if you know enough about the non-mental you would see the mental exists. This is what physicalism claims.

I suppose one could state the existence of the mind by itself is axiomatic, but to defend that claim you have to appeal to your experiences, which assumes the mental exists.

I don't know if this is any good. Thoughts?

Also, couldn't this argument be made against any first-principle? Can't we say that the statement "A is A" is circular? Or that the LNC is circular? Or that "I exist" is circular?

That's not to say that the argument doesn't work. I just don't see how you can say the statement "I exist" is circular, or question begging, but other basic principles are not. It seems that, if *anything* is a first principle, "I exist" would be the most basic first principle.

I thought about that, but it seems first principles like LNC are rely on something else to be justified. Justify A is A, it's true by definition. But to justify your existence (assuming your existence is mental) you'd have to rely on itself to be justified.
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Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
n7
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5/27/2015 5:56:57 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/27/2015 5:02:47 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
Came up with this while reading a paragraph in a David Kelly book.

It's an epistemological argument that attempts to show a non-mental reality exists and physicalism is true.

In a nut shell, how can one go about proving the existence of the mind? One could start out stating facts about the mental or about the non-mental. However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist. Descartes said I think, therefore I am. However "I am" refers to the mind, so his argument boils down to "I have mental events, therefore mental events exists." Justification for the mental is mental.

Or take the idea that in order to doubt the mind you have to have the mental event of doubt. This is akin to saying in order to have a mental event (doubt) you must have a mind. This doesn't prove doubt exists, just that if there is mental events there is a mind. The only evidence for a mind one can give is from assertions about the mind, which is circular.

Therefore, in order to have any good philosophy of mind you have to admit non-mental facts exists. This leads us to physicalism. If the mind and body are two separate entities, then facts about one are irrelevant to facts about the other. If the second horn is true, then facts about the non-mental are relevant to facts about the mental and if you know enough about the non-mental you would see the mental exists. This is what physicalism claims.

I suppose one could state the existence of the mind by itself is axiomatic, but to defend that claim you have to appeal to your experiences, which assumes the mental exists.

I don't know if this is any good. Thoughts?

This shows that (assuming it's a sound argument), epistemologically, if we want to have a good philosophy of mind, there must be non-mental facts. But how does that show that the mind is physical? All it shows is that there are *some* non-mental facts, and that these mental facts are episemologically more fundamental than mental facts. However, how does this show non-mental facts are *metaphysically* more fundamental than mental facts?

It would show the non-mental is needed to know the mental. If the mental is self-existing, not reliant on anything else this would be false.
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Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
zmikecuber
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5/27/2015 6:02:56 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/27/2015 5:56:57 PM, n7 wrote:
At 5/27/2015 5:02:47 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
Came up with this while reading a paragraph in a David Kelly book.

It's an epistemological argument that attempts to show a non-mental reality exists and physicalism is true.

In a nut shell, how can one go about proving the existence of the mind? One could start out stating facts about the mental or about the non-mental. However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist. Descartes said I think, therefore I am. However "I am" refers to the mind, so his argument boils down to "I have mental events, therefore mental events exists." Justification for the mental is mental.

Or take the idea that in order to doubt the mind you have to have the mental event of doubt. This is akin to saying in order to have a mental event (doubt) you must have a mind. This doesn't prove doubt exists, just that if there is mental events there is a mind. The only evidence for a mind one can give is from assertions about the mind, which is circular.

Therefore, in order to have any good philosophy of mind you have to admit non-mental facts exists. This leads us to physicalism. If the mind and body are two separate entities, then facts about one are irrelevant to facts about the other. If the second horn is true, then facts about the non-mental are relevant to facts about the mental and if you know enough about the non-mental you would see the mental exists. This is what physicalism claims.

I suppose one could state the existence of the mind by itself is axiomatic, but to defend that claim you have to appeal to your experiences, which assumes the mental exists.

I don't know if this is any good. Thoughts?

