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The Modal Ontological Argument and Solipsism

Rational_Thinker9119
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7/15/2015 7:04:14 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
Does the possibility of any of us being a solipsistic entity refute the argument? If a maximally great being is possible then this being exists in every possible world meaning that every possible world would have this being. But if I am a solipsistic entity then this rules out any other mind existing. Thoughts?
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,244
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7/15/2015 10:25:55 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/15/2015 7:04:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Does the possibility of any of us being a solipsistic entity refute the argument? If a maximally great being is possible then this being exists in every possible world meaning that every possible world would have this being. But if I am a solipsistic entity then this rules out any other mind existing. Thoughts?

Not any more than the "possibility" of a universe without a God. If the MOA is correct, then such worlds only appear consistent by virtue of being embedded in an unspecified (yet still relied upon) existential medium, which the MOA would tell you has to amount to God. In other words, the "possibility" of solipsism is not really a problem for MOA, because it can simply say that solipsism is not actually possible in light of the MOA. In order to refute the MOA, you would have to show that the argument has some internal flaw, or makes unjustified assumptions e.g., that God exists in all possible worlds, that God is consistent, that only "God" satisfies the condition "exists in all possible worlds".
Mhykiel
Posts: 5,987
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7/15/2015 11:14:01 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/15/2015 7:04:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Does the possibility of any of us being a solipsistic entity refute the argument? If a maximally great being is possible then this being exists in every possible world meaning that every possible world would have this being. But if I am a solipsistic entity then this rules out any other mind existing. Thoughts?

What's to say the solipsistic being is not the maximally great being itself?
ShabShoral
Posts: 3,229
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7/15/2015 11:14:05 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/15/2015 7:04:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Does the possibility of any of us being a solipsistic entity refute the argument? If a maximally great being is possible then this being exists in every possible world meaning that every possible world would have this being. But if I am a solipsistic entity then this rules out any other mind existing. Thoughts?

It's trivially true that if you're the only mind then there are no other minds... it's also trivially true that if there are multiple minds you aren't the only mind. One of these alternatives must be actual - there are no contingencies in logic and reality. That which is simply is and could not have been otherwise, so, in a way, the only possible world is the world that exists, granting you no extra information.

In other words, if solipsism is true, God doesn't exist. Whether or not solipsism is true, though, is totally noncontingent on possible worlds - it's true if it's true.
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FullMetal.Alchemist
Posts: 62
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7/15/2015 11:38:24 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/15/2015 10:25:55 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/15/2015 7:04:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Does the possibility of any of us being a solipsistic entity refute the argument? If a maximally great being is possible then this being exists in every possible world meaning that every possible world would have this being. But if I am a solipsistic entity then this rules out any other mind existing. Thoughts?

In other words, the "possibility" of solipsism is not really a problem for MOA, because it can simply say that solipsism is not actually possible in light of the MOA.

OR you can say that a maximally great being is not actually possible in light of solipsism...
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,244
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7/16/2015 12:15:38 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/15/2015 11:38:24 PM, FullMetal.Alchemist wrote:
At 7/15/2015 10:25:55 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/15/2015 7:04:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Does the possibility of any of us being a solipsistic entity refute the argument? If a maximally great being is possible then this being exists in every possible world meaning that every possible world would have this being. But if I am a solipsistic entity then this rules out any other mind existing. Thoughts?

In other words, the "possibility" of solipsism is not really a problem for MOA, because it can simply say that solipsism is not actually possible in light of the MOA.

OR you can say that a maximally great being is not actually possible in light of solipsism...

Yes, which is why the argument is irrelevant. Either way, you're injecting your own assumptions into the equation and thus perceiving what you already take for granted. For this reason, the MOA has to be considered in isolation.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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7/16/2015 2:02:50 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/15/2015 10:25:55 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/15/2015 7:04:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Does the possibility of any of us being a solipsistic entity refute the argument? If a maximally great being is possible then this being exists in every possible world meaning that every possible world would have this being. But if I am a solipsistic entity then this rules out any other mind existing. Thoughts?

