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Potential Problem For Material Objects

Rational_Thinker9119
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7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM
Posted: 5 months ago
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?
AtheistBrony
Posts: 83
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7/6/2016 3:30:07 PM
Posted: 5 months ago
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

Technically smells can be associated with shapes but should they, probably because FOOD has a shape, so do the molecules you smell have their own shape. Your bias to your perspective as viewing of the senses as random data (or something similar enough, or something with a parallel to) is clouding your understanding of the purpose of the sense of smell to help solve the problem.

But on the subject of your criticism of the senses there is the issue of convenience for the brain. Yes the sky isn't actually 'blue', but we perceive color to make it easier to recognize things which are potentially hazardous, or potentially edible etc. Its a system of convenience, and if anything proves that our senses are real because its not the reality we see just our perception of the reality. You should be suspicious if no senses existed at all.
They say they want to save people from hell, but I see them trying to save people with hell. They deny science when on a computer. They say the bible is metaphors for some parts and not others, and follow some parts and not others. They believe their culture more than their bible they supposedly follow, and will deny any contradictions of the bible. Then say we are the dishonest ones? Since we don't believe in a deity which is equally as convincing as any other then god made the devil knowingly?
mrsatan
Posts: 418
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7/6/2016 3:37:53 PM
Posted: 5 months ago
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

I think you make a shift from "represents" to "resembles" that is unwarranted. I can pick up a pencil and use it to represent a spacecraft, even though there is no semblance between the two.
To say one has free will, to have chosen other than they did, is to say they have will over their will... Will over the will they have over their will... Will over the will they have over the will they have over their will, etc... It's utter nonsense.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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7/6/2016 6:10:25 PM
Posted: 5 months ago
At 7/6/2016 3:30:07 PM, AtheistBrony wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

Technically smells can be associated with shapes but should they, probably because FOOD has a shape, so do the molecules you smell have their own shape. Your bias to your perspective as viewing of the senses as random data (or something similar enough, or something with a parallel to) is clouding your understanding of the purpose of the sense of smell to help solve the problem.

But a smell cannot resemble a square. We could smell something and know that there is something square shaped (like a rice crispy square), but that's not the same thing.


But on the subject of your criticism of the senses there is the issue of convenience for the brain. Yes the sky isn't actually 'blue', but we perceive color to make it easier to recognize things which are potentially hazardous, or potentially edible etc. Its a system of convenience, and if anything proves that our senses are real because its not the reality we see just our perception of the reality. You should be suspicious if no senses existed at all.

The objects we experience have shape and color and feel a certain way. The hypothesis that there is something out there that is nothing like the objects of experience, causing our experiences is useless. We could never experience such a reality. Why believe there is a "sky" that exists "out there" if all we ever experience is the blueness and shape of it which resides within consciousness?
Rational_Thinker9119
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7/6/2016 6:11:43 PM
Posted: 5 months ago
At 7/6/2016 3:37:53 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

I think you make a shift from "represents" to "resembles" that is unwarranted. I can pick up a pencil and use it to represent a spacecraft, even though there is no semblance between the two.

But the lead on the page in that configuration does resemble the space craft, I don't see there is a real distinction here.
mrsatan
Posts: 418
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7/6/2016 6:29:38 PM
Posted: 5 months ago
At 7/6/2016 6:11:43 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:37:53 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

I think you make a shift from "represents" to "resembles" that is unwarranted. I can pick up a pencil and use it to represent a spacecraft, even though there is no semblance between the two.

But the lead on the page in that configuration does resemble the space craft, I don't see there is a real distinction here.

A pencil looks like a spacecraft... We might have to agree to disagree on that... Point is, you shift from representation to resemblance for no apparent reason, other than to say there can't be a resemblance.

Showing that resemblance is necessary for representation is a connection that's missing from your argument. Without that, it's non-sequitur.
To say one has free will, to have chosen other than they did, is to say they have will over their will... Will over the will they have over their will... Will over the will they have over the will they have over their will, etc... It's utter nonsense.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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7/6/2016 7:07:07 PM
Posted: 5 months ago
At 7/6/2016 6:29:38 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:11:43 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:37:53 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

I think you make a shift from "represents" to "resembles" that is unwarranted. I can pick up a pencil and use it to represent a spacecraft, even though there is no semblance between the two.

But the lead on the page in that configuration does resemble the space craft, I don't see there is a real distinction here.

A pencil looks like a spacecraft... We might have to agree to disagree on that...

The configuration of lead on the page resembles the craft, I didn't say the pencil...

Point is, you shift from representation to resemblance for no apparent reason, other than to say there can't be a resemblance.

The shift is necessary if you want to believe in a material tree with shape, greenness and brownness. Our mental image we experience would contain shape, greenness and brownness so if you want to believe something else out there has those properties then clearly resemblance is needed.


Showing that resemblance is necessary for representation is a connection that's missing from your argument. Without that, it's non-sequitur.

Read above.
mrsatan
Posts: 418
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7/6/2016 7:54:22 PM
Posted: 5 months ago
At 7/6/2016 7:07:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:29:38 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:11:43 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:37:53 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

I think you make a shift from "represents" to "resembles" that is unwarranted. I can pick up a pencil and use it to represent a spacecraft, even though there is no semblance between the two.

But the lead on the page in that configuration does resemble the space craft, I don't see there is a real distinction here.

A pencil looks like a spacecraft... We might have to agree to disagree on that...

The configuration of lead on the page resembles the craft, I didn't say the pencil...


I never said anything about drawing the spacecraft. The pencil itself can be used to represent the spacecraft, a couch to represent the Earth, a bottle of ketchup can represent the moon, etc... Zero semblance.

Subsequently, you make a mental image of a spacecraft, which is representing the pencil, an image of the Earth to represent the couch, and an image of the moon to represent the ketchup. Semblance is unnecessary for any of it.

Point is, you shift from representation to resemblance for no apparent reason, other than to say there can't be a resemblance.

The shift is necessary if you want to believe in a material tree with shape, greenness and brownness. Our mental image we experience would contain shape, greenness and brownness so if you want to believe something else out there has those properties then clearly resemblance is needed.

You believe that the tree has those properties because that's what you perceive, and your perception has proven itself to be a reliable tool. Perception tends to be pretty consistent, but it's not necessarily accurate. In some ways, such as color, it's demonstrably inaccurate, albeit consistent in it's inaccuracy. The mental image is built from that perception, and the belief is built off the mental image. If the perception is inaccurate, the image that follows it will also be inaccurate, as well as the subsequent belief. So no, semblance is not necessary for belief of semblance.



Showing that resemblance is necessary for representation is a connection that's missing from your argument. Without that, it's non-sequitur.

Read above.
To say one has free will, to have chosen other than they did, is to say they have will over their will... Will over the will they have over their will... Will over the will they have over the will they have over their will, etc... It's utter nonsense.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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7/6/2016 8:21:14 PM
Posted: 5 months ago
At 7/6/2016 7:54:22 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 7:07:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:29:38 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:11:43 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:37:53 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

I think you make a shift from "represents" to "resembles" that is unwarranted. I can pick up a pencil and use it to represent a spacecraft, even though there is no semblance between the two.

But the lead on the page in that configuration does resemble the space craft, I don't see there is a real distinction here.

A pencil looks like a spacecraft... We might have to agree to disagree on that...

The configuration of lead on the page resembles the craft, I didn't say the pencil...


