Total Posts:35|Showing Posts:1-30|Last Page
Jump to topic:

The ontological argument against God?

KingDebater
Posts: 687
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 1:27:11 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
Why is the modal ontological argument for the non-existence of God unsound? It's the same as the modal ontological argument for the existence of God, except that it says that it's possible that a maximally great being does not exist, etc.
AlbinoBunny
Posts: 3,781
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 1:35:17 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 1:27:11 PM, KingDebater wrote:
Why is the modal ontological argument for the non-existence of God unsound? It's the same as the modal ontological argument for the existence of God, except that it says that it's possible that a maximally great being does not exist, etc.

Existence is "maximally great" , supposedly.
bladerunner060 | bsh1 , 2014! Presidency campaign!

http://www.debate.org...
http://www.debate.org... - Running for president.
http://www.debate.org... - Running as his vice president.

May the best man win!
phantom
Posts: 6,774
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 1:44:23 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
It's not that the premise is incorrect. Theists would just deny that it's possible God doesn't exist. It's not possible for anything necessary to not exist and the whole purpose of the ontological argument is to prove God exists necessarily. So in the end you're just left debating whether God is necessary, so it doesn't bring the discussion anywhere really.

There are more problems. But that's the one that strikes me first.
"Music is a zen-like ecstatic state where you become the new man of the future, the Nietzschean merger of Apollo and Dionysus." Ray Manzarek (The Doors)
Nur-Ab-Sal
Posts: 1,637
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 1:49:56 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
A maximally great being is either instantiated in every possible world by its possibility --> necessity (S5), or instantiated in no possible word through its unnecessity --> impossibility. So, the counter-MOA really just brings you back to arguing over premise 1.
Genesis I. And God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them.
Radar
Posts: 424
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 2:44:41 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 1:27:11 PM, KingDebater wrote:
Why is the modal ontological argument for the non-existence of God unsound? It's the same as the modal ontological argument for the existence of God, except that it says that it's possible that a maximally great being does not exist, etc.

Because "just because" doesn't explain anything.
philochristos
Posts: 2,614
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 2:52:19 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 1:27:11 PM, KingDebater wrote:
Why is the modal ontological argument for the non-existence of God unsound? It's the same as the modal ontological argument for the existence of God, except that it says that it's possible that a maximally great being does not exist, etc.

I think all it does is illustrate the fact that we can't know whether the first premise in the argument for God is true or not. We know that either a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, or in no possible worlds, so it's either necessary or impossible. But we don't know which it is. So either argument could be sound for all we know.
"Not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education." ~Aristotle

"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it." ~Aristotle
AlbinoBunny
Posts: 3,781
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 4:10:33 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 2:52:19 PM, philochristos wrote:
At 3/27/2013 1:27:11 PM, KingDebater wrote:
Why is the modal ontological argument for the non-existence of God unsound? It's the same as the modal ontological argument for the existence of God, except that it says that it's possible that a maximally great being does not exist, etc.

I think all it does is illustrate the fact that we can't know whether the first premise in the argument for God is true or not. We know that either a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, or in no possible worlds, so it's either necessary or impossible. But we don't know which it is. So either argument could be sound for all we know.

We know a "maximally great" being is subjective. We know necessary existence isn't a property.
bladerunner060 | bsh1 , 2014! Presidency campaign!

http://www.debate.org...
http://www.debate.org... - Running for president.
http://www.debate.org... - Running as his vice president.

May the best man win!
philochristos
Posts: 2,614
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 4:20:03 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 4:10:33 PM, AlbinoBunny wrote:
At 3/27/2013 2:52:19 PM, philochristos wrote:
At 3/27/2013 1:27:11 PM, KingDebater wrote:
Why is the modal ontological argument for the non-existence of God unsound? It's the same as the modal ontological argument for the existence of God, except that it says that it's possible that a maximally great being does not exist, etc.

I think all it does is illustrate the fact that we can't know whether the first premise in the argument for God is true or not. We know that either a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, or in no possible worlds, so it's either necessary or impossible. But we don't know which it is. So either argument could be sound for all we know.

We know a "maximally great" being is subjective. We know necessary existence isn't a property.

We know that existence isn't a property, but there's debate on whether necessity is a property. After all, two things can both exist where one is necessary and the other isn't. So necessity appears to be a property. That's one of the advantages of the modal ontological argument over Anselm's version. Anselm treated existence as if it were a property, and that was the major flaw in his argument.

