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Benevolent God & Modal Collapse

Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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12/14/2014 5:52:27 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
This argument I have just thought of... To have fun poking holes in it theists :-p

Definitions:

God: Necessary Being, Free Will, Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnibenevolent
Necessary Being: God is necessary in any possible world that could exist
Omnipotent: God can do anything logically possible
Omniscient: God knows everything
Omnibenevolent: Assumes a defined, static and objective code of 'Good' God exhibits perfect adherence to this code (regardless of whether or not the God is part of God's nature, external, whatever).

Argument:

1. If God both could, and would always act perfectly Good, then he always will
2. God could and would always act perfectly Good
3. God will always act perfectly Good
4. Acting perfectly Good entails acting deterministically
5. If God acts deterministically, then creation of worlds is done deterministically
6. If all worlds are created by God deterministically, then all worlds are the same
7. Something is contingent if and only if it could have been different
8. Thus, if God created this world, then it is not contingent

It's a bit lengthy. The argument up to 3 is pretty easy to defend, as they just follow by definition. #4 entails because for something to be objectively good entails there is *A* best way for things to be, and God would only chose that singularly best path. To assert there is not a *best* path entails perfect moral objectivism is false. 5 follows directly from 4 since the creation of worlds is an act of God (he is by definition necessary FOR a world to exist).

#6 is a bit strange, but remember each world starts with a blank state, ex nihilo. Thus all worlds before their creation are exactly the same, and hence there cannot be any deviation between world 1 or world 2 etc. Therefore the oerfect moral oath for both worlds will be identical,mind hence God must create them the same way (according to the perfect moral path). 7 is true by definition and 8 follows deductively.

This would have big side implications for this God concept, such as on free will, or the fact that humans are necessary, not cintingent, and therefore are 'Gods' in themselves. As are inanimate things.
Mhykiel
Posts: 5,987
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12/14/2014 6:01:06 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/14/2014 5:52:27 PM, Envisage wrote:
This argument I have just thought of... To have fun poking holes in it theists :-p

Definitions:

God: Necessary Being, Free Will, Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnibenevolent
Necessary Being: God is necessary in any possible world that could exist
Omnipotent: God can do anything logically possible
Omniscient: God knows everything
Omnibenevolent: Assumes a defined, static and objective code of 'Good' God exhibits perfect adherence to this code (regardless of whether or not the God is part of God's nature, external, whatever).

Argument:

1. If God both could, and would always act perfectly Good, then he always will
2. God could and would always act perfectly Good
3. God will always act perfectly Good
4. Acting perfectly Good entails acting deterministically
5. If God acts deterministically, then creation of worlds is done deterministically
6. If all worlds are created by God deterministically, then all worlds are the same
7. Something is contingent if and only if it could have been different
8. Thus, if God created this world, then it is not contingent

It's a bit lengthy. The argument up to 3 is pretty easy to defend, as they just follow by definition. #4 entails because for something to be objectively good entails there is *A* best way for things to be, and God would only chose that singularly best path. To assert there is not a *best* path entails perfect moral objectivism is false. 5 follows directly from 4 since the creation of worlds is an act of God (he is by definition necessary FOR a world to exist).

#6 is a bit strange, but remember each world starts with a blank state, ex nihilo. Thus all worlds before their creation are exactly the same, and hence there cannot be any deviation between world 1 or world 2 etc. Therefore the oerfect moral oath for both worlds will be identical,mind hence God must create them the same way (according to the perfect moral path). 7 is true by definition and 8 follows deductively.

This would have big side implications for this God concept, such as on free will, or the fact that humans are necessary, not cintingent, and therefore are 'Gods' in themselves. As are inanimate things.

I agree with all 6 points.

What if "Good" is to have free-will? What if "Good" is to have a probability based interactions than deterministic?
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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12/14/2014 6:05:07 PM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/14/2014 6:01:06 PM, Mhykiel wrote:
At 12/14/2014 5:52:27 PM, Envisage wrote:
This argument I have just thought of... To have fun poking holes in it theists :-p

Definitions:

God: Necessary Being, Free Will, Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnibenevolent
Necessary Being: God is necessary in any possible world that could exist
Omnipotent: God can do anything logically possible
Omniscient: God knows everything
Omnibenevolent: Assumes a defined, static and objective code of 'Good' God exhibits perfect adherence to this code (regardless of whether or not the God is part of God's nature, external, whatever).