I never said anything about drawing the spacecraft. The pencil itself can be used to represent the spacecraft, a couch to represent the Earth, a bottle of ketchup can represent the moon, etc... Zero semblance.

Subsequently, you make a mental image of a spacecraft, which is representing the pencil, an image of the Earth to represent the couch, and an image of the moon to represent the ketchup. Semblance is unnecessary for any of it.

How does a moon represent ketchup exactly?


Point is, you shift from representation to resemblance for no apparent reason, other than to say there can't be a resemblance.

The shift is necessary if you want to believe in a material tree with shape, greenness and brownness. Our mental image we experience would contain shape, greenness and brownness so if you want to believe something else out there has those properties then clearly resemblance is needed.

You believe that the tree has those properties because that's what you perceive, and your perception has proven itself to be a reliable tool. Perception tends to be pretty consistent, but it's not necessarily accurate. In some ways, such as color, it's demonstrably inaccurate, albeit consistent in it's inaccuracy. The mental image is built from that perception, and the belief is built off the mental image. If the perception is inaccurate, the image that follows it will also be inaccurate, as well as the subsequent belief. So no, semblance is not necessary for belief of semblance.

Do you believe that the shape, greenness, and brownness of a tree exists "out there" non-mentally? If so, then you must admit that the visual experience containing the shape, greenness, and brownness resembles the shape, greenness, and brownness out there in the non-mental world (even if it isn't 100% accurate).



Showing that resemblance is necessary for representation is a connection that's missing from your argument. Without that, it's non-sequitur.

Read above.
keithprosser
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7/6/2016 9:25:01 PM
Posted: 5 months ago
However, how can an idea resemble a material object?

If we think of an idea as "a pattern of neural activity in a brain" then obviously ideas about, say, chocolate don't physically look like like little Mars bars inside your head.

What almost certainly happens is that patterns of neural activity encode information about objects, much as information about objects is stored in computer RAM. If I point a webcam at my cat the resulting pattern of 1 and 0 is RAM doesn't physically resemble a cat, but it is none the less a usable representation my cat - I could use it to produce a hard-copy for instance.

There is no deep mystery about encoding visual sense data into a pattern of neural activity not even about extracting the data out again - those processes are routinely done in computers, albeit using different media . Chalmers calls such 'engineering' aspects the 'easy problem of consciousness' (RAM chips v. neurons). The hard problem is that extracting the data encoded in neural activity is not enough to produce subjective consciousness - if it was then the humble PC would be a conscious entity, and no one really thinks that is true.
Rational_Thinker9119
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7/6/2016 10:50:03 PM
Posted: 5 months ago
At 7/6/2016 9:25:01 PM, keithprosser wrote:
However, how can an idea resemble a material object?

If we think of an idea as "a pattern of neural activity in a brain" then obviously ideas about, say, chocolate don't physically look like like little Mars bars inside your head.

Well that's not what an idea is. If that was the case then we could do neuroscience by pure introspection, which is not the case it seems.


What almost certainly happens is that patterns of neural activity encode information about objects, much as information about objects is stored in computer RAM. If I point a webcam at my cat the resulting pattern of 1 and 0 is RAM doesn't physically resemble a cat, but it is none the less a usable representation my cat - I could use it to produce a hard-copy for instance.

Are you saying that the shapes and colors we experience don't actually exist "out there" in the material reality, and that material reality is akin to 1's and 0's instead of shapes and colors?


There is no deep mystery about encoding visual sense data into a pattern of neural activity not even about extracting the data out again - those processes are routinely done in computers, albeit using different media . Chalmers calls such 'engineering' aspects the 'easy problem of consciousness' (RAM chips v. neurons). The hard problem is that extracting the data encoded in neural activity is not enough to produce subjective consciousness - if it was then the humble PC would be a conscious entity, and no one really thinks that is true.
Sidewalker
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7/7/2016 3:23:07 AM
Posted: 5 months ago
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object?

What makes you think an idea about a material object should resemble the object? That just doesn't make sense.

As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories.

Then just don't say it, there is no reason to say that an idea resembles a material objecti, an idea doesn't resemble a material object, they are different.

Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic.

Why? Ideas and material objects are different, they have different qualities, it doesn't follow that therefore material objects don't exist. A square doesn't resemble a circle, but that doesn"t mean circles don"t exist.

Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain.

Circles don"t exist, otherwise we would be left with the absurdity that squares resemble circles, really?

We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

We are talking about distinct shapes that couldn"t resemble each other it seems, therefore circles don"t exist?

Seriously, that is supposed to be an argument?
"It is one of the commonest of mistakes to consider that the limit of our power of perception is also the limit of all there is to perceive." " C. W. Leadbeater
Rational_Thinker9119
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7/7/2016 4:35:30 AM
Posted: 5 months ago
At 7/7/2016 3:23:07 AM, Sidewalker wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object?

What makes you think an idea about a material object should resemble the object? That just doesn't make sense.

Well if it doesn't, then there is no reason to think the shape of a tree exists materially, or the greenness or brownness of it, as that is what is entailed by the mental imagery we experience of it.

As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories.

Then just don't say it, there is no reason to say that an idea resembles a material objecti, an idea doesn't resemble a material object, they are different.

So the visual experience of a shape, greenness, and brownness doesn't resemble any shape, greenness, or brownness in this supposed material world?


Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic.

Why? Ideas and material objects are different, they have different qualities, it doesn't follow that therefore material objects don't exist. A square doesn't resemble a circle, but that doesn"t mean circles don"t exist.

That's not the argument (you have a bad habit of misrepresenting arguments and summarizing them incorrectly).


Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain.

Circles don"t exist, otherwise we would be left with the absurdity that squares resemble circles, really?

We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

We are talking about distinct shapes that couldn"t resemble each other it seems, therefore circles don"t exist?

Seriously, that is supposed to be an argument?

No that's the not the argument, that's your mistepresentation and straw-man of the argument. The argument is that of a material object causes are experience or idea of the object, then it would make no sense to say the qualities of that experience (such as shape and color) exist independently of the mind. Because, these qualities are aspects of the experience and idea, which you concede, is nothing like the material objects.
keithprosser
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7/7/2016 7:40:20 AM
Posted: 5 months ago
Well that's not what an idea is. If that was the case then we could do neuroscience by pure introspection, which is not the case it seems.

I'd prefer to avoid quibbling over semantics when what matters is the mechanism. If you don't think 'idea' is the right world for 'a pattern of neural activity encoding information' then I'll happliky use a different term - neural data-structure say.

The essence is that sense data produces 'neutal data structures' and subsequent retrieval of the information so encoded provides the content of conscious experience.

Note that I stress 'provides the content of conscious experience', not 'provides conscious experience'. No-one knows how conscious experience comes about despite centuries of speculation, and I won't be solving Chalmer's 'hard problem' in this post - but I'll give it my best shot!

The hypothesis that what we are conscious of is information encoded into neural data structures in our brain. As I said, getting the data in and out of such structures is not a philosophical problem - it is an engineering one. The philosophical problem is to produce subjective experience (I think some people might equate 'idea' with 'subective experience').

If we accept the hypothesis, consciousness of X does not guarantee the reality of X, but consciousness of X does guarantee that X is the information encoded in some neural data structure. So if some object is really a cube but for some reason it gets mis-encoded as a sphere we perceve a sphere - i.e. it would 'seem to be' a sphere, or in alternative terms we would be 'conscious of', or 'perceive' a sphere.

