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Apeiron
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1/2/2013 7:39:46 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
So begins an epic discourse between unitedandy & Apeiron regarding the Problem of Evil. The topics in this discourse can be found as "spring-board points" raised in this debate,

http://www.debate.org...

First I'd like to thank Andy for his interest in this tough topic and his dedication to respond to arguments. At this point Andy is convinced that we'll never agree, I remain optimistic either way.

I prefer to hold true on our general debate structure:

1) Defending P1 vs Contra-P1
2) Defending P3 vs Contra-P3
3) Alleged Contradictions
4) God of Law

Premise one of the evidential problem of evil (EPoE) claims that God"s motive (omnibenevolence) to prevent gratuitous evil is incompatible with his means (omniscience / omnipotence) of prevention,

If there were an all-powerful and all-good God, then there would not be any evil in the world unless that evil is logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.

Or in less words,

If God exists, then gratuitous evils don't

Andy believes P1 here is true because God would have the motive & means to prevent those types and amounts of evils which have no morally sufficient reason to be permitted. I shall call this premise the "Incompatibility Claim" or IC hereafter. But first it would help to define God"s properties that the WSA EPoE questions.

God"s Motive

Omnibenevolence- God is to be praised in the sense of adoration for his axiological perfection, not in the sense of commendation for fully executing his duties. God by definition is singularly worthy of worship, and only a being that is the locus, source, and standard of all value is worthy of worship. Also, unless we are nihilists, we must recognize some ultimate standard of value, and God seems to be the least arbitrary stopping point.

Note that one needn't prove God as good in order to argue against the PoE. Rather it is assumed in the IC that this definition of God,

"By God, I mean an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, personal being who created the universe, and is (to a greater or lesser extent) active within the universe."
-unitedandy

All the detractor of the EPoE must do is rebut that God has morally wronged someone.

God"s Means

Omniscience- I hold to a conceptualist model of divine knowledge that also includes Molinism. Meaning God has natural knowledge of what COULD happen, middle knowledge of what WOULD happen (given the combination of different possible circumstances), & free knowledge of what WILL happen.

First, in natural knowledge, God"s knowledge here is self-contained like a contingent mind"s ideas: God knows all true propositions, including ones about future contingents, the range of possible worlds, etc.

In middle knowledge, God also has knowledge of all contingently true counterfactual propositions, including those of creaturely free actions. Thus God not only knows of the range of possible worlds, but then also the range of feasible worlds. The basis of middle knowledge is that God knows the individual essence of every possible creature so well that He knows what that creature would do in any possible combination of circumstances that God may actualize him in, and also that God simply discernes all truths including counterfactual truths.

Take God"s knowledge of possible & feasible worlds together with the his knowledge of the actual world, and one can see that God follows the knowledge of his own decree, the actual world.

Omnipotence- God is all powerful just if he can actualize any state of affairs that isn"t described by the counterfactuals of the free acts of others and that is broadly logically possible for someone to actualize, given the same hard past and the same true counterfactuals about the free acts of others.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

With this in place, I'll now ask Andy of he's ready to being Contra-P1 first with the Resolution argument.
Ramshutu
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1/2/2013 7:51:28 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
There is not necessarily a problem with evil, as there are situations that the greater good necessitates the present of evil.

However, if you can show the nature of evil cannot be explained by the required necessities, then you can disprove God.

More importantly, if the omnipotent God can always think of the best solution, the alternative argument would simply be to propose a 'better' system of evil with regards to the overall set of definitions provided.
Apeiron
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1/2/2013 7:57:01 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 7:51:28 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
There is not necessarily a problem with evil, as there are situations that the greater good necessitates the present of evil.

However, if you can show the nature of evil cannot be explained by the required necessities, then you can disprove God.

More importantly, if the omnipotent God can always think of the best solution, the alternative argument would simply be to propose a 'better' system of evil with regards to the overall set of definitions provided.

Thanks for your insight. I disagree that every evil must occur FOR some greater good in order to be permitted by a good God.

However, what do you mean by a better system of evil?
Ramshutu
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1/2/2013 8:04:35 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 7:57:01 PM, Apeiron wrote:
At 1/2/2013 7:51:28 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
There is not necessarily a problem with evil, as there are situations that the greater good necessitates the present of evil.

However, if you can show the nature of evil cannot be explained by the required necessities, then you can disprove God.

More importantly, if the omnipotent God can always think of the best solution, the alternative argument would simply be to propose a 'better' system of evil with regards to the overall set of definitions provided.

Thanks for your insight. I disagree that every evil must occur FOR some greater good in order to be permitted by a good God.

However, what do you mean by a better system of evil?

If there is no evil, there is no capacity to be good. If a system of evil can be defined that always provides another the capacity to be good.

For example, god is smart enough to put in a system of rule where evil is possible, but every act of evil can be pre-empted or stopped by a single act of goodness by someone else. If you can show this is not the case in the real world, you have found a better system provided that the justification your con-arguer puts for evil being there in the first place is fulfilled.
Composer
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1/2/2013 8:20:45 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 8:04:35 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
If there is no evil, there is no capacity to be good.

Are you stating that your Omnipotent Supernatural god is hence NOT Omnipotent because it is incapable of providing a system where evil isn't a necessity?
TheAntidoter
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1/2/2013 8:22:05 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 8:20:45 PM, Composer wrote:
At 1/2/2013 8:04:35 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
If there is no evil, there is no capacity to be good.

Are you stating that your Omnipotent Supernatural god is hence NOT Omnipotent because it is incapable of providing a system where evil isn't a necessity?


Are you saying that a system with no evil could not exist?
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Dogknox
Posts: 5,043
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1/2/2013 8:26:54 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
Apeiron God is LOVE!
Scriptures tell you in two places "God IS LOVE!"

LOVE IS: Giving of self freely from the heart!

Man is made in the image of God: "God is LOVE"!
To LOVE, man must have "Free will"!
To be made in the image of God, man must have Free Will to make a decision to love or to hate, to love or not to love!!

Love says we must have the freedom to decide!
I can't force you to love, I can't force you to accept my love!

Apeiron To love, there must be a free willingness to love; True love can't be true, unless it is given freely!

The problem with evil is not a problem but a result!
Evil is: The free will decision to NOT LOVE!

God allows evil or he would not be a loving god!

Apeiron God gave us the "FREEDOM" to love or not to love, evil is the result of the decision to not love! Sure....
Apeiron Sure God could have snapped his finger or given a kind of "love potion" to man.. but then God would not be perfect, thus he would not be God!
God is perfect pure 100% LOVE... Because he is pure LOVE he has given man "Free will" to love or not to love!