Argument:

1. If God both could, and would always act perfectly Good, then he always will
2. God could and would always act perfectly Good
3. God will always act perfectly Good
4. Acting perfectly Good entails acting deterministically
5. If God acts deterministically, then creation of worlds is done deterministically
6. If all worlds are created by God deterministically, then all worlds are the same
7. Something is contingent if and only if it could have been different
8. Thus, if God created this world, then it is not contingent

It's a bit lengthy. The argument up to 3 is pretty easy to defend, as they just follow by definition. #4 entails because for something to be objectively good entails there is *A* best way for things to be, and God would only chose that singularly best path. To assert there is not a *best* path entails perfect moral objectivism is false. 5 follows directly from 4 since the creation of worlds is an act of God (he is by definition necessary FOR a world to exist).

#6 is a bit strange, but remember each world starts with a blank state, ex nihilo. Thus all worlds before their creation are exactly the same, and hence there cannot be any deviation between world 1 or world 2 etc. Therefore the oerfect moral oath for both worlds will be identical,mind hence God must create them the same way (according to the perfect moral path). 7 is true by definition and 8 follows deductively.

This would have big side implications for this God concept, such as on free will, or the fact that humans are necessary, not cintingent, and therefore are 'Gods' in themselves. As are inanimate things.

I agree with all 6 points.

What if "Good" is to have free-will? What if "Good" is to have a probability based interactions than deterministic?

Seems like that would blatently violate God's omnipotence, since Goe would no longer be able to choose a specific pathway. If you are arguing for some sort of 'uncertainty principle' then I don't think that can be logically applied to God, irrespective of how free will is defined.
popculturepooka
Posts: 7,924
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12/15/2014 10:51:52 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
Nope. There could be no absolutely best option (just as there is no highest natural number) and God has to choose between several sufficiently good options or there could be equally best options.
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Amoranemix
Posts: 521
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12/18/2014 7:40:50 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
Envisage 1
4. Acting perfectly Good entails acting deterministically
That is not obvious to me. There could be several equivalent possible worlds as popculturepooka suggested.

Mhykiel 3
What if "Good" is to have free-will? What if "Good" is to have a probability based interactions than deterministic?
Envisage
Seems like that would blatently violate God's omnipotence, since Goe would no longer be able to choose a specific pathway. If you are arguing for some sort of 'uncertainty principle' then I don't think that can be logically applied to God, irrespective of how free will is defined.
I think there are other options.
Assume what Mhykiel means is 'the more free will, the better'. One problem is that free will ill-defined, but suppose we came up with a definition such that free will is quantifiable (a number). That would mean the quality/desirability of the world is quantifiable. That would imply benevolence is quantifiable and hence can be calculated.
1) Now, if free will is all that matters, then God could create (one of the) world(s) with the most free will. It doesn't seem God did that though.
2) If other criteria matter too, then a complete moral standard would combine these different criteria and God could optimize them. Since God knows everything, he can perfectly predict how every creature will behave and act accordingly. If he is for example against raping children for fun and if for some reason raping children for fun is unavoidable if everyone has free will, he could reduce the amount of free will people have in order to reduce child rape, i.e. find an optimum. God could not create the perfect world without child rape where everyone had maximal free will. But such world would be impossible or, as William Lane Craig puts it, unfeasible. If someone omnipotent is supposed to be able to do the unfeasible, then God would indeed not be omnipotent.
The earth does not belong to man; man belongs to the earth.
Envisage
Posts: 3,646
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12/18/2014 8:32:46 AM
Posted: 1 year ago
At 12/15/2014 10:51:52 AM, popculturepooka wrote:
Nope. There could be no absolutely best option (just as there is no highest natural number) and God has to choose between several sufficiently good options or there could be equally best options.

Then you run into serious problems with the eurythro dilemma. Since what is 'good' according to theism is to be in accordance with God's nature. Or God grounds the definition of Good.

Because to argue God has a nature, is to argue God's nature has a content, "X". That content may contain derivative claims such as "murder is wrong in situation X" etc. To argue there is not 'a' way to be good is to argue God has multiple natures, which essentially means God becomes incoherent, as the definition is no longer bounded.

It also becomes self-contradictory, since it would entail there to be conflicting claims as to what God's nature is. God's nature sets the bound for what is good, thus the highest number analogy simply doesn't work.