Do laws imply authority?

At 7/10/2012 5:16:49 PM, Wnope wrote:

What they do that I have a problem with is your claim that their insertion of an "ethical premise" along with positive statements does not constitute a violation of hume's is-ought dilemma.

Lets approach on thing at a time, and start with this, to avoid further confusion.

The paper specifically states that your interpretation of the Naturalistic Fallacy is Moore's, and not Humes, and that a syllogism that has a positive claim to substantiate an ethical claim leading to an ethical conclusion is valid. It also specifically states:

"Unfortunately, appealing to the naturalistic fallacy is not the drop-dead argument that it is often taken to be."

So, you are misinterpreting Hume, who has his critics, and instead appealing to Moore, whose naturalistic theory has practically been filibustered into invalidity (see Sober 1991, 1994).

Any questions?

At 7/10/2012 5:33:05 PM, Ren wrote:

At 7/10/2012 5:16:49 PM, Wnope wrote:

What they do that I have a problem with is your claim that their insertion of an "ethical premise" along with positive statements does not constitute a violation of hume's is-ought dilemma.

Lets approach on thing at a time, and start with this, to avoid further confusion.

The paper specifically states that your interpretation of the Naturalistic Fallacy is Moore's, and not Humes, and that a syllogism that has a positive claim to substantiate an ethical claim leading to an ethical conclusion is valid. It also specifically states:

"Unfortunately, appealing to the naturalistic fallacy is not the drop-dead argument that it is often taken to be."

So, you are misinterpreting Hume, who has his critics, and instead appealing to Moore, whose naturalistic theory has practically been filibustered into invalidity (see Sober 1991, 1994).

Any questions?

Yes, quick question: Did you actually not read the paper, or did you not read my posts?

Let's go over my stance: Ought statements cannot be derived exclusively from is statements. However, if an "ought" premise is included with the "is" statement, you can derive valid, coherent moral systems.

"Hume claimed that ethical statements cannot be deduced exclusively from factual statements."

"Hume would regard the following argument as deductively invalid:

torturing people for fun causes great suffering (factual premise)
torturing people for fun is wrong (ethical conclusion)

However, if we supply an additional [ethical] premise, the argument can be made deductively valid:

Torturing people for fun causes great suffering(factual premise)
it is wrong to cause great suffering (ethical premise)
tortuing people for fun is wrong (ethical conclusion).

More generally, a factual statement must be combined with an ethical statement to derive an ethical conclusion. Hence, ought cannot be described exclusively from 'is.'"

Lol, this appears to be an impasse.

I'm not convinced I'm wrong, but the last time I became derisive under the assumption I was right in such a situation, I embarrassed myself.

However, I've reassessed the information, and I can't really identify where we're disagreeing.

Hume stated that one cannot go from "it is red" to "it is right to paint things red."

He asserted that one must bridge it with an ethical statement that is not an assumption, but is instead derived from the positive statement, within the framework of the common good.

So, instead, it would be something like, "it is red," "one must obey traffic laws for the sake of safety," (therefore) "I ought stop because it is red."

That is fully quantified, meta-ethically, as well as in regards to Humes perspectives as evidenced by his writings.

Actually, speaking of his writings, I think I'm going to go back and read that chapter of the Treatise and see whether I can glean something from it to help us...

...

...Ah. I see.

So, apparently, your whole thing is that Hume claims that morality is outside of reason, because it needs something outside of reason to quantify it. Therefore, there is no reason in morality. However, you draw the conclusion that morality is thus invalid. Well, that's false.

Instead, Hume is indicating that ethics are not altogether reasoned through pure logic alone -- and thus, reasoning and logic can lead to immoral conclusions, resulting in toxic ethical systems. However, when one applies what we intrinsically understand ethically as well as logically, we can come to valid ethical conclusions as to what we ought to do.

Observe:

"But to make these general reflections more dear and convincing, we may illustrate them by some particular instances, wherein this character of moral good or evil is the most universally acknowledged. Of all crimes that human creatures are capable of committing, the most horrid and unnatural is ingratitude, especially when it is committed against parents, and appears in the more flagrant instances of wounds and death. This is acknowledged by all mankind, philosophers as well as the people; the question only arises among philosophers, whether the guilt or moral deformity of this action be discovered by demonstrative reasoning, or be felt by an internal sense, and by means of some sentiment, which the reflecting on such an action naturally occasions. This question will soon be decided against the former opinion, if we can shew the same relations in other objects, without the notion of any guilt or iniquity attending them. Reason or science is nothing but the comparing of ideas, and the discovery of their relations; and if the same relations have different characters, it must evidently follow, that those characters are not discovered merely by reason.

