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Interesting Argument Against God's Existence

Rational_Thinker9119
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3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?
Wnope
Posts: 6,924
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3/10/2013 6:09:24 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
I believe the idea is that you're supposed to protect your kids from dying so God gets the final call and when to axe your progeny.
Wnope
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3/10/2013 6:09:47 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 6:09:24 PM, Wnope wrote:
I believe the idea is that you're supposed to protect your kids from dying so God gets the final call on when to axe your progeny.

Fixed
Rational_Thinker9119
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3/10/2013 6:10:50 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 5:59:44 PM, medic0506 wrote:
Maybe I'm having a grey moment, but I don't see how P4 follows.

If it is true that someone ought to prevent a child from suffering, then it follows that they won't benefit in the long run. This is because, if they would benefit in the long run, then morally we ought not prevent a child from suffering. Since that is not the case (because we ought to prevent a child from suffering), then it is true that some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
Rational_Thinker9119
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3/10/2013 6:17:14 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
Also, lets say we are talking about a 6 year old girl. If I put her on the torture rack until she dies, then this is actually beneficial for the child under theism, and I am doing her a favor. Think about it... Only 6 years in a place far less great than heaven (the natural world), is much greater, then a full 90 some odd years in a place far less great than heaven. The problem is, we know that we ought not do that to a child, this is because there obviously is not benefit for them in the long run. If we really believed that these horrible things are beneficial in the long run, then there would be no logical reason that we ought to prevent them. But there is!
Nur-Ab-Sal
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3/10/2013 6:24:22 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 5:59:44 PM, medic0506 wrote:
Maybe I'm having a grey moment, but I don't see how P4 follows.

Logically, P4 follows from modus tollens.

G = god exists; B = child will ultimately benefit from suffering; P = prevent child from suffering

1. G -> B
2. B -> ~P
3. P
4. ~B (MT, 2, 3)
5. ~G (MT, 1, 4)
Genesis I. And God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them.
Dan4reason
Posts: 1,168
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3/10/2013 7:08:08 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Maybe God allows people to suffer in the world without benefit so we humans can work together in a way that builds a society where needless suffering is eradicated. As you can see, my big problem is with P1.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?
DakotaKrafick
Posts: 1,517
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3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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3/10/2013 7:23:04 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 7:08:08 PM, Dan4reason wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Maybe God allows people to suffer in the world without benefit so we humans can work together in a way that builds a society where needless suffering is eradicated. As you can see, my big problem is with P1.

It seems rather obvious why you are wrong, you contradicted yourself. If humans worked together in a way that built a society where needless suffering is non-existent, then that would in itself, be a benefit.

Also, lets say a lightning bolt strikes a pole, and this pole lands on a child, crushes his ribs, and suffocates him to death. If God would have came to the exact same moral end if no such thing happened, then that means that was gratuitous suffering (suffering for nothing) that the free will argument cannot get you out of. Even William Lane Craig realizes this problem, which is why he argues that any event which seems like gratuitous suffering, isn't necessarily gratuitous suffering, because it could exist to cause a greater good. However, if the exact same amount of "good" would be present if no such suffering occurred, then this means that the suffering was for nothing because it didn't cause anything (the same "good" would have happened if no said suffering occurred anyway). This is a huge problem for theism. Thus, theists have to accept P1, in order for theism to be reasonable.


Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.



Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?
DakotaKrafick
Posts: 1,517
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3/10/2013 7:29:14 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?

I wouldn't. I would scrap it. As it stands, it is invalid, and I see no way to fix it.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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3/10/2013 7:32:48 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 7:29:14 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?

I wouldn't. I would scrap it. As it stands, it is invalid, and I see no way to fix it.

It's certainly not invalid. Everything follows.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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3/10/2013 7:45:21 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 7:29:14 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?

I wouldn't. I would scrap it. As it stands, it is invalid, and I see no way to fix it.

