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# Proof of Idealism

 Posts: 13,034 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PMPosted: 2 years ago1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental."In case anyone hasn't noticed it, the West is in extremis. The undertaker is checking his watch at the foot of its bed, and there's a sinister kettle of croaking, money-feathered vultures on the roof."
 Posts: 2,300 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/16/2015 2:33:11 PMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.You are confusing predicates and properties. Predicates are linguistic, hence used for definitions, properties are not, they are possesed by objects and might just be non-mental.The problem with Capitalism is that people are not greedy enough.
 Posts: 13,034 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/16/2015 2:43:25 PMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 2:33:11 PM, Fkkize wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.You are confusing predicates and properties. Predicates are linguistic, hence used for definitions, properties are not, they are possesed by objects and might just be non-mental.If you think my argument relies on my usage of "predicate" as opposed to "property", then you don't understand my argument. The entire point of the argument was to show that there's no such thing as an "object" (or anything, for that matter) which is not ultimately equivalent to some description."In case anyone hasn't noticed it, the West is in extremis. The undertaker is checking his watch at the foot of its bed, and there's a sinister kettle of croaking, money-feathered vultures on the roof."
 Posts: 2,300 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/16/2015 3:08:23 PMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 2:43:25 PM, dylancatlow wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:33:11 PM, Fkkize wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.You are confusing predicates and properties. Predicates are linguistic, hence used for definitions, properties are not, they are possesed by objects and might just be non-mental.If you think my argument relies on my usage of "predicate" as opposed to "property", then you don't understand my argument. The entire point of the argument was to show that there's no such thing as an "object" (or anything, for that matter) which is not ultimately equivalent to some description.But that's my point, objects are not, in the sense required for your concluision, eqiuvalent to definitions, definitions only refer to objects. Predicates denote properties, they are not equivalent to them.Just because we have to represent the properties of objects by applying predicates it does not follow that properties or objects are mental.The problem with Capitalism is that people are not greedy enough.
 Posts: 729 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/16/2015 3:11:36 PMPosted: 2 years ago1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.Just in case it's not clear from the above, 1 and 2 are the premises and 3 is the conclusion.It's easier to follow if I just use initials.1) D is M,2) R is D , D is R2) means we can substitute R for D in 1), so we get3) R is M.QED. So the form of the argument is sound - it's just a good old fashioned 3 line syllogism. But is it a proof of what it claims? Is it a proof of anything?Well, it's a proof that if D is M and R is D then R is M - as with any syllogism.Lets use Dogs, Mice and Rabbits.if dogs are mice.and Rabbits are dogs (and dogs are rabbits)then Rabbits are Mice.Oops. Something's wrong. It's not the form of logic - syllogisms are valid logic. The problem is that dogs aren't mice and rabbits aren't dogs. Syllogisms aren't magic - they don't work if their premises are wrong. So whether DC's argument is sound depends purely on the valdity of the starting premises, so let's examine them.1 Definitions are mental.Well, maybe we know what definitions are, but I am not sure we know what 'mental' means. Is the definition of word in a dictionary mental? Is it still mental when the dictionary is shut and no-one is looking at it? Or is a different definition of definition intended? If so may be we don't know what 'definition' means after all, and we certainly don't know what mental means in any detail. So it's hard to be sure if 'definitions are mental' or not, as we don't know what the words mean individually, leave alone combined in a sentence.But we'll take DCs word for it that they are the same, and move on.2 Reality is equivalent to its definition.We've stuggled with the meaning of definition already, but now we are faced with 'reality'. What the h. is 'reality'? Do we know what 'reality' is with enough confidence to say it is 'equivalent to' (what ever 'equivalent to' means - another can of worms) its definition, when we aren't even sure how 'definition' is, well, defined?Basically DC as presented us with a trival syllogism dressed up as something profound, but its seeming profundity lies purely in its use of grand sounding but undefined terms.If DC thinks that a proof of idealism can be done with a simple syllogism, let me suggest philosophy might not be for him.