Evil is the result of the loving decision of giving man "Free Will"! OR...
Apeiron Or in other words, Evil is the result of forming man in the image of LOVE!

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unitedandy
Posts: 1,173
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1/2/2013 8:51:00 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 7:39:46 PM, Apeiron wrote:
So begins an epic discourse between unitedandy & Apeiron regarding the Problem of Evil. The topics in this discourse can be found as "spring-board points" raised in this debate,

http://www.debate.org...

First I'd like to thank Andy for his interest in this tough topic and his dedication to respond to arguments. At this point Andy is convinced that we'll never agree, I remain optimistic either way.

I prefer to hold true on our general debate structure:

1) Defending P1 vs Contra-P1
2) Defending P3 vs Contra-P3
3) Alleged Contradictions
4) God of Law

Premise one of the evidential problem of evil (EPoE) claims that God"s motive (omnibenevolence) to prevent gratuitous evil is incompatible with his means (omniscience / omnipotence) of prevention,

If there were an all-powerful and all-good God, then there would not be any evil in the world unless that evil is logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.

Or in less words,

If God exists, then gratuitous evils don't

Andy believes P1 here is true because God would have the motive & means to prevent those types and amounts of evils which have no morally sufficient reason to be permitted. I shall call this premise the "Incompatibility Claim" or IC hereafter. But first it would help to define God"s properties that the WSA EPoE questions.


God"s Motive

Omnibenevolence- God is to be praised in the sense of adoration for his axiological perfection, not in the sense of commendation for fully executing his duties. God by definition is singularly worthy of worship, and only a being that is the locus, source, and standard of all value is worthy of worship. Also, unless we are nihilists, we must recognize some ultimate standard of value, and God seems to be the least arbitrary stopping point.

Note that one needn't prove God as good in order to argue against the PoE. Rather it is assumed in the IC that this definition of God,

"By God, I mean an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, personal being who created the universe, and is (to a greater or lesser extent) active within the universe."
-unitedandy

All the detractor of the EPoE must do is rebut that God has morally wronged someone.


God"s Means

Omniscience- I hold to a conceptualist model of divine knowledge that also includes Molinism. Meaning God has natural knowledge of what COULD happen, middle knowledge of what WOULD happen (given the combination of different possible circumstances), & free knowledge of what WILL happen.

First, in natural knowledge, God"s knowledge here is self-contained like a contingent mind"s ideas: God knows all true propositions, including ones about future contingents, the range of possible worlds, etc.

In middle knowledge, God also has knowledge of all contingently true counterfactual propositions, including those of creaturely free actions. Thus God not only knows of the range of possible worlds, but then also the range of feasible worlds. The basis of middle knowledge is that God knows the individual essence of every possible creature so well that He knows what that creature would do in any possible combination of circumstances that God may actualize him in, and also that God simply discernes all truths including counterfactual truths.

Take God"s knowledge of possible & feasible worlds together with the his knowledge of the actual world, and one can see that God follows the knowledge of his own decree, the actual world.

Omnipotence- God is all powerful just if he can actualize any state of affairs that isn"t described by the counterfactuals of the free acts of others and that is broadly logically possible for someone to actualize, given the same hard past and the same true counterfactuals about the free acts of others.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

With this in place, I'll now ask Andy of he's ready to being Contra-P1 first with the Resolution argument.

Lol. I said I'd resolve any outstanding issues. I ain't debating the whole thing again. Pick individual points made in the debate and state your issue. If I've already answered it, and we disagree, then unless there's something new to add, I don't see the point in banging our heads against a brick wall.
Apeiron
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1/2/2013 8:56:49 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 8:04:35 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
At 1/2/2013 7:57:01 PM, Apeiron wrote:
At 1/2/2013 7:51:28 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
There is not necessarily a problem with evil, as there are situations that the greater good necessitates the present of evil.

However, if you can show the nature of evil cannot be explained by the required necessities, then you can disprove God.

More importantly, if the omnipotent God can always think of the best solution, the alternative argument would simply be to propose a 'better' system of evil with regards to the overall set of definitions provided.

Thanks for your insight. I disagree that every evil must occur FOR some greater good in order to be permitted by a good God.

However, what do you mean by a better system of evil?

If there is no evil, there is no capacity to be good. If a system of evil can be defined that always provides another the capacity to be good.

For example, god is smart enough to put in a system of rule where evil is possible, but every act of evil can be pre-empted or stopped by a single act of goodness by someone else. If you can show this is not the case in the real world, you have found a better system provided that the justification your con-arguer puts for evil being there in the first place is fulfilled.

Right, I tend to agree with this, and it's what my theodicy bespeaks- that any instance of evil in the actual world is defeat-able (by a virtuous response) & outbalance-able (by God's promise of perfect happiness in an afterlife). And defeat-able outbalance-able evil isn't gratuitous.

Hence the BoP is on Andy to show that the actual world doesn't contain the un-defeat-able and un-outbalance-able evil.
Apeiron
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1/2/2013 8:58:25 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 8:51:00 PM, unitedandy wrote:
At 1/2/2013 7:39:46 PM, Apeiron wrote:
So begins an epic discourse between unitedandy & Apeiron regarding the Problem of Evil. The topics in this discourse can be found as "spring-board points" raised in this debate,

http://www.debate.org...

First I'd like to thank Andy for his interest in this tough topic and his dedication to respond to arguments. At this point Andy is convinced that we'll never agree, I remain optimistic either way.

I prefer to hold true on our general debate structure:

1) Defending P1 vs Contra-P1
2) Defending P3 vs Contra-P3
3) Alleged Contradictions
4) God of Law

Premise one of the evidential problem of evil (EPoE) claims that God"s motive (omnibenevolence) to prevent gratuitous evil is incompatible with his means (omniscience / omnipotence) of prevention,

If there were an all-powerful and all-good God, then there would not be any evil in the world unless that evil is logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.

Or in less words,

If God exists, then gratuitous evils don't

Andy believes P1 here is true because God would have the motive & means to prevent those types and amounts of evils which have no morally sufficient reason to be permitted. I shall call this premise the "Incompatibility Claim" or IC hereafter. But first it would help to define God"s properties that the WSA EPoE questions.


God"s Motive

Omnibenevolence- God is to be praised in the sense of adoration for his axiological perfection, not in the sense of commendation for fully executing his duties. God by definition is singularly worthy of worship, and only a being that is the locus, source, and standard of all value is worthy of worship. Also, unless we are nihilists, we must recognize some ultimate standard of value, and God seems to be the least arbitrary stopping point.

Note that one needn't prove God as good in order to argue against the PoE. Rather it is assumed in the IC that this definition of God,

"By God, I mean an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, personal being who created the universe, and is (to a greater or lesser extent) active within the universe."
-unitedandy

All the detractor of the EPoE must do is rebut that God has morally wronged someone.