Presumably evolution would have produced brains that match what is encoded to what is really there well as it can do, but it is obvious from common experience - such as optical illusions and hallucinations - that the process is far from perfect, so our perception is fairly reliable, but not not completely so.

One of the most important things we are conscious of (ie perceieve) is 'People are conscious entities' and 'have subjective experiences'. True or not, that is certanly how it seems to be - at least it was until people start to over-think things!

But that doesn't guarantee people really are conscious nor that we have subective experiences. What is guaranteed is that the neural data structure that encodes information about our own nature portrays us as conscious and having subective experiences.

The hard problem arises because its hard to see how subjective experience can happen. I am suggesting subjective experience doesn't happen - but it is 'neurally represented' as happening so we perceive it happening.

The point is that I agree with many dualists in that subective consciousness is impossible under physicalism. But while actual subective consciousness is impossble a neural representation of subective consciousness is not so impossible. It is akin the the difference between building a time machine and writing a novel about a time machine.

So if what is a cube 'out there' is neurally represeted as sphere, you will percieve a sphere. If you represent yourself as 'subjectively conscious' you will perceive youraelf as subectvely conscious even if you are not.

I am fully prepared to admit that is nothing like a fully convincing or complete theiry of consciousness, but I don't want to write any more in one post, or it will be a case 'tldr'. I'd rather 'dr,lor' - did read, load of rubbish!
Sidewalker
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7/7/2016 10:34:26 AM
Posted: 4 months ago
At 7/7/2016 4:35:30 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/7/2016 3:23:07 AM, Sidewalker wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object?

What makes you think an idea about a material object should resemble the object? That just doesn't make sense.

Well if it doesn't, then there is no reason to think the shape of a tree exists materially, or the greenness or brownness of it, as that is what is entailed by the mental imagery we experience of it.

OK, so you equate "an idea is about a material object" with "an idea resembles a material object", that's a very odd use of the word "resemble". By definition, if something resembles another thing, the two things "have qualities or features, especially those of appearance, in common".

You think that if we perceive a tree to have a certain size, shape and color then the perception itself must have that shape and color? I'm sorry, that just makes no sense at all, rather than just assert it, how does this "principle of equality" work, and logically, why does it work that way?

As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories.

Then just don't say it, there is no reason to say that an idea resembles a material objecti, an idea doesn't resemble a material object, they are different.

So the visual experience of a shape, greenness, and brownness doesn't resemble any shape, greenness, or brownness in this supposed material world?

No, why would it?

I know you like to say I"m misrepresenting your argument when I apply your logic to something other than your apriori commitment to idealism presuppositions, but nevertheless, logic should be consistent, so it is a valid approach to understanding the use of logic, especially when the logic itself is so peculiar.

So, according to your logic, gravity can't act on an object that is say, blue and pyramid shaped, unless gravity itself is blue and pyramid shaped? Does the idea of gravity itself need to exert a force that attracts material bodies that have mass? How about photographs, does a photograph of an object need to be the same size, shape and color of the object?

This just makes no sense, and there is just no logical reason whatsoever to think such a peculiar thing. Can you explain the logic behind this idea about ideas, and if it doesnt, then also explain why this so called "logic" doesn"t apply to something like gravity or a photograph?

Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic.

Why? Ideas and material objects are different, they have different qualities, it doesn't follow that therefore material objects don't exist. A square doesn't resemble a circle, but that doesn"t mean circles don"t exist.

That's not the argument (you have a bad habit of misrepresenting arguments and summarizing them incorrectly).

Yeah, yeah, your special logic only applies to the specific words you apply it to and nothing else, your logic is special idealism logic and applying it to anything other than your special idealism is a strawman, that's how special logic works, I know, I know.

I'm just wondering if we can actually apply real logic to your argument, because it certainly doesn't appear that we can.

Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain.

Circles don"t exist, otherwise we would be left with the absurdity that squares resemble circles, really?

We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

We are talking about distinct shapes that couldn"t resemble each other it seems, therefore circles don"t exist?

Seriously, that is supposed to be an argument?

No that's the not the argument, that's your mistepresentation and straw-man of the argument.

LOL, yeah, applying real logic to your special logic is a strawman, real logic is a misrepresentation of special logic, got it.

The argument is that of a material object causes are experience or idea of the object, then it would make no sense to say the qualities of that experience (such as shape and color) exist independently of the mind. Because, these qualities are aspects of the experience and idea, which you concede, is nothing like the material objects.

LOL, so the visual image of a tree needs to be the same size, shape and color of the tree or the tree doesn't exist? How about smells, for something to have an odor, does the odor itself have to have the same shape and color of the thing that emits the odor? And sound, if something makes a sound, does the sound itself have to the size, shape and color of the thing making the sound?

This is the most peculiar concept of causation I've ever seen, and I've seen some real doozies.

Can you be a little more explicit about your special logic, and please try to understand, shrieking "strawman, strawman" isn't an explanation.

Can you actually explain the logic behind this fascinating principle of equality, why do ideas, perceptions, sensations, etc. themselves need to have the actual physical characteristics of the things they represent, perceive or sense?

While you are at it, I think we'd all like to understand why this "special logic" doesn't apply to things like gravity and photographs.
"It is one of the commonest of mistakes to consider that the limit of our power of perception is also the limit of all there is to perceive." " C. W. Leadbeater
keithprosser
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7/7/2016 11:18:20 AM
Posted: 4 months ago
Colours are not much of a problem.

Essentially, the neural representaton of a blue ball is physically different from a neural reprsentation of a red ball - maybe different neurons are involved, or their patten of synaptic firings is different, whatever. That physical difference can be exploited to cause different reactions to blue balls and red balls - there is nothing mysterious about different causes having different effects.

That simple scheme of different representations having different effects in a very direct way probably occurs in lowly animals which have a limited range of responses to a limited range of stimuli, but for complex behavour there needs to be some organising scheme.

For complex behaviour there has to be away that the information about the world stored in neural representations can be processed in various ways. Inferences can be drawn from it, it can be compared to previously stored data and so on. And - I suggest - such infomation processing is exactly what is going on inside our heads.

What happens (I am suggesting, not insisting!) is the brain gets provided (by evolution) with a means of making the information in neural reprsentations available for extensive processing by creating a neural representation of a fictitious model of its own operation. What is going on in the brain 'obectively' is ordinary information processing, but it is neuronally represented internally as 'subjective consciousness', so it seems we are subjectively conscious.

The process of extracting information from neural representations is 'leveraged' to provide a method of organising and using that informaton by the brain neuronally representing (in fact misprepresenting) its own operation.
Rational_Thinker9119
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7/7/2016 3:59:58 PM
Posted: 4 months ago
At 7/7/2016 10:34:26 AM, Sidewalker wrote:
At 7/7/2016 4:35:30 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/7/2016 3:23:07 AM, Sidewalker wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object?

What makes you think an idea about a material object should resemble the object? That just doesn't make sense.

Well if it doesn't, then there is no reason to think the shape of a tree exists materially, or the greenness or brownness of it, as that is what is entailed by the mental imagery we experience of it.

OK, so you equate "an idea is about a material object" with "an idea resembles a material object", that's a very odd use of the word "resemble". By definition, if something resembles another thing, the two things "have qualities or features, especially those of appearance, in common".

You think that if we perceive a tree to have a certain size, shape and color then the perception itself must have that shape and color? I'm sorry, that just makes no sense at all, rather than just assert it, how does this "principle of equality" work, and logically, why does it work that way?