 Posts: 13,034 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/16/2015 7:35:12 PMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 3:11:36 PM, kp98 wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.Just in case it's not clear from the above, 1 and 2 are the premises and 3 is the conclusion.It's easier to follow if I just use initials.1) D is M,2) R is D , D is R2) means we can substitute R for D in 1), so we get3) R is M.QED. So the form of the argument is sound - it's just a good old fashioned 3 line syllogism. But is it a proof of what it claims? Is it a proof of anything?Well, it's a proof that if D is M and R is D then R is M - as with any syllogism.Lets use Dogs, Mice and Rabbits.if dogs are mice.and Rabbits are dogs (and dogs are rabbits)then Rabbits are Mice.Oops. Something's wrong. It's not the form of logic - syllogisms are valid logic. The problem is that dogs aren't mice and rabbits aren't dogs. Syllogisms aren't magic - they don't work if their premises are wrong. So whether DC's argument is sound depends purely on the valdity of the starting premises, so let's examine them.1 Definitions are mental.Well, maybe we know what definitions are, but I am not sure we know what 'mental' means. Is the definition of word in a dictionary mental? Is it still mental when the dictionary is shut and no-one is looking at it? Or is a different definition of definition intended? If so may be we don't know what 'definition' means after all, and we certainly don't know what mental means in any detail. So it's hard to be sure if 'definitions are mental' or not, as we don't know what the words mean individually, leave alone combined in a sentence.But we'll take DCs word for it that they are the same, and move on.2 Reality is equivalent to its definition.We've stuggled with the meaning of definition already, but now we are faced with 'reality'. What the h. is 'reality'? Do we know what 'reality' is with enough confidence to say it is 'equivalent to' (what ever 'equivalent to' means - another can of worms) its definition, when we aren't even sure how 'definition' is, well, defined?Basically DC as presented us with a trival syllogism dressed up as something profound, but its seeming profundity lies purely in its use of grand sounding but undefined terms.If DC thinks that a proof of idealism can be done with a simple syllogism, let me suggest philosophy might not be for him.I'm not interested in giving you a vocabulary lesson."In case anyone hasn't noticed it, the West is in extremis. The undertaker is checking his watch at the foot of its bed, and there's a sinister kettle of croaking, money-feathered vultures on the roof."
 Posts: 13,034 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/16/2015 7:48:30 PMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 3:08:23 PM, Fkkize wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:43:25 PM, dylancatlow wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:33:11 PM, Fkkize wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.You are confusing predicates and properties. Predicates are linguistic, hence used for definitions, properties are not, they are possesed by objects and might just be non-mental.If you think my argument relies on my usage of "predicate" as opposed to "property", then you don't understand my argument. The entire point of the argument was to show that there's no such thing as an "object" (or anything, for that matter) which is not ultimately equivalent to some description.But that's my point, objects are not, in the sense required for your concluision, eqiuvalent to definitions, definitions only refer to objects. Predicates denote properties, they are not equivalent to them.If that's really the case, then "X" and " the definition of X" must have different definitions entirely, for how else could one make the distinction. Now we're faced with two choices: either "X" is equivalent to its new definition, or we must come up with a new definition to distinguish it from the one we've just created to describe it. If we go with the latter, then we're faced with the same choice: if X is not equivalent to that definition, then we must create another one to distinguish it from that definition. Since this regress never ends, "X" is left without a definition, in which case it cannot be used as an example of something non-mental.Just because we have to represent the properties of objects by applying predicates it does not follow that properties or objects are mental."In case anyone hasn't noticed it, the West is in extremis. The undertaker is checking his watch at the foot of its bed, and there's a sinister kettle of croaking, money-feathered vultures on the roof."
 Posts: 2,402 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/16/2015 9:03:45 PMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.You 2nd point is flawed. If not totally untrue.A definition can be wrong--and we see cases of this all the time. They are merely words derived from man-made speech."Sunrise" For example.Accepted. Used daily. By millions of people.Yet....cosmologically inaccurate.Thus...."reality" not need be solely mental.Try this......walk around with a blindfold.Walk into a brick wall.Bang your nose. You were not thinking of the wall,as you did not even see it.But yet,,it certainly proved to be real!Thus, non-mental.Science Flies Us to the Moon. Religion Flies us Into Skyscrapers.
 Posts: 2,402 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/16/2015 9:11:13 PMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.As an addendum to my previous post, I offer this..............def"i"ni"tionG6;defəG2;niSH(ə)n/noun1.a statement of the exact meaning of a word, especially in a dictionary.an exact statement or description of the nature, scope, or meaning of something."our definition of what constitutes poetry"synonyms:meaning, denotation, sense; Morethe action or process of defining something.(I bolded the word "statement.")To reiterate that it constitutes only an item (noun) of man-made speech. Thus is not inextricably tied to the word "reality" or "real."Science Flies Us to the Moon. Religion Flies us Into Skyscrapers.