Nur-Ab-Sal explains it better than I, but here is a simple say to show the obvious validity of the argument...

'x' = God exists
'A' = A Suffering child benefits from said suffering
'y' = We ought not to prevent a child from suffering

If x, then A
If A, then y
(the above necessitates that the truth of y being the case, if x is the case)
-y
if -y, then - A
If - A, then - x
(the above necessitates the truth, that since y is not the case, then x is not the case)
-x
DakotaKrafick
Posts: 1,517
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3/10/2013 7:45:26 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 7:32:48 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:29:14 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?

I wouldn't. I would scrap it. As it stands, it is invalid, and I see no way to fix it.

It's certainly not invalid. Everything follows.

P4: "Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it." does not follow from the previous premises. P3 says we should (or would) prevent the suffering of some child, not prevent any benefits that may follow.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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3/10/2013 7:45:38 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 7:29:14 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?

I wouldn't. I would scrap it. As it stands, it is invalid, and I see no way to fix it.

*way
Dan4reason
Posts: 1,168
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3/10/2013 7:47:40 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 7:23:04 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:08:08 PM, Dan4reason wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Maybe God allows people to suffer in the world without benefit so we humans can work together in a way that builds a society where needless suffering is eradicated. As you can see, my big problem is with P1.

It seems rather obvious why you are wrong, you contradicted yourself. If humans worked together in a way that built a society where needless suffering is non-existent, then that would in itself, be a benefit.

Well, it would not be a benefit to the person suffering specifically. My theory is that needless suffering exists because humans do not have the will and ability to eradicate it yet. God allows it to exist so humans can try to eradicate it.

So while needless suffering certainly does produce benefits by indirectly creating a stronger society, this only works if people stand up to eradicate it. So premise 2 is refuted. It misses the point of needless suffering. The benefits of needless suffering only arise through our will to destroy it so obviously letting it happen is not a logical idea.

Also, lets say a lightning bolt strikes a pole, and this pole lands on a child, crushes his ribs, and suffocates him to death. If God would have came to the exact same moral end if no such thing happened, then that means that was gratuitous suffering (suffering for nothing) that the free will argument cannot get you out of. Even William Lane Craig realizes this problem, which is why he argues that any event which seems like gratuitous suffering, isn't necessarily gratuitous suffering, because it could exist to cause a greater good. However, if the exact same amount of "good" would be present if no such suffering occurred, then this means that the suffering was for nothing because it didn't cause anything (the same "good" would have happened if no said suffering occurred anyway). This is a huge problem for theism. Thus, theists have to accept P1, in order for theism to be reasonable.

The way out of this dilemma is apparent once we consider the situation when God swoops in to fix all needless suffering events. If so, then people would not have the work ethic to make sure they make poles that are resistant to falling from thunder.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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3/10/2013 7:53:10 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 7:45:26 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:32:48 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:29:14 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?

I wouldn't. I would scrap it. As it stands, it is invalid, and I see no way to fix it.

It's certainly not invalid. Everything follows.

P4: "Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it." does not follow from the previous premises.

Of course it does. It's true that the suffering/ dying of a child ultimately doesn't cause a benefit for the child, because it's true that we ought to prevent this suffering/ killing. Think about it, if it's true that if suffering/ dying does benefits and that we should not prevent it, then that means, if we should prevent it, that the opposite it true. With the opposite being, the suffering/ dying in question does not cause a benefit. Thus, P4 follows logically from the other premises.

P3 says we should (or would) prevent the suffering of some child, not prevent any benefits that may follow.

Preventing the suffering of a child, would be preventing any benefits that will follow from the suffering. However, the only way that the benefits could follow, is if the suffering/ dying happens in the first place.
DakotaKrafick
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3/10/2013 7:56:16 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 7:45:21 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:29:14 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?

I wouldn't. I would scrap it. As it stands, it is invalid, and I see no way to fix it.

Nur-Ab-Sal explains it better than I, but here is a simple say to show the obvious validity of the argument...