This shows that (assuming it's a sound argument), epistemologically, if we want to have a good philosophy of mind, there must be non-mental facts. But how does that show that the mind is physical? All it shows is that there are *some* non-mental facts, and that these mental facts are episemologically more fundamental than mental facts. However, how does this show non-mental facts are *metaphysically* more fundamental than mental facts?

It would show the non-mental is needed to know the mental. If the mental is self-existing, not reliant on anything else this would be false.

isn't this deriving metaphysics from epistemology? Say I'm blindfolded, and I'm standing on a board in open space. The first thing I know is a board. Then I crawl across the board, and find the building it's attached to. The second thing I know is the building. In order to know the existence of the building, I first need to know the board. The board is epistemologically prior to the building. But that doesn't mean it's metaphysically prior, sicne quite obviously the building is.

So I see how this argument shows that in order to have a good philosophy of, we have to assume non-mental principles. It shows that we can only know the existence of the mental through knowing the existence of the non-mental. In other words, the non-mental is epistemologically prior. But how does this show that the non-mental is *metaphysically* prior?
"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."
RuvDraba
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5/27/2015 6:12:01 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
in order to have any good philosophy of mind you have to admit non-mental facts exists. This leads us to physicalism.

A notion of physical reality is very convenient, N7, because it helps us distinguish identity and difference, uniqueness and multiplicity, belonging and dissociation, and helps us create stable taxa of categories, from which a great deal of logical reason derive.

If we abandon physical reality, category loses all intuitive meaning, and it becomes hard to see what a valid inference means any more.

On the other hand, that a physical reality exists isn't the same as saying the non-physical doesn't exist. First you have to identify what you mean by non-physical, and explain to other physical beings how they can recognise it. If it turns out that you can't do that, then you've really created two separate domains -- a shared, physical one you can communicate with little ambiguity; and another, possibly vacuous domain you can't confidently communicate about at all.

Whether it exists and is populated or no, it may be convenient to treat all communication with others as pragmatically physical, just so you can be confident of communicating at all. :)

I hope that may be useful.
n7
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5/27/2015 6:58:31 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/27/2015 6:02:56 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 5/27/2015 5:56:57 PM, n7 wrote:
At 5/27/2015 5:02:47 PM, zmikecuber wrote:
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
Came up with this while reading a paragraph in a David Kelly book.

It's an epistemological argument that attempts to show a non-mental reality exists and physicalism is true.

In a nut shell, how can one go about proving the existence of the mind? One could start out stating facts about the mental or about the non-mental. However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist. Descartes said I think, therefore I am. However "I am" refers to the mind, so his argument boils down to "I have mental events, therefore mental events exists." Justification for the mental is mental.

Or take the idea that in order to doubt the mind you have to have the mental event of doubt. This is akin to saying in order to have a mental event (doubt) you must have a mind. This doesn't prove doubt exists, just that if there is mental events there is a mind. The only evidence for a mind one can give is from assertions about the mind, which is circular.

Therefore, in order to have any good philosophy of mind you have to admit non-mental facts exists. This leads us to physicalism. If the mind and body are two separate entities, then facts about one are irrelevant to facts about the other. If the second horn is true, then facts about the non-mental are relevant to facts about the mental and if you know enough about the non-mental you would see the mental exists. This is what physicalism claims.

I suppose one could state the existence of the mind by itself is axiomatic, but to defend that claim you have to appeal to your experiences, which assumes the mental exists.

I don't know if this is any good. Thoughts?

This shows that (assuming it's a sound argument), epistemologically, if we want to have a good philosophy of mind, there must be non-mental facts. But how does that show that the mind is physical? All it shows is that there are *some* non-mental facts, and that these mental facts are episemologically more fundamental than mental facts. However, how does this show non-mental facts are *metaphysically* more fundamental than mental facts?