 Posts: 729 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/16/2015 9:19:38 PMPosted: 2 years agoSoM - while you have your dictionary out, look up what a metalinguistic metaobject is for me. It's not in mine.
 Posts: 1,465 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/16/2015 11:46:51 PMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.What makes a definition true? For example, what if I convinced everybody, even yourself that you by definition aren't human. You are equivalent to your definition and everybody agrees that a part of your definition is that you're not human. Why is this definition wrong, even though all minds define you as inhuman?404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution. Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
 Posts: 1,465 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/16/2015 11:55:56 PMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 7:48:30 PM, dylancatlow wrote:At 7/16/2015 3:08:23 PM, Fkkize wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:43:25 PM, dylancatlow wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:33:11 PM, Fkkize wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.You are confusing predicates and properties. Predicates are linguistic, hence used for definitions, properties are not, they are possesed by objects and might just be non-mental.If you think my argument relies on my usage of "predicate" as opposed to "property", then you don't understand my argument. The entire point of the argument was to show that there's no such thing as an "object" (or anything, for that matter) which is not ultimately equivalent to some description.But that's my point, objects are not, in the sense required for your concluision, eqiuvalent to definitions, definitions only refer to objects. Predicates denote properties, they are not equivalent to them.If that's really the case, then "X" and " the definition of X" must have different definitions entirely, for how else could one make the distinction. Now we're faced with two choices: either "X" is equivalent to its new definition, or we must come up with a new definition to distinguish it from the one we've just created to describe it. If we go with the latter, then we're faced with the same choice: if X is not equivalent to that definition, then we must create another one to distinguish it from that definition. Since this regress never ends, "X" is left without a definition, in which case it cannot be used as an example of something non-mental.Just because we have to represent the properties of objects by applying predicates it does not follow that properties or objects are mental.Why do we have to come up with a new definition of x?X = the object.The definition of X= the concept of describing X.We don't need to come up with a new definition of X at all.also belief=false and imagination = i dont know :p404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution. Uphold Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Sargonist-n7ism.
 Posts: 3,648 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 12:33:33 AMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently,False.and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference".Again, false. I can pull stuff out of my rectum too.Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.You still haven't attempted to justify why definitions are mental.
 Posts: 62 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 1:05:48 AMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.Not at all. A definition is just a series of words we use to describe a physically-existent 'something'. That conceptual linguistic tag is quite distinct from the 'something' itself...3. Reality is mental.
 Posts: 9,469 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 2:17:08 AMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 9:03:45 PM, Saint_of_Me wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.You 2nd point is flawed. If not totally untrue.A definition can be wrong--and we see cases of this all the time. They are merely words derived from man-made speech."Sunrise" For example.Accepted. Used daily. By millions of people.Yet....cosmologically inaccurate.Thus...."reality" not need be solely mental.Try this......walk around with a blindfold.Walk into a brick wall.Bang your nose. You were not thinking of the wall,as you did not even see it.But yet,,it certainly proved to be real!Thus, non-mental.Just because something exists outside your thought doesn't mean it is non-mental. It could still exist as content in some Grand-Mind.
 Posts: 9,469 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 2:18:36 AMPosted: 2 years agoAs an Idealist, I don't think this argument for Idealism is very good.
 Posts: 9,469 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 2:22:29 AMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 11:55:56 PM, n7 wrote:At 7/16/2015 7:48:30 PM, dylancatlow wrote:At 7/16/2015 3:08:23 PM, Fkkize wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:43:25 PM, dylancatlow wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:33:11 PM, Fkkize wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.You are confusing predicates and properties. Predicates are linguistic, hence used for definitions, properties are not, they are possesed by objects and might just be non-mental.If you think my argument relies on my usage of "predicate" as opposed to "property", then you don't understand my argument. The entire point of the argument was to show that there's no such thing as an "object" (or anything, for that matter) which is not ultimately equivalent to some description.But that's my point, objects are not, in the sense required for your concluision, eqiuvalent to definitions, definitions only refer to objects. Predicates denote properties, they are not equivalent to them.If that's really the case, then "X" and " the definition of X" must have different definitions entirely, for how else could one make the distinction. Now we're faced with two choices: either "X" is equivalent to its new definition, or we must come up with a new definition to distinguish it from the one we've just created to describe it. If we go with the latter, then we're faced with the same choice: if X is not equivalent to that definition, then we must create another one to distinguish it from that definition. Since this regress never ends, "X" is left without a definition, in which case it cannot be used as an example of something non-mental.Just because we have to represent the properties of objects by applying predicates it does not follow that properties or objects are mental.Why do we have to come up with a new definition of x?X = the object.Whatever you plug the variable with would be the same as the definition. Lets say "X" is a "Wooden Box".The definition of X= the concept of describing X.The definition would be the same... "A Wooden Box"We don't need to come up with a new definition of X at all.also belief=false and imagination = i dont know :pI don't buy Dylan's argument at all, but I suppose this is how he would respond. X and the definition of X are identical.... "A Wooden Box"
 Posts: 9,469 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 2:42:24 AMPosted: 2 years agoDylan's argument is a trick based on the fact that we cannot separate the object from the definition linguistically when talking about it. For example, the bottle in front of me is "a bottle", but how do you define "a bottle"? Well, "A bottle". So Dylan takes this to mean that an object and a bottle are the same ontologically when that's not true, they are only the same linguistically.Also, this argument clearly fails in my opinion as discoveries are made all the time and then the definitions are created to describe them. This proves that the object and the definition cannot be identical.
