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Euthyphro

socialpinko
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3/14/2011 7:01:38 PM
Posted: 5 years ago
I have always pondered the Euthyphro dillemna but since I am not a Christian I have no way of answering it. So I will ask all Christians out there, is something bad because your god decided it was bad or was it already bad and that is why your god teaches against it? Honest question.
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popculturepooka
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3/14/2011 7:34:21 PM
Posted: 5 years ago
Robert Adams ftw.

"d. Modified Divine Command Theory

Robert Adams (1987) has offered a modified version of the Divine Command Theory, which a defender of the theory can appropriate in response to the Euthyphro Dilemma. Adams argues that a modified divine command theorist "wants to say…that an act is wrong if and only if it is contrary to God's will or commands (assuming God loves us)" (121). Moreover, Adams claims that the following is a necessary truth: "Any action is ethically wrong if and only if it is contrary to the commands of a loving God" (132). On this modification of Divine Command Theory, actions, and perhaps intentions and individuals, possess the property of ethical wrongness, and this property is an objective property. That is, an action such as torturing someone for fun is ethically wrong, irrespective of whether anyone actually believes that it is wrong, and it is wrong because it is contrary to the commands of a loving God.

One could agree with this modification of Divine Command Theory, but disagree with the claim that it is a necessary truth that any action is ethically wrong if and only if it is contrary to the commands of a loving God. One might hold that this claim is a contingent truth, that is, that in the actual world, being contrary to the commands of a loving God is what constitutes ethical wrongness, but that there are other possible worlds in which ethical wrongness is not identified with being contrary to the commands of a loving God. It should be pointed out that for the theist who wants to argue from the existence of objective moral properties back to the existence of God, Adams' stronger claim, namely, that an action is wrong if and only if it goes against the commands of a loving God, should be taken as a necessary truth, rather than a contingent one.

At any rate, whichever option a modified divine command theorist chooses, the modification at issue is aimed at avoiding both horns of the Euthyphro Dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma posed by Socrates to Euthyphro is that if an act is morally right because God commands it, then morality becomes arbitrary. Given this, we could be morally obligated to inflict cruelty upon others. The Modified Divine Command Theory avoids this problem, because morality is not based on the mere commands of God, but is rooted in the unchanging omnibenevolent nature of God. Hence, morality is not arbitrary nor would God command cruelty for its own sake, because God's nature is fixed and unchanging, and to do so would violate it. It is not possible for a loving God to command cruelty for its own sake. The Modified Divine Command Theory is also thought to avoid the second horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma. God is the source of morality, because morality is grounded in the character of God. Moreover, God is not subject to a moral law that exists external to him. On the Modified Divine Command Theory, the moral law is a feature of God's nature. Given that the moral law exists internal to God, in this sense, God is not subject to an external moral law, but rather is that moral law. God therefore retains his supreme moral and metaphysical status. Morality, for the modified divine command theorist, is ultimately grounded in the perfect nature of God."

http://www.iep.utm.edu...
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socialpinko
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3/14/2011 7:57:36 PM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/14/2011 7:34:21 PM, popculturepooka wrote:
Robert Adams ftw.

"d. Modified Divine Command Theory

Robert Adams (1987) has offered a modified version of the Divine Command Theory, which a defender of the theory can appropriate in response to the Euthyphro Dilemma. Adams argues that a modified divine command theorist "wants to say…that an act is wrong if and only if it is contrary to God's will or commands (assuming God loves us)" (121). Moreover, Adams claims that the following is a necessary truth: "Any action is ethically wrong if and only if it is contrary to the commands of a loving God" (132). On this modification of Divine Command Theory, actions, and perhaps intentions and individuals, possess the property of ethical wrongness, and this property is an objective property. That is, an action such as torturing someone for fun is ethically wrong, irrespective of whether anyone actually believes that it is wrong, and it is wrong because it is contrary to the commands of a loving God.

One could agree with this modification of Divine Command Theory, but disagree with the claim that it is a necessary truth that any action is ethically wrong if and only if it is contrary to the commands of a loving God. One might hold that this claim is a contingent truth, that is, that in the actual world, being contrary to the commands of a loving God is what constitutes ethical wrongness, but that there are other possible worlds in which ethical wrongness is not identified with being contrary to the commands of a loving God. It should be pointed out that for the theist who wants to argue from the existence of objective moral properties back to the existence of God, Adams' stronger claim, namely, that an action is wrong if and only if it goes against the commands of a loving God, should be taken as a necessary truth, rather than a contingent one.

At any rate, whichever option a modified divine command theorist chooses, the modification at issue is aimed at avoiding both horns of the Euthyphro Dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma posed by Socrates to Euthyphro is that if an act is morally right because God commands it, then morality becomes arbitrary. Given this, we could be morally obligated to inflict cruelty upon others. The Modified Divine Command Theory avoids this problem, because morality is not based on the mere commands of God, but is rooted in the unchanging omnibenevolent nature of God. Hence, morality is not arbitrary nor would God command cruelty for its own sake, because God's nature is fixed and unchanging, and to do so would violate it. It is not possible for a loving God to command cruelty for its own sake. The Modified Divine Command Theory is also thought to avoid the second horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma. God is the source of morality, because morality is grounded in the character of God. Moreover, God is not subject to a moral law that exists external to him. On the Modified Divine Command Theory, the moral law is a feature of God's nature. Given that the moral law exists internal to God, in this sense, God is not subject to an external moral law, but rather is that moral law. God therefore retains his supreme moral and metaphysical status. Morality, for the modified divine command theorist, is ultimately grounded in the perfect nature of God."

http://www.iep.utm.edu...

What an excellent way of slinking around the question.
: At 9/29/2014 10:55:59 AM, imabench wrote:
: : At 9/29/2014 9:43:46 AM, kbub wrote:
: :
: : DDO should discredit support of sexual violence at any time and in every way.
:
: I disagree.
popculturepooka
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3/14/2011 8:01:05 PM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/14/2011 7:57:36 PM, socialpinko wrote:

What an excellent way of slinking around the question.

Lolwut.
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Cliff.Stamp
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3/14/2011 8:44:01 PM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/14/2011 7:34:21 PM, popculturepooka wrote:

"d. Modified Divine Command Theory

Pop, have you not simply replaced one definitional problem (morality) with another (benevolence/loving). Essentially it defines morals to be that which is an act of benevolence/love but what is the objective standard by which God can be judged to be benevolent or to show love? Is not the exact same problem created if someone was to ask - how would you define pure and perfect love and you were to answer - how God feels towards us.
popculturepooka
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3/14/2011 9:24:43 PM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/14/2011 8:44:01 PM, Cliff.Stamp wrote:
At 3/14/2011 7:34:21 PM, popculturepooka wrote:

"d. Modified Divine Command Theory

Pop, have you not simply replaced one definitional problem (morality) with another (benevolence/loving). Essentially it defines morals to be that which is an act of benevolence/love but what is the objective standard by which God can be judged to be benevolent or to show love? Is not the exact same problem created if someone was to ask - how would you define pure and perfect love and you were to answer - how God feels towards us.

No for a couple of reasons:

1) Modified Divine command theory isn't a theory of the semantics; it's not a theory of the *meaning* of the value-laden words "good" and "bad". It's a theory of deontological properties like "right" and "wrong" and "moral obligation" as opposed to axiological properties like "good" and "bad". These are seperate concepts in ethics. Something can be good without being morally obligatory.

2) It's saying "ethical wrongness is (i.e., is identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving/perfectly good God". That is a straightforward identity claim - not a theory of meaning. For example, the "morning star" and the "evening star" have different meanings yet they are identical - they are exactly one and the same star.
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tigg13
Posts: 302
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3/14/2011 9:48:03 PM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/14/2011 9:24:43 PM, popculturepooka wrote:
At 3/14/2011 8:44:01 PM, Cliff.Stamp wrote:
At 3/14/2011 7:34:21 PM, popculturepooka wrote:

"d. Modified Divine Command Theory

Pop, have you not simply replaced one definitional problem (morality) with another (benevolence/loving). Essentially it defines morals to be that which is an act of benevolence/love but what is the objective standard by which God can be judged to be benevolent or to show love? Is not the exact same problem created if someone was to ask - how would you define pure and perfect love and you were to answer - how God feels towards us.

No for a couple of reasons:

1) Modified Divine command theory isn't a theory of the semantics; it's not a theory of the *meaning* of the value-laden words "good" and "bad". It's a theory of deontological properties like "right" and "wrong" and "moral obligation" as opposed to axiological properties like "good" and "bad". These are seperate concepts in ethics. Something can be good without being morally obligatory.

But, even from a deontological stand point, don't you need an objective standard in order to define "right" and "wrong"? And wouldn't this standard either have to be of God (and therefore arbitrary), or apart from God ) which makes God subordinate to it)?

2) It's saying "ethical wrongness is (i.e., is identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving/perfectly good God". That is a straightforward identity claim - not a theory of meaning. For example, the "morning star" and the "evening star" have different meanings yet they are identical - they are exactly one and the same star.

Ok, first you say this isn't a theory of semantics and now you're saying God is synonymous with goodness. How do you arrive at the notion that God is a perfectly loving being? If it is simply by definition then morality is arbitrary and if it isn't by definition then that standard (whatever it is) is the true source of morality, not God.
Cliff.Stamp
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3/14/2011 9:59:39 PM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/14/2011 9:24:43 PM, popculturepooka wrote:

2) It's saying "ethical wrongness is (i.e., is identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving/perfectly good God".

Yes, and what I do not see is how that helps anything, note the dilemma was originally asked in terms of love not morality.

If God loves something does he do so because it is worthy of love or is it worthy of love simply because he loves it.

Later love was replaced by morality, but any of the attributes of God can be so questioned and they all lead to the same definitional problem which is that either the attribute in question is not constrained or it is constrained.

If it is constrained then what constrains it, if it is not constrained then anything can be exhibited and be claimed to be good/benevolent/loving/moral/wise etc. .
popculturepooka
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3/14/2011 11:45:09 PM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/14/2011 9:59:39 PM, Cliff.Stamp wrote:
At 3/14/2011 9:24:43 PM, popculturepooka wrote:


2) It's saying "ethical wrongness is (i.e., is identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving/perfectly good God".

Yes, and what I do not see is how that helps anything, note the dilemma was originally asked in terms of love not morality.

If God loves something does he do so because it is worthy of love or is it worthy of love simply because he loves it.

Later love was replaced by morality, but any of the attributes of God can be so questioned and they all lead to the same definitional problem which is that either the attribute in question is not constrained or it is constrained.

If it is constrained then what constrains it, if it is not constrained then anything can be exhibited and be claimed to be good/benevolent/loving/moral/wise etc. .

The original question was, "Is something pious because it is loved by the gods or loved by the gods because it is pious?" You are correct there.

The question was transformed into (the non-strawman version), "Is something ethically right because it is commanded by God or commanded by God because it is ethically right?"

The response is to take the first horn here with the MDCT and say that something is ethically right because it is commanded by God (where "because" is meant in an ontological sense in that they don't exist seperately). Then the claim is further brought along that this makes God's commands and "rightness" arbitrary because God could command anything as morally right like some evil act such as torturing people for fun. But the God that defenders have in mind when talking about the mdct is perfectly good and that surely constrains what he could command. A good person would not command that we go around torturing children for fun. So, no, the arbitrariness objection doesn't stick.

You're saying that there is a definitional problem which is exactly what mdct is denying. There isn't a definitional problem because I'm NOT making a semantical claim. I'm not saying that something being ethically wrong just is it being contrary to God's commands.

There is a difference between semantical claims and identity claims. If I say "Clark Kent is Superman" I'm making an identity claim but I'm not making a semantical/defintional claim because the two terms have different meanings. If they did have the same meaning then it would amount to me saying "Clark Kent is Clark Kent" which is just a useless tautology but, luckily, this is not the case.

Again, I am not making a definitional claim here.

Also, you're drawing a parallel that defenders explicitly deny. Love is a value; it is an axiological property, so is "good". The MDCT is only concerned with deontological properties, not axiological properties. So even if you could apply that question to certain values like love, goodness, justice, fairness...it doesn't follow that applies to ethics in relation to God.

And, no, not all of God attributes can be questioned like that coherently. Here's one involving a semantical issue. Imagine I say "God is omniscient". Imagine my interlocutor says "Is God omniscient because he knows all truths or does he know all truths because he is omniscient?" This question doesn't even make sense. That's just what the term means. It's like someone asking is a bachelor a bachelor because they are an unmarried man or are they an unmarried man because they are a bachelor. That question wouldn't make sense either.
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DATCMOTO
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3/15/2011 5:30:36 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/14/2011 7:01:38 PM, socialpinko wrote:
I have always pondered the Euthyphro dillemna but since I am not a Christian I have no way of answering it. So I will ask all Christians out there, is something bad because your god decided it was bad or was it already bad and that is why your god teaches against it? Honest question.

God does not 'decide' in the same sense that we do, He is bound by His own Nature, He is the " SAME, yesterday, today and forever.. " and so He cannot be what He is not.. God IS good IS God.. Devil is evil is devil..
The Cross.. the Cross.
Meatros
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3/15/2011 6:42:23 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 5:30:36 AM, DATCMOTO wrote:
At 3/14/2011 7:01:38 PM, socialpinko wrote:
I have always pondered the Euthyphro dillemna but since I am not a Christian I have no way of answering it. So I will ask all Christians out there, is something bad because your god decided it was bad or was it already bad and that is why your god teaches against it? Honest question.

God does not 'decide' in the same sense that we do, He is bound by His own Nature, He is the " SAME, yesterday, today and forever.. " and so He cannot be what He is not.. God IS good IS God.. Devil is evil is devil..

What determines God's nature? If God's nature was different, would that mean that morality is different?
Meatros
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3/15/2011 6:42:47 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/14/2011 7:01:38 PM, socialpinko wrote:
I have always pondered the Euthyphro dillemna but since I am not a Christian I have no way of answering it. So I will ask all Christians out there, is something bad because your god decided it was bad or was it already bad and that is why your god teaches against it? Honest question.

Why is the Euth-Dil only a dilemma for Christians?
Cliff.Stamp
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3/15/2011 8:25:55 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/14/2011 11:45:09 PM, popculturepooka wrote:

A good person would not command that we go around torturing children for fun.

Pop I understand however, you have simply replaced the moral delimma with the same thing now only the issue is now good.

The question now is simply is something good because it is God's action or does God do something because it is good?

What is the objective standard which is used to judge if an action by God is good, benevolent, just, wise, etc. .

Again, I am not making a definitional claim here.

I should have been more clear, I am not saying you are introducting a definition for morality as = good. I am saying you have made a definitional claim for goodness.

Imagine my interlocutor says "Is God omniscient because he knows all truths or does he know all truths because he is omniscient?"

Ironically omniscience was exactly redefined internally as required to allow God to both have omniscience and still allow free will.

Yes there are a few attributes which have objective definitions, though disputed to allow them to exist together (omniscience and free will) they do not have the same dilemma which comes from morality.
Cliff.Stamp
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3/15/2011 8:27:24 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 5:30:36 AM, DATCMOTO wrote:

God does not 'decide' in the same sense that we do, He is bound by His own Nature

It does not have free will?
Thaddeus
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3/15/2011 8:43:44 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 8:27:24 AM, Cliff.Stamp wrote:
At 3/15/2011 5:30:36 AM, DATCMOTO wrote:

God does not 'decide' in the same sense that we do, He is bound by His own Nature

It does not have free will?

I think trying to ascribe god with characteristics such as free will would be meaningless in light of the fact we tend to use absolutes to describe god, like omnibenevolence. God can't make a choice; there is the action he takes and all the other wrong ones.
Meatros
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3/15/2011 8:47:33 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 8:43:44 AM, Thaddeus wrote:
At 3/15/2011 8:27:24 AM, Cliff.Stamp wrote:
At 3/15/2011 5:30:36 AM, DATCMOTO wrote:

God does not 'decide' in the same sense that we do, He is bound by His own Nature

It does not have free will?

I think trying to ascribe god with characteristics such as free will would be meaningless in light of the fact we tend to use absolutes to describe god, like omnibenevolence. God can't make a choice; there is the action he takes and all the other wrong ones.

So wouldn't that mean that God doesn't know what it's like to make a choice?
Cliff.Stamp
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3/15/2011 8:53:12 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 8:43:44 AM, Thaddeus wrote:

God can't make a choice; there is the action he takes and all the other wrong ones.

God can not make a choice, or he always chooses correctly? These are two very different concepts.

As an interesting aside, check out Plantinga's argument for free will, how he defines it to allow God to allow evil.

Now consider th same argument applied to God instead of man.
Thaddeus
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3/15/2011 8:53:45 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 8:47:33 AM, Meatros wrote:
At 3/15/2011 8:43:44 AM, Thaddeus wrote:
At 3/15/2011 8:27:24 AM, Cliff.Stamp wrote:
At 3/15/2011 5:30:36 AM, DATCMOTO wrote:

God does not 'decide' in the same sense that we do, He is bound by His own Nature

It does not have free will?

I think trying to ascribe god with characteristics such as free will would be meaningless in light of the fact we tend to use absolutes to describe god, like omnibenevolence. God can't make a choice; there is the action he takes and all the other wrong ones.

So wouldn't that mean that God doesn't know what it's like to make a choice?

Nah, he'd probably know, because he can know through our existence and probably all permutations of existence (which may or may not exist), but in the sense of his existence saying he makes choices is meaningless.
Meatros
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3/15/2011 9:16:36 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 8:53:45 AM, Thaddeus wrote:
At 3/15/2011 8:47:33 AM, Meatros wrote:
At 3/15/2011 8:43:44 AM, Thaddeus wrote:
At 3/15/2011 8:27:24 AM, Cliff.Stamp wrote:
At 3/15/2011 5:30:36 AM, DATCMOTO wrote:

God does not 'decide' in the same sense that we do, He is bound by His own Nature

It does not have free will?

I think trying to ascribe god with characteristics such as free will would be meaningless in light of the fact we tend to use absolutes to describe god, like omnibenevolence. God can't make a choice; there is the action he takes and all the other wrong ones.

So wouldn't that mean that God doesn't know what it's like to make a choice?

Nah, he'd probably know, because he can know through our existence and probably all permutations of existence (which may or may not exist), but in the sense of his existence saying he makes choices is meaningless.

I'm not sure I agree with this. It seems to me that God might know the text book definition of what it would mean - but he would not know how it actually feels to make a choice.

He could 'know' through us, perhaps in a way similar to watching a movie, but that still isn't the same way of knowing as it is when we actually make the choice.

I'm thinking of arguments along the lines that Michael Martin makes in his philosophical justification for atheism book, btw.
Thaddeus
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3/15/2011 9:32:14 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 9:16:36 AM, Meatros wrote:
At 3/15/2011 8:53:45 AM, Thaddeus wrote:
At 3/15/2011 8:47:33 AM, Meatros wrote:
At 3/15/2011 8:43:44 AM, Thaddeus wrote:
At 3/15/2011 8:27:24 AM, Cliff.Stamp wrote:
At 3/15/2011 5:30:36 AM, DATCMOTO wrote:

God does not 'decide' in the same sense that we do, He is bound by His own Nature

It does not have free will?

I think trying to ascribe god with characteristics such as free will would be meaningless in light of the fact we tend to use absolutes to describe god, like omnibenevolence. God can't make a choice; there is the action he takes and all the other wrong ones.

So wouldn't that mean that God doesn't know what it's like to make a choice?

Nah, he'd probably know, because he can know through our existence and probably all permutations of existence (which may or may not exist), but in the sense of his existence saying he makes choices is meaningless.

I'm not sure I agree with this. It seems to me that God might know the text book definition of what it would mean - but he would not know how it actually feels to make a choice.

He could 'know' through us, perhaps in a way similar to watching a movie, but that still isn't the same way of knowing as it is when we actually make the choice.

I'm thinking of arguments along the lines that Michael Martin makes in his philosophical justification for atheism book, btw.

Fair enough. I would say that, yes it would be like a "tv", but a perfect tv where she can experience absolutely everything we can, including choice. Perfect knowledge of us would also imply perfect knowledge of our free will.
Also if our hypothetical god is the christian one; J-dizzle was tempted by satan - in christian theology he certainly had experience of free will. It would logically follow (as much as theology can logically follow) that god as part of a triune godhead with Jesus would also be aware of exactly what the nature of free will is like.
I like that book; I disagree with a fair amount of what he says, but he argues in a clear and logical way, unlike more recent vocal atheists.
Meatros
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3/15/2011 9:40:11 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 9:32:14 AM, Thaddeus wrote:
Fair enough. I would say that, yes it would be like a "tv", but a perfect tv where she can experience absolutely everything we can, including choice. Perfect knowledge of us would also imply perfect knowledge of our free will.

I'm not sure I see how that's possible. In effect, God would have to be me.

Also if our hypothetical god is the christian one; J-dizzle was tempted by satan - in christian theology he certainly had experience of free will. It would logically follow (as much as theology can logically follow) that god as part of a triune godhead with Jesus would also be aware of exactly what the nature of free will is like.

Possibly - but putting that aside for a moment - let's explore 'types' of knowledge to see if that sheds light on anything. Martin mentions 'physical' knowledge, such as riding a bike. We 'physically remember' how to ride a bike. This is an example of knowledge that God would not have (not even through Jesus).

It seems to me that there are types of knowledge that God wouldn't have access to - bike riding and what it is to be 'me'. I would put free will in this as well, since Jesus, presumably, knew he was God and knew everything that God knew, right?

I like that book; I disagree with a fair amount of what he says, but he argues in a clear and logical way, unlike more recent vocal atheists.

I liked it too - it had a lot to think about and it wasn't dismissive to theists (that I remember, anyway) as a lot of the more recent atheist books have been (the God Debates being an exception - granted, I'm only 1/5th of the way through it).
Thaddeus
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3/15/2011 9:46:55 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 9:40:11 AM, Meatros wrote:
At 3/15/2011 9:32:14 AM, Thaddeus wrote:
Fair enough. I would say that, yes it would be like a "tv", but a perfect tv where she can experience absolutely everything we can, including choice. Perfect knowledge of us would also imply perfect knowledge of our free will.

I'm not sure I see how that's possible. In effect, God would have to be me.

Also if our hypothetical god is the christian one; J-dizzle was tempted by satan - in christian theology he certainly had experience of free will. It would logically follow (as much as theology can logically follow) that god as part of a triune godhead with Jesus would also be aware of exactly what the nature of free will is like.

Possibly - but putting that aside for a moment - let's explore 'types' of knowledge to see if that sheds light on anything. Martin mentions 'physical' knowledge, such as riding a bike. We 'physically remember' how to ride a bike. This is an example of knowledge that God would not have (not even through Jesus).

It seems to me that there are types of knowledge that God wouldn't have access to - bike riding and what it is to be 'me'. I would put free will in this as well, since Jesus, presumably, knew he was God and knew everything that God knew, right?

I like that book; I disagree with a fair amount of what he says, but he argues in a clear and logical way, unlike more recent vocal atheists.

I liked it too - it had a lot to think about and it wasn't dismissive to theists (that I remember, anyway) as a lot of the more recent atheist books have been (the God Debates being an exception - granted, I'm only 1/5th of the way through it).

Unless you are arguing that the knowledge (or more accurately the feeling) of freewill transcends other types of knowledge, such that it no longer has a physical basis in our synapses, I don't see how you can make the assertion that she can't know through us. (also for that matter she could be us, I mean what would you be doing with unlimited power and infinite time? =P)
JustCallMeTarzan
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3/15/2011 11:09:55 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/14/2011 7:01:38 PM, socialpinko wrote:
I have always pondered the Euthyphro dillemna but since I am not a Christian I have no way of answering it. So I will ask all Christians out there, is something bad because your god decided it was bad or was it already bad and that is why your god teaches against it? Honest question.

IMO it is quite obvious that God commands something because it is good... and the Bible clearly shows that not everything God commands is good, so the other option cannot *always* be correct.

Also consider the multitude of studies that show God has absolutely nothing to do with conceptualizations of morality...
Cliff.Stamp
Posts: 2,169
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3/15/2011 10:32:50 PM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 11:09:55 AM, JustCallMeTarzan wrote:

IMO it is quite obvious that God commands something because it is good

What is the standard by which God judges something good if it is not his inherent nature?
JustCallMeTarzan
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3/15/2011 10:59:55 PM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 10:32:50 PM, Cliff.Stamp wrote:
At 3/15/2011 11:09:55 AM, JustCallMeTarzan wrote:


IMO it is quite obvious that God commands something because it is good

What is the standard by which God judges something good if it is not his inherent nature?

Beats the hell outta me, but he's obviously not a very good moral judge, judging from the Bible.
socialpinko
Posts: 10,458
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3/15/2011 11:27:13 PM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/14/2011 11:45:09 PM, popculturepooka wrote:
At 3/14/2011 9:59:39 PM, Cliff.Stamp wrote:
At 3/14/2011 9:24:43 PM, popculturepooka wrote:


2) It's saying "ethical wrongness is (i.e., is identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving/perfectly good God".

Yes, and what I do not see is how that helps anything, note the dilemma was originally asked in terms of love not morality.

If God loves something does he do so because it is worthy of love or is it worthy of love simply because he loves it.

Later love was replaced by morality, but any of the attributes of God can be so questioned and they all lead to the same definitional problem which is that either the attribute in question is not constrained or it is constrained.

If it is constrained then what constrains it, if it is not constrained then anything can be exhibited and be claimed to be good/benevolent/loving/moral/wise etc. .


The original question was, "Is something pious because it is loved by the gods or loved by the gods because it is pious?" You are correct there.

The question was transformed into (the non-strawman version), "Is something ethically right because it is commanded by God or commanded by God because it is ethically right?"

The response is to take the first horn here with the MDCT and say that something is ethically right because it is commanded by God (where "because" is meant in an ontological sense in that they don't exist seperately). Then the claim is further brought along that this makes God's commands and "rightness" arbitrary because God could command anything as morally right like some evil act such as torturing people for fun. But the God that defenders have in mind when talking about the mdct is perfectly good and that surely constrains what he could command. A good person would not command that we go around torturing children for fun. So, no, the arbitrariness objection doesn't stick.

If god's benevolence constrains him from doing anything bad then A)What is his benevolence based on and B)Doesn't this destroy the claim of omnipotence?
: At 9/29/2014 10:55:59 AM, imabench wrote:
: : At 9/29/2014 9:43:46 AM, kbub wrote:
: :
: : DDO should discredit support of sexual violence at any time and in every way.
:
: I disagree.
Cliff.Stamp
Posts: 2,169
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3/16/2011 1:06:37 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 10:59:55 PM, JustCallMeTarzan wrote:

Beats the hell outta me ...

But its ok to you for God to have reference to an external moral criteria?

... but he's obviously not a very good moral judge, judging from the Bible.

And your objective moral standard comes from ...
DATCMOTO
Posts: 6,160
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3/16/2011 5:40:45 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 6:42:23 AM, Meatros wrote:
At 3/15/2011 5:30:36 AM, DATCMOTO wrote:
At 3/14/2011 7:01:38 PM, socialpinko wrote:
I have always pondered the Euthyphro dillemna but since I am not a Christian I have no way of answering it. So I will ask all Christians out there, is something bad because your god decided it was bad or was it already bad and that is why your god teaches against it? Honest question.

God does not 'decide' in the same sense that we do, He is bound by His own Nature, He is the " SAME, yesterday, today and forever.. " and so He cannot be what He is not.. God IS good IS God.. Devil is evil is devil..

a) What determines God's nature?
b) If God's nature was different, would that mean that morality is different?

a) Nothing, as there is nothing 'outside or beyond or before' Him.. He is " I Am. "

b) Yes, but THAT IS THE GOOD NEWS! (the Gospel) that God IS GOOD! that was why Jesus went to the cross to reveal this very fact!
The Cross.. the Cross.
DATCMOTO
Posts: 6,160
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3/16/2011 5:46:22 AM
Posted: 5 years ago
At 3/15/2011 8:27:24 AM, Cliff.Stamp wrote:
At 3/15/2011 5:30:36 AM, DATCMOTO wrote:

God does not 'decide' in the same sense that we do, He is bound by His own Nature

It does not have free will?

He has free will WITHIN His nature.. which is why He HAD to give Adam and Eve the choice to reject Him (Truth, Light, Love, Peace, Life..) and choose the enemies word over His, (leading to lies, darkness, selfishness, personal torment and death..)
the alternative; NOT to give them this choice, is a HORROR to a GOOD and JUST God..
The Cross.. the Cross.