God"s Means

Omniscience- I hold to a conceptualist model of divine knowledge that also includes Molinism. Meaning God has natural knowledge of what COULD happen, middle knowledge of what WOULD happen (given the combination of different possible circumstances), & free knowledge of what WILL happen.

First, in natural knowledge, God"s knowledge here is self-contained like a contingent mind"s ideas: God knows all true propositions, including ones about future contingents, the range of possible worlds, etc.

In middle knowledge, God also has knowledge of all contingently true counterfactual propositions, including those of creaturely free actions. Thus God not only knows of the range of possible worlds, but then also the range of feasible worlds. The basis of middle knowledge is that God knows the individual essence of every possible creature so well that He knows what that creature would do in any possible combination of circumstances that God may actualize him in, and also that God simply discernes all truths including counterfactual truths.

Take God"s knowledge of possible & feasible worlds together with the his knowledge of the actual world, and one can see that God follows the knowledge of his own decree, the actual world.

Omnipotence- God is all powerful just if he can actualize any state of affairs that isn"t described by the counterfactuals of the free acts of others and that is broadly logically possible for someone to actualize, given the same hard past and the same true counterfactuals about the free acts of others.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

With this in place, I'll now ask Andy of he's ready to being Contra-P1 first with the Resolution argument.


Lol. I said I'd resolve any outstanding issues. I ain't debating the whole thing again. Pick individual points made in the debate and state your issue. If I've already answered it, and we disagree, then unless there's something new to add, I don't see the point in banging our heads against a brick wall.

I'll take that as you're ready to go over the RA..
unitedandy
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1/2/2013 10:35:09 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 8:58:25 PM, Apeiron wrote:
At 1/2/2013 8:51:00 PM, unitedandy wrote:
At 1/2/2013 7:39:46 PM, Apeiron wrote:
So begins an epic discourse between unitedandy & Apeiron regarding the Problem of Evil. The topics in this discourse can be found as "spring-board points" raised in this debate,

http://www.debate.org...

First I'd like to thank Andy for his interest in this tough topic and his dedication to respond to arguments. At this point Andy is convinced that we'll never agree, I remain optimistic either way.

I prefer to hold true on our general debate structure:

1) Defending P1 vs Contra-P1
2) Defending P3 vs Contra-P3
3) Alleged Contradictions
4) God of Law

Premise one of the evidential problem of evil (EPoE) claims that God"s motive (omnibenevolence) to prevent gratuitous evil is incompatible with his means (omniscience / omnipotence) of prevention,

If there were an all-powerful and all-good God, then there would not be any evil in the world unless that evil is logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.

Or in less words,

If God exists, then gratuitous evils don't

Andy believes P1 here is true because God would have the motive & means to prevent those types and amounts of evils which have no morally sufficient reason to be permitted. I shall call this premise the "Incompatibility Claim" or IC hereafter. But first it would help to define God"s properties that the WSA EPoE questions.


God"s Motive

Omnibenevolence- God is to be praised in the sense of adoration for his axiological perfection, not in the sense of commendation for fully executing his duties. God by definition is singularly worthy of worship, and only a being that is the locus, source, and standard of all value is worthy of worship. Also, unless we are nihilists, we must recognize some ultimate standard of value, and God seems to be the least arbitrary stopping point.

Note that one needn't prove God as good in order to argue against the PoE. Rather it is assumed in the IC that this definition of God,

"By God, I mean an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, personal being who created the universe, and is (to a greater or lesser extent) active within the universe."
-unitedandy

All the detractor of the EPoE must do is rebut that God has morally wronged someone.


God"s Means

Omniscience- I hold to a conceptualist model of divine knowledge that also includes Molinism. Meaning God has natural knowledge of what COULD happen, middle knowledge of what WOULD happen (given the combination of different possible circumstances), & free knowledge of what WILL happen.

First, in natural knowledge, God"s knowledge here is self-contained like a contingent mind"s ideas: God knows all true propositions, including ones about future contingents, the range of possible worlds, etc.

In middle knowledge, God also has knowledge of all contingently true counterfactual propositions, including those of creaturely free actions. Thus God not only knows of the range of possible worlds, but then also the range of feasible worlds. The basis of middle knowledge is that God knows the individual essence of every possible creature so well that He knows what that creature would do in any possible combination of circumstances that God may actualize him in, and also that God simply discernes all truths including counterfactual truths.

Take God"s knowledge of possible & feasible worlds together with the his knowledge of the actual world, and one can see that God follows the knowledge of his own decree, the actual world.

Omnipotence- God is all powerful just if he can actualize any state of affairs that isn"t described by the counterfactuals of the free acts of others and that is broadly logically possible for someone to actualize, given the same hard past and the same true counterfactuals about the free acts of others.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

With this in place, I'll now ask Andy of he's ready to being Contra-P1 first with the Resolution argument.


Lol. I said I'd resolve any outstanding issues. I ain't debating the whole thing again. Pick individual points made in the debate and state your issue. If I've already answered it, and we disagree, then unless there's something new to add, I don't see the point in banging our heads against a brick wall.

I'll take that as you're ready to go over the RA..

First, there's no way I'm going to go into things like Molinism and the like. I don't find it plausible, you're never going to justify it, and it's tangential, so I'd rather drop it. As for your straw-man (bolded), just no. If there is an instance of evil which is strictly necessary for a greater good, then (given P1), the conclusion follows. God's inability to prevent gratuitous evil is the problem

As for RA, remember outstanding issues. No starting from scratch and rehashing the whole issue.

But while I'm here, there's a few of things I need clarified.

On falsification - are you "agnostic" about Flew's undetectable gardener? Wouldn't theism entail a different world than atheism?

Can he rule out that an "infinite mind" may have created an illusory past, given that we have epistemic limitations? How does one do this?

Can he rule out a deceptive "evil daemon" type world, created by an omnisicient Anti-God? How?

Why think that Virtue is more plausible than P3, rather than a mere possibility? What about cases where evil begets evil (cycle of poverty, addiction, perpetual war and so forth)? Why think allowing ebola is the best way for Virtue? What about where Virtue doesn't apply? Is it really the case that allowing suffering on this scale, as part of some (seeming) utilitarian sum is morally permissible?

Is adopting a contradictory position viable? How does he plan to solve this?

We'll call this the unanswered questions round. To be fair, I think I asked all of these in the debate, and never got a response. Think there around 13 questions, and this is before we get into your response to Law or ST, which are (for me at least) the juicy bits.
Composer
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1/2/2013 10:45:08 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 8:22:05 PM, TheAntidoter wrote:
At 1/2/2013 8:20:45 PM, Composer wrote:
At 1/2/2013 8:04:35 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
If there is no evil, there is no capacity to be good.