Not any more than the "possibility" of a universe without a God. If the MOA is correct, then such worlds only appear consistent by virtue of being embedded in an unspecified (yet still relied upon) existential medium, which the MOA would tell you has to amount to God. In other words, the "possibility" of solipsism is not really a problem for MOA, because it can simply say that solipsism is not actually possible in light of the MOA.

Ok, then we can say that the possibility of Maximally Great Being is not really a problem for the possibility of Solipsism, because it can simply say that it is not actually possible in light of the possibility of Solipsism.

In order to refute the MOA, you would have to show that the argument has some internal flaw, or makes unjustified assumptions e.g., that God exists in all possible worlds, that God is consistent, that only "God" satisfies the condition "exists in all possible worlds".

I could just say that in order to refute the possibility of Solipsism, you would have to show some internal flaw. How is this response not Special Pleading?
Nac
Posts: 326
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7/16/2015 1:24:02 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/15/2015 7:04:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Does the possibility of any of us being a solipsistic entity refute the argument? If a maximally great being is possible then this being exists in every possible world meaning that every possible world would have this being. But if I am a solipsistic entity then this rules out any other mind existing. Thoughts?

I do not think it does.

The argument, in premise to conclusion form, is this:

(1) If God exists then he has necessary existence.
(2) Either God has necessary existence, or he doesn"t.
(3) If God doesn"t have necessary existence, then he necessarily doesn"t.
Therefore:
(4) Either God has necessary existence, or he necessarily doesn"t.
(5) If God necessarily doesn"t have necessary existence, then God necessarily doesn"t exist.
Therefore:
(6) Either God has necessary existence, or he necessarily doesn"t exist.
(7) It is not the case that God necessarily doesn"t exist.
Therefore:
(8) God has necessary existence.
(9) If God has necessary existence, then God exists.
Therefore:
(10) God exists.

http://www.philosophyofreligion.info...

The only premise which appears relevant to your argument is 7. However, in order to falsify this, we have to state that it is necessary that he does not exist, not that it is possible. This condition is not met, so this argument appears to be ineffectual.

Do you have a different understanding of the modal ontological argument? Could you please provide it in this form? It is extremely difficult for me to consider this argument if it is not, which makes you somewhat impressive for being able to make this attempt without the premises.
Fkkize
Posts: 2,149
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7/16/2015 2:27:35 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
Yes, the possibility of solopsism defeats the MOA, just as the possibility of metaphysical naturalism does. A while ago there was a fairly lenghty thread concerning the MOA and the reverse MOA, which uses pretty much the same idea as you do.

Dylan pointed out that in light of the MOA we would have to discard the possibility of solipsism, but that is not true.
The arguments, in all its forms, features a premise like this:
<>God exists -> []God exists
The transposition of this would then be:
~[]God exists -> ~<>God exists
Therefore I can construct a counter argument as follows.

1. <>solipsism (epistemic possibility just as with the existence of God in the original MOA)
2. <>solipsism -> ~[]God exists (If there is a solipsist world then God obviously cannot be a necessary being)
3. ~[]God exists -> ~<>God exists (Transposition from the original MOA)
4. ~<>God exists (From 1, 2, 3)
C. Therefore, God does not exists (From 4)

There is prima facie no way to choose between both arguments, hence we can't claim solipsism to be impossible by means of the MOA. Unless of course one can prove solipsism/naturalism/etc. to be incoherent to start with.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
n7
Posts: 1,360
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7/17/2015 11:26:06 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/15/2015 7:04:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Does the possibility of any of us being a solipsistic entity refute the argument? If a maximally great being is possible then this being exists in every possible world meaning that every possible world would have this being. But if I am a solipsistic entity then this rules out any other mind existing. Thoughts?

You got this from KnownNoMore, right?

I think it does. If God is necessary, then he exists in every possible world. I am not God, but it's possible my mind is the only one in existence. Therefore, there is a possible world where God doesn't exist.
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.


Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,244
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7/17/2015 1:02:43 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/16/2015 2:27:35 PM, Fkkize wrote:
Yes, the possibility of solopsism defeats the MOA, just as the possibility of metaphysical naturalism does. A while ago there was a fairly lenghty thread concerning the MOA and the reverse MOA, which uses pretty much the same idea as you do.

Dylan pointed out that in light of the MOA we would have to discard the possibility of solipsism, but that is not true.

I didn't say that. I said that if the MOA is true, then solipsism is impossible, so it doesn't present a problem for it so long as the argument actually works. In other words, by appealing to solipsism to defeat the MOA, you are basically saying that "The MOA is false because the MOA is false". This would only be true if the MOA is inherently inconsistent or unjustified. So it's simply irrelevant: if the argument works, it works; if it doesn't work, then solipsism is possible, in which case it doesn't work. This is trivial. You can't use the possibility of solipsism to defeat the argument unless you can show that solipsism is actually possible (which you can't do merely by describing it, since you need to show that the reality of which it is a part need not amount to God), and you can't do that without defeating the MOA and its conclusions. In order to do that, you would need to show that the argument is simply false.

The arguments, in all its forms, features a premise like this:
<>God exists -> []God exists
The transposition of this would then be:
~[]God exists -> ~<>God exists
Therefore I can construct a counter argument as follows.

1. <>solipsism (epistemic possibility just as with the existence of God in the original MOA)
2. <>solipsism -> ~[]God exists (If there is a solipsist world then God obviously cannot be a necessary being)
3. ~[]God exists -> ~<>God exists (Transposition from the original MOA)
4. ~<>God exists (From 1, 2, 3)
C. Therefore, God does not exists (From 4)

There is prima facie no way to choose between both arguments, hence we can't claim solipsism to be impossible by means of the MOA. Unless of course one can prove solipsism/naturalism/etc. to be incoherent to start with.

Yes there is. One argument takes for granted that God is consistent, while the other takes for granted that God is contradictory. Depending on which of these assumptions is correct, one argument is true while the other is false.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,244
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7/17/2015 1:21:01 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
In other words, in order to prove that a godless world is consistent, and thus capable of existing, you need to prove that the consistency need not owe to God. If a godless world is only consistent by virtue of being embedded in a reality whose only real interpretation amounts to God, then it only appears consistent because you have not recognized that its very existence belies what it says about itself.
Fkkize
Posts: 2,149
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7/17/2015 1:54:49 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/17/2015 1:02:43 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/16/2015 2:27:35 PM, Fkkize wrote:
Yes, the possibility of solopsism defeats the MOA, just as the possibility of metaphysical naturalism does. A while ago there was a fairly lenghty thread concerning the MOA and the reverse MOA, which uses pretty much the same idea as you do.

Dylan pointed out that in light of the MOA we would have to discard the possibility of solipsism, but that is not true.

I didn't say that. I said that if the MOA is true, then solipsism is impossible, so it doesn't present a problem for it so long as the argument actually works.
I saw others follow that line of reasoning and misinterpreted what you said. My sincerest apologies.

In other words, by appealing to solipsism to defeat the MOA, you are basically saying that "The MOA is false because the MOA is false". This would only be true if the MOA is inherently inconsistent or unjustified. So it's simply irrelevant: if the argument works, it works; if it doesn't work, then solipsism is possible, in which case it doesn't work. This is trivial. You can't use the possibility of solipsism to defeat the argument unless you can show that solipsism is actually possible (which you can't do merely by describing it, since you need to show that the reality of which it is a part need not amount to God), and you can't do that without defeating the MOA and its conclusions. In order to do that, you would need to show that the argument is simply false.
But now you fall back to the exact reasoning you dissociated yourself from. You privilege the MOA for no reason. Why should it be my burden to show that solispism is possible? If anything the onus is the proponent of the MOA to show the definition of a necessary being to be coherent. P1) of my argument uses epistemic possibility, just as the MOA does, therefore my premise is at least as justified as the corresponding one.

The arguments, in all its forms, features a premise like this:
<>God exists -> []God exists
The transposition of this would then be:
~[]God exists -> ~<>God exists
Therefore I can construct a counter argument as follows.