'x' = God exists
'A' = A Suffering child benefits from said suffering
'y' = We ought not to prevent a child from suffering


If x, then A
If A, then y
(the above necessitates that the truth of y being the case, if x is the case)
-y
if -y, then - A

-A would be "no suffering child benefits from their suffering" but that does not follow from "we ought to prevent children from suffering" (or even "we do prevent children from suffering"). What would follow, if anything, is "there are no suffering children and therefore, no suffering for them to directly benefit from".

Ultimately, you're saying for ever injury a child is inflicted, God gives them a band-aid. But we should stop children from getting injuries; if we do, then God would therefore not give them any band-aids; therefore, God doesn't exist.

Just because you halt God's necessary response to injured children (giving them band-aids) by halting the existence of all injured children doesn't mean God himself doesn't exist.
DakotaKrafick
Posts: 1,517
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3/10/2013 7:58:36 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 7:53:10 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:45:26 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:32:48 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:29:14 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?

I wouldn't. I would scrap it. As it stands, it is invalid, and I see no way to fix it.

It's certainly not invalid. Everything follows.

P4: "Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it." does not follow from the previous premises.

Of course it does. It's true that the suffering/ dying of a child ultimately doesn't cause a benefit for the child, because it's true that we ought to prevent this suffering/ killing.

In that case, you presuppose the truth of the conclusion "God does not exist" in the warrant of your premise "we ought to prevent the suffering of children".
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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3/10/2013 8:11:40 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 7:47:40 PM, Dan4reason wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:23:04 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:08:08 PM, Dan4reason wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Maybe God allows people to suffer in the world without benefit so we humans can work together in a way that builds a society where needless suffering is eradicated. As you can see, my big problem is with P1.

It seems rather obvious why you are wrong, you contradicted yourself. If humans worked together in a way that built a society where needless suffering is non-existent, then that would in itself, be a benefit.

Well, it would not be a benefit to the person suffering specifically.

Fair enough. However, the argument can be reworded to be compatible with your rebuttal.

P1: If God exists, then it's necessary that when a child suffers/ dies, this directly or indirectly causes a greater good, which would not be present if there was no said suffering /dying.

P2: If any child that suffers/ dies necessitates a direct or indirect cause of a greater good, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering/ dying.

P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.

P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies does not necessitate a direct or indirect cause of a greater good, that would not be present if there was no said suffering/ dying.

P5: Thus, God does not exist.

My theory is that needless suffering exists because humans do not have the will and ability to eradicate it yet. God allows it to exist so humans can try to eradicate it.

If God uses this suffering so humans can try to eradicate it, then it's not really needless now it is?


So while needless suffering certainly does produce benefits by indirectly creating a stronger society, this only works if people stand up to eradicate it. So premise 2 is refuted.

Nothing you said there refutes premise 2.

It misses the point of needless suffering.

That's a logical contradiction. How can there be a "point" to something that is "needless"? That makes no sense.

The benefits of needless suffering only arise through our will to destroy it so obviously letting it happen is not a logical idea.

More contradictions. If you need the suffering to get the benefits, then the suffering isn't needless.


Also, lets say a lightning bolt strikes a pole, and this pole lands on a child, crushes his ribs, and suffocates him to death. If God would have came to the exact same moral end if no such thing happened, then that means that was gratuitous suffering (suffering for nothing) that the free will argument cannot get you out of. Even William Lane Craig realizes this problem, which is why he argues that any event which seems like gratuitous suffering, isn't necessarily gratuitous suffering, because it could exist to cause a greater good. However, if the exact same amount of "good" would be present if no such suffering occurred, then this means that the suffering was for nothing because it didn't cause anything (the same "good" would have happened if no said suffering occurred anyway). This is a huge problem for theism. Thus, theists have to accept P1, in order for theism to be reasonable.

The way out of this dilemma is apparent once we consider the situation when God swoops in to fix all needless suffering events.