Are you stating that your Omnipotent Supernatural god is hence NOT Omnipotent because it is incapable of providing a system where evil isn't a necessity?


At 1/2/2013 8:22:05 PM, TheAntidoter wrote:
Are you saying that a system with no evil could not exist?

No!
Apeiron
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1/2/2013 11:21:43 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 10:35:09 PM, unitedandy wrote:

I'll take that as you're ready to go over the RA..

First, there's no way I'm going to go into things like Molinism and the like. I don't find it plausible, you're never going to justify it, and it's tangential, so I'd rather drop it. As for your straw-man (bolded), just no. If there is an instance of evil which is strictly necessary for a greater good, then (given P1), the conclusion follows. God's inability to prevent gratuitous evil is the problem

As for RA, remember outstanding issues. No starting from scratch and rehashing the whole issue.

Mind your manners bud, you don't give me any ultimatums. If I want to bring up new arguments I will- this is a discourse that you agreed to have. You can always just not respond to my new arguments, but that doesn't mean I won't bring them up for the benefit of others and my benefit. Again, it's not all about you.

But then you go into new arguments yourself below! And I'm the one accused of double standards? C'mon bro..

But while I'm here, there's a few of things I need clarified.

Sure why not? This IS a discourse isn't it?

On falsification - are you "agnostic" about Flew's undetectable gardener? Wouldn't theism entail a different world than atheism?

Can he rule out that an "infinite mind" may have created an illusory past, given that we have epistemic limitations? How does one do this?

Can he rule out a deceptive "evil daemon" type world, created by an omnisicient Anti-God? How?

Why think that Virtue is more plausible than P3, rather than a mere possibility? What about cases where evil begets evil (cycle of poverty, addiction, perpetual war and so forth)? Why think allowing ebola is the best way for Virtue? What about where Virtue doesn't apply? Is it really the case that allowing suffering on this scale, as part of some (seeming) utilitarian sum is morally permissible?

Is adopting a contradictory position viable? How does he plan to solve this?

We'll call this the unanswered questions round. To be fair, I think I asked all of these in the debate, and never got a response. Think there around 13 questions, and this is before we get into your response to Law or ST, which are (for me at least) the juicy bits.

Oh stop crying Andy I never said you have to defend against molinism. It's simply the part of the part of the part of the background knowledge regarding God's properties you wish to draw an coherency between. So it's important to mention, for at least others & myself (it's not all about you ya know ;-)

Also, I have good arguments for Molinism, so don't assume I won't justify it at the drop of a hat with a quick syllogism.

Now it's true regarding the BoP that my only burden is to rebut that God has morally wronged someone in allowing some instance of evil. It's strange you would deny this since this is the very essence of your argument,

"God has the means and motive to prevent suffering. Hence if he exists, he WOULD prevent pointless evil."

&

"Pointless evil exists"

^ this is your BoP... while mine is,

"God doesn't fail to be morally perfect first if he wouldn't prevent pointless suffering, and second that that we don't find gratuity in the world anyway."

Loosely speaking anyway- I think you'll agree here anyway. Moving on.. .

You'll have to clarify Flew's undetectable gardener, I only aquainted myself with his death by a thousand qualifications. Nevertheless I hope this helps clarify my position to you that I'm a justificationist. I have good reason for thinking it's more tenable than falsification. Plus I've noticed in recent years that falsificationism in the philosophy of science is under much criticism. Even though it's a good tool for induction, it's certainly not the be all end all. Plus then there's good deductive arguments for theism!

Anyhow we'll get there in time. Right now we're focussing on RA, not P3 yet. I'll try to remember your questions and come back to them. I do however remember answering these questions, one way or the other, in our debate. If I didn't, then I'll find out when we get there.

For now though let's move on to RA. My next post will be the skeleton argument and your criticisms.
Apeiron
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1/2/2013 11:59:17 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
Contra-P1

Premise one assumes the claim,"

"God would, if he existed, arrange the world in the best possible state he could"

" this assumes evil is bad"simpliciter, which"assumes utilitarianism; a failed ethical theory. Hence, God has no special reason to aim at minimizing pain or maximizing pleasure on a global scale.."

However it seems true that, ceteris paribus, God would have reason to minimize local evil- evil FOR each individual. But among the other things to be kept equal in this principle is the existence of such individuals. And local evil doesn't seem to provide God with a reason for preventing the existence of such individuals since God can't love that which doesn't yet exist!"Here then is the Resolution Argument,

RA

1- God has good reason to bring into existence a natural world, consisting of real entities distinct from himself: prone to brokeness through sin.

2- It is metaphysically necessary for the existence of such a natural world that God"s effective freedom of intervention in that world be severely limited"by a binding resolution or commitment on God"s part, R*

3- God has good reason to enter into R*

^For"God would have no overriding reason not to enter into R* given the Existential Presupposition of Love (EPL)."

4- It is"epistemically"possible that for every evil, God"s prevention of it would've violated R* in a particular way.

^Given our ignorance of the actual content of such prior divine resolutions
^There is both an internal nature and a natural environment essential to each creature x--"such internal natures and natural environments in many cases entail that x runs an objective risk of suffering bad things like Y. The combination of x"s internal nature, x"s natural environment, and God"s non- intervention in the circumstances entails a finite probability of x"s suffering Y

5-Necessarily, R* provides God with overriding moral reason not to intervene."

6-Necessarily, if person has been created by God who already entered into R*, then God has entered into R* in any world in which that person exists.

7- God cannot have compelling reasons for logically incompatible actions.

8- Necessarily, God"s love does not provide a compelling reason for God to violate R*

9- Therefore, IC is false.

The Resolution Argument views the conditionals of creaturely existence in light of prior divine teleology; it does not view evil used for some greater good, as P1 expects. So it"s not that God"s moral justification for R* somehow makes the resulting evils necessary for greater goods, but rather that our existence in a world prone to sinful brokeness possibly requires R*

RA argues that even though God has omnibenevolence as a motive for preventing his creatures from experiencing gratuitous evils, nevertheless an overriding motivation that is necessary to instantiate such creatures in the first place, is also possible. For had the world been so structured to make unlimited intervention in a fallen world possible, then it might"ve been significantly different at the time of human conception. Hence, any person who might"ve been conceived in such a world couldn"t have been me. Thus the incompatibility of God"s love with his non-intervention in a fallen world given the possibility of such an anthropic condition is false.