If the perception didn't contain shape and color then there would be 0 justification for saying you saw anything material with shape or color, as the only thing you directly experience is your perceptions.


As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories.

Then just don't say it, there is no reason to say that an idea resembles a material objecti, an idea doesn't resemble a material object, they are different.

So the visual experience of a shape, greenness, and brownness doesn't resemble any shape, greenness, or brownness in this supposed material world?

No, why would it?

I know you like to say I"m misrepresenting your argument when I apply your logic to something other than your apriori commitment to idealism presuppositions, but nevertheless, logic should be consistent, so it is a valid approach to understanding the use of logic, especially when the logic itself is so peculiar.

So, according to your logic, gravity can't act on an object that is say, blue and pyramid shaped, unless gravity itself is blue and pyramid shaped?

No that's not my logic, merely a straw-man, as usual, of my logic. Both gravity and atoms reduce to the same unified field. So, they are of the same stuff. Also, grvaity is just curved spacetime, a state of spacetime.

Does the idea of gravity itself need to exert a force that attracts material bodies that have mass? How about photographs, does a photograph of an object need to be the same size, shape and color of the object?

No a photograph doesn't need to be the same size and shape but there needs to be some resemblance. The problem is that there is no resemblance a material object has to an idea, so the notion that an idea can contain similar qualities that a material object has (like color and shape) seems to make no sense.


This just makes no sense, and there is just no logical reason whatsoever to think such a peculiar thing. Can you explain the logic behind this idea about ideas, and if it doesnt, then also explain why this so called "logic" doesn"t apply to something like gravity or a photograph.

Well gravity and a pyramid have nothing to do with what we are taking about here, because gravity doesn't resemble a pyramid in any way or vice versa. The photograph analogy works because the photograph and what is being photographed are both made of atoms so it's no shocker that one can resemble another.


Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic.

Why? Ideas and material objects are different, they have different qualities, it doesn't follow that therefore material objects don't exist. A square doesn't resemble a circle, but that doesn"t mean circles don"t exist.

That's not the argument (you have a bad habit of misrepresenting arguments and summarizing them incorrectly).

Yeah, yeah, your special logic only applies to the specific words you apply it to and nothing else, your logic is special idealism logic and applying it to anything other than your special idealism is a strawman, that's how special logic works, I know, I know.

I'm just wondering if we can actually apply real logic to your argument, because it certainly doesn't appear that we can.

I just explained why your examples failed.


Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain.

Circles don"t exist, otherwise we would be left with the absurdity that squares resemble circles, really?

We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

We are talking about distinct shapes that couldn"t resemble each other it seems, therefore circles don"t exist?

Seriously, that is supposed to be an argument?

No that's the not the argument, that's your mistepresentation and straw-man of the argument.

LOL, yeah, applying real logic to your special logic is a strawman, real logic is a misrepresentation of special logic, got it.

No you just don't understand that there are different situations, and different situations call for different reasoning as we are taking about completely different things... Obviously.


The argument is that of a material object causes are experience or idea of the object, then it would make no sense to say the qualities of that experience (such as shape and color) exist independently of the mind. Because, these qualities are aspects of the experience and idea, which you concede, is nothing like the material objects.

LOL, so the visual image of a tree needs to be the same size, shape and color of the tree or the tree doesn't exist? How about smells, for something to have an odor, does the odor itself have to have the same shape and color of the thing that emits the odor? And sound, if something makes a sound, does the sound itself have to the size, shape and color of the thing making the sound?

This is the most peculiar concept of causation I've ever seen, and I've seen some real doozies.

Can you be a little more explicit about your special logic, and please try to understand, shrieking "strawman, strawman" isn't an explanation.

Can you actually explain the logic behind this fascinating principle of equality, why do ideas, perceptions, sensations, etc. themselves need to have the actual physical characteristics of the things they represent, perceive or sense?

While you are at it, I think we'd all like to understand why this "special logic" doesn't apply to things like gravity and photographs.

Again, if our perceptions didn't involve shape, size and color then how could you say there is a material thing with those qualities? It would be impossible, bed has the second you said "the tree is green" it could only be because of your perception with cantained greenness.
Rational_Thinker9119
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7/7/2016 4:05:24 PM
Posted: 4 months ago
At 7/7/2016 11:18:20 AM, keithprosser wrote:
Colours are not much of a problem.

Essentially, the neural representaton of a blue ball is physically different from a neural reprsentation of a red ball - maybe different neurons are involved, or their patten of synaptic firings is different, whatever. That physical difference can be exploited to cause different reactions to blue balls and red balls - there is nothing mysterious about different causes having different effects.

No but what is mysterious is how I can have an idea containing blueness that resembles the blueness of the material ball, yet, the material is nothing like the mind. If the material is nothing like the mind, then it would be impossible for an idea in my mind to mimic a material objects qualities.


That simple scheme of different representations having different effects in a very direct way probably occurs in lowly animals which have a limited range of responses to a limited range of stimuli, but for complex behavour there needs to be some organising scheme.

For complex behaviour there has to be away that the information about the world stored in neural representations can be processed in various ways. Inferences can be drawn from it, it can be compared to previously stored data and so on. And - I suggest - such infomation processing is exactly what is going on inside our heads.

What happens (I am suggesting, not insisting!) is the brain gets provided (by evolution) with a means of making the information in neural reprsentations available for extensive processing by creating a neural representation of a fictitious model of its own operation. What is going on in the brain 'obectively' is ordinary information processing, but it is neuronally represented internally as 'subjective consciousness', so it seems we are subjectively conscious.

Well of course we are subjectly conscious, if we weren't then there woud be no justification for saying a brain exists, as the only justification we have for the brain is our subjective experiences we have when we examine one. Consciousness cannot be an illusion, becaus an illusion presupposes perception, which in turn presupposes consciousness having the perception.


The process of extracting information from neural representations is 'leveraged' to provide a method of organising and using that informaton by the brain neuronally representing (in fact misprepresenting) its own operation.

This has nothing to do with what I'm saying though, I am talking about consciousness not neural activity.
keithprosser
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7/7/2016 6:13:35 PM
Posted: 4 months ago
what is mysterious is how I can have an idea containing blueness that resembles the blueness of the material ball,

It would be mysterous if that is what happens! Objectively, the blueness of a blue ball is related to the quality of light it reflects. That is not the idea you get by looking at a blue ball - the subjective idea is more like, say, <blue> (imagine <blue> is a square of blue, which I can't put in a post, unforunately). Later we may get told that we see things by the light they reflect and that <blue> is shorter wavelength light that <red> , but we cettainly don't get that from the experience of seeing red things and blue things. The nature of perceptions is quite different from the nature of what is perceived.

Consciousness cannot be an illusion, becaus an illusion presupposes perception, which in turn presupposes consciousness having the perception.

I was careful not to call consciousness an illusion, because I don't think it's true. It's not easy to get the words right to describe what I want to express, but bear with me!

The brain has mechanisms for creating and reading neural representations. If X' (x prime) is a neural representation then it produces the perception of X, (regardless of the existental state of X). We certainly do perceive something we call our consciousness - so there must be a neural representation in our brain that describes/encodes how our consciousness is seems to be.

But how our consciousness seems to be does not have to be how our consciousness is. I am suggesting that consciousness is not the strange and mystical thing it seems to be - rather consciousness is ordinary information processing. It gets slightly complicated because brains recusively represent their own internal operation to enhanve its power and flexibility in controlling behaviour, but brains self-represent themselves in terms of strange and magical consciounes rather than the fairly prosaic information processing that is really going on.