He doesn't need to swoop in, he could have ordained a world from the get go where that situation wouldn't have happened. Guess what? It wouldn't have interfered with our free will at all. Nature will do what it does, because it's the nature that God programmed if he exists.

If so, then people would not have the work ethic to make sure they make poles that are resistant to falling from thunder.

So you admit then when suffering/ dying of that nature happens, that it is for a greater good. If this is case then you admit that there is no reason why we should try to prevent that specific case from happening. If you have a chance to swoop in and save a boy, would you not do it because you know it would lead to stronger poles in the future? No. We ought to save that boy, meaning that there is no necessary benefit. There would have to be a necessary benefit if God existed, therefore God does not exist.

Like I said, it seems sound. There could be a sound objection to it, but all you really did is force me to reword it.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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3/10/2013 8:15:22 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 7:58:36 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:53:10 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:45:26 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:32:48 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:29:14 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?

I wouldn't. I would scrap it. As it stands, it is invalid, and I see no way to fix it.

It's certainly not invalid. Everything follows.

P4: "Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it." does not follow from the previous premises.

Of course it does. It's true that the suffering/ dying of a child ultimately doesn't cause a benefit for the child, because it's true that we ought to prevent this suffering/ killing.

In that case, you presuppose the truth of the conclusion "God does not exist" in the warrant of your premise "we ought to prevent the suffering of children".

It's simple logic dude. If God exists, then we ought not to prevent suffering/ dying because it is sufficient for a greater good. However, we ought to prevent suffering/ dying, thus suffering/ dying is not necessarily for a greater good, thus God does not exist, because if he did exist, suffering/ dying would necessarily be for a greater good. It all follows...The only beef anyone should have is with the premises. The argument is valid.
DakotaKrafick
Posts: 1,517
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3/10/2013 8:43:45 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 8:15:22 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:58:36 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:53:10 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:45:26 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:32:48 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:29:14 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?

I wouldn't. I would scrap it. As it stands, it is invalid, and I see no way to fix it.

It's certainly not invalid. Everything follows.

P4: "Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it." does not follow from the previous premises.

Of course it does. It's true that the suffering/ dying of a child ultimately doesn't cause a benefit for the child, because it's true that we ought to prevent this suffering/ killing.

In that case, you presuppose the truth of the conclusion "God does not exist" in the warrant of your premise "we ought to prevent the suffering of children".

It's simple logic dude.

No, it's circular logic. You cannot say "If we should prevent suffering, then God doesn't exist" and then somehow say we should accept the premise "we should prevent suffering" irrespective of the conclusion's truth "God doesn't exist".

If God exists, then we ought not to prevent suffering/ dying because it is sufficient for a greater good. However, we ought to prevent suffering/ dying, thus suffering/ dying is not necessarily for a greater good, thus God does not exist, because if he did exist, suffering/ dying would necessarily be for a greater good. It all follows...The only beef anyone should have is with the premises. The argument is valid.

I still fail to see how, but okay.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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3/10/2013 8:57:24 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 8:43:45 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 8:15:22 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:58:36 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:53:10 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:45:26 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:32:48 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:29:14 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?

I wouldn't. I would scrap it. As it stands, it is invalid, and I see no way to fix it.

It's certainly not invalid. Everything follows.

P4: "Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it." does not follow from the previous premises.

Of course it does. It's true that the suffering/ dying of a child ultimately doesn't cause a benefit for the child, because it's true that we ought to prevent this suffering/ killing.

In that case, you presuppose the truth of the conclusion "God does not exist" in the warrant of your premise "we ought to prevent the suffering of children".

It's simple logic dude.

No, it's circular logic.

How so?

You cannot say "If we should prevent suffering, then God doesn't exist" and then somehow say we should accept the premise "we should prevent suffering" irrespective of the conclusion's truth "God doesn't exist".