Such an overriding motivation, the anthropic condition of God"s resolution of non-intervention, would of course be prior to his creation and is possibly essential to it. And since love presupposes its object, the problem of God failing to love his creation in future times of pointless evils wouldn"t be a problem at all! For God"s creation wouldn"t exist yet without R*! Call this overriding motivation a Resolution (R) of divine non-interference with specific exceptions (*),

R*

R* is not a compensating good but rather an anthropic condition which itself requires only limited intervention if given the condition that mankind falls into sin. For "the creation of a real world of entities distinct from God [and prone to sin] requires that divine intervention in that world be the exception rather than the rule, but it does not require that all intervention be excluded." (Koons)

The limited intervention, given the fallen conditional, includes validating revelatory messengers (prophets / apostles), the revealed God in Christ (miracles permitted to surround Christ"s ministry) & petitionary prayers. Of course God wouldn"t entirely reveal such exceptions to us. But this gives us back control over a world fallen into sin, & encourages us to petition God in all we do thereby cultivating a relationship of trust (a virtue which mends our brokeness into wholeness).

Such miracles showed Israel in their Exodus out of bondage that Yaweh had chosen them as his people through whom the salvation of mankind would come. God works a miracle at Elijah"s request which vindicates Yahweh as the true God to those who worshipped Baal. With God"s self-revelation in his Son, Jesus- God himself is attended with miraculous acts on Jesus" part.

In John:9.30-32 Christ heals the blind man, and "the man answered, why this is a marvel! You do not know where he comes from and yet he opened my eyes. We know that God does not listen to sinners, but if anyone is a worshiper of God and does his will, God listens to him. Never since the world began, has it been heard that anyone has opened the eyes of a man born blind. If this man were not from God, he could do nothing."

Here we see a perfect illustration of how miracles serve to to warrant the message and proclamation of Jesus and his being a special revelation from God in a fallen world.

Now given R*, and that God can"t have compelling reasons for logically incompatible actions, then God"s love for his creatures can"t provide a compelling reason to violate *R. So God"s failure to prevent every pointless evil is consistent with God"s perfect love, and so here Pr (IC) = .5

Therefore, nothing interesting is said when we"re told that gratuitous evils exist.

In this post,

http://debate.org...

I imagined standing in line to enlist but with the knowledge that because of my enlistment I"ll fall in love with a girl who will suffer pointlessly upon my certain death in combat. No one reading this would fault me for remaining in line or call me unloving. While in such a scenario, I just wouldn"t know her yet even though she existed. But in God"s case prior to creation, we didn"t even exist yet! How then can he be called unloving given that he had good moral reasons for [*R] prior to creation, and whatever pointless suffering therein?
Ramshutu
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1/3/2013 6:42:11 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 8:20:45 PM, Composer wrote:
At 1/2/2013 8:04:35 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
If there is no evil, there is no capacity to be good.

Are you stating that your Omnipotent Supernatural god is hence NOT Omnipotent because it is incapable of providing a system where evil isn't a necessity?

Yes and no.

Think of it like a scientific hypothesis.

You have evidence (the way the world works), and an explanation for that evidence (God).

Most religions, and Gods, have specific attributes and specific 'given' motivations (we assume that he intentionally created us, and has intentionally given us free will).

Provided these attributes and motivations are clearly laid out, and provided that one of these attributes is that the Universe is the best it can be as God is smarter, to show that God is not logically consistent, one must only show that there is a better universe imaginable in order to invalidate the hypothesis.

In my experience, as most religions tend to load their God up with attributes like a supernatural game of Buckaroo, such invalidations are always possible.
Apeiron
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1/3/2013 6:50:32 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/3/2013 6:42:11 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
At 1/2/2013 8:20:45 PM, Composer wrote:
At 1/2/2013 8:04:35 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
If there is no evil, there is no capacity to be good.

Are you stating that your Omnipotent Supernatural god is hence NOT Omnipotent because it is incapable of providing a system where evil isn't a necessity?

Yes and no.

Think of it like a scientific hypothesis.

You have evidence (the way the world works), and an explanation for that evidence (God).

Most religions, and Gods, have specific attributes and specific 'given' motivations (we assume that he intentionally created us, and has intentionally given us free will).

Provided these attributes and motivations are clearly laid out, and provided that one of these attributes is that the Universe is the best it can be as God is smarter, to show that God is not logically consistent, one must only show that there is a better universe imaginable in order to invalidate the hypothesis.

In my experience, as most religions tend to load their God up with attributes like a supernatural game of Buckaroo, such invalidations are always possible.

Lol^

I'm inclined to think God simply creates and sustains good things- I don't see there's any reason for thinking God picks from a range of possible worlds, the best one. For the best world may not be feasible, even though it's the "best."

This "maximization of possible worlds" has inherent a history of Benthemite psychology and a sort of economic influence of finite creatures. But God isn't limited by lack of resources. And so I see little reason for a maximization principle.
Composer
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1/3/2013 8:36:17 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 8:20:45 PM, Composer wrote:
At 1/2/2013 8:04:35 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
If there is no evil, there is no capacity to be good.

Are you stating that your Omnipotent Supernatural god is hence NOT Omnipotent because it is incapable of providing a system where evil isn't a necessity?

At 1/3/2013 6:42:11 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
You have evidence (the way the world works), and an explanation for that evidence (God).

Not so because my explanation is that Susan the Alien & her 12 Sisters created everything! I might be wrong but so far there is NO legitimate evidence refuting that concept!

At 1/3/2013 6:42:11 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
Most religions, and Gods, have specific attributes and specific 'given' motivations (we assume that he intentionally created us, and has intentionally given us free will).

That is mere human speculation at best!

Those claiming to be ' xtians ' demonstrate the spurious notion of Free Will!

It is admitted readily by these dupes calling themselves xtians, that they remain malignant sinners!

That shows us that they have NO Free-Will, because they admit they can't stop themselves from malignantly Freely choosing to keep sinning!

Cheers!
Composer
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1/3/2013 8:46:16 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/3/2013 6:50:32 PM, Apeiron wrote:
I'm inclined to think God simply creates and sustains good things-

1. The legitimate evidence for ANY Supernatural god = zero!

2. You think therefore that your imagined Supernatural god created & sustains e.g.

The ebola virus, Tsunamis, drought, to name a few, is ' sustaining good things? '.
Apeiron
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1/3/2013 9:18:22 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/3/2013 8:46:16 PM, Composer wrote:
At 1/3/2013 6:50:32 PM, Apeiron wrote:
I'm inclined to think God simply creates and sustains good things-

1. The legitimate evidence for ANY Supernatural god = zero!

Right, of course I, as well as brilliant other theists down through the ages, disagree- it's just boring atheist propaganda at this point dude, and at best #1 here, if true, would land us in agnosticism anyhow.