You may well ask why would an inaccurate (indeed misleading) way for the brain to represent its own action would evolve!!
mrsatan
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7/7/2016 7:28:52 PM
Posted: 4 months ago
At 7/6/2016 8:21:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 7:54:22 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 7:07:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:29:38 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:11:43 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:37:53 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

I think you make a shift from "represents" to "resembles" that is unwarranted. I can pick up a pencil and use it to represent a spacecraft, even though there is no semblance between the two.

But the lead on the page in that configuration does resemble the space craft, I don't see there is a real distinction here.

A pencil looks like a spacecraft... We might have to agree to disagree on that...

The configuration of lead on the page resembles the craft, I didn't say the pencil...


I never said anything about drawing the spacecraft. The pencil itself can be used to represent the spacecraft, a couch to represent the Earth, a bottle of ketchup can represent the moon, etc... Zero semblance.

Subsequently, you make a mental image of a spacecraft, which is representing the pencil, an image of the Earth to represent the couch, and an image of the moon to represent the ketchup. Semblance is unnecessary for any of it.

How does a moon represent ketchup exactly?

Not the moon, the image of the moon one would construct within the mind. The ketchup is being used to represent the moon. One could then substitute the mental image of the scenario in place of the representation (the pencil, couch, and ketchup).

Representing the representation with a mental image of what the representation is representing. An odd statement, but technically that is what one would be doing if they mentally picture the Earth, Moon, and space in that scenario.



Point is, you shift from representation to resemblance for no apparent reason, other than to say there can't be a resemblance.

The shift is necessary if you want to believe in a material tree with shape, greenness and brownness. Our mental image we experience would contain shape, greenness and brownness so if you want to believe something else out there has those properties then clearly resemblance is needed.

You believe that the tree has those properties because that's what you perceive, and your perception has proven itself to be a reliable tool. Perception tends to be pretty consistent, but it's not necessarily accurate. In some ways, such as color, it's demonstrably inaccurate, albeit consistent in it's inaccuracy. The mental image is built from that perception, and the belief is built off the mental image. If the perception is inaccurate, the image that follows it will also be inaccurate, as well as the subsequent belief. So no, semblance is not necessary for belief of semblance.

Do you believe that the shape, greenness, and brownness of a tree exists "out there" non-mentally?

Yes, no, and no. The tree has a shape, so yes, that is out there in the world. As for the colors, no. Those are only in the mind.

If so, then you must admit that the visual experience containing the shape, greenness, and brownness resembles the shape, greenness, and brownness out there in the non-mental world (even if it isn't 100% accurate).

As I say no for colors to the question above, I'll respond to this in regards to shape.

The visual experience of the tree doesn't contain shape, only color. The shape is extrapolated by the mind from the breaks between colors and the shifts in shading. Take perspective based optical illusion street art, for example. More specifically, let's say it's an illusion that makes it look like there's a ravine in the middle of the street. The shifts and breaks of shades and colors work with your mind so that it extrapolates shape from the visual experience, even though the shapes aren't really there.

Essentially, there is a mental experience of shape that the mind extrapolates from the visual experience. However, the mental experience does not itself have a shape, rather, it is the idea of shape.




Showing that resemblance is necessary for representation is a connection that's missing from your argument. Without that, it's non-sequitur.

Read above.
To say one has free will, to have chosen other than they did, is to say they have will over their will... Will over the will they have over their will... Will over the will they have over the will they have over their will, etc... It's utter nonsense.
Rational_Thinker9119
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7/7/2016 7:38:05 PM
Posted: 4 months ago
At 7/7/2016 7:28:52 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 8:21:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 7:54:22 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 7:07:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:29:38 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:11:43 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:37:53 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

I think you make a shift from "represents" to "resembles" that is unwarranted. I can pick up a pencil and use it to represent a spacecraft, even though there is no semblance between the two.

But the lead on the page in that configuration does resemble the space craft, I don't see there is a real distinction here.

A pencil looks like a spacecraft... We might have to agree to disagree on that...

The configuration of lead on the page resembles the craft, I didn't say the pencil...


I never said anything about drawing the spacecraft. The pencil itself can be used to represent the spacecraft, a couch to represent the Earth, a bottle of ketchup can represent the moon, etc... Zero semblance.

Subsequently, you make a mental image of a spacecraft, which is representing the pencil, an image of the Earth to represent the couch, and an image of the moon to represent the ketchup. Semblance is unnecessary for any of it.

How does a moon represent ketchup exactly?

Not the moon, the image of the moon one would construct within the mind. The ketchup is being used to represent the moon. One could then substitute the mental image of the scenario in place of the representation (the pencil, couch, and ketchup).

Representing the representation with a mental image of what the representation is representing. An odd statement, but technically that is what one would be doing if they mentally picture the Earth, Moon, and space in that scenario.



Point is, you shift from representation to resemblance for no apparent reason, other than to say there can't be a resemblance.

The shift is necessary if you want to believe in a material tree with shape, greenness and brownness. Our mental image we experience would contain shape, greenness and brownness so if you want to believe something else out there has those properties then clearly resemblance is needed.

You believe that the tree has those properties because that's what you perceive, and your perception has proven itself to be a reliable tool. Perception tends to be pretty consistent, but it's not necessarily accurate. In some ways, such as color, it's demonstrably inaccurate, albeit consistent in it's inaccuracy. The mental image is built from that perception, and the belief is built off the mental image. If the perception is inaccurate, the image that follows it will also be inaccurate, as well as the subsequent belief. So no, semblance is not necessary for belief of semblance.

Do you believe that the shape, greenness, and brownness of a tree exists "out there" non-mentally?

Yes, no, and no. The tree has a shape, so yes, that is out there in the world. As for the colors, no. Those are only in the mind.

If so, then you must admit that the visual experience containing the shape, greenness, and brownness resembles the shape, greenness, and brownness out there in the non-mental world (even if it isn't 100% accurate).

As I say no for colors to the question above, I'll respond to this in regards to shape.

The visual experience of the tree doesn't contain shape, only color. The shape is extrapolated by the mind from the breaks between colors and the shifts in shading. Take perspective based optical illusion street art, for example. More specifically, let's say it's an illusion that makes it look like there's a ravine in the middle of the street. The shifts and breaks of shades and colors work with your mind so that it extrapolates shape from the visual experience, even though the shapes aren't really there.

Essentially, there is a mental experience of shape that the mind extrapolates from the visual experience. However, the mental experience does not itself have a shape, rather, it is the idea of shape.




Showing that resemblance is necessary for representation is a connection that's missing from your argument. Without that, it's non-sequitur.

Read above.

But ifthe concept of shape is dependant on colors, and colors don't exist "out there" then how is it intelligible to say there is shape "out there"?
ShabShoral
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7/7/2016 7:45:55 PM
Posted: 4 months ago
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

I just copy-pasted like ten pages of Wittgenstein but ddo swallowed it. Nevermind
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Rational_Thinker9119
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7/7/2016 8:35:37 PM
Posted: 4 months ago
At 7/7/2016 6:13:35 PM, keithprosser wrote:
what is mysterious is how I can have an idea containing blueness that resembles the blueness of the material ball,

It would be mysterous if that is what happens! Objectively, the blueness of a blue ball is related to the quality of light it reflects. That is not the idea you get by looking at a blue ball - the subjective idea is more like, say, <blue> (imagine <blue> is a square of blue, which I can't put in a post, unforunately). Later we may get told that we see things by the light they reflect and that <blue> is shorter wavelength light that <red> , but we cettainly don't get that from the experience of seeing red things and blue things. The nature of perceptions is quite different from the nature of what is perceived.