Our knowledge of what is maximally great is subjective, but maximal greatness itself is not subjective.
"Not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education." ~Aristotle

"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it." ~Aristotle
AlbinoBunny
Posts: 3,781
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 4:40:40 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 4:20:03 PM, philochristos wrote:
At 3/27/2013 4:10:33 PM, AlbinoBunny wrote:
At 3/27/2013 2:52:19 PM, philochristos wrote:
At 3/27/2013 1:27:11 PM, KingDebater wrote:
Why is the modal ontological argument for the non-existence of God unsound? It's the same as the modal ontological argument for the existence of God, except that it says that it's possible that a maximally great being does not exist, etc.

I think all it does is illustrate the fact that we can't know whether the first premise in the argument for God is true or not. We know that either a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, or in no possible worlds, so it's either necessary or impossible. But we don't know which it is. So either argument could be sound for all we know.

We know a "maximally great" being is subjective. We know necessary existence isn't a property.

We know that existence isn't a property, but there's debate on whether necessity is a property. After all, two things can both exist where one is necessary and the other isn't. So necessity appears to be a property. That's one of the advantages of the modal ontological argument over Anselm's version. Anselm treated existence as if it were a property, and that was the major flaw in his argument.

Our knowledge of what is maximally great is subjective, but maximal greatness itself is not subjective.

Well I side with necessity as not a property for now.

Also greatness is created in our minds, and we all view different things as great. Sounds subjective at least.
bladerunner060 | bsh1 , 2014! Presidency campaign!

http://www.debate.org...
http://www.debate.org... - Running for president.
http://www.debate.org... - Running as his vice president.

May the best man win!
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 4:52:52 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 4:40:40 PM, AlbinoBunny wrote:
At 3/27/2013 4:20:03 PM, philochristos wrote:
At 3/27/2013 4:10:33 PM, AlbinoBunny wrote:
At 3/27/2013 2:52:19 PM, philochristos wrote:
At 3/27/2013 1:27:11 PM, KingDebater wrote:
Why is the modal ontological argument for the non-existence of God unsound? It's the same as the modal ontological argument for the existence of God, except that it says that it's possible that a maximally great being does not exist, etc.

I think all it does is illustrate the fact that we can't know whether the first premise in the argument for God is true or not. We know that either a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, or in no possible worlds, so it's either necessary or impossible. But we don't know which it is. So either argument could be sound for all we know.

We know a "maximally great" being is subjective. We know necessary existence isn't a property.

We know that existence isn't a property, but there's debate on whether necessity is a property. After all, two things can both exist where one is necessary and the other isn't. So necessity appears to be a property. That's one of the advantages of the modal ontological argument over Anselm's version. Anselm treated existence as if it were a property, and that was the major flaw in his argument.

Our knowledge of what is maximally great is subjective, but maximal greatness itself is not subjective.

Well I side with necessity as not a property for now.

Also greatness is created in our minds, and we all view different things as great. Sounds subjective at least.

I've always said that greatness is subjective, unless discussing numbers...6 > 5 for example.

Also, it seems the biggest beef theists have with premise 1 of the reverse MOA, is that is seems illogical on it's face. A Maximally great being is one who exists in all possible worlds, so the premise "it's possible for a being who exists in all possible worlds, to exist in no possible world" is contradictory.

Unfortunately, that rebuttal to premise 1 of the reverse MOA fails because only if it's possible for God to exist, does he exist in all possible worlds. Since one would have to presuppose to the most controversial premise of the MOA to attack premise 1 of the reverse MOA in that fashion, it fails. In reality, premise 1 of the reverse MOA is:

"It's possible, for a being who if exists in one possible world, exists in all possible worlds, to exist in no possible world"

There is nothing illogical about that, so I see no reason to disregard the logic behind the first premise of the MOA.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 5:10:19 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 1:49:56 PM, Nur-Ab-Sal wrote:
A maximally great being is either instantiated in every possible world by its possibility --> necessity (S5), or instantiated in no possible word through its unnecessity --> impossibility. So, the counter-MOA really just brings you back to arguing over premise 1.

If you are equating the first premise with the conclusion, then the argument is circular (if this is not what you doing, then correct me). It's not like all other arguments like the Kalam Cosmological Argument for example, where the first premise is not the same thing as the conclusion. If you are implying that premise 1 equates to the conclusion, then you are using the conclusion to defend your conclusion.
philochristos
Posts: 2,614
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 5:19:42 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 5:10:19 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/27/2013 1:49:56 PM, Nur-Ab-Sal wrote:
A maximally great being is either instantiated in every possible world by its possibility --> necessity (S5), or instantiated in no possible word through its unnecessity --> impossibility. So, the counter-MOA really just brings you back to arguing over premise 1.