2. You think therefore that your imagined Supernatural god created & sustains e.g.

Thanks for claiming to know my inner thoughts, I can tell how sincere you are with this topic.

The ebola virus, Tsunamis, drought, to name a few, is ' sustaining good things? '.

Whatever is necessary to instantiate a feasible good world can't logically count against the claim that the instantiator does harm to his creation. Natural processes that make our feasible world possible, also makes such natural evils possible.

Nevertheless each of these natural evils are not only defeat-able (by a potential and actual virtuous response) but also outbalance-able (by God's bestowing an eternity of healing and perfect happiness). And defeated outbalanced evil that's necessary for our life does nothing to undercut theism.
unitedandy
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1/3/2013 10:59:06 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 11:59:17 PM, Apeiron wrote:
Contra-P1

Premise one assumes the claim,"

"God would, if he existed, arrange the world in the best possible state he could"

" this assumes evil is bad"simpliciter, which"assumes utilitarianism; a failed ethical theory. Hence, God has no special reason to aim at minimizing pain or maximizing pleasure on a global scale.."

I don't see how wanting the best possible world, especially when we're talking about preventing things like rape, torture and horrible suffering generally, assumes utilitarianism at all. This just sounds like a return to the straw-man - seeing the PoE as mere pleasure and pain.

However it seems true that, ceteris paribus, God would have reason to minimize local evil- evil FOR each individual. But among the other things to be kept equal in this principle is the existence of such individuals. And local evil doesn't seem to provide God with a reason for preventing the existence of such individuals since God can't love that which doesn't yet exist!"Here then is the Resolution Argument,

RA

1- God has good reason to bring into existence a natural world, consisting of real entities distinct from himself: prone to brokeness through sin.


I realise you want to discuss RA first, but until you either abandon ST or reply to the point about theological skepticism, this claim is unsupported and unsupportable.

2- It is metaphysically necessary for the existence of such a natural world that God"s effective freedom of intervention in that world be severely limited"by a binding resolution or commitment on God"s part, R*

3- God has good reason to enter into R*

^For"God would have no overriding reason not to enter into R* given the Existential Presupposition of Love (EPL)."

4- It is"epistemically"possible that for every evil, God"s prevention of it would've violated R* in a particular way.

^Given our ignorance of the actual content of such prior divine resolutions
^There is both an internal nature and a natural environment essential to each creature x--"such internal natures and natural environments in many cases entail that x runs an objective risk of suffering bad things like Y. The combination of x"s internal nature, x"s natural environment, and God"s non- intervention in the circumstances entails a finite probability of x"s suffering Y

5-Necessarily, R* provides God with overriding moral reason not to intervene."

6-Necessarily, if person has been created by God who already entered into R*, then God has entered into R* in any world in which that person exists.

7- God cannot have compelling reasons for logically incompatible actions.

8- Necessarily, God"s love does not provide a compelling reason for God to violate R*

9- Therefore, IC is false.

The Resolution Argument views the conditionals of creaturely existence in light of prior divine teleology; it does not view evil used for some greater good, as P1 expects. So it"s not that God"s moral justification for R* somehow makes the resulting evils necessary for greater goods, but rather that our existence in a world prone to sinful brokeness possibly requires R*

If God has a morally sufficient reason for R, then any consequent evil is not gratuitous. There's just no way getting around this, and the fact you keep affirming it kind of proves my point.

RA argues that even though God has omnibenevolence as a motive for preventing his creatures from experiencing gratuitous evils, nevertheless an overriding motivation that is necessary to instantiate such creatures in the first place, is also possible. For had the world been so structured to make unlimited intervention in a fallen world possible, then it might"ve been significantly different at the time of human conception. Hence, any person who might"ve been conceived in such a world couldn"t have been me. Thus the incompatibility of God"s love with his non-intervention in a fallen world given the possibility of such an anthropic condition is false.

Again, justify this stuff. Second, theological scepticism. Third, I'm not talking about "unlimited intervention". Only cases where evil is gratuitous.

Such an overriding motivation, the anthropic condition of God"s resolution of non-intervention, would of course be prior to his creation and is possibly essential to it. And since love presupposes its object, the problem of God failing to love his creation in future times of pointless evils wouldn"t be a problem at all! For God"s creation wouldn"t exist yet without R*! Call this overriding motivation a Resolution (R) of divine non-interference with specific exceptions (*),

R*

R* is not a compensating good but rather an anthropic condition which itself requires only limited intervention if given the condition that mankind falls into sin. For "the creation of a real world of entities distinct from God [and prone to sin] requires that divine intervention in that world be the exception rather than the rule, but it does not require that all intervention be excluded." (Koons)

The limited intervention, given the fallen conditional, includes validating revelatory messengers (prophets / apostles), the revealed God in Christ (miracles permitted to surround Christ"s ministry) & petitionary prayers. Of course God wouldn"t entirely reveal such exceptions to us. But this gives us back control over a world fallen into sin, & encourages us to petition God in all we do thereby cultivating a relationship of trust (a virtue which mends our brokeness into wholeness).

Such miracles showed Israel in their Exodus out of bondage that Yaweh had chosen them as his people through whom the salvation of mankind would come. God works a miracle at Elijah"s request which vindicates Yahweh as the true God to those who worshipped Baal. With God"s self-revelation in his Son, Jesus- God himself is attended with miraculous acts on Jesus" part.

In John:9.30-32 Christ heals the blind man, and "the man answered, why this is a marvel! You do not know where he comes from and yet he opened my eyes. We know that God does not listen to sinners, but if anyone is a worshiper of God and does his will, God listens to him. Never since the world began, has it been heard that anyone has opened the eyes of a man born blind. If this man were not from God, he could do nothing."

Here we see a perfect illustration of how miracles serve to to warrant the message and proclamation of Jesus and his being a special revelation from God in a fallen world.

Theological scepticism.

Now given R*, and that God can"t have compelling reasons for logically incompatible actions, then God"s love for his creatures can"t provide a compelling reason to violate *R. So God"s failure to prevent every pointless evil is consistent with God"s perfect love, and so here Pr (IC) = .5

Therefore, nothing interesting is said when we"re told that gratuitous evils exist.



In this post,

http://debate.org...

I imagined standing in line to enlist but with the knowledge that because of my enlistment I"ll fall in love with a girl who will suffer pointlessly upon my certain death in combat. No one reading this would fault me for remaining in line or call me unloving. While in such a scenario, I just wouldn"t know her yet even though she existed. But in God"s case prior to creation, we didn"t even exist yet! How then can he be called unloving given that he had good moral reasons for [*R] prior to creation, and whatever pointless suffering therein?