...

I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason."

Moreover, I'm pretty sure that Hume is asserting that God determines morality, ultimately.

You agree, Wnope?

At 7/10/2012 8:27:08 PM, Ren wrote:
I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.."

This isn't an impasse, it's you down-and-out lying about Hume and purposefully ignoring what I am saying.

ON HUME

I just quoted YOUR PAPER to show that Hume says EXACTLY what I say.

You said I was using Moore's interpretation. I showed you that word for word I was using Hume.

Hume NEVER said that you can "bridge" is the is-ought problem with an ethical statement derived from a positive statement. If such a thing could be done then THERE IS NO "IS-OUGHT DILEMMA."

Hume NEVER mentioned the common good as a source of defining what is "right."

You quote Hume:

"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it."

This is easier to understand when you put it in context:

First, let's define our terms. Hume says "reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be the object of our reason."

So, when Hume says "outside reason" he MEANS that the proposition cannot be true or false. He DOES NOT mean you cannot use "reason" to think moral statements.

Next, he gives examples of things that are neither true nor false and therefore "outside reason."

"Now it is evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. It is impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason."

PASSION, as defined by Hume, is in contrast to UNDERSTANDING.

"Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and practical; and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division, it is supposed to influence our passions and actions, and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding... A person may be affected with passion, by supposing a pain or pleasure to lie in an object, which has no tendency to produce either of these sensations, or which produces the contrary to what is imagined.

Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be derived from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already proved, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason."

REASON, then (according to Hume), can only influence conduct in one of two ways:" It has been observed, that reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have influence on our conduct only after two ways: of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion."

TO CONCLUDE: When Hume says morality is "outside reason" he means that you cannot give a moral statement truth values if they are not derived from a statement which corresponds to some state of affairs in reality.

That is EXACTLY what I have been saying.

Now, you can retract your claim that I defined the argument using Moore instead of Hume, or you can rebut it.

Then, maybe, just maybe, you'll actually try addressing how Hume's argument defeats your pragmatism as easily as it defeats utilitarianism.

At 7/10/2012 10:14:25 PM, Wnope wrote:

At 7/10/2012 8:27:08 PM, Ren wrote:
I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.."

This isn't an impasse, it's you down-and-out lying about Hume and purposefully ignoring what I am saying.

ON HUME

I just quoted YOUR PAPER to show that Hume says EXACTLY what I say.

You said I was using Moore's interpretation. I showed you that word for word I was using Hume.

Hume NEVER said that you can "bridge" is the is-ought problem with an ethical statement derived from a positive statement. If such a thing could be done then THERE IS NO "IS-OUGHT DILEMMA."

There isn't, fool!

I showed you a whole academic paper written on about the misinterpretation you're making. There is no "is-ought dilemma" according to Hume. He was only pointing out that people who claim that ethics can be solely logically derived are being specious, because there are some logical conclusions that are markedly unethical. He makes this clear in the conclusion of this section:

"I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason."

Hume NEVER mentioned the common good as a source of defining what is "right."

Wait... are we saying Hume is the sole authority on this subject, or what? Because, I didn't necessarily claim that Hume indicates that the common good is what defines what is right. I was more referencing the paper I initially shared with you, for how they specifically defined "common good."

REASON, then (according to Hume), can only influence conduct in one of two ways:" It has been observed, that reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have influence on our conduct only after two ways: of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion."

TO CONCLUDE: When Hume says morality is "outside reason" he means that you cannot give a moral statement truth values if they are not derived from a statement which corresponds to some state of affairs in reality.

That is EXACTLY what I have been saying.

No, you haven't. You claim that there's some "is-ought dilemma" that somehow invalidates all moral conclusions in existence, which is absurd. My rebuttal to that claim, is the above, including your supposed conclusion that you suddenly adopted.

This is why I felt as though we're at an impasse. There's obviously no way for us to agree, as you will not acknowledge anything I say in response to your arguments.

Now, you can retract your claim that I defined the argument using Moore instead of Hume, or you can rebut it.

Then, maybe, just maybe, you'll actually try addressing how Hume's argument defeats your pragmatism as easily as it defeats utilitarianism.

