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The Modal Ontological Argument proof of God

Rational_Thinker9119
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8/7/2012 3:28:47 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
Do any Atheists on this site have any good refutations to this argument? Out of all the arguments for theism, this one seems to be the most promising (considering I find all other arguments for theism to be duds).

Also, I would prefer no "maximally great banana" type parodies, those types of parodies don't work. Thank you.
drafterman
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8/7/2012 3:39:40 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
As with many arguments for god, it is actually only arguing for the existence of some aspect that they attribute to god. For example, consider the "First Mover" or "First Cause" arguments.

In the end, they just slap the label of "god" on whatever it is they proved and call it a day.

Even if we grant that the ontological argument proves the existence of some "maximally great" entity, how do we know that it is the same "maximally great" entity they call "God"?
SarcasticIndeed
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8/7/2012 3:41:12 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 3:28:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Do any Atheists on this site have any good refutations to this argument? Out of all the arguments for theism, this one seems to be the most promising (considering I find all other arguments for theism to be duds).

Also, I would prefer no "maximally great banana" type parodies, those types of parodies don't work. Thank you.

What if you change the argument by adding not to each premise? Like this:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being doesn't exist.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being doesn't exist, then a maximally great being doesn't exist in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being doesn't exist in some possible world, then it doesn't exist in every possible world.

4. If it doesn't exist in every possible world, then it doesn't exist in the actual world.

5. Therefore, a maximally great being doesn't exist.

Just heard of that kind of refutation. Anyway, how about the fact that we have not proven that there are possible worlds, so it's just an assumption that they exist.
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Rational_Thinker9119
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8/7/2012 3:42:54 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 3:39:40 PM, drafterman wrote:
As with many arguments for god, it is actually only arguing for the existence of some aspect that they attribute to god. For example, consider the "First Mover" or "First Cause" arguments.

In the end, they just slap the label of "god" on whatever it is they proved and call it a day.

Even if we grant that the ontological argument proves the existence of some "maximally great" entity, how do we know that it is the same "maximally great" entity they call "God"?

Well, if a maximally great being isn't God, then nothing is lol A maximally great being has all great making properties, such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.

If you know any being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent who isn't worthy of the name God....You let me know.
Rational_Thinker9119
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8/7/2012 3:54:32 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 3:41:12 PM, SarcasticIndeed wrote:
At 8/7/2012 3:28:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Do any Atheists on this site have any good refutations to this argument? Out of all the arguments for theism, this one seems to be the most promising (considering I find all other arguments for theism to be duds).

Also, I would prefer no "maximally great banana" type parodies, those types of parodies don't work. Thank you.

What if you change the argument by adding not to each premise? Like this:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being doesn't exist.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being doesn't exist, then a maximally great being doesn't exist in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being doesn't exist in some possible world, then it doesn't exist in every possible world.

4. If it doesn't exist in every possible world, then it doesn't exist in the actual world.

5. Therefore, a maximally great being doesn't exist.

Just heard of that kind of refutation. Anyway, how about the fact that we have not proven that there are possible worlds, so it's just an assumption that they exist.

I' know that theists have a rebuttal to the Reverse Ontological Argument, but I do not recall what it is (if any theists know of a rebuttal to the ROA, feel free to throw in your two cents). However, there are two problems I see with what you said. First of all, nobody is claiming this possible worlds actually exist. Secondly, not existing in the actual world does not follow from the fact that he wouldn't have necessary existence. I mean, neither you and I have necessary existence yet we live in the actual world.
Stephen_Hawkins
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8/7/2012 4:07:36 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 3:42:54 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 8/7/2012 3:39:40 PM, drafterman wrote:
As with many arguments for god, it is actually only arguing for the existence of some aspect that they attribute to god. For example, consider the "First Mover" or "First Cause" arguments.

In the end, they just slap the label of "god" on whatever it is they proved and call it a day.

Even if we grant that the ontological argument proves the existence of some "maximally great" entity, how do we know that it is the same "maximally great" entity they call "God"?

Well, if a maximally great being isn't God, then nothing is lol A maximally great being has all great making properties, such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.

If you know any being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent who isn't worthy of the name God....You let me know.

Greatness includes being humble, being clear and being a non-douche in general.

greatness does not mean real. A cat is no greater or weaker for not being real. In fact, it's concept is arguable greater than its reality.
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Rational_Thinker9119
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8/7/2012 4:17:53 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 4:07:36 PM, Stephen_Hawkins wrote:
At 8/7/2012 3:42:54 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 8/7/2012 3:39:40 PM, drafterman wrote:
As with many arguments for god, it is actually only arguing for the existence of some aspect that they attribute to god. For example, consider the "First Mover" or "First Cause" arguments.