It would show the non-mental is needed to know the mental. If the mental is self-existing, not reliant on anything else this would be false.

isn't this deriving metaphysics from epistemology? Say I'm blindfolded, and I'm standing on a board in open space. The first thing I know is a board. Then I crawl across the board, and find the building it's attached to. The second thing I know is the building. In order to know the existence of the building, I first need to know the board. The board is epistemologically prior to the building. But that doesn't mean it's metaphysically prior, sicne quite obviously the building is.

So I see how this argument shows that in order to have a good philosophy of, we have to assume non-mental principles. It shows that we can only know the existence of the mental through knowing the existence of the non-mental. In other words, the non-mental is epistemologically prior. But how does this show that the non-mental is *metaphysically* prior?

I see. I'd agree with most positions, but it seems non-physicalist positions imply a certain epistemology. A vitalist metaphysics implies science cannot know what life physically is, however if it's epistemically true that science can, then a vitalist metaphysics is false.
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Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
RuvDraba
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5/27/2015 8:15:23 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/27/2015 6:58:31 PM, n7 wrote:
A vitalist metaphysics implies science cannot know what life physically is, however if it's epistemically true that science can, then a vitalist metaphysics is false.

Sorry to pile response on unanswered response, N7, but there seems to be an unaddressed epistemological issue here. If life can be distinguished from non-life physically, then the difference can be described physically. So it would become immediately true that the difference has a scientific definition. (And for practical purposes, we already have a scientific description for the criteria of life, though it's not a precise definition in every respect. The usual biological critiera include most or all of homeostasis, organisation, metabolism, growth, adaptation, stimulus-response, and reproduction.)

it would also follow pragmatically then, that anything science might engineer to meet those criteria, should rightly be called alive -- even if the specimen did not resemble a life we had previously seen in nonessential criteria. Further, to the extent that science might reliably engineer such a specimen from the same sorts of materials (e.g. an organism from raw organic molecules), arguments for vitalism would be immediately and irrevocably destroyed. And the question a modern biochemist might ask is:if we think this task impossible, at what step is it expected to fail, and why? In other words, in the synthesis from hydrocarbon to amine, from amine to nucleic acids and proteins to cells and organs, which step is expected to fail in a surprising way, and how would that be recognised?

And it's conceivable that our definition of life may become a spectrum rather than a wall, anyway. For example, viruses already sit on the boundary of life and non-life. It might be possible to engineer specimens that blur things further.

But if we hold the contrary: that life cannot ever be defined physically, then is that a failure of empiricism, or just intellectual laziness? if life can't be defined physically then how did the question occur to us in the first place? Moreover, if only life can recognise life, can every individual discern the difference between (say) a dead tree-trunk with viable fungal spores and one without?

Most vitalist claims have been untestable, and those which were testable failed to demonstrate their claim. This is why in the last century, biology now largely ignores (and is sometimes almost embarrassed by) vitalistic theories from the past.

But here I've tried to argue that vitalism may also be ill-conceived in some fundamental epistemological way -- that it may be an argument of emotional intuition looking for grounding in logic.

I hope that may be useful.
dylancatlow
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5/27/2015 11:28:39 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist.

Facts about the mental could not be true unless the mental existed. So if the facts are correct, then the mind exists - and that's precisely what the facts are claiming.
n7
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5/28/2015 10:00:39 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/27/2015 11:28:39 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist.

Facts about the mental could not be true unless the mental existed. So if the facts are correct, then the mind exists - and that's precisely what the facts are claiming.

Of course, but how do we prove facts about the mental exist without it being circular?
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Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
dylancatlow
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5/28/2015 1:34:55 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
The "mind" is simply the word we use to describe the only thing that is known i.e., the cosmological medium of experience and knowledge and meaning. We do not "know" anything else by definition. Attempting to prove the existence of the mind is like trying to prove the existence of existence. There's no conceivable distinction between proving the existence of the "mind" and the existence of reality. If you know anything, your mind exists, because the mind is just "that through which you know and think and define".
dylancatlow
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5/28/2015 1:37:08 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/28/2015 10:00:39 AM, n7 wrote:
At 5/27/2015 11:28:39 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist.