If you are equating the first premise with the conclusion, then the argument is circular (if this is not what you doing, then correct me). It's not like all other arguments like the Kalam Cosmological Argument for example, where the first premise is not the same thing as the conclusion. If you are implying that premise 1 equates to the conclusion, then you are using the conclusion to defend your conclusion.

I got the impression he was saying the same thing I was saying, which is that a MGB is either necessary or impossible, and it all comes down to whether the first premise is true.
"Not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education." ~Aristotle

"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it." ~Aristotle
Nur-Ab-Sal
Posts: 1,637
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 5:24:36 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 5:10:19 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/27/2013 1:49:56 PM, Nur-Ab-Sal wrote:
A maximally great being is either instantiated in every possible world by its possibility --> necessity (S5), or instantiated in no possible word through its unnecessity --> impossibility. So, the counter-MOA really just brings you back to arguing over premise 1.

If you are equating the first premise with the conclusion, then the argument is circular (if this is not what you doing, then correct me). It's not like all other arguments like the Kalam Cosmological Argument for example, where the first premise is not the same thing as the conclusion. If you are implying that premise 1 equates to the conclusion, then you are using the conclusion to defend your conclusion.

No, I was trying to show how the metaphysical possibility of a maximally great being (instantiated in *some* possible world) leads to His metaphysical necessity (instantiation in *all* possible worlds) / or, that the lack of metaphysical necessity (*not* instantiated in *some* possible world) leads to His metaphysical impossibility (instantiation in *no* possible world).

It's pretty clear to me that the MOA is not circular; here's a reformulation that says the same thing.

1. If a maximally great being possibly exists, a maximally great being exists
2. A maximally great being possibly exists
3. Hence, a maximally great being exists

Of course, (1) is just S5 again, and it's (2) that's the contentious premise.

Sorry if I was confusing.
Genesis I. And God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 5:25:03 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 5:19:42 PM, philochristos wrote:
At 3/27/2013 5:10:19 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/27/2013 1:49:56 PM, Nur-Ab-Sal wrote:
A maximally great being is either instantiated in every possible world by its possibility --> necessity (S5), or instantiated in no possible word through its unnecessity --> impossibility. So, the counter-MOA really just brings you back to arguing over premise 1.

If you are equating the first premise with the conclusion, then the argument is circular (if this is not what you doing, then correct me). It's not like all other arguments like the Kalam Cosmological Argument for example, where the first premise is not the same thing as the conclusion. If you are implying that premise 1 equates to the conclusion, then you are using the conclusion to defend your conclusion.

I got the impression he was saying the same thing I was saying, which is that a MGB is either necessary or impossible, and it all comes down to whether the first premise is true.

It seemed like he was saying:

Possibility of 'x' = Necessity of 'x'
Possibility of no 'x' = No 'x'
Nur-Ab-Sal
Posts: 1,637
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 5:27:20 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 5:19:42 PM, philochristos wrote:
At 3/27/2013 5:10:19 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/27/2013 1:49:56 PM, Nur-Ab-Sal wrote:
A maximally great being is either instantiated in every possible world by its possibility --> necessity (S5), or instantiated in no possible word through its unnecessity --> impossibility. So, the counter-MOA really just brings you back to arguing over premise 1.

If you are equating the first premise with the conclusion, then the argument is circular (if this is not what you doing, then correct me). It's not like all other arguments like the Kalam Cosmological Argument for example, where the first premise is not the same thing as the conclusion. If you are implying that premise 1 equates to the conclusion, then you are using the conclusion to defend your conclusion.

I got the impression he was saying the same thing I was saying, which is that a MGB is either necessary or impossible, and it all comes down to whether the first premise is true.

This is what I was trying to say, but I'm not as articulate.
Genesis I. And God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 5:28:10 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 5:24:36 PM, Nur-Ab-Sal wrote:
At 3/27/2013 5:10:19 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/27/2013 1:49:56 PM, Nur-Ab-Sal wrote:
A maximally great being is either instantiated in every possible world by its possibility --> necessity (S5), or instantiated in no possible word through its unnecessity --> impossibility. So, the counter-MOA really just brings you back to arguing over premise 1.