I'd like to see how Hume's argument "defeats my pragmatism," lulz.

Please, elaborate.

At 7/12/2012 11:29:06 AM, Ren wrote:

At 7/10/2012 10:14:25 PM, Wnope wrote:

At 7/10/2012 8:27:08 PM, Ren wrote:
I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.."

This isn't an impasse, it's you down-and-out lying about Hume and purposefully ignoring what I am saying.

ON HUME

I just quoted YOUR PAPER to show that Hume says EXACTLY what I say.

You said I was using Moore's interpretation. I showed you that word for word I was using Hume.

Hume NEVER said that you can "bridge" is the is-ought problem with an ethical statement derived from a positive statement. If such a thing could be done then THERE IS NO "IS-OUGHT DILEMMA."

There isn't, fool!

I showed you a whole academic paper written on about the misinterpretation you're making. There is no "is-ought dilemma" according to Hume. He was only pointing out that people who claim that ethics can be solely logically derived are being specious, because there are some logical conclusions that are markedly unethical. He makes this clear in the conclusion of this section:

"I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason."

Hume NEVER mentioned the common good as a source of defining what is "right."

Wait... are we saying Hume is the sole authority on this subject, or what? Because, I didn't necessarily claim that Hume indicates that the common good is what defines what is right. I was more referencing the paper I initially shared with you, for how they specifically defined "common good."

REASON, then (according to Hume), can only influence conduct in one of two ways:" It has been observed, that reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have influence on our conduct only after two ways: of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion."

TO CONCLUDE: When Hume says morality is "outside reason" he means that you cannot give a moral statement truth values if they are not derived from a statement which corresponds to some state of affairs in reality.

That is EXACTLY what I have been saying.

No, you haven't. You claim that there's some "is-ought dilemma" that somehow invalidates all moral conclusions in existence, which is absurd. My rebuttal to that claim, is the above, including your supposed conclusion that you suddenly adopted.

This is why I felt as though we're at an impasse. There's obviously no way for us to agree, as you will not acknowledge anything I say in response to your arguments.

Now, you can retract your claim that I defined the argument using Moore instead of Hume, or you can rebut it.

Then, maybe, just maybe, you'll actually try addressing how Hume's argument defeats your pragmatism as easily as it defeats utilitarianism.

I'd like to see how Hume's argument "defeats my pragmatism," lulz.

Please, elaborate

Wnope: "TO CONCLUDE: When Hume says morality is "outside reason" he means that you cannot give a moral statement truth values if they are not derived from a statement which corresponds to some state of affairs in reality.
That's EXACTLY what I have been saying"

Ren: No, you haven't.

Alright, let's see how accurate that statement is.

Wnope: Correctly stated, the problem has been solved only when normative statements can be derived from SOLELY positive statements.

READ YOUR OWN PAPER:

Hume claimed ethical statements cannot be derived exclusively from is statements.

A factual statement must be combined with an ethical statement to derive an ethical conclusion. Hence, ought cannot be described exclusively from 'is.

If you look at the paragraph above your quote mine of Hume, you'd know the observation he is simply adding to how the morally righteous never seem to care about the following problem:

"Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science; but if examin'd, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discover'd by the understanding. This is the second part of our argument; and if it can be made evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an object of reason. But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case."

The is-ought problem doesn't invalidate all moral conclusions. It just means that no meta-ethical statement can be said to be "true" while another is "false" if your definition of truth involves correspondence with state of affairs (or as Hume would say matter of fact).

You honestly have been reading this long but don't see how is-ought applies to pragmatism?

Alright, what set of positive facts allows you to derive the normative conclusion "we ought to do that which best suits our long term survival" as TRUE while "we ought to do that which results in immediate gains regardless of long term consequences" is FALSE without appealing to another normative claim?

And again, "well, you may as well die then" as a rebuttal is simply another appeal to pragmatism.

At 7/12/2012 4:14:45 PM, Wnope wrote:

Wnope: "TO CONCLUDE: When Hume says morality is "outside reason" he means that you cannot give a moral statement truth values if they are not derived from a statement which corresponds to some state of affairs in reality.
That's EXACTLY what I have been saying"

Ren: No, you haven't.

Alright, let's see how accurate that statement is.

Wnope: Correctly stated, the problem has been solved only when normative statements can be derived from SOLELY positive statements.

READ YOUR OWN PAPER:

Hume claimed ethical statements cannot be derived exclusively from is statements.