Facts about the mental could not be true unless the mental existed. So if the facts are correct, then the mind exists - and that's precisely what the facts are claiming.

Of course, but how do we prove facts about the mental exist without it being circular?

There's nothing wrong with circularity so long as you have the assurance of full generality. Since the mind is totally comprehensive - since we cannot refer to anything that is not identical to our definition of it - nothing escapes the scope of the mind except utter nonsense.
n7
Posts: 1,360
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5/29/2015 10:23:11 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/28/2015 1:37:08 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 5/28/2015 10:00:39 AM, n7 wrote:
At 5/27/2015 11:28:39 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist.

Facts about the mental could not be true unless the mental existed. So if the facts are correct, then the mind exists - and that's precisely what the facts are claiming.

Of course, but how do we prove facts about the mental exist without it being circular?

There's nothing wrong with circularity so long as you have the assurance of full generality. Since the mind is totally comprehensive - since we cannot refer to anything that is not identical to our definition of it - nothing escapes the scope of the mind except utter nonsense.

Why does full generality make circular reasoning ok? It still wouldn't seem so.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
n7
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5/29/2015 10:24:11 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/28/2015 1:34:55 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
The "mind" is simply the word we use to describe the only thing that is known i.e., the cosmological medium of experience and knowledge and meaning. We do not "know" anything else by definition. Attempting to prove the existence of the mind is like trying to prove the existence of existence. There's no conceivable distinction between proving the existence of the "mind" and the existence of reality. If you know anything, your mind exists, because the mind is just "that through which you know and think and define".

I don't know of many people why try to define the mind into existence. At any event, one could still ask why we should accept this definition?
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
dylancatlow
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5/30/2015 5:35:44 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/29/2015 10:23:11 AM, n7 wrote:
At 5/28/2015 1:37:08 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 5/28/2015 10:00:39 AM, n7 wrote:
At 5/27/2015 11:28:39 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 5/27/2015 2:50:22 PM, n7 wrote:
However if you assert facts about the mental, you're begging the question. Mental facts are what you're trying to prove in the first place, stating mental facts presumes they exist.

Facts about the mental could not be true unless the mental existed. So if the facts are correct, then the mind exists - and that's precisely what the facts are claiming.

Of course, but how do we prove facts about the mental exist without it being circular?

There's nothing wrong with circularity so long as you have the assurance of full generality. Since the mind is totally comprehensive - since we cannot refer to anything that is not identical to our definition of it - nothing escapes the scope of the mind except utter nonsense.

Why does full generality make circular reasoning ok? It still wouldn't seem so.

Full generality means that you cannot relativize your way of the conclusion in any consistent, meaningful way, in which case the conclusion always applies.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,255
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5/30/2015 5:44:54 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 5/29/2015 10:24:11 AM, n7 wrote:
At 5/28/2015 1:34:55 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
The "mind" is simply the word we use to describe the only thing that is known i.e., the cosmological medium of experience and knowledge and meaning. We do not "know" anything else by definition. Attempting to prove the existence of the mind is like trying to prove the existence of existence. There's no conceivable distinction between proving the existence of the "mind" and the existence of reality. If you know anything, your mind exists, because the mind is just "that through which you know and think and define".

I don't know of many people why try to define the mind into existence. At any event, one could still ask why we should accept this definition?

I'm not defining it into existence; minds don't have to exist. I'm simply pointing out that there is nothing to talk about that isn't part of a mind. There is no such thing as a non-mental definition, and that which is nonisomorphic to a definition is utterly meaningless and thus cannot exist. The existence of the mind is axiomatic, because anyone who denies it would essentially be denying the existence of the truth of their own statement.
dylancatlow
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5/30/2015 6:13:54 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
Experience is self-evident for that which experiences...we experience our experience, and there in lies its existence. In this sense, the existence of our mind is a self-contained truth. For all intents and purposes, our mind is simply "that which exists".