If you are equating the first premise with the conclusion, then the argument is circular (if this is not what you doing, then correct me). It's not like all other arguments like the Kalam Cosmological Argument for example, where the first premise is not the same thing as the conclusion. If you are implying that premise 1 equates to the conclusion, then you are using the conclusion to defend your conclusion.

No, I was trying to show how the metaphysical possibility of a maximally great being (instantiated in *some* possible world) leads to His metaphysical necessity (instantiation in *all* possible worlds) / or, that the lack of metaphysical necessity (*not* instantiated in *some* possible world) leads to His metaphysical impossibility (instantiation in *no* possible world).

It's pretty clear to me that the MOA is not circular; here's a reformulation that says the same thing.

1. If a maximally great being possibly exists, a maximally great being exists
2. A maximally great being possibly exists
3. Hence, a maximally great being exists

Of course, (1) is just S5 again, and it's (2) that's the contentious premise.

Sorry if I was confusing.

I think I get what you are saying... The controversial premise necessarily leads to the conclusion, but it isn't itself, the conclusion, thus, the argument is not circular. That reams reasonable to me, my bad for the confusion.
Nur-Ab-Sal
Posts: 1,637
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 5:29:58 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 5:28:10 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/27/2013 5:24:36 PM, Nur-Ab-Sal wrote:
At 3/27/2013 5:10:19 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/27/2013 1:49:56 PM, Nur-Ab-Sal wrote:
A maximally great being is either instantiated in every possible world by its possibility --> necessity (S5), or instantiated in no possible word through its unnecessity --> impossibility. So, the counter-MOA really just brings you back to arguing over premise 1.

If you are equating the first premise with the conclusion, then the argument is circular (if this is not what you doing, then correct me). It's not like all other arguments like the Kalam Cosmological Argument for example, where the first premise is not the same thing as the conclusion. If you are implying that premise 1 equates to the conclusion, then you are using the conclusion to defend your conclusion.

No, I was trying to show how the metaphysical possibility of a maximally great being (instantiated in *some* possible world) leads to His metaphysical necessity (instantiation in *all* possible worlds) / or, that the lack of metaphysical necessity (*not* instantiated in *some* possible world) leads to His metaphysical impossibility (instantiation in *no* possible world).

It's pretty clear to me that the MOA is not circular; here's a reformulation that says the same thing.

1. If a maximally great being possibly exists, a maximally great being exists
2. A maximally great being possibly exists
3. Hence, a maximally great being exists

Of course, (1) is just S5 again, and it's (2) that's the contentious premise.

Sorry if I was confusing.

I think I get what you are saying... The controversial premise necessarily leads to the conclusion, but it isn't itself, the conclusion, thus, the argument is not circular. That reams reasonable to me, my bad for the confusion.

It's fine, no worries.
Genesis I. And God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them.
Magic8000
Posts: 975
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 6:20:04 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
Here's the response I've heard

"If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world."

It's said that in order for this premise to be true, there must be a contradiction in the character of God. Which OAAG doesn't show.

I'm curious about this version of the argument

1. A non-sentient world is a possible world
2. No sentient being can exist in it
3. Therefore a maximally great being can't exist in every possible world
4. The OA is invalid
404 coherent debate topic not found. Please restart the debate with clear resolution.

"So Magic8000 believes Einstein was a proctologist who was persuaded by the Government and Hitler to fabricate the Theory of Relativity"- GWL-CPA
philochristos
Posts: 2,614
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 6:30:26 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
Yeah, that's the problem. There's no way to tell if the first premise of either version of the argument is true. There's no obviously contradiction in a world with a MGB, but there's no obvious contradiction in a world without one either. So both premises seem possible, yet only one of them can be true. We don't know which it is.
"Not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education." ~Aristotle

"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it." ~Aristotle
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 6:47:15 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 6:20:04 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
Here's the response I've heard

"If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world."

It's said that in order for this premise to be true, there must be a contradiction in the character of God. Which OAAG doesn't show.

I think the premise you are speaking of here, is:

"It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist"

The premise you quoted is not in question, and is true.


I'm curious about this version of the argument

1. A non-sentient world is a possible world

The theist would just say that it's not possible, because God is necessary. Therefore, a world in which there is no sentient beings, is impossible. God, a sentient being, exists in every possible world...