A factual statement must be combined with an ethical statement to derive an ethical conclusion. Hence, ought cannot be described exclusively from 'is.

If you look at the paragraph above your quote mine of Hume, you'd know the observation he is simply adding to how the morally righteous never seem to care about the following problem:

"Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science; but if examin'd, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discover'd by the understanding. This is the second part of our argument; and if it can be made evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an object of reason. But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case."

The is-ought problem doesn't invalidate all moral conclusions. It just means that no meta-ethical statement can be said to be "true" while another is "false" if your definition of truth involves correspondence with state of affairs (or as Hume would say matter of fact).

Lolol

Seriously right now, guy?

Well, look who's just now catching up.

From the very beginning, I was saying:

At 7/7/2012 4:20:05 PM, Ren wrote:

That doesn't make sense. One justifies using facts. Morality is justified through reality. If it weren't, then it wouldn't be applicable to reality.

Or

At 7/7/2012 8:35:24 PM, Ren wrote:

What is, justifies what ought. What are you doing, when you determine "ought," but considering what "is?"

One never simply considers, "well, I wonder what I ought to do," outside of any sort of context whatsoever. That is literally a situation that does not exist. This is why the "is/ought" argument is specious. It presents the "ought" question with no given context, without justifying why it is presented out of context.

In rendering such explanations, which coincide both with the paper I shared and the views of Hume himself (lol, since when was he such an authority? Like, sure, he's famous, he's really smart, but he isn't Horus, Jesus Christ), you responded with:

At 7/8/2012 4:59:35 PM, Wnope wrote:

Does it strike you as at all odd that both myself and this poster (who have VERY different views) keep saying you are playing a semantics game?

No, I'm not playing a semantics game. It just so happens that I actually read the information I decide to discuss and develop perspectives based on it.

You honestly have been reading this long but don't see how is-ought applies to pragmatism?

Oh, I certainly do not.

Alright, what set of positive facts allows you to derive the normative conclusion "we ought to do that which best suits our long term survival" as TRUE while "we ought to do that which results in immediate gains regardless of long term consequences" is FALSE without appealing to another normative claim?

And again, "well, you may as well die then" as a rebuttal is simply another appeal to pragmatism.

Naw, man, I don't think you understand pragmatism at all.

Pragmatism is essentially, applied philosophy, distinct from traditional philosophy in the way that theoretical physics is distinct from applied physics.

At 7/10/2012 10:14:25 PM, Wnope wrote:

At 7/10/2012 8:27:08 PM, Ren wrote:
I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.."

This isn't an impasse, it's you down-and-out lying about Hume and purposefully ignoring what I am saying.

ON HUME

I just quoted YOUR PAPER to show that Hume says EXACTLY what I say.

You said I was using Moore's interpretation. I showed you that word for word I was using Hume.

Hume NEVER said that you can "bridge" is the is-ought problem with an ethical statement derived from a positive statement. If such a thing could be done then THERE IS NO "IS-OUGHT DILEMMA."

Hume NEVER mentioned the common good as a source of defining what is "right."

You quote Hume:

"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it."

This is easier to understand when you put it in context:

First, let's define our terms. Hume says "reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be the object of our reason."

So, when Hume says "outside reason" he MEANS that the proposition cannot be true or false. He DOES NOT mean you cannot use "reason" to think moral statements.

Next, he gives examples of things that are neither true nor false and therefore "outside reason."

"Now it is evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. It is impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason."

PASSION, as defined by Hume, is in contrast to UNDERSTANDING.

"Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and practical; and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division, it is supposed to influence our passions and actions, and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding... A person may be affected with passion, by supposing a pain or pleasure to lie in an object, which has no tendency to produce either of these sensations, or which produces the contrary to what is imagined.

Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be derived from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already proved, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason."

REASON, then (according to Hume), can only influence conduct in one of two ways:" It has been observed, that reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have influence on our conduct only after two ways: of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion."

TO CONCLUDE: When Hume says morality is "outside reason" he means that you cannot give a moral statement truth values if they are not derived from a statement which corresponds to some state of affairs in reality.

That is EXACTLY what I have been saying.

Now, you can retract your claim that I defined the argument using Moore instead of Hume, or you can rebut it.

Then, maybe, just maybe, you'll actually try addressing how Hume's argument defeats your pragmatism as easily as it defeats utilitarianism.

The Fool: I see you are taking a liking to philosophy, Good Job. cheers.

At 7/7/2012 1:41:45 PM, phantom wrote:
It is generally thought of in life that laws are authoritatively based.

The Fool: I think by definition that when we say a law it does imply and authority or we would just not call something a Law.

phantom: This can be seen in the government, family life and other aspects. But my question is, can it be established that all laws imply authority?

The Fool: it depend what you mean, I would argue logical laws exist indubitably, we could not even Cognize a law of nature as being a fact if we didn't intuitivly graps the law of non-contradiction. We would try to break it and hurt our self.

phantom:Or do some laws simply exist?

The Fool: Just because a logical law exist does'n mean you can't break it. But you just won't make Coherent sense. And again you may end up hurting your self of somebody else.

phantom:In the more metaphysical sense, we find the moral argument for God follows these lines, but if we establish the proposition that all laws do imply authority, then we can do more than that.

The Fool: I think we can just drop metaphysical physical and mental and just consider everything as existing and just create categories. The whole problem would be solved. You can't know that God is moral unless you already know what is moral in the first place. You would just be using the 'word' moral. similarly you can know if God is good unless you first know what Goodness is.

phantom: Most people deny the moral argument based on the objection that objective moral laws do not exist.

The Fool: that is a problem of language. Etymologically Objective comes from being in relation to and object. Anything thought was and object of thought. What was objective was logic/math/geometry. After postivism people started calling only physical things object. So that because object. And now people are questioning is math exist. lol. Its all linguistical ILLUSION. Nothing can be knowledge that has not been cognized by our mind. What physically exist in it self are PURELY FORMLUATIVE that is why we make up 'word' like forces and energy, nobody see this. is all mathmatical Formulation. So according to the modern extreme definition nothing is can be validly be called objective.


phantom: However, most everyone agrees that objective laws of logic exist.

Because even to assert that physical thinks are objective it depend on LOGICAL LAW> even that assertion in itself. IS AND APPLICATION OF LOGIC. Even to say it is something we all could see. IS A LOGICAL STATEMENT>

phantom: If laws do indeed imply authority then only a being such as God could account for the laws of logic.

The Fool: There is nothing logical about this statement. Do you not get that even to have a coherent meaning at all asserts logic whether we like it or not.

Here you are making an IF THEN (-->) statement.

OR mabye that logic is a Property of the universe all ready without god, and whether we like it or not

Therefore, do laws always imply authority and if so, would this not point to God?

There there is nothing about universe that points to God at all. Nothing point to god ever ..

The Original definition of Universe is All things that exist PERIOD. Thus even God and trancendence exist in the universe. It only because physicalist thinking reduced the universe to only object percieved by sense information became universe. And then Theologins. Defined into existence and outside.

At 7/12/2012 6:51:32 PM, Ren wrote:

At 7/12/2012 4:14:45 PM, Wnope wrote:

Wnope: "TO CONCLUDE: When Hume says morality is "outside reason" he means that you cannot give a moral statement truth values if they are not derived from a statement which corresponds to some state of affairs in reality.
That's EXACTLY what I have been saying"

Ren: No, you haven't.

Alright, let's see how accurate that statement is.

Wnope: Correctly stated, the problem has been solved only when normative statements can be derived from SOLELY positive statements.

READ YOUR OWN PAPER:

Hume claimed ethical statements cannot be derived exclusively from is statements.

A factual statement must be combined with an ethical statement to derive an ethical conclusion. Hence, ought cannot be described exclusively from 'is.

If you look at the paragraph above your quote mine of Hume, you'd know the observation he is simply adding to how the morally righteous never seem to care about the following problem:

"Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science; but if examin'd, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discover'd by the understanding. This is the second part of our argument; and if it can be made evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an object of reason. But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case."

The is-ought problem doesn't invalidate all moral conclusions. It just means that no meta-ethical statement can be said to be "true" while another is "false" if your definition of truth involves correspondence with state of affairs (or as Hume would say matter of fact).

Lolol

Seriously right now, guy?

Well, look who's just now catching up.

From the very beginning, I was saying:

At 7/7/2012 4:20:05 PM, Ren wrote:

That doesn't make sense. One justifies using facts. Morality is justified through reality. If it weren't, then it wouldn't be applicable to reality.

Or

At 7/7/2012 8:35:24 PM, Ren wrote:

What is, justifies what ought. What are you doing, when you determine "ought," but considering what "is?"