 Posts: 13,034 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 3:11:52 AMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/17/2015 2:42:24 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:Dylan's argument is a trick based on the fact that we cannot separate the object from the definition linguistically when talking about it.So? It's not like there's anything worth talking about that can't be discussed.For example, the bottle in front of me is "a bottle", but how do you define "a bottle"? Well, "A bottle". So Dylan takes this to mean that an object and a bottle are the same ontologically when that's not true, they are only the same linguistically.According to the argument, there's no fundamental separation between "ontology" and "linguistics" to begin with.Also, this argument clearly fails in my opinion as discoveries are made all the time and then the definitions are created to describe them. This proves that the object and the definition cannot be identical.I never implied that if we don't define something, it doesn't exist and thus can't be "discovered". Something need not be defined by humans in order to be defined in an abstract sense."In case anyone hasn't noticed it, the West is in extremis. The undertaker is checking his watch at the foot of its bed, and there's a sinister kettle of croaking, money-feathered vultures on the roof."
 Posts: 13,034 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 3:20:59 AMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 11:46:51 PM, n7 wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.What makes a definition true? For example, what if I convinced everybody, even yourself that you by definition aren't human. You are equivalent to your definition and everybody agrees that a part of your definition is that you're not human. Why is this definition wrong, even though all minds define you as inhuman?It's not necessarily wrong. It all depends on what one means by "me" and "human". If we define them in the usual sense, then obviously the claim that I'm not human is semantically inconsistent and therefore false. It amounts to the assertion that X is by definition not X."In case anyone hasn't noticed it, the West is in extremis. The undertaker is checking his watch at the foot of its bed, and there's a sinister kettle of croaking, money-feathered vultures on the roof."
 Posts: 9,469 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 3:23:31 AMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/17/2015 3:11:52 AM, dylancatlow wrote:At 7/17/2015 2:42:24 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:Dylan's argument is a trick based on the fact that we cannot separate the object from the definition linguistically when talking about it.So? It's not like there's anything worth talking about that can't be discussed.It being able to be defined and it actually being defined are two different things.For example, the bottle in front of me is "a bottle", but how do you define "a bottle"? Well, "A bottle". So Dylan takes this to mean that an object and a bottle are the same ontologically when that's not true, they are only the same linguistically.According to the argument, there's no fundamental separation between "ontology" and "linguistics" to begin with.How can this be? Did nothing ontologically exist prior to language? Language is a contingent aspect of what is.Also, this argument clearly fails in my opinion as discoveries are made all the time and then the definitions are created to describe them. This proves that the object and the definition cannot be identical.I never implied that if we don't define something, it doesn't exist and thus can't be "discovered". Something need not be defined by humans in order to be defined in an abstract sense.But then the strength of your argument decreases, as we don't have any self-evident reason to assume that objects are defined in any abstract sense.
 Posts: 729 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 3:31:50 AMPosted: 2 years agoI'm not interested in giving you a vocabulary lesson.Shame, because I'd really like to have learned what 'metalinguistic metaobjects' are.But I do know quite a lot of words. A random sample: 'Pretentious' 'meaningless' 'pseudo-intellectual' and 'tripe'.