Of course, this assumes that it is possible that God exists. It seems that any theistic rebuttal which simply assumes the controversial premise of the MOA without reason, isn't very convincing. What reason would there be to question the controversial premise of the MOA? Well, the very fact that there is nothing impossible, with the idea of a world in which there are no sentient beings, would be a good reason to question the controversial premise of the MOA...Why? Well, to accept that it's possible for a maximally great being to exist, leads to the conclusion that a non-sentient world is impossible. So, if a world in which there are no sentient beings isn't impossible, then why would anyone accept the crucial MOA premise? I actually agree with what you are trying to say here...

Basically, I think it boils down to what is more likely...A possible world in which a being exists, who also exists in every possible world as well, or a possible world in which there are no sentient beings. I think if we apply Occam's Razor, a world where there is no sentient beings, is less "fatty" than a world where a being exists, who also exists in every possible world as well.

2. No sentient being can exist in it

If this wasn't the case, then it wouldn't be a non-sentient world now would it? I don't think anybody would disagree with this.

3. Therefore a maximally great being can't exist in every possible world

This follows.

4. The OA is invalid

Well, if the OA is invalid, then so is this argument because it uses the same form of logic. The conclusion that follows is:

"4. A maximally great being does not exist"
AlbinoBunny
Posts: 3,781
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 6:51:21 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 6:47:15 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:

"4. A maximally great being does not exist"

Maybe so, but does the maximally great fire exist?
bladerunner060 | bsh1 , 2014! Presidency campaign!

http://www.debate.org...
http://www.debate.org... - Running for president.
http://www.debate.org... - Running as his vice president.

May the best man win!
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/27/2013 6:59:19 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 6:51:21 PM, AlbinoBunny wrote:
At 3/27/2013 6:47:15 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:

"4. A maximally great being does not exist"

Maybe so, but does the maximally great fire exist?

The theist would claim that fire is contingent, and to be maximally great, is to be necessary. However, we only know that some form of fire is contingent, we are not in a epistemic position to claim that all possible forms of fire, are necessarily contingent. So, I guess according to the MOA logic, yes! This is why, even though MOA logic is technically logically valid, using the same logic in other areas seem to lead to absurd conclusions.
wiploc
Posts: 1,485
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/28/2013 1:14:10 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 1:27:11 PM, KingDebater wrote:
Why is the modal ontological argument for the non-existence of God unsound? It's the same as the modal ontological argument for the existence of God, except that it says that it's possible that a maximally great being does not exist, etc.

It is unsound for all of the reasons that the argument it parodies is unsound. Therefore, it is not a standalone argument, but only useful as a rebuttal.

As a rebuttal, it is good. It proves that there is something wrong with the logic of the ontological argument. Even people who can't fight there way thru Plantingian obscurantisms can see that there must be something wrong with a logic that proves both that god exists and that god doesn't exist.
Nur-Ab-Sal
Posts: 1,637
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/28/2013 1:24:30 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 6:59:19 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/27/2013 6:51:21 PM, AlbinoBunny wrote:
At 3/27/2013 6:47:15 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:

"4. A maximally great being does not exist"

Maybe so, but does the maximally great fire exist?

The theist would claim that fire is contingent, and to be maximally great, is to be necessary. However, we only know that some form of fire is contingent, we are not in a epistemic position to claim that all possible forms of fire, are necessarily contingent. So, I guess according to the MOA logic, yes! This is why, even though MOA logic is technically logically valid, using the same logic in other areas seem to lead to absurd conclusions.

Well, it depends on what we mean by fire. If you remove from the substance of fire all that makes fire contingent, then you're no longer left with fire.
Genesis I. And God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them.
wiploc
Posts: 1,485
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/28/2013 1:25:04 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 6:20:04 PM, Magic8000 wrote:
"If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world."

Bingo! That's fatal to the OA.

It's said that in order for this premise to be true, there must be a contradiction in the character of God. Which OAAG doesn't show.

I see no reason to accept that. I agree that "maximal greatness" is incoherent nonsense, but that doesn't mean it is contradictory. And the OA would work just as well without maximal greatness. All you have to do is define god as existing-in-all-possible-worlds-if-he-exists-in-any. That doesn't make him contradictory; it just makes him nonexistent.

I'm curious about this version of the argument

1. A non-sentient world is a possible world
2. No sentient being can exist in it
3. Therefore a maximally great being can't exist in every possible world
4. The OA is invalid

That works. I'd tweak it a bit.

1. Some worlds without sentient beings are possible worlds.
2. No sentient beings exist in those possible worlds.
3. Maximally great beings are sentient.
3. Maximally great beings do not exist in the above-mentioned possible worlds.
4. Therefore, maximally great beings do not exist.
5. The OA purports to prove that maximally great beings do exist.
6. Therefore, the OA is unsound.
wiploc
Posts: 1,485
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/28/2013 1:30:21 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 6:30:26 PM, philochristos wrote:
Yeah, that's the problem. There's no way to tell if the first premise of either version of the argument is true.

Sure there is. We know that godless worlds are possible. Godless worlds don't have logical contradictions; therefore, they are possible worlds.

Therefore, the version of the OA that asserts that gods exist in all possible worlds is clearly false.

There's no obviously contradiction in a world with a MGB,

Yes, there is. For an MGB to exist in any possible world, it would have to exist in every possible world---including those in which it doesn't exist! That's a contradiction.

but there's no obvious contradiction in a world without one either.

No contradiction at all.

So both premises seem possible, yet only one of them can be true. We don't know which it is.

That, alone, is fatal to the OA. It doesn't prove anything. In the scales of persuasion, it weighs zero.
wiploc
Posts: 1,485
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/28/2013 1:32:35 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/27/2013 6:47:15 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Of course, this assumes that it is possible that God exists.

It is possible that gods exist. It is just not possible that necessary gods exist.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/28/2013 7:00:31 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/28/2013 1:24:30 AM, Nur-Ab-Sal wrote:
At 3/27/2013 6:59:19 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/27/2013 6:51:21 PM, AlbinoBunny wrote:
At 3/27/2013 6:47:15 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:

"4. A maximally great being does not exist"

Maybe so, but does the maximally great fire exist?

The theist would claim that fire is contingent, and to be maximally great, is to be necessary. However, we only know that some form of fire is contingent, we are not in a epistemic position to claim that all possible forms of fire, are necessarily contingent. So, I guess according to the MOA logic, yes! This is why, even though MOA logic is technically logically valid, using the same logic in other areas seem to lead to absurd conclusions.

Well, it depends on what we mean by fire. If you remove from the substance of fire all that makes fire contingent, then you're no longer left with fire.

I see your point. Fire is "combustion or burning, in which substances combine chemically with oxygen from the air and typically give out bright light, heat, and smoke". Meaning, that fire is contingent upon that chemical reaction, so if something is not contingent upon this chemical reaction, it is not fire. However, using this logic, a being cannot be necessary either. A Being is either a "person" or "a living thing". A person is "a human being regarded as an individual" and life is "the condition that distinguishes organisms from inorganic objects and dead organisms, being manifested by growth through metabolism, reproduction, and the power of adaptation to environment through changes originating internally". Since a human, or any organism distinguished from inorganic matter cannot be necessary, then a being cannot be necessary. A being is a living thing, and to be living is to be a form of matter distinguishable from inorganic matter.
Rational_Thinker9119
Posts: 9,054
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/28/2013 7:02:01 AM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/28/2013 1:32:35 AM, wiploc wrote:
At 3/27/2013 6:47:15 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
Of course, this assumes that it is possible that God exists.

It is possible that gods exist. It is just not possible that necessary gods exist.

By "God", I clearly meant a necessary being...
Nur-Ab-Sal
Posts: 1,637
Add as Friend
Challenge to a Debate
Send a Message
3/28/2013 11:08:40 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 3/28/2013 7:00:31 AM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/28/2013 1:24:30 AM, Nur-Ab-Sal wrote:
At 3/27/2013 6:59:19 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:
At 3/27/2013 6:51:21 PM, AlbinoBunny wrote:
At 3/27/2013 6:47:15 PM, Rational_Thinker9119 wrote:

"4. A maximally great being does not exist"

Maybe so, but does the maximally great fire exist?

The theist would claim that fire is contingent, and to be maximally great, is to be necessary. However, we only know that some form of fire is contingent, we are not in a epistemic position to claim that all possible forms of fire, are necessarily contingent. So, I guess according to the MOA logic, yes! This is why, even though MOA logic is technically logically valid, using the same logic in other areas seem to lead to absurd conclusions.

Well, it depends on what we mean by fire. If you remove from the substance of fire all that makes fire contingent, then you're no longer left with fire.

A person is "a human being regarded as an individual"

I read your debate with Contradiction on physicalism v. non-physicalism, and while I disagree with your stance of the mind's contingency on a brain, I haven't read nearly enough in philosophy of mind to argue with you about it.
Genesis I. And God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them.