That's valid logic. Only if A is the case, is B the case. A is not the case, therefore, B is not the case. I fail to see how that is circular.


If God exists, then we ought not to prevent suffering/ dying because it is sufficient for a greater good. However, we ought to prevent suffering/ dying, thus suffering/ dying is not necessarily for a greater good, thus God does not exist, because if he did exist, suffering/ dying would necessarily be for a greater good. It all follows...The only beef anyone should have is with the premises. The argument is valid.

I still fail to see how, but okay.
DakotaKrafick
Posts: 1,517
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3/10/2013 9:01:19 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 8:57:24 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 8:43:45 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 8:15:22 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:58:36 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:53:10 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:45:26 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:32:48 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:29:14 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?

I wouldn't. I would scrap it. As it stands, it is invalid, and I see no way to fix it.

It's certainly not invalid. Everything follows.

P4: "Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it." does not follow from the previous premises.

Of course it does. It's true that the suffering/ dying of a child ultimately doesn't cause a benefit for the child, because it's true that we ought to prevent this suffering/ killing.

In that case, you presuppose the truth of the conclusion "God does not exist" in the warrant of your premise "we ought to prevent the suffering of children".

It's simple logic dude.

No, it's circular logic.

How so?

Because, as previously stated, you presuppose the truth of the conclusion in your warrant of premise 3. And you still haven't responded to my most recent criticisms regarding the fact that P4 does not follow.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
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3/10/2013 9:13:15 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/10/2013 9:01:19 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 8:57:24 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 8:43:45 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 8:15:22 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:58:36 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:53:10 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:45:26 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:32:48 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:29:14 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:24:47 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/10/2013 7:14:35 PM, DakotaKrafick wrote:
At 3/10/2013 5:45:26 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
I saw an argument in a debate on this website, that really seemed convincing.

P1: If God exists, then any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it.
P2: If any child that suffers/ dies will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.
P3: But, someone ought to prevent a child from suffering/ dying.
P4: Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it.
P5: Thus, God does not exist.

Defense of P1: I'm sure the theist will have no problem with P1. If a child is killed, or is suffering, then God will make it up to them in the afterlife (and maybe even later in this life, who knows). Either way, the child will ultimately benefit from this suffering due to the loving nature of this hypothetical being. Only a being who wasn't loving, would let a child suffer without it being morally beneficial for the child in the long run.

Defense of P2: The theist may have a problem with this, however to deny it would be illogical. This premise is necessary, because it's negation breaks the rule of non-contradiction. A child cannot ultimately benefit from suffering, if the child is in fact not enduring any suffering (which would be the case if this suffering was prevented). If God is a logical being, then he would not make it so we "ought" to do something logically impossible. It would be logically impossible to prevent suffering which will ultimately benefit the child, because for the suffering to ultimately benefit the child, the suffering actually has to take place.

Also, the idea that we are morally obligated to halt a child's well being, seems absurd on it's face regardless.

Defense of P3: I'm sure not theist will deny this, so I do not think it needs defending.

Defense of P4: This follows from the previous premises.

Defense of Conclusion: This follows from the previous premises.

It seems like a sound argument, but course I haven't heard many rebuttals against it. There may be one which shuts it down completely. What would refute this argument?

P4 doesn't (or shouldn't) say "A child who suffers will not benefit from it" but "A child who would have otherwise suffered but was prevented from doing so will not suffer and, ergo, will not benefit from suffering".

How would you reformulate the argument?

I wouldn't. I would scrap it. As it stands, it is invalid, and I see no way to fix it.

It's certainly not invalid. Everything follows.

P4: "Therefore, some child that suffers/ dies will ultimately fail to benefit from it." does not follow from the previous premises.

Of course it does. It's true that the suffering/ dying of a child ultimately doesn't cause a benefit for the child, because it's true that we ought to prevent this suffering/ killing.

In that case, you presuppose the truth of the conclusion "God does not exist" in the warrant of your premise "we ought to prevent the suffering of children".

It's simple logic dude.

No, it's circular logic.

How so?

Because, as previously stated, you presuppose the truth of the conclusion in your warrant of premise 3.

That's not true. We use premise 3 to get to the conclusion of the argument, we do not assume the conclusion of the argument to get to premise 3. You are confusing cause and effect, thus, your rebuttal is invalid and this argument is not circular at all.

And you still haven't responded to my most recent criticisms regarding the fact that P4 does not follow.

I have many times. If God exists, then certain things have to be true. This means, that if they are not true, God does not exist. For one, the suffering/ dying of a child has to be for a greater good. If something is necessarily for a greater good, then we should necessarily not prevent it. This means, that if God exists, then it cannot be true that we should certain prevent suffering/ dying, because it is for a greater good. However, it is true that we ought to prevent some suffering/ dying of children. Since it is true that we ought to prevent the suffering/ dying of a child, then it's not true that we ought not to prevent them. Since this is true, we can conclude God does not exist.

You do not assume the conclusion true to justify premise 3, that would make the argument circular. Premise 3 simply part of what justifies the conclusion itself.
Pwner
Posts: 92
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3/10/2013 11:08:06 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
I've been defending this argument in my debate with popculturepooka. Premise 1 seems true on pain of God being a child abuser, premise true on pain of denying the law of non-contradiction and premise 3 true on pain of child abuse not being wrong. The idea is that the theist is either forced to cease belief in God or embrace absurdity.
medic0506
Posts: 13,450
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3/11/2013 12:40:25 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
I think the argument fails because it asserts that suffering must be tied to some benefit. Suffering exists in the world as a result of man's fall. Making it about a child is an appeal to emotion. Suffering affects everyone, regardless of age and there is nothing saying that children are immune.

God said that He will have mercy on who He will have mercy, and have compassion on who He will have compassion. He can exist without any benefit for suffering.
Pwner
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3/11/2013 1:53:05 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/11/2013 12:40:25 AM, medic0506 wrote:
I think the argument fails because it asserts that suffering must be tied to some benefit. Suffering exists in the world as a result of man's fall. Making it about a child is an appeal to emotion. Suffering affects everyone, regardless of age and there is nothing saying that children are immune.

God said that He will have mercy on who He will have mercy, and have compassion on who He will have compassion. He can exist without any benefit for suffering.

There's so much to say in response to this--by noting its question-begging use of Judeo-Christian theology, its mischaracterization of discussing child-suffering as emotional appeal when it's really just better at eliciting the relevant intuitions--but, I'll stick to adressing your main objection head on.

You say the problem is that [child] suffering doesn't have to be tied to benefit. Now, depending on what you mean by 'have to' (or 'must' in your words), I'd agree. It's not logically impossible, for instance, for child suffering to be untied to benefit. However, there is another--more relevant--sense in which child suffering does have to be tied to benefit: when an powerful, morally perfect being exists, nothing happens unless it allows it to happen, and it doesn't allow anything that it shouldn't allow (lest it be morally imperfect). Since allowing a child to suffer for no ultimate benefit whatsoever is wrong (Cf. child abuse), God wouldn't allow it.

Look at it this way. If God exists, he's allowed children to suffer. If he's allowed children to suffer, it's been either for no one's sake or for someone's sake. But, it hasn't been for no one's sake. (You'd say it'd at least be for God's greater glory or some such) Therefore, it's been for someone's sake. If it's been for someone's sake, then it's either been for the child or for someone other than the child. But, it couldn't be purely for someone other than the child. (Children aren't tools we can use as if they had no personal dignity) Therefore, it's been for the child's sake (at least, partially, which is all I need).

The way I see it, no matter how you try to wriggle out of this, you're gonna be stuck with something morally offensive, or ridiculous, like believing that children are in fact just tools. If we have to accept things like that to believe in God, it's not at all difficult to see that belief in God is irrational.