Doesn't really work though. Omnipotence is what creates the problem. A helpless lover is a complete disanalogy.
unitedandy
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1/3/2013 11:09:56 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 11:21:43 PM, Apeiron wrote:
At 1/2/2013 10:35:09 PM, unitedandy wrote:

I'll take that as you're ready to go over the RA..

First, there's no way I'm going to go into things like Molinism and the like. I don't find it plausible, you're never going to justify it, and it's tangential, so I'd rather drop it. As for your straw-man (bolded), just no. If there is an instance of evil which is strictly necessary for a greater good, then (given P1), the conclusion follows. God's inability to prevent gratuitous evil is the problem



As for RA, remember outstanding issues. No starting from scratch and rehashing the whole issue.

Mind your manners bud, you don't give me any ultimatums. If I want to bring up new arguments I will- this is a discourse that you agreed to have. You can always just not respond to my new arguments, but that doesn't mean I won't bring them up for the benefit of others and my benefit. Again, it's not all about you.

But then you go into new arguments yourself below! And I'm the one accused of double standards? C'mon bro..

But while I'm here, there's a few of things I need clarified.

Sure why not? This IS a discourse isn't it?

On falsification - are you "agnostic" about Flew's undetectable gardener? Wouldn't theism entail a different world than atheism?

Can he rule out that an "infinite mind" may have created an illusory past, given that we have epistemic limitations? How does one do this?

Can he rule out a deceptive "evil daemon" type world, created by an omnisicient Anti-God? How?

Why think that Virtue is more plausible than P3, rather than a mere possibility? What about cases where evil begets evil (cycle of poverty, addiction, perpetual war and so forth)? Why think allowing ebola is the best way for Virtue? What about where Virtue doesn't apply? Is it really the case that allowing suffering on this scale, as part of some (seeming) utilitarian sum is morally permissible?

Is adopting a contradictory position viable? How does he plan to solve this?

We'll call this the unanswered questions round. To be fair, I think I asked all of these in the debate, and never got a response. Think there around 13 questions, and this is before we get into your response to Law or ST, which are (for me at least) the juicy bits.


Oh stop crying Andy I never said you have to defend against molinism. It's simply the part of the part of the part of the background knowledge regarding God's properties you wish to draw an coherency between. So it's important to mention, for at least others & myself (it's not all about you ya know ;-)

Also, I have good arguments for Molinism, so don't assume I won't justify it at the drop of a hat with a quick syllogism.

Now it's true regarding the BoP that my only burden is to rebut that God has morally wronged someone in allowing some instance of evil. It's strange you would deny this since this is the very essence of your argument,

"God has the means and motive to prevent suffering. Hence if he exists, he WOULD prevent pointless evil."

&

"Pointless evil exists"

^ this is your BoP... while mine is,

"God doesn't fail to be morally perfect first if he wouldn't prevent pointless suffering, and second that that we don't find gratuity in the world anyway."

Loosely speaking anyway- I think you'll agree here anyway. Moving on.. .

You'll have to clarify Flew's undetectable gardener, I only aquainted myself with his death by a thousand qualifications. Nevertheless I hope this helps clarify my position to you that I'm a justificationist. I have good reason for thinking it's more tenable than falsification. Plus I've noticed in recent years that falsificationism in the philosophy of science is under much criticism. Even though it's a good tool for induction, it's certainly not the be all end all. Plus then there's good deductive arguments for theism!

Anyhow we'll get there in time. Right now we're focussing on RA, not P3 yet. I'll try to remember your questions and come back to them. I do however remember answering these questions, one way or the other, in our debate. If I didn't, then I'll find out when we get there.

For now though let's move on to RA. My next post will be the skeleton argument and your criticisms.

This isn't a one-way street, at least, from my perspective. No ultimatum, but I ain't going over old ground again, nor do I think it fair you get you your questions answered without answering any of mine. Besides, it's a bit rich. I've debated you twice on this, so it's not as if I'm ducking anything.

As for Flew's gardener, read his paper Theology and Falsification.
wiploc
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1/4/2013 10:07:36 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/2/2013 8:04:35 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
If there is no evil, there is no capacity to be good.

So Eve was forced to eat the apple? She didn't have free will until after she was punished for doing something she didn't choose?
Apeiron
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1/4/2013 10:13:30 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/4/2013 10:07:36 AM, wiploc wrote:
At 1/2/2013 8:04:35 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
If there is no evil, there is no capacity to be good.

So Eve was forced to eat the apple? She didn't have free will until after she was punished for doing something she didn't choose?

I think it's clear Ramshutu meant the potential for both. Principle of Charity wiploc.
Apeiron
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1/4/2013 10:35:20 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/3/2013 11:09:56 PM, unitedandy wrote:

For now though let's move on to RA. My next post will be the skeleton argument and your criticisms.

This isn't a one-way street, at least, from my perspective. No ultimatum, but I ain't going over old ground again, nor do I think it fair you get you your questions answered without answering any of mine. Besides, it's a bit rich. I've debated you twice on this, so it's not as if I'm ducking anything.

As for Flew's gardener, read his paper Theology and Falsification.

Relax, I'm answering your questions as we go- but one thing needs to be dealt with at a time. I'm saving your alleged contradictions until we get to Contra-P3 since it just makes sense that way. This takes time so no rush, but ultimately I'd like to have us really engage with eachothers arguments. And I think the debate provided only a good springboard to these discussions for each point. It has been by no means exhaustive.

I'll read Flew's gardener. But in the meantime lets discuss this thing peace-meal.
Ramshutu
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1/4/2013 10:46:41 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/3/2013 8:36:17 PM, Composer wrote:
At 1/2/2013 8:20:45 PM, Composer wrote:
At 1/2/2013 8:04:35 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
If there is no evil, there is no capacity to be good.

Are you stating that your Omnipotent Supernatural god is hence NOT Omnipotent because it is incapable of providing a system where evil isn't a necessity?

At 1/3/2013 6:42:11 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
You have evidence (the way the world works), and an explanation for that evidence (God).

Not so because my explanation is that Susan the Alien & her 12 Sisters created everything! I might be wrong but so far there is NO legitimate evidence refuting that concept!

Obviously.

But if I said that Susan, the alien & her 12 sisters created everything, and that the worst and most evil substance in the entire universe was chocolate cake, and that they have used all their powers to prevent the humans from consuming it, there is legimate edence for refuting the whole concept:

a) Coaco beans grow on earth.
b) Cake tastes good.

Now this an obviously Faceatious argument, but the principle of what I am trying to explain is fairly sound.


At 1/3/2013 6:42:11 PM, Ramshutu wrote:
Most religions, and Gods, have specific attributes and specific 'given' motivations (we assume that he intentionally created us, and has intentionally given us free will).