1. <>solipsism (epistemic possibility just as with the existence of God in the original MOA)
2. <>solipsism -> ~[]God exists (If there is a solipsist world then God obviously cannot be a necessary being)
3. ~[]God exists -> ~<>God exists (Transposition from the original MOA)
4. ~<>God exists (From 1, 2, 3)
C. Therefore, God does not exists (From 4)

There is prima facie no way to choose between both arguments, hence we can't claim solipsism to be impossible by means of the MOA. Unless of course one can prove solipsism/naturalism/etc. to be incoherent to start with.

Yes there is. One argument takes for granted that God is consistent, while the other takes for granted that God is contradictory. Depending on which of these assumptions is correct, one argument is true while the other is false.
Not at all. The reverse MOA takes for granted that solipsism / meataphysical naturalism / etc. is coherent, not that God as a necessary being is incoherent. That is the conclusion. The original MOA takes this definition as coherent.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Nac
Posts: 326
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7/17/2015 2:11:36 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/15/2015 11:14:01 PM, Mhykiel wrote:
At 7/15/2015 7:04:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Does the possibility of any of us being a solipsistic entity refute the argument? If a maximally great being is possible then this being exists in every possible world meaning that every possible world would have this being. But if I am a solipsistic entity then this rules out any other mind existing. Thoughts?

What's to say the solipsistic being is not the maximally great being itself?

Fair point, but this simply means we must restrict the argument to a person being the solipsistic entity. It is a possibility, and it rules out a maximally great being.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,244
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7/17/2015 3:19:53 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/17/2015 1:54:49 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/17/2015 1:02:43 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/16/2015 2:27:35 PM, Fkkize wrote:
Yes, the possibility of solopsism defeats the MOA, just as the possibility of metaphysical naturalism does. A while ago there was a fairly lenghty thread concerning the MOA and the reverse MOA, which uses pretty much the same idea as you do.

Dylan pointed out that in light of the MOA we would have to discard the possibility of solipsism, but that is not true.

I didn't say that. I said that if the MOA is true, then solipsism is impossible, so it doesn't present a problem for it so long as the argument actually works.
I saw others follow that line of reasoning and misinterpreted what you said. My sincerest apologies.

In other words, by appealing to solipsism to defeat the MOA, you are basically saying that "The MOA is false because the MOA is false". This would only be true if the MOA is inherently inconsistent or unjustified. So it's simply irrelevant: if the argument works, it works; if it doesn't work, then solipsism is possible, in which case it doesn't work. This is trivial. You can't use the possibility of solipsism to defeat the argument unless you can show that solipsism is actually possible (which you can't do merely by describing it, since you need to show that the reality of which it is a part need not amount to God), and you can't do that without defeating the MOA and its conclusions. In order to do that, you would need to show that the argument is simply false.
But now you fall back to the exact reasoning you dissociated yourself from. You privilege the MOA for no reason. Why should it be my burden to show that solispism is possible? If anything the onus is the proponent of the MOA to show the definition of a necessary being to be coherent. P1) of my argument uses epistemic possibility, just as the MOA does, therefore my premise is at least as justified as the corresponding one.


I'm not advocating for the MOA (I consider it to be an incomplete argument). I'm only claiming that it is not REFUTED by the fact that solipsism is a meaningful notion.


The arguments, in all its forms, features a premise like this:
<>God exists -> []God exists
The transposition of this would then be:
~[]God exists -> ~<>God exists
Therefore I can construct a counter argument as follows.

1. <>solipsism (epistemic possibility just as with the existence of God in the original MOA)
2. <>solipsism -> ~[]God exists (If there is a solipsist world then God obviously cannot be a necessary being)
3. ~[]God exists -> ~<>God exists (Transposition from the original MOA)
4. ~<>God exists (From 1, 2, 3)
C. Therefore, God does not exists (From 4)

There is prima facie no way to choose between both arguments, hence we can't claim solipsism to be impossible by means of the MOA. Unless of course one can prove solipsism/naturalism/etc. to be incoherent to start with.