In the end, they just slap the label of "god" on whatever it is they proved and call it a day.

Even if we grant that the ontological argument proves the existence of some "maximally great" entity, how do we know that it is the same "maximally great" entity they call "God"?

Well, if a maximally great being isn't God, then nothing is lol A maximally great being has all great making properties, such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.

If you know any being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent who isn't worthy of the name God....You let me know.

Greatness includes being humble, being clear and being a non-douche in general.

greatness does not mean real. A cat is no greater or weaker for not being real. In fact, it's concept is arguable greater than its reality.

6>5, 7>6 ect...

Thus a being who exists in more possible worlds than another is objectively, and mathematically greater. Next....
twocupcakes
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8/7/2012 4:20:15 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
I'm not quite sure I fully understand modal logic...But, I don't think existence is a necessary trait. For example, if a triangle has 3 sides in one world, it has 3 sides in all worlds. This does not mean that triangles exist, just that if they do exist, they have three sides. Like God, if God is maximally great in one world, he is maximally great in all worlds. This does not mean that God exists in all worlds, just if he does exist, he is defined as maximally great. Existence is not a necessary trait.

Then again, this might just sound stupid, because I don't think i really understand modal logic. But, this is what i think right now.
Rational_Thinker9119
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8/7/2012 4:25:48 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 4:20:15 PM, twocupcakes wrote:
I'm not quite sure I fully understand modal logic...But, I don't think existence is a necessary trait. For example, if a triangle has 3 sides in one world, it has 3 sides in all worlds. This does not mean that triangles exist, just that if they do exist, they have three sides. Like God, if God is maximally great in one world, he is maximally great in all worlds. This does not mean that God exists in all worlds, just if he does exist, he is defined as maximally great. Existence is not a necessary trait.

Then again, this might just sound stupid, because I don't think i really understand modal logic. But, this is what i think right now.

But it's greater to exist in all worlds, rather than just have some truth about you exist whether you or not you exist.
Paradox_7
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8/7/2012 4:39:02 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 4:20:40 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Are there seriously no good objections to this argument? Do I have to become a theist soon! lol


lol! that would be dope.. you'd be a valueable vessel-- imo.

not that you're serious or anything.. just thought i'd put that out there.

Now, you didn't answer me about our debate though.. so you want me to post a nother late argument or do you wanna start over with only 3 rounds?
: At 10/23/2012 8:06:03 PM, tvellalott wrote:
: Don't be. The Catholic Church is ran by Darth Sidius for fvck sake. As far as I'm concerned, you're a bona fide member of the Sith.
twocupcakes
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8/7/2012 4:44:34 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
But it's greater to exist in all worlds, rather than just have some truth about you exist whether you or not you exist.

I know that something that exists is greater than something that does not exist, but when describing anything "existence" is taken for granite. Existence is assumed. "Maximally great" applies to being all good, all powerful and all knowing. Of course, when we imagine a maximally great being, we are imagining that it exists. Otherwise, we would be imagining an imaginary maximally great being. It seems Modal logic proves definitions not existence. Modal logic defines triangles as having 3 sides, that coin is dropped into a jar with two coins it contains three coins, it does not show that all these things exist. I think Modal logic defines God as great in all worlds, but define it as existing.

Then again, I don't really know if i fully understand Modal Logic.
stubs
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8/7/2012 4:48:00 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 3:41:12 PM, SarcasticIndeed wrote:
What if you change the argument by adding not to each premise? Like this:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being doesn't exist.


False. A maximally great being is metaphysically necessary. There is no possible world in which a necessarily existent being does not exist. It's a contradiction therefore, there is no possible world in which the proposition above is true.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being doesn't exist, then a maximally great being doesn't exist in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being doesn't exist in some possible world, then it doesn't exist in every possible world.

4. If it doesn't exist in every possible world, then it doesn't exist in the actual world.

5. Therefore, a maximally great being doesn't exist.

Just heard of that kind of refutation. Anyway, how about the fact that we have not proven that there are possible worlds, so it's just an assumption that they exist.
Rational_Thinker9119
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8/7/2012 4:55:22 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 4:39:02 PM, Paradox_7 wrote:
At 8/7/2012 4:20:40 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Are there seriously no good objections to this argument? Do I have to become a theist soon! lol


lol! that would be dope.. you'd be a valueable vessel-- imo.

not that you're serious or anything.. just thought i'd put that out there.

Now, you didn't answer me about our debate though.. so you want me to post a nother late argument or do you wanna start over with only 3 rounds?

We can do it over, but we have to use the exact same arguments we did in the previous debate. The do over, will be to get that extra round in, but we will treat it like the same debate basically.
Rational_Thinker9119
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8/7/2012 4:56:58 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 4:48:00 PM, stubs wrote:
At 8/7/2012 3:41:12 PM, SarcasticIndeed wrote:
What if you change the argument by adding not to each premise? Like this:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being doesn't exist.


False. A maximally great being is metaphysically necessary, if it is possible for the maximally great being to exist. There is no possible world in which a necessarily existent being does not exist. It's a contradiction therefore, there is no possible world in which the proposition above is true if it is possible for a maximally great being to exist.

Fixed.


2. If it is possible that a maximally great being doesn't exist, then a maximally great being doesn't exist in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being doesn't exist in some possible world, then it doesn't exist in every possible world.

4. If it doesn't exist in every possible world, then it doesn't exist in the actual world.

5. Therefore, a maximally great being doesn't exist.

Just heard of that kind of refutation. Anyway, how about the fact that we have not proven that there are possible worlds, so it's just an assumption that they exist.
DanteAlighieri
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8/7/2012 5:04:26 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
I've explained why the argument is question-begging in this thread: http://www.debate.org...

Basically, the accessibility relation in S5 modal logic is a Euclidean equivalence relation. So, every possible world can access every possible world in its equivalence class. Because of this, every iterated string of modal operators in S5 is equivalent to the last modal operator in the string. Understanding that <> denotes "possibly" and [] denotes "necessarily," in S5 <>[][]<>[]<>p means the same as <>p. This is because modal facts are accessible from every possible world - that is, in S5, the meaning of <> and [] comports to (5) axiom in S5 that <>p -> []<>p and the (4) axiom that []p -> [][]p.

Consider the definition of maximal greatness: it is a maximally excellent being that exists in all possible worlds i.e. a MGB is just a necessarily existent MEB. To assert that a necessarily existent MEB is possible (in S5) is the same as to assert that there is a necessarily existent MEB. In other words, the possibility premise is equivalent to the conclusion - or construed more weakly, no one has reason to accept the first premise unless they already believed the conclusion.

One of the main issues that gives the argument its apparent force is that (a) people confuse epistemic and modal possibility (i.e. that 0.9 repeating is not equal to 1 is modally impossible but epistemically possible) and (b) that people conflate possibility of the MEB with possibility of the MGB.

There is some sophistry about logical equivalence being insufficient for question-begging, but I address those criticisms above. There is also some concern about de dicto / de re conflation, but that only arises in quantified S5 where <>(Ex)[]Mx is equivalent to (Ex)[]Mx anyway, for M to denote "maximal excellence." The argument is just as question-begging in quantified S5 as it is in propositional S5 - in fact, general quantified S5 has the unpalatable consequence that everything necessarily exists. So it isn't surprising that asserting the possibility of the MEB is the same as asserting its necessary actuality!

And like Hartshorne's argument, Plantinga's argument suffers from the same symmetry transformation:

(1) It is possible there isn't a MGB.
(2) If a MGB exists, it necessarily exists. [per def of MGB]
(3) It is not necessary that a MGB exists [per modal operator exchange of 1]
(4) Necessarily it is not necessary that a MGB exists [per the (4) axiom following 3]
(4) A MGB necessarily does not exist [modal modus tollens of 2,4]

It should also be noted that Plantinga's procedure can be replicated for anything whatsoever:

(1) It is possible there is a Nunicorn
(2) Hence, there is a Nunicorn

Where Nunicorn refers to a necessarily existent unicorn. Many people will retort that a unicorn is contingent, so a Nunicorn is impossible. I agree, which is why it can be pointed out that a MEB is contingent, so a Nunicorn is impossible.

Or

(1) It is possible that P = NP
(2) Hence, P = NP.

Since mathematical propositions are necessarily true. So if P = NP, it is necessarily true. And hence if P = NP is possible, it is possibly necessary and so...

All three of these parodies are question-begging, but then again so was the original argument.
DanteAlighieri
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8/7/2012 5:16:58 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 4:48:00 PM, stubs wrote:
False. A maximally great being is metaphysically necessary. There is no possible world in which a necessarily existent being does not exist. It's a contradiction therefore, there is no possible world in which the proposition above is true.

Saying that a MGB possibly doesn't exist is the same as saying it is impossible that a MGB exist. That is, there is no possible world at which a MGB exists. So the first premise of the reverse OA is the same as the conclusion. Of course, this symmetric anti-ontological argument is question begging, but then again, so was the original argument.

It should be pointed out that the same "defense" can be offered for anyything whatsoever, from necessarily existent unicorns to necessarily existent anythings. In any case, both the original and reverse ontological arguments are question-begging.
Rational_Thinker9119
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8/7/2012 5:18:17 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 5:04:26 PM, DanteAlighieri wrote:
I've explained why the argument is question-begging in this thread: http://www.debate.org...

Basically, the accessibility relation in S5 modal logic is a Euclidean equivalence relation. So, every possible world can access every possible world in its equivalence class. Because of this, every iterated string of modal operators in S5 is equivalent to the last modal operator in the string. Understanding that <> denotes "possibly" and [] denotes "necessarily," in S5 <>[][]<>[]<>p means the same as <>p. This is because modal facts are accessible from every possible world - that is, in S5, the meaning of <> and [] comports to (5) axiom in S5 that <>p -> []<>p and the (4) axiom that []p -> [][]p.

Consider the definition of maximal greatness: it is a maximally excellent being that exists in all possible worlds i.e. a MGB is just a necessarily existent MEB. To assert that a necessarily existent MEB is possible (in S5) is the same as to assert that there is a necessarily existent MEB. In other words, the possibility premise is equivalent to the conclusion - or construed more weakly, no one has reason to accept the first premise unless they already believed the conclusion.

One of the main issues that gives the argument its apparent force is that (a) people confuse epistemic and modal possibility (i.e. that 0.9 repeating is not equal to 1 is modally impossible but epistemically possible) and (b) that people conflate possibility of the MEB with possibility of the MGB.

There is some sophistry about logical equivalence being insufficient for question-begging, but I address those criticisms above. There is also some concern about de dicto / de re conflation, but that only arises in quantified S5 where <>(Ex)[]Mx is equivalent to (Ex)[]Mx anyway, for M to denote "maximal excellence." The argument is just as question-begging in quantified S5 as it is in propositional S5 - in fact, general quantified S5 has the unpalatable consequence that everything necessarily exists. So it isn't surprising that asserting the possibility of the MEB is the same as asserting its necessary actuality!

And like Hartshorne's argument, Plantinga's argument suffers from the same symmetry transformation:

(1) It is possible there isn't a MGB.
(2) If a MGB exists, it necessarily exists. [per def of MGB]
(3) It is not necessary that a MGB exists [per modal operator exchange of 1]
(4) Necessarily it is not necessary that a MGB exists [per the (4) axiom following 3]
(4) A MGB necessarily does not exist [modal modus tollens of 2,4]

It should also be noted that Plantinga's procedure can be replicated for anything whatsoever:

(1) It is possible there is a Nunicorn
(2) Hence, there is a Nunicorn

Where Nunicorn refers to a necessarily existent unicorn. Many people will retort that a unicorn is contingent, so a Nunicorn is impossible. I agree, which is why it can be pointed out that a MEB is contingent, so a Nunicorn is impossible.

Or

(1) It is possible that P = NP
(2) Hence, P = NP.

Since mathematical propositions are necessarily true. So if P = NP, it is necessarily true. And hence if P = NP is possible, it is possibly necessary and so...

All three of these parodies are question-begging, but then again so was the original argument.

This is a response worth taking seriously. If I get what you are saying, it's that accepting possibility is accepting necessity off of the bat, and therefore, actual existence right off the bat. The spread out syllogism may be a disguise to hide the fact that the conclusion was right there in this initial premise all along....Interesting. Thanks for the response.
SarcasticIndeed
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8/7/2012 5:36:07 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 5:18:17 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 8/7/2012 5:04:26 PM, DanteAlighieri wrote:
I've explained why the argument is question-begging in this thread: http://www.debate.org...

Basically, the accessibility relation in S5 modal logic is a Euclidean equivalence relation. So, every possible world can access every possible world in its equivalence class. Because of this, every iterated string of modal operators in S5 is equivalent to the last modal operator in the string. Understanding that <> denotes "possibly" and [] denotes "necessarily," in S5 <>[][]<>[]<>p means the same as <>p. This is because modal facts are accessible from every possible world - that is, in S5, the meaning of <> and [] comports to (5) axiom in S5 that <>p -> []<>p and the (4) axiom that []p -> [][]p.