That is mere human speculation at best!

Well, yes. The point is to disprove the sum of what is speculated.


Those claiming to be ' xtians ' demonstrate the spurious notion of Free Will!

It is admitted readily by these dupes calling themselves xtians, that they remain malignant sinners!

That shows us that they have NO Free-Will, because they admit they can't stop themselves from malignantly Freely choosing to keep sinning!

Cheers!

Not sure if this is aimed at me.
Apeiron
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1/4/2013 11:51:49 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/3/2013 10:59:06 PM, unitedandy wrote:
At 1/2/2013 11:59:17 PM, Apeiron wrote:
Contra-P1

Premise one assumes the claim,"

"God would, if he existed, arrange the world in the best possible state he could"

this assumes evil is bad simpliciter, which assumes utilitarianism; a failed ethical theory. Hence, God has no special reason to aim at minimizing pain or maximizing pleasure on a global scale..

I don't see how wanting the best possible world, especially when we're talking about preventing things like rape, torture and horrible suffering generally, assumes utilitarianism at all. This just sounds like a return to the straw-man - seeing the PoE as mere pleasure and pain.

As such, the best possible world wouldn't include such gratuitous evil. But this assumes utilitarianism because it treats evil as something necessary for some best possible world, where -globally- the least amount of evil is actualized. Utilitarianism holds that the proper course of action is the one that minimizes evil.

What you must do is clearly define evil. Because everything I'm talking about is consistent with your definition,

"Anything which in and of itself, rational creatures would universally seek to avoid, ceteris paribus. Examples of such things include suffering, pain, disability and death."

You say "mere pain" but how is psychological, physical, emotional, existential pain NOT the same as evil? It seems you're using evil as a mysterious catch-all for something not yet defined. Call it "bad" for all I care. I'm not trying to straw-man anything here. I want to get past whatever ambiguity you're implicit about here so make it explicit please.

However it seems true that, ceteris paribus, God would have reason to minimize local evil- evil FOR each individual. But among the other things to be kept equal in this principle is the existence of such individuals. And local evil doesn't seem to provide God with a reason for preventing the existence of such individuals since God can't love that which doesn't yet exist!"Here then is the Resolution Argument,

RA

1- God has good reason to bring into existence a natural world, consisting of real entities distinct from himself: prone to brokeness through sin.


I realise you want to discuss RA first, but until you either abandon ST or reply to the point about theological skepticism, this claim is unsupported and unsupportable.

First, we're not dealing with Contra-P3 yet or it's alleged contradictions concerning Contra-P1 UNTIL we've dealt with Contra-P1.

But regardless of Contra-P3, Knowing that it's possible for a maximally great being to have good reason for creating a good world where there would obviously be entities that aren't maximally great (an minimum quasi great) would just clearly be prone to sin, that is, less than maximal greatness. This is possible regardless whether or not ST is true. But even IF ST effected this premise, at best it would show that we can't know the specific reasons God created the universe. It wouldn't show that he didn't have good reasons not to create it.

2- It is metaphysically necessary for the existence of such a natural world that God"s effective freedom of intervention in that world be severely limited"by a binding resolution or commitment on God"s part, R*

3- God has good reason to enter into R*

^For"God would have no overriding reason not to enter into R* given the Existential Presupposition of Love (EPL)."

4- It is"epistemically"possible that for every evil, God"s prevention of it would've violated R* in a particular way.

^Given our ignorance of the actual content of such prior divine resolutions
^There is both an internal nature and a natural environment essential to each creature x--"such internal natures and natural environments in many cases entail that x runs an objective risk of suffering bad things like Y. The combination of x"s internal nature, x"s natural environment, and God"s non- intervention in the circumstances entails a finite probability of x"s suffering Y

5-Necessarily, R* provides God with overriding moral reason not to intervene."

6-Necessarily, if person has been created by God who already entered into R*, then God has entered into R* in any world in which that person exists.

7- God cannot have compelling reasons for logically incompatible actions.

8- Necessarily, God"s love does not provide a compelling reason for God to violate R*

9- Therefore, IC is false.

The Resolution Argument views the conditionals of creaturely existence in light of prior divine teleology; it does not view evil used for some greater good, as P1 expects. So it"s not that God"s moral justification for R* somehow makes the resulting evils necessary for greater goods, but rather that our existence in a world prone to sinful brokeness possibly requires R*

If God has a morally sufficient reason for R, then any consequent evil is not gratuitous. There's just no way getting around this, and the fact you keep affirming it kind of proves my point.

Here is where you miss the point of the RA. I said this argument does not view evil used for some greater good.

Certainly evil CAN be used for good once it is in the world through sin or whatever. But that doesn't mean God created the world with R* FOR evil FOR a greater good. This is just to confuse the ultimate purposes of God with his proximate purposes. RA concerns the former with R* in order to show the lack latter concerning his intervention with evil is compatible with the former. Please speak to this?

RA argues that even though God has omnibenevolence as a motive for preventing his creatures from experiencing gratuitous evils, nevertheless an overriding motivation that is necessary to instantiate such creatures in the first place, is also possible. For had the world been so structured to make unlimited intervention in a fallen world possible, then it might've been significantly different at the time of human conception. Hence, any person who might've been conceived in such a world couldn"t have been me. Thus the incompatibility of God"s love with his non-intervention in a fallen world given the possibility of such an anthropic condition is false.

Again, justify this stuff. Second, theological scepticism. Third, I'm not talking about "unlimited intervention". Only cases where evil is gratuitous.

I DID justify it! See above, you're failing to deal with the argument by just asserting that I didn't justify each of these premises!

ST will be dealt with just before we get to Contra-P3.
Apeiron
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1/4/2013 11:56:47 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 1/3/2013 10:59:06 PM, unitedandy wrote:
In this post,

http://debate.org...

I imagined standing in line to enlist but with the knowledge that because of my enlistment I"ll fall in love with a girl who will suffer pointlessly upon my certain death in combat. No one reading this would fault me for remaining in line or call me unloving. While in such a scenario, I just wouldn"t know her yet even though she existed. But in God"s case prior to creation, we didn"t even exist yet! How then can he be called unloving given that he had good moral reasons for [*R] prior to creation, and whatever pointless suffering therein?

Doesn't really work though. Omnipotence is what creates the problem. A helpless lover is a complete disanalogy.

It's a disanalogy in the opposite way! For to God we never even existed yet and so he cannot be said to be unloving towards an object which didn't exist yet- when he entered into R* upon the condition that humanity would fall into sin and thus sperate themselves from God.

But even so, the lover ISN'T helpless! He can get out of line. Once he enters into the line, he enters into the contract that makes both him and the french girl expereince incomensruable good and bad.