Yes there is. One argument takes for granted that God is consistent, while the other takes for granted that God is contradictory. Depending on which of these assumptions is correct, one argument is true while the other is false.
Not at all. The reverse MOA takes for granted that solipsism / meataphysical naturalism / etc. is coherent, not that God as a necessary being is incoherent. That is the conclusion. The original MOA takes this definition as coherent.

Sorry. When I saw "Reverse MOA", I assumed you were talking about the argument that replaces "It is possible that God exists" with "It is possible that God does not exist".

Anyway, by taking for granted that those things are coherent/possible, you are, in effect, taking for granted that God is impossible.
Fkkize
Posts: 2,149
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7/17/2015 4:27:13 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/17/2015 3:19:53 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/17/2015 1:54:49 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/17/2015 1:02:43 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/16/2015 2:27:35 PM, Fkkize wrote:
Yes, the possibility of solopsism defeats the MOA, just as the possibility of metaphysical naturalism does. A while ago there was a fairly lenghty thread concerning the MOA and the reverse MOA, which uses pretty much the same idea as you do.

Dylan pointed out that in light of the MOA we would have to discard the possibility of solipsism, but that is not true.

I didn't say that. I said that if the MOA is true, then solipsism is impossible, so it doesn't present a problem for it so long as the argument actually works.
I saw others follow that line of reasoning and misinterpreted what you said. My sincerest apologies.

In other words, by appealing to solipsism to defeat the MOA, you are basically saying that "The MOA is false because the MOA is false". This would only be true if the MOA is inherently inconsistent or unjustified. So it's simply irrelevant: if the argument works, it works; if it doesn't work, then solipsism is possible, in which case it doesn't work. This is trivial. You can't use the possibility of solipsism to defeat the argument unless you can show that solipsism is actually possible (which you can't do merely by describing it, since you need to show that the reality of which it is a part need not amount to God), and you can't do that without defeating the MOA and its conclusions. In order to do that, you would need to show that the argument is simply false.
But now you fall back to the exact reasoning you dissociated yourself from. You privilege the MOA for no reason. Why should it be my burden to show that solispism is possible? If anything the onus is the proponent of the MOA to show the definition of a necessary being to be coherent. P1) of my argument uses epistemic possibility, just as the MOA does, therefore my premise is at least as justified as the corresponding one.


I'm not advocating for the MOA (I consider it to be an incomplete argument). I'm only claiming that it is not REFUTED by the fact that solipsism is a meaningful notion.


The arguments, in all its forms, features a premise like this:
<>God exists -> []God exists
The transposition of this would then be:
~[]God exists -> ~<>God exists
Therefore I can construct a counter argument as follows.

1. <>solipsism (epistemic possibility just as with the existence of God in the original MOA)
2. <>solipsism -> ~[]God exists (If there is a solipsist world then God obviously cannot be a necessary being)
3. ~[]God exists -> ~<>God exists (Transposition from the original MOA)
4. ~<>God exists (From 1, 2, 3)
C. Therefore, God does not exists (From 4)

There is prima facie no way to choose between both arguments, hence we can't claim solipsism to be impossible by means of the MOA. Unless of course one can prove solipsism/naturalism/etc. to be incoherent to start with.

Yes there is. One argument takes for granted that God is consistent, while the other takes for granted that God is contradictory. Depending on which of these assumptions is correct, one argument is true while the other is false.
Not at all. The reverse MOA takes for granted that solipsism / meataphysical naturalism / etc. is coherent, not that God as a necessary being is incoherent. That is the conclusion. The original MOA takes this definition as coherent.

Sorry. When I saw "Reverse MOA", I assumed you were talking about the argument that replaces "It is possible that God exists" with "It is possible that God does not exist".

Anyway, by taking for granted that those things are coherent/possible, you are, in effect, taking for granted that God is impossible.
Not exactly. It is implied of course, but so does this definition of 'God' tak for granted that every other option is impossible. The onus remains on the proponent of the MOA to show this to be correct.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic