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Argument for God

dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

If something doesn't exist, then we're dealing with an entity that could, in principle, be subject to external constraint. This is because the non-existence of an entity within reality amounts to a constraint imposed from the outside, given that the entity in question does not exist and thus cannot "constrain" anything or decide its non-existence. If the concept of "God" can be externally constrained in principle, then it could not ensure that the definition of reality is under its control, could not ensure that everything which exists is contained within it, could not ensure that its actions coincide with what is moral, and could not ensure that it knows everything there is to know. If it could not ensure these things, then it couldn't be said to possess them by definition, which is like saying that "the concept of God needn't be the concept of God".

Moreover, God is the only consistent entity which can be characterized as "externally unconstrained". If something is externally unconstrained, then there's no constraint which actually has any ontological force with respect to it. Yet in order to exist, it still has to be constrained in order for its existence to be selected for over its non-existence, which implies that it is self-constraining (which implies omnipotence). Since its omnipotence can only be exercised by self-constraint, it must be omnipresent, since something existing outside of it would amount to an external constraint and would undermine its omnipotence. It must also be all-knowing, since if it weren't all-knowing, it wouldn't "know" what to do if it wanted to become all-knowing, which would undermine its omnipotence. It also has to be omnibenevolent, since, as a totally self-determinative entity, it must provide itself with a reason (or standard) for why it self-defines as it does, otherwise its own choice of determination would be undetermined, and its actions must be motivated by this standard, otherwise they would be inexplicable and thus undecidable.

Any additional constraints e.g., "that God is a toaster" would imply that God is somehow not in control of itself, given that such constraints are totally unnecessary.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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7/25/2015 3:09:52 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

If something doesn't exist, then we're dealing with an entity that could, in principle, be subject to external constraint. This is because the non-existence of an entity within reality amounts to a constraint imposed from the outside, given that the entity in question does not exist and thus cannot "constrain" anything or decide its non-existence. If the concept of "God" can be externally constrained in principle, then it could not ensure that the definition of reality is under its control, could not ensure that everything which exists is contained within it, could not ensure that its actions coincide with what is moral, and could not ensure that it knows everything there is to know. If it could not ensure these things, then it couldn't be said to possess them by definition, which is like saying that "the concept of God needn't be the concept of God".

Moreover, God is the only consistent entity which can be characterized as "externally unconstrained". If something is externally unconstrained, then there's no constraint which actually has any ontological force with respect to it. Yet in order to exist, it still has to be constrained in order for its existence to be selected for over its non-existence, which implies that it is self-constraining (which implies omnipotence). Since its omnipotence can only be exercised by self-constraint, it must be omnipresent, since something existing outside of it would amount to an external constraint and would undermine its omnipotence. It must also be all-knowing, since if it weren't all-knowing, it wouldn't "know" what to do if it wanted to become all-knowing, which would undermine its omnipotence. It also has to be omnibenevolent, since, as a totally self-determinative entity, it must provide itself with a reason (or standard) for why it self-defines as it does, otherwise its own choice of determination would be undetermined, and its actions must be motivated by this standard, otherwise they would be inexplicable and thus undecidable.

Any additional constraints e.g., "that God is a toaster" would imply that God is somehow not in control of itself, given that such constraints are totally unnecessary.

Can God also be not God? If not then he is constrained by the laws of logic. Since he is constrained, he cannot be God according to this definition.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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7/25/2015 3:37:48 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 3:09:52 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

If something doesn't exist, then we're dealing with an entity that could, in principle, be subject to external constraint. This is because the non-existence of an entity within reality amounts to a constraint imposed from the outside, given that the entity in question does not exist and thus cannot "constrain" anything or decide its non-existence. If the concept of "God" can be externally constrained in principle, then it could not ensure that the definition of reality is under its control, could not ensure that everything which exists is contained within it, could not ensure that its actions coincide with what is moral, and could not ensure that it knows everything there is to know. If it could not ensure these things, then it couldn't be said to possess them by definition, which is like saying that "the concept of God needn't be the concept of God".

Moreover, God is the only consistent entity which can be characterized as "externally unconstrained". If something is externally unconstrained, then there's no constraint which actually has any ontological force with respect to it. Yet in order to exist, it still has to be constrained in order for its existence to be selected for over its non-existence, which implies that it is self-constraining (which implies omnipotence). Since its omnipotence can only be exercised by self-constraint, it must be omnipresent, since something existing outside of it would amount to an external constraint and would undermine its omnipotence. It must also be all-knowing, since if it weren't all-knowing, it wouldn't "know" what to do if it wanted to become all-knowing, which would undermine its omnipotence. It also has to be omnibenevolent, since, as a totally self-determinative entity, it must provide itself with a reason (or standard) for why it self-defines as it does, otherwise its own choice of determination would be undetermined, and its actions must be motivated by this standard, otherwise they would be inexplicable and thus undecidable.

Any additional constraints e.g., "that God is a toaster" would imply that God is somehow not in control of itself, given that such constraints are totally unnecessary.

Can God also be not God? If not then he is constrained by the laws of logic. Since he is constrained, he cannot be God according to this definition.

Such a constraint is not externally imposed. It's necessarily imposed by God in order for him to exist.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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7/25/2015 3:44:07 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 3:37:48 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 3:09:52 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

If something doesn't exist, then we're dealing with an entity that could, in principle, be subject to external constraint. This is because the non-existence of an entity within reality amounts to a constraint imposed from the outside, given that the entity in question does not exist and thus cannot "constrain" anything or decide its non-existence. If the concept of "God" can be externally constrained in principle, then it could not ensure that the definition of reality is under its control, could not ensure that everything which exists is contained within it, could not ensure that its actions coincide with what is moral, and could not ensure that it knows everything there is to know. If it could not ensure these things, then it couldn't be said to possess them by definition, which is like saying that "the concept of God needn't be the concept of God".

Moreover, God is the only consistent entity which can be characterized as "externally unconstrained". If something is externally unconstrained, then there's no constraint which actually has any ontological force with respect to it. Yet in order to exist, it still has to be constrained in order for its existence to be selected for over its non-existence, which implies that it is self-constraining (which implies omnipotence). Since its omnipotence can only be exercised by self-constraint, it must be omnipresent, since something existing outside of it would amount to an external constraint and would undermine its omnipotence. It must also be all-knowing, since if it weren't all-knowing, it wouldn't "know" what to do if it wanted to become all-knowing, which would undermine its omnipotence. It also has to be omnibenevolent, since, as a totally self-determinative entity, it must provide itself with a reason (or standard) for why it self-defines as it does, otherwise its own choice of determination would be undetermined, and its actions must be motivated by this standard, otherwise they would be inexplicable and thus undecidable.

Any additional constraints e.g., "that God is a toaster" would imply that God is somehow not in control of itself, given that such constraints are totally unnecessary.

Can God also be not God? If not then he is constrained by the laws of logic. Since he is constrained, he cannot be God according to this definition.

Such a constraint is not externally imposed. It's necessarily imposed by God in order for him to exist.

This implies that God is ontologically prior to those laws. That means that God could also not be God ontologically prior to the imposing of these laws.
Fkkize
Posts: 2,147
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7/25/2015 3:58:44 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

Have you heard of the puzzle of non-existentials?
Here is a basic way to refute premise one:

~W07;x (Gx & W04;y ((Gy IFF (Oy & ...)) & (Gy > (x=y))))

Where G "...is a God" and O "...is omnipotent".
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Fkkize
Posts: 2,147
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7/25/2015 4:01:11 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
Cool it screwed up my quantifiers again. Someday I'll learn that, too.

~Ex (Gx & Ay ((Gy IFF (Oy & ...)) & (Gy > (x=y))))

Where 'E' and 'A' are the respective quantifiers.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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7/25/2015 4:32:12 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 3:44:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/25/2015 3:37:48 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 3:09:52 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

If something doesn't exist, then we're dealing with an entity that could, in principle, be subject to external constraint. This is because the non-existence of an entity within reality amounts to a constraint imposed from the outside, given that the entity in question does not exist and thus cannot "constrain" anything or decide its non-existence. If the concept of "God" can be externally constrained in principle, then it could not ensure that the definition of reality is under its control, could not ensure that everything which exists is contained within it, could not ensure that its actions coincide with what is moral, and could not ensure that it knows everything there is to know. If it could not ensure these things, then it couldn't be said to possess them by definition, which is like saying that "the concept of God needn't be the concept of God".

Moreover, God is the only consistent entity which can be characterized as "externally unconstrained". If something is externally unconstrained, then there's no constraint which actually has any ontological force with respect to it. Yet in order to exist, it still has to be constrained in order for its existence to be selected for over its non-existence, which implies that it is self-constraining (which implies omnipotence). Since its omnipotence can only be exercised by self-constraint, it must be omnipresent, since something existing outside of it would amount to an external constraint and would undermine its omnipotence. It must also be all-knowing, since if it weren't all-knowing, it wouldn't "know" what to do if it wanted to become all-knowing, which would undermine its omnipotence. It also has to be omnibenevolent, since, as a totally self-determinative entity, it must provide itself with a reason (or standard) for why it self-defines as it does, otherwise its own choice of determination would be undetermined, and its actions must be motivated by this standard, otherwise they would be inexplicable and thus undecidable.

Any additional constraints e.g., "that God is a toaster" would imply that God is somehow not in control of itself, given that such constraints are totally unnecessary.

Can God also be not God? If not then he is constrained by the laws of logic. Since he is constrained, he cannot be God according to this definition.

Such a constraint is not externally imposed. It's necessarily imposed by God in order for him to exist.

This implies that God is ontologically prior to those laws. That means that God could also not be God ontologically prior to the imposing of these laws.

He's not prior to them. They are merely necessary properties of his self-configuring nature.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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7/25/2015 4:36:18 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 3:58:44 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

Have you heard of the puzzle of non-existentials?
Here is a basic way to refute premise one:

~W07;x (Gx & W04;y ((Gy IFF (Oy & ...)) & (Gy > (x=y))))

Where G "...is a God" and O "...is omnipotent".

Define "basic".
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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7/25/2015 4:36:43 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 4:32:12 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 3:44:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/25/2015 3:37:48 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 3:09:52 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

If something doesn't exist, then we're dealing with an entity that could, in principle, be subject to external constraint. This is because the non-existence of an entity within reality amounts to a constraint imposed from the outside, given that the entity in question does not exist and thus cannot "constrain" anything or decide its non-existence. If the concept of "God" can be externally constrained in principle, then it could not ensure that the definition of reality is under its control, could not ensure that everything which exists is contained within it, could not ensure that its actions coincide with what is moral, and could not ensure that it knows everything there is to know. If it could not ensure these things, then it couldn't be said to possess them by definition, which is like saying that "the concept of God needn't be the concept of God".

Moreover, God is the only consistent entity which can be characterized as "externally unconstrained". If something is externally unconstrained, then there's no constraint which actually has any ontological force with respect to it. Yet in order to exist, it still has to be constrained in order for its existence to be selected for over its non-existence, which implies that it is self-constraining (which implies omnipotence). Since its omnipotence can only be exercised by self-constraint, it must be omnipresent, since something existing outside of it would amount to an external constraint and would undermine its omnipotence. It must also be all-knowing, since if it weren't all-knowing, it wouldn't "know" what to do if it wanted to become all-knowing, which would undermine its omnipotence. It also has to be omnibenevolent, since, as a totally self-determinative entity, it must provide itself with a reason (or standard) for why it self-defines as it does, otherwise its own choice of determination would be undetermined, and its actions must be motivated by this standard, otherwise they would be inexplicable and thus undecidable.

Any additional constraints e.g., "that God is a toaster" would imply that God is somehow not in control of itself, given that such constraints are totally unnecessary.

Can God also be not God? If not then he is constrained by the laws of logic. Since he is constrained, he cannot be God according to this definition.

Such a constraint is not externally imposed. It's necessarily imposed by God in order for him to exist.

This implies that God is ontologically prior to those laws. That means that God could also not be God ontologically prior to the imposing of these laws.

He's not prior to them. They are merely necessary properties of his self-configuring nature.

Then the Laws of Logic are prior to God, and God depends on the Laws of Logic and is therefore constrained by them. If X depends on Y, then Y is ontologically prior to X. Just like how beer cans depend on atoms, thus, atoms are ontologically prior to beer cans. However, if God's existence depends on the Laws of Logic then God is constrained. However, if God is constrained then God cannot exist.
Fkkize
Posts: 2,147
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7/25/2015 4:40:33 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 4:36:18 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 3:58:44 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

Have you heard of the puzzle of non-existentials?
Here is a basic way to refute premise one:

~W07;x (Gx & W04;y ((Gy IFF (Oy & ...)) & (Gy > (x=y))))

Where G "...is a God" and O "...is omnipotent".

Define "basic".
"Basic" as in "with knowledge available in an introductory book on metaphysics/ philosophy of language/ logic".
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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7/25/2015 4:43:46 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 4:36:43 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:32:12 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 3:44:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/25/2015 3:37:48 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 3:09:52 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

If something doesn't exist, then we're dealing with an entity that could, in principle, be subject to external constraint. This is because the non-existence of an entity within reality amounts to a constraint imposed from the outside, given that the entity in question does not exist and thus cannot "constrain" anything or decide its non-existence. If the concept of "God" can be externally constrained in principle, then it could not ensure that the definition of reality is under its control, could not ensure that everything which exists is contained within it, could not ensure that its actions coincide with what is moral, and could not ensure that it knows everything there is to know. If it could not ensure these things, then it couldn't be said to possess them by definition, which is like saying that "the concept of God needn't be the concept of God".

Moreover, God is the only consistent entity which can be characterized as "externally unconstrained". If something is externally unconstrained, then there's no constraint which actually has any ontological force with respect to it. Yet in order to exist, it still has to be constrained in order for its existence to be selected for over its non-existence, which implies that it is self-constraining (which implies omnipotence). Since its omnipotence can only be exercised by self-constraint, it must be omnipresent, since something existing outside of it would amount to an external constraint and would undermine its omnipotence. It must also be all-knowing, since if it weren't all-knowing, it wouldn't "know" what to do if it wanted to become all-knowing, which would undermine its omnipotence. It also has to be omnibenevolent, since, as a totally self-determinative entity, it must provide itself with a reason (or standard) for why it self-defines as it does, otherwise its own choice of determination would be undetermined, and its actions must be motivated by this standard, otherwise they would be inexplicable and thus undecidable.

Any additional constraints e.g., "that God is a toaster" would imply that God is somehow not in control of itself, given that such constraints are totally unnecessary.

Can God also be not God? If not then he is constrained by the laws of logic. Since he is constrained, he cannot be God according to this definition.

Such a constraint is not externally imposed. It's necessarily imposed by God in order for him to exist.

This implies that God is ontologically prior to those laws. That means that God could also not be God ontologically prior to the imposing of these laws.

He's not prior to them. They are merely necessary properties of his self-configuring nature.

Then the Laws of Logic are prior to God, and God depends on the Laws of Logic and is therefore constrained by them. If X depends on Y, then Y is ontologically prior to X. Just like how beer cans depend on atoms, thus, atoms are ontologically prior to beer cans. However, if God's existence depends on the Laws of Logic then God is constrained. However, if God is constrained then God cannot exist.

Neither is "prior" to the other; they go hand in hand. And I never said that God is not constrained. He is constrained by himself, hence logical.
Dragonfang
Posts: 1,122
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7/25/2015 4:45:19 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
Why is it assumed that the laws of logic are independent of God?

1- If the laws of logic exists, they are universal, infallible, immutable, omnipresent, eternal, intentional truths.
2- Intentional entities are best explained by mental products.
3- Therefore, if the laws of logic exists, then they are best explained by universal, infallible, immutable, omnipresent, and an eternal mind (God's mind).
4- The laws of logic exists.
C: Therefore, they are best explained by the product of God's mind which is universal, infallible, immutable, omnipresent, eternal, and source of intentionality.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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7/25/2015 4:46:02 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 4:40:33 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:36:18 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 3:58:44 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

Have you heard of the puzzle of non-existentials?
Here is a basic way to refute premise one:

~W07;x (Gx & W04;y ((Gy IFF (Oy & ...)) & (Gy > (x=y))))

Where G "...is a God" and O "...is omnipotent".

Define "basic".
"Basic" as in "with knowledge available in an introductory book on metaphysics/ philosophy of language/ logic".

I googled "puzzle of non-existentials" and got literally zero returns. Mind explaining your argument?
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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7/25/2015 4:50:50 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
I get the sense that you're misunderstanding my point. My argument is not that "it's contradictory to speak of non-existing things, so you can't deny God". Indeed, that would even apply to Santa, whose non-existence we are obviously justified in talking about.
Fkkize
Posts: 2,147
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7/25/2015 4:56:36 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 4:46:02 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:40:33 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:36:18 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 3:58:44 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

Have you heard of the puzzle of non-existentials?
Here is a basic way to refute premise one:

~W07;x (Gx & W04;y ((Gy IFF (Oy & ...)) & (Gy > (x=y))))

Where G "...is a God" and O "...is omnipotent".

Define "basic".
"Basic" as in "with knowledge available in an introductory book on metaphysics/ philosophy of language/ logic".

I googled "puzzle of non-existentials" and got literally zero returns. Mind explaining your argument?
Interesting. When I googled the exact same thing I found, without scrolling down the following:
1) The video The Puzzle of Negative Existentials by carneades.org, one of the best philosophy youtube channels out there.
2) The SEP article on existence.
3) The SEP article on intentionality (as it covers the puzzle of true negative existential beliefs).
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
s-anthony
Posts: 2,582
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7/25/2015 4:57:24 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

If something doesn't exist, then we're dealing with an entity that could, in principle, be subject to external constraint. This is because the non-existence of an entity within reality amounts to a constraint imposed from the outside, given that the entity in question does not exist and thus cannot "constrain" anything or decide its non-existence. If the concept of "God" can be externally constrained in principle, then it could not ensure that the definition of reality is under its control, could not ensure that everything which exists is contained within it, could not ensure that its actions coincide with what is moral, and could not ensure that it knows everything there is to know. If it could not ensure these things, then it couldn't be said to possess them by definition, which is like saying that "the concept of God needn't be the concept of God".

Moreover, God is the only consistent entity which can be characterized as "externally unconstrained". If something is externally unconstrained, then there's no constraint which actually has any ontological force with respect to it. Yet in order to exist, it still has to be constrained in order for its existence to be selected for over its non-existence, which implies that it is self-constraining (which implies omnipotence). Since its omnipotence can only be exercised by self-constraint, it must be omnipresent, since something existing outside of it would amount to an external constraint and would undermine its omnipotence. It must also be all-knowing, since if it weren't all-knowing, it wouldn't "know" what to do if it wanted to become all-knowing, which would undermine its omnipotence. It also has to be omnibenevolent, since, as a totally self-determinative entity, it must provide itself with a reason (or standard) for why it self-defines as it does, otherwise its own choice of determination would be undetermined, and its actions must be motivated by this standard, otherwise they would be inexplicable and thus undecidable.

Any additional constraints e.g., "that God is a toaster" would imply that God is somehow not in control of itself, given that such constraints are totally unnecessary.

Why would God be self-constraining?
Fkkize
Posts: 2,147
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7/25/2015 4:59:20 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 4:50:50 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
I get the sense that you're misunderstanding my point. My argument is not that "it's contradictory to speak of non-existing things, so you can't deny God". Indeed, that would even apply to Santa, whose non-existence we are obviously justified in talking about.

1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
Then you are in effect defining God into existence and the argument begs the question.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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7/25/2015 5:03:28 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 4:59:20 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:50:50 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
I get the sense that you're misunderstanding my point. My argument is not that "it's contradictory to speak of non-existing things, so you can't deny God". Indeed, that would even apply to Santa, whose non-existence we are obviously justified in talking about.

1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
Then you are in effect defining God into existence and the argument begs the question.

So what if I'm defining God into existence? If the existence of the thing I define does, in fact, follow from its meaning, where's the problem? I spent two paragraphs explaining why an "existent God" is the only way to interpret the God concept.
Fkkize
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7/25/2015 5:15:22 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 5:03:28 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:59:20 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:50:50 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
I get the sense that you're misunderstanding my point. My argument is not that "it's contradictory to speak of non-existing things, so you can't deny God". Indeed, that would even apply to Santa, whose non-existence we are obviously justified in talking about.

1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
Then you are in effect defining God into existence and the argument begs the question.

So what if I'm defining God into existence? If the existence of the thing I define does, in fact, follow from its meaning, where's the problem?
From the SEP article on ontological arguments:

These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely via a definition. An obvious problem is that claims involving that vocabulary cannot then be non-question-beggingly detached from the scope of that definition. (The inference from "By definition, God is an existent being" to "God exists" is patently invalid; while the inference to "By definition, God exists" is valid, but uninteresting.)


I spent two paragraphs explaining why an "existent God" is the only way to interpret the God concept.
Which is called begging the question.
And the whole time you use terms like "ontological constraint", "external constraint", "ontological force", which in fact I have never heard before (except by you) and can't find anything on when searching for them. I have no idea what you are talking about and never do you clearly define your terms, which makes comprehending your arguments impossible and me jumping on the premises directly.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
s-anthony
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7/25/2015 5:31:24 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

If something doesn't exist, then we're dealing with an entity that could, in principle, be subject to external constraint. This is because the non-existence of an entity within reality amounts to a constraint imposed from the outside, given that the entity in question does not exist and thus cannot "constrain" anything or decide its non-existence. If the concept of "God" can be externally constrained in principle, then it could not ensure that the definition of reality is under its control, could not ensure that everything which exists is contained within it, could not ensure that its actions coincide with what is moral, and could not ensure that it knows everything there is to know. If it could not ensure these things, then it couldn't be said to possess them by definition, which is like saying that "the concept of God needn't be the concept of God".

Moreover, God is the only consistent entity which can be characterized as "externally unconstrained". If something is externally unconstrained, then there's no constraint which actually has any ontological force with respect to it. Yet in order to exist, it still has to be constrained in order for its existence to be selected for over its non-existence, which implies that it is self-constraining (which implies omnipotence). Since its omnipotence can only be exercised by self-constraint, it must be omnipresent, since something existing outside of it would amount to an external constraint and would undermine its omnipotence. It must also be all-knowing, since if it weren't all-knowing, it wouldn't "know" what to do if it wanted to become all-knowing, which would undermine its omnipotence. It also has to be omnibenevolent, since, as a totally self-determinative entity, it must provide itself with a reason (or standard) for why it self-defines as it does, otherwise its own choice of determination would be undetermined, and its actions must be motivated by this standard, otherwise they would be inexplicable and thus undecidable.

Any additional constraints e.g., "that God is a toaster" would imply that God is somehow not in control of itself, given that such constraints are totally unnecessary.

Action speaks of will, a desire to change from one state of being into another. In saying God is self-constraining, you are saying God chose constraint over non-constraint. This speaks of a duality of nature. Seeing, as you say, God has no external constraints, the desire for constraint is an internal one, a desire to act against oneself. For, if God were not unconstrained, then, the need for constraint would not make sense.
dylancatlow
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7/25/2015 5:34:01 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 4:56:36 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:46:02 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:40:33 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:36:18 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 3:58:44 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 2:15:42 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
2: Thus, it's contradictory to speak of a "non-existing God".
C: God exists.

Have you heard of the puzzle of non-existentials?
Here is a basic way to refute premise one:

~W07;x (Gx & W04;y ((Gy IFF (Oy & ...)) & (Gy > (x=y))))

Where G "...is a God" and O "...is omnipotent".

Define "basic".
"Basic" as in "with knowledge available in an introductory book on metaphysics/ philosophy of language/ logic".

I googled "puzzle of non-existentials" and got literally zero returns. Mind explaining your argument?
Interesting. When I googled the exact same thing I found, without scrolling down the following:
1) The video The Puzzle of Negative Existentials by carneades.org, one of the best philosophy youtube channels out there.
2) The SEP article on existence.
3) The SEP article on intentionality (as it covers the puzzle of true negative existential beliefs).

Sorry. The way you phrased it made it seem like "The Puzzle of Non-Existentials" was actually the name given to the problem. I've actually addressed this problem before. When we talk about non-existent things, we needn't assume that our descriptions map to the reality concept in a generalized way i.e., describe the distributed syntax in terms of which they are expressed. They are merely descriptions of themselves.

In any case, I don't see how this problem is relevant to this thread, because one of two things has to be true: (1) either the paradox is unresolvable in which case the first premise is obviously true assuming God is a meaningful concept (2) we can define non-existent things without assuming they are existent, in which case case the first premise is still true.
dylancatlow
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7/25/2015 5:34:57 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 5:15:22 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:03:28 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:59:20 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:50:50 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
I get the sense that you're misunderstanding my point. My argument is not that "it's contradictory to speak of non-existing things, so you can't deny God". Indeed, that would even apply to Santa, whose non-existence we are obviously justified in talking about.

1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
Then you are in effect defining God into existence and the argument begs the question.

So what if I'm defining God into existence? If the existence of the thing I define does, in fact, follow from its meaning, where's the problem?
From the SEP article on ontological arguments:

These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely via a definition. An obvious problem is that claims involving that vocabulary cannot then be non-question-beggingly detached from the scope of that definition. (The inference from "By definition, God is an existent being" to "God exists" is patently invalid; while the inference to "By definition, God exists" is valid, but uninteresting.)



I spent two paragraphs explaining why an "existent God" is the only way to interpret the God concept.
Which is called begging the question.
And the whole time you use terms like "ontological constraint", "external constraint", "ontological force", which in fact I have never heard before (except by you) and can't find anything on when searching for them. I have no idea what you are talking about and never do you clearly define your terms, which makes comprehending your arguments impossible and me jumping on the premises directly.

You really don't have a clue, do you? Begging the question means assuming what you have set out to prove. I'm only "begging the question" in the sense that I'm "assuming" God conforms to the definition which I claim logically implies his existence. That's hardly an unjustified assumption.
Fkkize
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7/25/2015 5:47:08 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 5:34:57 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:15:22 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:03:28 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:59:20 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:50:50 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
I get the sense that you're misunderstanding my point. My argument is not that "it's contradictory to speak of non-existing things, so you can't deny God". Indeed, that would even apply to Santa, whose non-existence we are obviously justified in talking about.

1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
Then you are in effect defining God into existence and the argument begs the question.

So what if I'm defining God into existence? If the existence of the thing I define does, in fact, follow from its meaning, where's the problem?
From the SEP article on ontological arguments:

These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely via a definition. An obvious problem is that claims involving that vocabulary cannot then be non-question-beggingly detached from the scope of that definition. (The inference from "By definition, God is an existent being" to "God exists" is patently invalid; while the inference to "By definition, God exists" is valid, but uninteresting.)



I spent two paragraphs explaining why an "existent God" is the only way to interpret the God concept.
Which is called begging the question.
And the whole time you use terms like "ontological constraint", "external constraint", "ontological force", which in fact I have never heard before (except by you) and can't find anything on when searching for them. I have no idea what you are talking about and never do you clearly define your terms, which makes comprehending your arguments impossible and me jumping on the premises directly.

In any case, I don't see how this problem is relevant to this thread, because one of two things has to be true: (1) either the paradox is unresolvable in which case the first premise is obviously true assuming God is a meaningful concept (2) we can define non-existent things without assuming they are existent, in which case case the first premise is still true.
There are two very closely related ways I read your first premise.
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
The first one is that one cannot describe an non existing x as God. This has been proven wrong about 100 years ago.

You really don't have a clue, do you? Begging the question means assuming what you have set out to prove.
Exactly. Which brings me to my second reading.
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
This is saying that God cannot be said to not exist which is exactly what you are trying to prove. Hence, begging the question.

I'm only "begging the question" in the sense that I'm "assuming" God conforms to the definition which I claim logically implies his existence. That's hardly an unjustified assumption.
Perhaps you should read the quote from SEP on defintional ontological arguments again.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
dylancatlow
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7/25/2015 6:06:46 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 5:47:08 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:34:57 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:15:22 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:03:28 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:59:20 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:50:50 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
I get the sense that you're misunderstanding my point. My argument is not that "it's contradictory to speak of non-existing things, so you can't deny God". Indeed, that would even apply to Santa, whose non-existence we are obviously justified in talking about.

1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
Then you are in effect defining God into existence and the argument begs the question.

So what if I'm defining God into existence? If the existence of the thing I define does, in fact, follow from its meaning, where's the problem?
From the SEP article on ontological arguments:

These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely via a definition. An obvious problem is that claims involving that vocabulary cannot then be non-question-beggingly detached from the scope of that definition. (The inference from "By definition, God is an existent being" to "God exists" is patently invalid; while the inference to "By definition, God exists" is valid, but uninteresting.)



I spent two paragraphs explaining why an "existent God" is the only way to interpret the God concept.
Which is called begging the question.
And the whole time you use terms like "ontological constraint", "external constraint", "ontological force", which in fact I have never heard before (except by you) and can't find anything on when searching for them. I have no idea what you are talking about and never do you clearly define your terms, which makes comprehending your arguments impossible and me jumping on the premises directly.

In any case, I don't see how this problem is relevant to this thread, because one of two things has to be true: (1) either the paradox is unresolvable in which case the first premise is obviously true assuming God is a meaningful concept (2) we can define non-existent things without assuming they are existent, in which case case the first premise is still true.
There are two very closely related ways I read your first premise.
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
The first one is that one cannot describe an non existing x as God. This has been proven wrong about 100 years ago.

I imagine you're referring to some "resolution" to the problem of non-existentials, which, as I've explained, is entirely irrelevant, because I'm not basing premise one on the notion that it is contradictory to speak of non-existing things. It is perfectly alright to talk about non-existing things so long as they are not God, for reasons which I have explained.

You really don't have a clue, do you? Begging the question means assuming what you have set out to prove.
Exactly. Which brings me to my second reading.
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
This is saying that God cannot be said to not exist which is exactly what you are trying to prove. Hence, begging the question.

My syllogism isn't meant to be self-contained. Hence, the two paragraphs which follow. My argument is that assigning non-existence to the God concept doesn't work, because the very act of assigning non-existence implies non-God. I'm only "begging the question" in the sense that I am assuming that God actually conforms to the manner I've described him in. I.e., I'm "assuming" that God = God. If one can show that non-existence is incompatible with God's properties, then concluding that the only meaningful interpretation of "God" includes his existence in the actual world is not anymore "circular" than logic itself. I really don't know how to make myself any clearer.


I'm only "begging the question" in the sense that I'm "assuming" God conforms to the definition which I claim logically implies his existence. That's hardly an unjustified assumption.
Perhaps you should read the quote from SEP on defintional ontological arguments again.
Fkkize
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7/25/2015 6:24:09 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 6:06:46 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:47:08 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:34:57 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:15:22 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:03:28 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:59:20 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:50:50 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
I get the sense that you're misunderstanding my point. My argument is not that "it's contradictory to speak of non-existing things, so you can't deny God". Indeed, that would even apply to Santa, whose non-existence we are obviously justified in talking about.

1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
Then you are in effect defining God into existence and the argument begs the question.

So what if I'm defining God into existence? If the existence of the thing I define does, in fact, follow from its meaning, where's the problem?
From the SEP article on ontological arguments:

These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely via a definition. An obvious problem is that claims involving that vocabulary cannot then be non-question-beggingly detached from the scope of that definition. (The inference from "By definition, God is an existent being" to "God exists" is patently invalid; while the inference to "By definition, God exists" is valid, but uninteresting.)



I spent two paragraphs explaining why an "existent God" is the only way to interpret the God concept.
Which is called begging the question.
And the whole time you use terms like "ontological constraint", "external constraint", "ontological force", which in fact I have never heard before (except by you) and can't find anything on when searching for them. I have no idea what you are talking about and never do you clearly define your terms, which makes comprehending your arguments impossible and me jumping on the premises directly.

In any case, I don't see how this problem is relevant to this thread, because one of two things has to be true: (1) either the paradox is unresolvable in which case the first premise is obviously true assuming God is a meaningful concept (2) we can define non-existent things without assuming they are existent, in which case case the first premise is still true.
There are two very closely related ways I read your first premise.
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
The first one is that one cannot describe an non existing x as God. This has been proven wrong about 100 years ago.

I imagine you're referring to some "resolution" to the problem of non-existentials, which, as I've explained, is entirely irrelevant, because I'm not basing premise one on the notion that it is contradictory to speak of non-existing things. It is perfectly alright to talk about non-existing things so long as they are not God, for reasons which I have explained.

You really don't have a clue, do you? Begging the question means assuming what you have set out to prove.
Exactly. Which brings me to my second reading.
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
This is saying that God cannot be said to not exist which is exactly what you are trying to prove. Hence, begging the question.

My syllogism isn't meant to be self-contained. Hence, the two paragraphs which follow. My argument is that assigning non-existence to the God concept doesn't work, because the very act of assigning non-existence implies non-God. I'm only "begging the question" in the sense that I am assuming that God actually conforms to the manner I've described him in. I.e., I'm "assuming" that God = God. If one can show that non-existence is incompatible with God's properties, then concluding that the only meaningful interpretation of "God" includes his existence in the actual world is not anymore "circular" than logic itself. I really don't know how to make myself any clearer.
Perhaps you should read the quote from SEP on defintional ontological arguments again.

I'm only "begging the question" in the sense that I'm "assuming" God conforms to the definition which I claim logically implies his existence. That's hardly an unjustified assumption.
Perhaps you should read the quote from SEP on defintional ontological arguments again.
: At 7/2/2016 3:05:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
:
: space contradicts logic
Rational_Thinker9119
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7/25/2015 7:34:11 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
The Flying Spaghetti Monster that exists.... To say the FSM that exists doesn't exist would be a contradiction. So, the Flying Speghetti Monster that exists, exists.
dylancatlow
Posts: 12,242
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7/25/2015 7:46:13 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 6:24:09 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 6:06:46 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:47:08 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:34:57 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:15:22 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 5:03:28 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:59:20 PM, Fkkize wrote:
At 7/25/2015 4:50:50 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
I get the sense that you're misunderstanding my point. My argument is not that "it's contradictory to speak of non-existing things, so you can't deny God". Indeed, that would even apply to Santa, whose non-existence we are obviously justified in talking about.

1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
Then you are in effect defining God into existence and the argument begs the question.

So what if I'm defining God into existence? If the existence of the thing I define does, in fact, follow from its meaning, where's the problem?
From the SEP article on ontological arguments:

These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely via a definition. An obvious problem is that claims involving that vocabulary cannot then be non-question-beggingly detached from the scope of that definition. (The inference from "By definition, God is an existent being" to "God exists" is patently invalid; while the inference to "By definition, God exists" is valid, but uninteresting.)



I spent two paragraphs explaining why an "existent God" is the only way to interpret the God concept.
Which is called begging the question.
And the whole time you use terms like "ontological constraint", "external constraint", "ontological force", which in fact I have never heard before (except by you) and can't find anything on when searching for them. I have no idea what you are talking about and never do you clearly define your terms, which makes comprehending your arguments impossible and me jumping on the premises directly.

In any case, I don't see how this problem is relevant to this thread, because one of two things has to be true: (1) either the paradox is unresolvable in which case the first premise is obviously true assuming God is a meaningful concept (2) we can define non-existent things without assuming they are existent, in which case case the first premise is still true.
There are two very closely related ways I read your first premise.
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
The first one is that one cannot describe an non existing x as God. This has been proven wrong about 100 years ago.

I imagine you're referring to some "resolution" to the problem of non-existentials, which, as I've explained, is entirely irrelevant, because I'm not basing premise one on the notion that it is contradictory to speak of non-existing things. It is perfectly alright to talk about non-existing things so long as they are not God, for reasons which I have explained.

You really don't have a clue, do you? Begging the question means assuming what you have set out to prove.
Exactly. Which brings me to my second reading.
1: If X doesn't exist, then it cannot be described as God.
This is saying that God cannot be said to not exist which is exactly what you are trying to prove. Hence, begging the question.

My syllogism isn't meant to be self-contained. Hence, the two paragraphs which follow. My argument is that assigning non-existence to the God concept doesn't work, because the very act of assigning non-existence implies non-God. I'm only "begging the question" in the sense that I am assuming that God actually conforms to the manner I've described him in. I.e., I'm "assuming" that God = God. If one can show that non-existence is incompatible with God's properties, then concluding that the only meaningful interpretation of "God" includes his existence in the actual world is not anymore "circular" than logic itself. I really don't know how to make myself any clearer.
Perhaps you should read the quote from SEP on defintional ontological arguments again.

I'm only "begging the question" in the sense that I'm "assuming" God conforms to the definition which I claim logically implies his existence. That's hardly an unjustified assumption.
Perhaps you should read the quote from SEP on defintional ontological arguments again.

Perhaps you should try thinking for yourself for once, rather than parroting what we've all heard a thousand times before. Believe it or not, I am aware of the apparent circular reasoning associated with defining God into existence. But unlike you, I recognize that the God concept wouldn't make sense if its non-existence weren't ruled out by it. Defining God into existence might be circular if it were done arbitrarily, but I don't claim to be doing that. My argument is that God's existence cannot be separated from his meaning i.e., is necessarily implied by it. You have merely asserted that this is unjustified without adequately explaining yourself, instead making vague appeals to "circularity".
dylancatlow
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7/25/2015 7:48:25 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 7:34:11 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
The Flying Spaghetti Monster that exists.... To say the FSM that exists doesn't exist would be a contradiction. So, the Flying Speghetti Monster that exists, exists.

It's a contradictory concept if it's unable to establish that this is in fact so. And for reasons I've explained, it would need to be God in order to back up such a claim.
Rational_Thinker9119
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7/25/2015 7:53:13 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 7:48:25 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 7:34:11 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
The Flying Spaghetti Monster that exists.... To say the FSM that exists doesn't exist would be a contradiction. So, the Flying Speghetti Monster that exists, exists.

It's a contradictory concept if it's unable to establish that this is in fact so. And for reasons I've explained, it would need to be God in order to back up such a claim.

Nope, sorry, a FSM that exists that doesn't exist is a contradiction. Therefore, a FSM that exists has to exist.
dylancatlow
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7/25/2015 7:57:43 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 7/25/2015 7:53:13 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/25/2015 7:48:25 PM, dylancatlow wrote:
At 7/25/2015 7:34:11 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
The Flying Spaghetti Monster that exists.... To say the FSM that exists doesn't exist would be a contradiction. So, the Flying Speghetti Monster that exists, exists.

It's a contradictory concept if it's unable to establish that this is in fact so. And for reasons I've explained, it would need to be God in order to back up such a claim.

Nope, sorry, a FSM that exists that doesn't exist is a contradiction. Therefore, a FSM that exists has to exist.

Either the FSM is equivalent to God, in which case it is contradictory, given that God need not be an FSM, or it is not equivalent to God, in which case it amounts to the notion of a "Being which has to exist, yet which cannot ensure this" which is simply contradictory. A being which has to exist must, in some way, be able to ensure its existence, otherwise it is not actually the case that it has to exist and thus what it says about itself is contradicted by its own limited nature. So sorry, your counterargument doesn't work.