So you are saying the qualitiy of blueness is only mental, and that there is no blueness out there in material reality, only light waves which interact with our eyes and brains to bring this quality about? If so, then why believe anything we experience actually exists "out there"? There is a quality of experience when we do experiments involving light waves but if all we have are those experiences why believe they exist "out there"?


Consciousness cannot be an illusion, becaus an illusion presupposes perception, which in turn presupposes consciousness having the perception.

I was careful not to call consciousness an illusion, because I don't think it's true. It's not easy to get the words right to describe what I want to express, but bear with me!

The brain has mechanisms for creating and reading neural representations. If X' (x prime) is a neural representation then it produces the perception of X, (regardless of the existental state of X). We certainly do perceive something we call our consciousness - so there must be a neural representation in our brain that describes/encodes how our consciousness is seems to be.

But how our consciousness seems to be does not have to be how our consciousness is. I am suggesting that consciousness is not the strange and mystical thing it seems to be - rather consciousness is ordinary information processing.

Well there are reasons to believe this is false. We can conceive of information processing without the quality of experience. Also there is a philosophical zombie problem. There is no reason to think the tast of chocolate can be reduced to brain states (or supervene on them).

It gets slightly complicated because brains recusively represent their own internal operation to enhanve its power and flexibility in controlling behaviour, but brains self-represent themselves in terms of strange and magical consciounes rather than the fairly prosaic information processing that is really going on.

Conscousness is only magical of you believe in a material reality from which it emerges from. It's just as magical as a genie coming from Aladin's lamp, which is why I reject Materialism.


You may well ask why would an inaccurate (indeed misleading) way for the brain to represent its own action would evolve!!
mrsatan
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7/8/2016 11:49:07 AM
Posted: 4 months ago
At 7/7/2016 7:38:05 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/7/2016 7:28:52 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 8:21:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 7:54:22 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 7:07:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:29:38 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:11:43 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:37:53 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

I think you make a shift from "represents" to "resembles" that is unwarranted. I can pick up a pencil and use it to represent a spacecraft, even though there is no semblance between the two.

But the lead on the page in that configuration does resemble the space craft, I don't see there is a real distinction here.

A pencil looks like a spacecraft... We might have to agree to disagree on that...

The configuration of lead on the page resembles the craft, I didn't say the pencil...


I never said anything about drawing the spacecraft. The pencil itself can be used to represent the spacecraft, a couch to represent the Earth, a bottle of ketchup can represent the moon, etc... Zero semblance.

Subsequently, you make a mental image of a spacecraft, which is representing the pencil, an image of the Earth to represent the couch, and an image of the moon to represent the ketchup. Semblance is unnecessary for any of it.

How does a moon represent ketchup exactly?

Not the moon, the image of the moon one would construct within the mind. The ketchup is being used to represent the moon. One could then substitute the mental image of the scenario in place of the representation (the pencil, couch, and ketchup).

Representing the representation with a mental image of what the representation is representing. An odd statement, but technically that is what one would be doing if they mentally picture the Earth, Moon, and space in that scenario.



Point is, you shift from representation to resemblance for no apparent reason, other than to say there can't be a resemblance.

The shift is necessary if you want to believe in a material tree with shape, greenness and brownness. Our mental image we experience would contain shape, greenness and brownness so if you want to believe something else out there has those properties then clearly resemblance is needed.

You believe that the tree has those properties because that's what you perceive, and your perception has proven itself to be a reliable tool. Perception tends to be pretty consistent, but it's not necessarily accurate. In some ways, such as color, it's demonstrably inaccurate, albeit consistent in it's inaccuracy. The mental image is built from that perception, and the belief is built off the mental image. If the perception is inaccurate, the image that follows it will also be inaccurate, as well as the subsequent belief. So no, semblance is not necessary for belief of semblance.

Do you believe that the shape, greenness, and brownness of a tree exists "out there" non-mentally?

Yes, no, and no. The tree has a shape, so yes, that is out there in the world. As for the colors, no. Those are only in the mind.

If so, then you must admit that the visual experience containing the shape, greenness, and brownness resembles the shape, greenness, and brownness out there in the non-mental world (even if it isn't 100% accurate).

As I say no for colors to the question above, I'll respond to this in regards to shape.

The visual experience of the tree doesn't contain shape, only color. The shape is extrapolated by the mind from the breaks between colors and the shifts in shading. Take perspective based optical illusion street art, for example. More specifically, let's say it's an illusion that makes it look like there's a ravine in the middle of the street. The shifts and breaks of shades and colors work with your mind so that it extrapolates shape from the visual experience, even though the shapes aren't really there.

Essentially, there is a mental experience of shape that the mind extrapolates from the visual experience. However, the mental experience does not itself have a shape, rather, it is the idea of shape.




Showing that resemblance is necessary for representation is a connection that's missing from your argument. Without that, it's non-sequitur.

Read above.

But ifthe concept of shape is dependant on colors, and colors don't exist "out there" then how is it intelligible to say there is shape "out there"?

The concept of shape isn't dependant on colors. Recognition of it from a visual standpoint is. If I were to blindfold you, and then put a small box in your hands, you could probably recognize it's shape through touch.
To say one has free will, to have chosen other than they did, is to say they have will over their will... Will over the will they have over their will... Will over the will they have over the will they have over their will, etc... It's utter nonsense.
keithprosser
Posts: 1,933
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7/8/2016 2:03:14 PM
Posted: 4 months ago
The concept of shape isn't dependant on colors. Recognition of it from a visual standpoint is. If I were to blindfold you, and then put a small box in your hands, you could probably recognize it's shape through touch.

If you handle a small cube or a sphere then the nerves in your hand send signals to your brain where they get integrated into a neural data structure that encodes the information so obtained - essentially that information will relate to the obects geometry, its hardness, it's weight and so on. However you do not percieve the objects shape directly by handing it - you are preceiving information encoded into some neural data structure produced by handling it.

If instead you look at two object that differ only in colour then you will obtain different information - you get information about the objects' light-reflective qualtities and their size and shape, but not (for example) their weight. Yet both cases of looking and handling are essentially similar in that sense data produces a neural data representation of the obects and what is perceived is the information encoded in 'NDR's.

Now suppose you perceive a surface is flat - that seems straightforward enough; you preceive it as flat because it is 'objectively' flat. But what about a surface you perceive as red? It doesn't seem quite right to say that surface is objectively red, but there is an interpretation that allows it : "A things in the universe is objectively red if it reflects or emits light that a normal observer perceives or would perceive as subjectively red."
We know a bit about human colour perception - we know for instance that long wavelength light looks red and short wavelength light looks blue, so a crude test for if something is obectively red would be to measure the spectum of its light. With more research we could - in principle - invent a measuring device that correctly predicts if a person would perceive something as red from its spectrum.