Consider the definition of maximal greatness: it is a maximally excellent being that exists in all possible worlds i.e. a MGB is just a necessarily existent MEB. To assert that a necessarily existent MEB is possible (in S5) is the same as to assert that there is a necessarily existent MEB. In other words, the possibility premise is equivalent to the conclusion - or construed more weakly, no one has reason to accept the first premise unless they already believed the conclusion.

One of the main issues that gives the argument its apparent force is that (a) people confuse epistemic and modal possibility (i.e. that 0.9 repeating is not equal to 1 is modally impossible but epistemically possible) and (b) that people conflate possibility of the MEB with possibility of the MGB.

There is some sophistry about logical equivalence being insufficient for question-begging, but I address those criticisms above. There is also some concern about de dicto / de re conflation, but that only arises in quantified S5 where <>(Ex)[]Mx is equivalent to (Ex)[]Mx anyway, for M to denote "maximal excellence." The argument is just as question-begging in quantified S5 as it is in propositional S5 - in fact, general quantified S5 has the unpalatable consequence that everything necessarily exists. So it isn't surprising that asserting the possibility of the MEB is the same as asserting its necessary actuality!

And like Hartshorne's argument, Plantinga's argument suffers from the same symmetry transformation:

(1) It is possible there isn't a MGB.
(2) If a MGB exists, it necessarily exists. [per def of MGB]
(3) It is not necessary that a MGB exists [per modal operator exchange of 1]
(4) Necessarily it is not necessary that a MGB exists [per the (4) axiom following 3]
(4) A MGB necessarily does not exist [modal modus tollens of 2,4]

It should also be noted that Plantinga's procedure can be replicated for anything whatsoever:

(1) It is possible there is a Nunicorn
(2) Hence, there is a Nunicorn

Where Nunicorn refers to a necessarily existent unicorn. Many people will retort that a unicorn is contingent, so a Nunicorn is impossible. I agree, which is why it can be pointed out that a MEB is contingent, so a Nunicorn is impossible.

Or

(1) It is possible that P = NP
(2) Hence, P = NP.

Since mathematical propositions are necessarily true. So if P = NP, it is necessarily true. And hence if P = NP is possible, it is possibly necessary and so...

All three of these parodies are question-begging, but then again so was the original argument.

This is a response worth taking seriously. If I get what you are saying, it's that accepting possibility is accepting necessity off of the bat, and therefore, actual existence right off the bat. The spread out syllogism may be a disguise to hide the fact that the conclusion was right there in this initial premise all along....Interesting. Thanks for the response.

It's funny that this guy never debates or anything, and just posts lengthy stuff about the Modal Ontological Argument.

Oh well. If I remember his pasts posts well, it's that you have to prove the existence of the base principle first (Tri-Omni God) before slapping the maximally great mark on it so it becomes necessary in every possible world. I guess it makes sense.
<SIGNATURE CENSORED> nac
drafterman
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8/7/2012 5:37:01 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 3:42:54 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 8/7/2012 3:39:40 PM, drafterman wrote:
As with many arguments for god, it is actually only arguing for the existence of some aspect that they attribute to god. For example, consider the "First Mover" or "First Cause" arguments.

In the end, they just slap the label of "god" on whatever it is they proved and call it a day.

Even if we grant that the ontological argument proves the existence of some "maximally great" entity, how do we know that it is the same "maximally great" entity they call "God"?

Well, if a maximally great being isn't God, then nothing is lol A maximally great being has all great making properties, such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.

If you know any being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent who isn't worthy of the name God....You let me know.

Well, those details would have to depend on the specific argument, as there are several.
drafterman
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8/7/2012 5:40:42 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
Also, the arguments only conclude in the existence of a being which is maximally great in an ontological sense and nothing more. Since omnipotence, omniscience, or omni benevolence don't necessarily follow from ontology, the the argument doesn't prove god.
The_Fool_on_the_hill
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8/7/2012 8:20:10 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 5:40:42 PM, drafterman wrote:
Also, the arguments only conclude in the existence of a being which is maximally great in an ontological sense and nothing more. Since omnipotence, omniscience, or omni benevolence don't necessarily follow from ontology, the the argument doesn't prove god.

The Fool: In fact maximally is just a mathmatical term for highest magnetude. Great is just high magnitude.
That is, there is no demarcation from mathematical conceptions. They would have to say that God is identical two these to mathematical expression. Which are really abstract 'ideas'
"The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another." G. W. F. HEGEL
tvellalott
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8/7/2012 8:31:54 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
It's fairly simple.

Unless you can prove that existence is a property of perfection, the argument is invalid.
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Reason_Alliance
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8/7/2012 8:36:42 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
"accepting possibility is accepting necessity"

Yes and there's a way about objecting with this in an easier way that Dante did. The weakest point I've found is actually P3. And this is why I'm unconvinced by Plantinga's formulation,

One can feasibly think of possible worlds in which Maximal Greatness isn't exemplified. If one thinks in this way, then the theist must either revise his concept of God, or revise his concept of possible worlds.

If you revise concept of God, he's no longer necessary. If you revise concept of possible worlds so that God fits it is question-begging.

Hence P3 presents us with a dilemma whence the objection is brought up that there are possible worlds in which Maximal Greatness isn't exemplified: worlds like where bunnies just suffer horribly for their whole life and copulate solely for the sake of suffering as entities with higher order awareness of pain, such a world seems possible but would God's greatness be maximal?
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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8/8/2012 3:21:19 PM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/7/2012 8:36:42 PM, Reason_Alliance wrote:
"accepting possibility is accepting necessity"

Yes and there's a way about objecting with this in an easier way that Dante did. The weakest point I've found is actually P3. And this is why I'm unconvinced by Plantinga's formulation,

One can feasibly think of possible worlds in which Maximal Greatness isn't exemplified. If one thinks in this way, then the theist must either revise his concept of God, or revise his concept of possible worlds.

If you revise concept of God, he's no longer necessary. If you revise concept of possible worlds so that God fits it is question-begging.

Hence P3 presents us with a dilemma whence the objection is brought up that there are possible worlds in which Maximal Greatness isn't exemplified: worlds like where bunnies just suffer horribly for their whole life and copulate solely for the sake of suffering as entities with higher order awareness of pain, such a world seems possible but would God's greatness be maximal?

I agree with this. I can conceive of a world where there are no sentient entities for example. Accepting the initial premise of the Modal Ontological Argument, is also accepting that a world where there are no sentient beings is incoherent. I see nothing incoherent with a possible world where there are no sentient beings, so why accept the initial premise of the Modal Ontological Argument?
TheJackel
Posts: 508
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8/9/2012 1:24:56 AM
Posted: 4 years ago
In regards to 'GODs Greatness" or maximum entity for the concept of god can fall under what a Pantheist once told me.. :

Modern Pantheism revolves around existence itself as GOD to which is the totality of power, greatness, causality, governess, rule, law, force, and that of everything in and of it.

As the question demonstrates blatantly:

What is GOD without existence?

So there is no GOD of existence but existence itself.. It's the absolute limit in which you can move the GOD goal post, it's the entire spectrum of everything there is, was, or ever could and will be. It's the only thing without cause since non-existence is impossible to be an existing person, place, object, substance, or thing. It's a self generating system where everything comes from itself, and even governs the conscious.. It also makes the god argument moot since that makes everything GOD, or OF GOD itself. It is the absolute first cause, and the very foundation and essence of all things in and of it.
Reason_Alliance
Posts: 1,283
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8/9/2012 2:11:53 AM
Posted: 4 years ago
At 8/8/2012 3:21:19 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 8/7/2012 8:36:42 PM, Reason_Alliance wrote:
"accepting possibility is accepting necessity"

Yes and there's a way about objecting with this in an easier way that Dante did. The weakest point I've found is actually P3. And this is why I'm unconvinced by Plantinga's formulation,

One can feasibly think of possible worlds in which Maximal Greatness isn't exemplified. If one thinks in this way, then the theist must either revise his concept of God, or revise his concept of possible worlds.

If you revise concept of God, he's no longer necessary. If you revise concept of possible worlds so that God fits it is question-begging.

Hence P3 presents us with a dilemma whence the objection is brought up that there are possible worlds in which Maximal Greatness isn't exemplified: worlds like where bunnies just suffer horribly for their whole life and copulate solely for the sake of suffering as entities with higher order awareness of pain, such a world seems possible but would God's greatness be maximal?

I agree with this. I can conceive of a world where there are no sentient entities for example. Accepting the initial premise of the Modal Ontological Argument, is also accepting that a world where there are no sentient beings is incoherent.

I see nothing incoherent with a possible world where there are no sentient beings, so why accept the initial premise of the Modal Ontological Argument?

Basically it forces us to show that sentient beings are an impossibility....