 Posts: 13,034 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 3:32:40 AMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 11:55:56 PM, n7 wrote:At 7/16/2015 7:48:30 PM, dylancatlow wrote:At 7/16/2015 3:08:23 PM, Fkkize wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:43:25 PM, dylancatlow wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:33:11 PM, Fkkize wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.You are confusing predicates and properties. Predicates are linguistic, hence used for definitions, properties are not, they are possesed by objects and might just be non-mental.If you think my argument relies on my usage of "predicate" as opposed to "property", then you don't understand my argument. The entire point of the argument was to show that there's no such thing as an "object" (or anything, for that matter) which is not ultimately equivalent to some description.But that's my point, objects are not, in the sense required for your concluision, eqiuvalent to definitions, definitions only refer to objects. Predicates denote properties, they are not equivalent to them.If that's really the case, then "X" and " the definition of X" must have different definitions entirely, for how else could one make the distinction. Now we're faced with two choices: either "X" is equivalent to its new definition, or we must come up with a new definition to distinguish it from the one we've just created to describe it. If we go with the latter, then we're faced with the same choice: if X is not equivalent to that definition, then we must create another one to distinguish it from that definition. Since this regress never ends, "X" is left without a definition, in which case it cannot be used as an example of something non-mental.Just because we have to represent the properties of objects by applying predicates it does not follow that properties or objects are mental.Why do we have to come up with a new definition of x?Because you're claiming the old definition i.e., "The definition of X" is not X, which requires that "X" be defined so that the distinction can be meaningfully made.X = the object.The definition of X= the concept of describing X.We don't need to come up with a new definition of X at all.also belief=false and imagination = i dont know :p"In case anyone hasn't noticed it, the West is in extremis. The undertaker is checking his watch at the foot of its bed, and there's a sinister kettle of croaking, money-feathered vultures on the roof."
 Posts: 13,034 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 3:48:27 AMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/17/2015 3:31:50 AM, kp98 wrote:I'm not interested in giving you a vocabulary lesson.Shame, because I'd really like to have learned what 'metalinguistic metaobjects' are."Meta" just means self-referential. So a metalinguistic metaobject is something that is at once linguistic, in the sense of being a description, and an object, in the sense of being the content of that description. Since the language used to describe the relationship between theory and universe refers to itself, and since the object is implicated in that description, they are both meta.But I do know quite a lot of words. A random sample: 'Pretentious' 'meaningless' 'pseudo-intellectual' and 'tripe'."In case anyone hasn't noticed it, the West is in extremis. The undertaker is checking his watch at the foot of its bed, and there's a sinister kettle of croaking, money-feathered vultures on the roof."
 Posts: 5,523 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 3:58:55 AMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 7:48:30 PM, dylancatlow wrote:At 7/16/2015 3:08:23 PM, Fkkize wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:43:25 PM, dylancatlow wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:33:11 PM, Fkkize wrote:At 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.You are confusing predicates and properties. Predicates are linguistic, hence used for definitions, properties are not, they are possesed by objects and might just be non-mental.If you think my argument relies on my usage of "predicate" as opposed to "property", then you don't understand my argument. The entire point of the argument was to show that there's no such thing as an "object" (or anything, for that matter) which is not ultimately equivalent to some description.But that's my point, objects are not, in the sense required for your concluision, eqiuvalent to definitions, definitions only refer to objects. Predicates denote properties, they are not equivalent to them.If that's really the caseIt is., then "X" and " the definition of X" must have different definitions entirely, for how else could one make the distinction.We obviously create definitions for everything - this is part of life - part of the human experience. We learn by observation and applying concepts to the world we were thrust into. Just because I call a tree a "tree" doesn't mean that it necessarily is one - "tree" is merely the identifying term I've attached to the object. The same goes for definitions of objects - just because we create a subjective meaning of an object ourselves doesn't mean the object doesn't have meaning on it's own. It's really hard to grasp because we're forced to look outside of the paradigm of reality we've crafted for ourselves; but a tree, for instance, was still "something" before we created the meaning and definition of a "tree".Now we're faced with two choices: either "X" is equivalent to its new definition, or we must come up with a new definition to distinguish it from the one we've just created to describe it. If we go with the latter, then we're faced with the same choice: if X is not equivalent to that definition, then we must create another one to distinguish it from that definition. Since this regress never ends, "X" is left without a definition, in which case it cannot be used as an example of something non-mental.The problem is that we only recognize or *know* the definition that we've ascribed to the object. The Bible says that God gave Adam the right to give names to every object surrounding him. Logic says that we have an intrinsic need to define and understand or *make sense of* our surroundings/reality. Thus, what the object truly is and what we perceive or define it to be could be two entirely different things. As humans, there is no authority challenging the definitions we give such things - hence why it sticks. We have no God telling us that a chair isn't actually a chair at all. We were left to define this reality alone and that's just how it is. That doesn't mean, however, that our definitions are equivalent to reality - rather, it just means that our definitions shape the way we perceive reality. It's just that though, our perception. Those objects were there before we perceived them in the manner we've come to. Thus, predicates =/= properties. Debate.org Deputy Vote Moderator & Official Voting Group Czar ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ DDO Voting Guide: http://www.debate.org... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Need a judge on your debate? Nominate me! http://www.debate.org...
 Posts: 729 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 4:51:26 AMPosted: 2 years agoit just means that our definitions shape the way we perceive realityIsn't it the other way 'round? i.e. our definitions are shaped by the way we perceive reality?
 Posts: 729 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 6:43:10 AMPosted: 2 years ago'Meta-' just means self-referential.What you mean is that you wanted meta to be understood in that particular sense. Meta- doesn't just mean self referential. Meta has at least 10 different possible meanings:1 Later in time: metestrus.2 At a later stage of development: metanephros.3 Situated behind: metacarpus4 Change; transformation: metachromatism5 Alternation: metagenesis.6 Beyond; transcending; more comprehensive: metapsychology.7 At a higher state of development: metazoan.8 Having undergone metamorphosis: metamyelocyte.9 Derivative or related chemical substance: metaprotein.10 Of or relating to one of three possible isomers of a benzene ring with two attached chemical groups, in which the carbon atoms with attached groups are separated by one unsubstituted carbon atom. Usually used in italic: meta- dibromobenzene.It's impossible to judge an argument based on terms that are ambiguous.Here is a formally corrent syllogism:Fire is a form of heat (F=H)Fire is a command to shoot. (F=S)The command to shoot is a form of heat. (S=H).It's formally correct but nonsense because it slips between meanings. With a word like 'fire' it is easy to spot the slide in meaning, but with terms like 'reality' and 'definition' it isn't easy at all. Precise and careful definition isn't an optional extra - it is a sine qua non of a serious argument.
 Posts: 2,300 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 8:09:00 AMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 7:48:30 PM, dylancatlow wrote:But that's my point, objects are not, in the sense required for your concluision, eqiuvalent to definitions, definitions only refer to objects. Predicates denote properties, they are not equivalent to them.If that's really the case, then "X" and " the definition of X" must have different definitions entirely, for how else could one make the distinction.You are, again, conflating properties and predicates. X is not a definition, X simply is. It instantiates various properties, but these are not linguistic/mental themself."Red is the color of ripe tomatoes." Here one property is designated by two different predicates, "is red" and "is the color of ripe tomatoes".I can include several ridiculous predicates in my descriptions, such as "is a left leg or made of iron", but predicates like this are not properties.Now we're faced with two choices: either "X" is equivalent to its new definition, or we must come up with a new definition to distinguish it from the one we've just created to describe it. If we go with the latter, then we're faced with the same choice: if X is not equivalent to that definition, then we must create another one to distinguish it from that definition. Since this regress never ends, "X" is left without a definition, in which case it cannot be used as an example of something non-mental.Here's something for you: rigid designators and the causal theory of reference.The problem with Capitalism is that people are not greedy enough.
 Posts: 3,749 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 8:29:40 AMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.If reality and reality's definition are not equivalent, then they must be defined differently, and these new predicates must conform to their new definitions - otherwise, it would invite yet another round of distinctions with new definitions to establish their "difference". Because this situation can be recursively extended in such a way that definitions and their definiendums are conflated to an arbitrary degree, reality can with unlimited precision be characterized as a "metalinguistic metaobject". If this regress did not terminate on some definition-definiendum equivalence, then "reality" would be left undefined. Since reality is defined by definition, reality must be mental.Good grief, the universe is not a semantic construct, words are pointers, they refer to reality, they don't constitute reality, that is magical thinking, not philosophy. I can describe a unicorn, that does not make a unicorn spring into existence.Get a grip."It is one of the commonest of mistakes to consider that the limit of our power of perception is also the limit of all there is to perceive." " C. W. Leadbeater
 Posts: 3,749 Add as FriendChallenge to a DebateSend a Message 7/17/2015 8:32:52 AMPosted: 2 years agoAt 7/16/2015 2:06:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:1. Definitions are mental.2. Reality is equivalent to its definition.3. Reality is mental.Your second postulate is nonsense.Do you really think the people at Meriam Webster created the universe/"It is one of the commonest of mistakes to consider that the limit of our power of perception is also the limit of all there is to perceive." " C. W. Leadbeater