So we can have two tools in our toolkit... an objective flat/curved detector and an obective red/blue detector. We can use either or both tools on a surface and they will correctly predict how an observer will preceve it in terms of flat or curved, red or blue. So the distinction between so called 'secondary' and 'primary' qualities is a lot more blurry that first appears.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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7/8/2016 4:05:47 PM
Posted: 4 months ago
At 7/8/2016 11:49:07 AM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/7/2016 7:38:05 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/7/2016 7:28:52 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 8:21:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 7:54:22 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 7:07:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:29:38 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:11:43 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:37:53 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

I think you make a shift from "represents" to "resembles" that is unwarranted. I can pick up a pencil and use it to represent a spacecraft, even though there is no semblance between the two.

But the lead on the page in that configuration does resemble the space craft, I don't see there is a real distinction here.

A pencil looks like a spacecraft... We might have to agree to disagree on that...

The configuration of lead on the page resembles the craft, I didn't say the pencil...


I never said anything about drawing the spacecraft. The pencil itself can be used to represent the spacecraft, a couch to represent the Earth, a bottle of ketchup can represent the moon, etc... Zero semblance.

Subsequently, you make a mental image of a spacecraft, which is representing the pencil, an image of the Earth to represent the couch, and an image of the moon to represent the ketchup. Semblance is unnecessary for any of it.

How does a moon represent ketchup exactly?

Not the moon, the image of the moon one would construct within the mind. The ketchup is being used to represent the moon. One could then substitute the mental image of the scenario in place of the representation (the pencil, couch, and ketchup).

Representing the representation with a mental image of what the representation is representing. An odd statement, but technically that is what one would be doing if they mentally picture the Earth, Moon, and space in that scenario.



Point is, you shift from representation to resemblance for no apparent reason, other than to say there can't be a resemblance.

The shift is necessary if you want to believe in a material tree with shape, greenness and brownness. Our mental image we experience would contain shape, greenness and brownness so if you want to believe something else out there has those properties then clearly resemblance is needed.

You believe that the tree has those properties because that's what you perceive, and your perception has proven itself to be a reliable tool. Perception tends to be pretty consistent, but it's not necessarily accurate. In some ways, such as color, it's demonstrably inaccurate, albeit consistent in it's inaccuracy. The mental image is built from that perception, and the belief is built off the mental image. If the perception is inaccurate, the image that follows it will also be inaccurate, as well as the subsequent belief. So no, semblance is not necessary for belief of semblance.

Do you believe that the shape, greenness, and brownness of a tree exists "out there" non-mentally?

Yes, no, and no. The tree has a shape, so yes, that is out there in the world. As for the colors, no. Those are only in the mind.

If so, then you must admit that the visual experience containing the shape, greenness, and brownness resembles the shape, greenness, and brownness out there in the non-mental world (even if it isn't 100% accurate).

As I say no for colors to the question above, I'll respond to this in regards to shape.

The visual experience of the tree doesn't contain shape, only color. The shape is extrapolated by the mind from the breaks between colors and the shifts in shading. Take perspective based optical illusion street art, for example. More specifically, let's say it's an illusion that makes it look like there's a ravine in the middle of the street. The shifts and breaks of shades and colors work with your mind so that it extrapolates shape from the visual experience, even though the shapes aren't really there.

Essentially, there is a mental experience of shape that the mind extrapolates from the visual experience. However, the mental experience does not itself have a shape, rather, it is the idea of shape.




Showing that resemblance is necessary for representation is a connection that's missing from your argument. Without that, it's non-sequitur.

Read above.

But ifthe concept of shape is dependant on colors, and colors don't exist "out there" then how is it intelligible to say there is shape "out there"?

The concept of shape isn't dependant on colors. Recognition of it from a visual standpoint is. If I were to blindfold you, and then put a small box in your hands, you could probably recognize it's shape through touch.

But that would be a sensational experience, which gives the idea of cubed shaped item. So that gives us evidence of an experience and ideas which reside without consciousness/ mind. This doesn't give us any reason to believe in any non-mental cube outside of experience, and we are still left with the problem of how the sensation and idea could possibly resemble something nothing like a sensation or idea; something material.
sadolite
Posts: 8,836
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7/8/2016 11:29:29 PM
Posted: 4 months ago
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

Your thoughts and ideas are only extrapolations of the material world you live in. It isn't rocket science.
It's not your views that divide us, it's what you think my views should be that divides us.

If you think I will give up my rights and forsake social etiquette to make you "FEEL" better you are sadly mistaken

If liberal democrats would just stop shooting people gun violence would drop by 90%
mrsatan
Posts: 418
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7/9/2016 8:33:32 PM
Posted: 4 months ago
At 7/8/2016 4:05:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/8/2016 11:49:07 AM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/7/2016 7:38:05 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/7/2016 7:28:52 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 8:21:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 7:54:22 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 7:07:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:29:38 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:11:43 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:37:53 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

I think you make a shift from "represents" to "resembles" that is unwarranted. I can pick up a pencil and use it to represent a spacecraft, even though there is no semblance between the two.

But the lead on the page in that configuration does resemble the space craft, I don't see there is a real distinction here.

A pencil looks like a spacecraft... We might have to agree to disagree on that...

The configuration of lead on the page resembles the craft, I didn't say the pencil...


I never said anything about drawing the spacecraft. The pencil itself can be used to represent the spacecraft, a couch to represent the Earth, a bottle of ketchup can represent the moon, etc... Zero semblance.

Subsequently, you make a mental image of a spacecraft, which is representing the pencil, an image of the Earth to represent the couch, and an image of the moon to represent the ketchup. Semblance is unnecessary for any of it.

How does a moon represent ketchup exactly?

Not the moon, the image of the moon one would construct within the mind. The ketchup is being used to represent the moon. One could then substitute the mental image of the scenario in place of the representation (the pencil, couch, and ketchup).

Representing the representation with a mental image of what the representation is representing. An odd statement, but technically that is what one would be doing if they mentally picture the Earth, Moon, and space in that scenario.



Point is, you shift from representation to resemblance for no apparent reason, other than to say there can't be a resemblance.

The shift is necessary if you want to believe in a material tree with shape, greenness and brownness. Our mental image we experience would contain shape, greenness and brownness so if you want to believe something else out there has those properties then clearly resemblance is needed.

You believe that the tree has those properties because that's what you perceive, and your perception has proven itself to be a reliable tool. Perception tends to be pretty consistent, but it's not necessarily accurate. In some ways, such as color, it's demonstrably inaccurate, albeit consistent in it's inaccuracy. The mental image is built from that perception, and the belief is built off the mental image. If the perception is inaccurate, the image that follows it will also be inaccurate, as well as the subsequent belief. So no, semblance is not necessary for belief of semblance.

Do you believe that the shape, greenness, and brownness of a tree exists "out there" non-mentally?

Yes, no, and no. The tree has a shape, so yes, that is out there in the world. As for the colors, no. Those are only in the mind.

If so, then you must admit that the visual experience containing the shape, greenness, and brownness resembles the shape, greenness, and brownness out there in the non-mental world (even if it isn't 100% accurate).

As I say no for colors to the question above, I'll respond to this in regards to shape.

The visual experience of the tree doesn't contain shape, only color. The shape is extrapolated by the mind from the breaks between colors and the shifts in shading. Take perspective based optical illusion street art, for example. More specifically, let's say it's an illusion that makes it look like there's a ravine in the middle of the street. The shifts and breaks of shades and colors work with your mind so that it extrapolates shape from the visual experience, even though the shapes aren't really there.

Essentially, there is a mental experience of shape that the mind extrapolates from the visual experience. However, the mental experience does not itself have a shape, rather, it is the idea of shape.




Showing that resemblance is necessary for representation is a connection that's missing from your argument. Without that, it's non-sequitur.

Read above.

But ifthe concept of shape is dependant on colors, and colors don't exist "out there" then how is it intelligible to say there is shape "out there"?

The concept of shape isn't dependant on colors. Recognition of it from a visual standpoint is. If I were to blindfold you, and then put a small box in your hands, you could probably recognize it's shape through touch.

But that would be a sensational experience, which gives the idea of cubed shaped item. So that gives us evidence of an experience and ideas which reside without consciousness/ mind. This doesn't give us any reason to believe in any non-mental cube outside of experience,

Did you mean to say "within" above?

Either way, it gives us evidence that there is something "out there" that we can experience. Do you believe that all experiences are just fabrications of our minds? That what appears to be a foundation for any experience isn't really there at all? Experiences like that do happen. People with schizophrenia tend to be plagued with them. The difference between those and typical experience is that the hallucinations are not shared experiences. That there are things "out there" that we share experience of suggests that those things are actually there.

and we are still left with the problem of how the sensation and idea could possibly resemble something nothing like a sensation or idea; something material.

I still see no problem here. That the mental image is comprised of shapes and colors doesn't mean the mental image itself has a shape or color. If I take a photo of a forest, would you say the photo resembles the forest? It contains elements of the forest, sure, but the photo itself looks nothing like a forest.
To say one has free will, to have chosen other than they did, is to say they have will over their will... Will over the will they have over their will... Will over the will they have over the will they have over their will, etc... It's utter nonsense.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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7/10/2016 7:48:21 AM
Posted: 4 months ago
At 7/8/2016 11:29:29 PM, sadolite wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."

To say that an idea resembles a material object would be as incoherent as the notion that a smell resembles a shape; we are talking about completely different categories. Non-mental atoms in the void is nothing like a visual experience, mass and electric charge are nothing like the taste of chocolate ect...So if there is something else "out there" causing are ideas and perceptions it seems it must be mental or idealistic. Otherwise we are left with the same absurdity as the notion of a color resembling pain. We are talking about disctinct categories that couldn't resemble each other it seems. Thought?

Your thoughts and ideas are only extrapolations of the material world you live in. It isn't rocket science.

There's no reason to necessarily believe that though, that's why the metaphysical position of Monistic Idealism exists.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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7/10/2016 8:01:49 AM
Posted: 4 months ago
At 7/9/2016 8:33:32 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/8/2016 4:05:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/8/2016 11:49:07 AM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/7/2016 7:38:05 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/7/2016 7:28:52 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 8:21:14 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 7:54:22 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 7:07:07 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:29:38 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 6:11:43 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:37:53 PM, mrsatan wrote:
At 7/6/2016 3:46:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
If there exists non-mental/ material objects then the photons bounce from the objects, reach our retinas, the brain does its magic, and then an idea or visual representation of the object forms in our mind. However, how can an idea resemble a material object? As Bishop Berkely stated:

"An idea can be like nothing but an idea."





But the lead on the page in that configuration does resemble the space craft, I don't see there is a real distinction here.

A pencil looks like a spacecraft... We might have to agree to disagree on that...

The configuration of lead on the page resembles the craft, I didn't say the pencil...


I never said anything about drawing the spacecraft. The pencil itself can be used to represent the spacecraft, a couch to represent the Earth, a bottle of ketchup can represent the moon, etc... Zero semblance.

Subsequently, you make a mental image of a spacecraft, which is representing the pencil, an image of the Earth to represent the couch, and an image of the moon to represent the ketchup. Semblance is unnecessary for any of it.

How does a moon represent ketchup exactly?

Not the moon, the image of the moon one would construct within the mind. The ketchup is being used to represent the moon. One could then substitute the mental image of the scenario in place of the representation (the pencil, couch, and ketchup).

Representing the representation with a mental image of what the representation is representing. An odd statement, but technically that is what one would be doing if they mentally picture the Earth, Moon, and space in that scenario.



Point is, you shift from representation to resemblance for no apparent reason, other than to say there can't be a resemblance.

The shift is necessary if you want to believe in a material tree with shape, greenness and brownness. Our mental image we experience would contain shape, greenness and brownness so if you want to believe something else out there has those properties then clearly resemblance is needed.

You believe that the tree has those properties because that's what you perceive, and your perception has proven itself to be a reliable tool. Perception tends to be pretty consistent, but it's not necessarily accurate. In some ways, such as color, it's demonstrably inaccurate, albeit consistent in it's inaccuracy. The mental image is built from that perception, and the belief is built off the mental image. If the perception is inaccurate, the image that follows it will also be inaccurate, as well as the subsequent belief. So no, semblance is not necessary for belief of semblance.

Do you believe that the shape, greenness, and brownness of a tree exists "out there" non-mentally?

Yes, no, and no. The tree has a shape, so yes, that is out there in the world. As for the colors, no. Those are only in the mind.

If so, then you must admit that the visual experience containing the shape, greenness, and brownness resembles the shape, greenness, and brownness out there in the non-mental world (even if it isn't 100% accurate).

As I say no for colors to the question above, I'll respond to this in regards to shape.



Essentially, there is a mental experience of shape that the mind extrapolates from the visual experience. However, the mental experience does not itself have a shape, rather, it is the idea of shape.




Showing that resemblance is necessary for representation is a connection that's missing from your argument. Without that, it's non-sequitur.

Read above.

But ifthe concept of shape is dependant on colors, and colors don't exist "out there" then how is it intelligible to say there is shape "out there"?

The concept of shape isn't dependant on colors. Recognition of it from a visual standpoint is. If I were to blindfold you, and then put a small box in your hands, you could probably recognize it's shape through touch.

But that would be a sensational experience, which gives the idea of cubed shaped item. So that gives us evidence of an experience and ideas which reside without consciousness/ mind. This doesn't give us any reason to believe in any non-mental cube outside of experience,

Did you mean to say "within" above?

Either way, it gives us evidence that there is something "out there" that we can experience

But you only experience a sensation, we still haven't dipped outside of consciousness yet.

Do you believe that all experiences are just fabrications of our minds? That what appears to be a foundation for any experience isn't really there at all?

Why believe the foundation of experience is fundamentally outside mind?

Experiences like that do happen. People with schizophrenia tend to be plagued with them. The difference between those and typical experience is that the hallucinations are not shared experiences. That there are things "out there" that we share experience of suggests that those things are actually there.

That logic doesn't make much sense to me. Because a reality is shared that magically makes it non-mental? This violates Occam's Razor, you have to assume not only mentality exists in your worldview but non-mentality as well. If we view reality as a collectively shared dream from different perspectives then we only have to use mentality to explain reality. Also mentality cannot be doubted coherently (as it takes a mind to doubt), and consciousness cannot be an illusion (because an illusion requires perception, which requires consciousness). It's a much safer bet to base reality on what cannot be doubted and what cannot be an illusion, instead of some made up non-mental world there is no reason to believe in.


and we are still left with the problem of how the sensation and idea could possibly resemble something nothing like a sensation or idea; something material.

I still see no problem here. That the mental image is comprised of shapes and colors doesn't mean the mental image itself has a shape or color. If I take a photo of a forest, would you say the photo resembles the forest? It contains elements of the forest?

If the photo has a bunch of trees then of course it resembles a forest. I don't know about you but the photos I take certainly resemble what the camera was aimed at, at least when my focus is on :p