One never simply considers, "well, I wonder what I ought to do," outside of any sort of context whatsoever. That is literally a situation that does not exist. This is why the "is/ought" argument is specious. It presents the "ought" question with no given context, without justifying why it is presented out of context.

In rendering such explanations, which coincide both with the paper I shared and the views of Hume himself (lol, since when was he such an authority? Like, sure, he's famous, he's really smart, but he isn't Horus, Jesus Christ), you responded with:

At 7/8/2012 4:59:35 PM, Wnope wrote:

Does it strike you as at all odd that both myself and this poster (who have VERY different views) keep saying you are playing a semantics game?

No, I'm not playing a semantics game. It just so happens that I actually read the information I decide to discuss and develop perspectives based on it.

You honestly have been reading this long but don't see how is-ought applies to pragmatism?

Oh, I certainly do not.

Alright, what set of positive facts allows you to derive the normative conclusion "we ought to do that which best suits our long term survival" as TRUE while "we ought to do that which results in immediate gains regardless of long term consequences" is FALSE without appealing to another normative claim?

And again, "well, you may as well die then" as a rebuttal is simply another appeal to pragmatism.

Naw, man, I don't think you understand pragmatism at all.

Pragmatism is essentially, applied philosophy, distinct from traditional philosophy in the way that theoretical physics is distinct from applied physics.

Just catching up?

So I was wrong when I said:

"Either you refuse to read what I write, or you simply don't understand it, because this is the THIRD TIME I have said that I have no problem with people applying positive statements to normative presuppositions in order to create coherent moral systems."

"Let's go over my stance: Ought statements cannot be derived exclusively from is statements. However, if an "ought" premise is included with the "is" statement, you can derive valid, coherent moral systems"

"A factual statement must be combined with an ethical statement to derive an ethical conclusion. Hence, ought cannot be described exclusively from 'is.'""


But I am right when I say:

"The is-ought problem doesn't invalidate all moral conclusions. It just means that no meta-ethical statement can be said to be "true" while another is "false" if your definition of truth involves correspondence with state of affairs (or as Hume would say matter of fact)."

That doesn't even pass the Laugh Test.

YOU SAID that you could derive normative statements from solely positive ones. Instead, all you've done is posit an ethical premise and use positive statements to derive context-specific moral decisions.

By agreeing to my definition, you have officially conceded your stance of having a moral system whose ethical premise can be called "true" while another is called "false."

Now, will you please, at the sake of condescending to my pitiful level of communication, tell me how you can derive the presuppositions of pragmatism from exclusively positive statements.

If you can't (and you still agree with my definition), you concede that your position is only meant to create coherent moral systems but NOT to show one moral system is "true" while another "false."

Applied philosophy is the epitomy of assuming ethical systems without questioning the validity calling the meta-ethical premise behind it "true" while others are false."

And I'll stop mentioning Hume when you concede that my entire argument is NOT conflating Moore's definition with Hume's.

The Fool: now you are just trying to show off ;)

Wnope: lol, let's try to approach everything one at a time... This conversation is getting convoluted, and I think a little deconstruction will help clarify some things.

First, I quipped that you're just catching up because you somehow came to a conclusion that reaffirms my own conclusions, as evidenced by my first posts on this thread. This, of course, is why I presented some of my own quotes, rather than approach yours to indicate any sort of error on your part (which clearly wouldn't make sense).

In fact, when you first claimed that you suddenly agree with Hume's actual argument, I stated that we're clearly at an impasse, because I can't even identify where we're disagreeing. The quotes I posted in my last post confirm this.

Okay, looking back at the beginning of our conversation, I see that we barey disagree. We agree that an ethical conclusion results from processing an ethical premise and a logical one, but you refuse to acknowlege that the initial ethical assumption derives from the logical assumption. In other words, according to you, the construction of an ethical argument is nonspecific, and neither claim holds any greater weight. Moreover, you seem to believe that ethical assumptions are not subject to reason.

However, what I was sharing with you is that ethical statements first require context, then reasonable substantiation in order to be valid. I posited to you that for the sake of such substantiation, one can defer to the "common good". But,that is a generalized claim that can only be reaffirmed in context. For example, if the situation regards only two people, then obviously, there is no "greater good." Accordingly, such substantiation is an appeal to reason, within context. This is why one doesn't simply indicate a logical premise and glean equally valid unethical conclusions, such as an interest in the individual at the expense of many, because that would be unreasonable .

In other words, I disagree with this:

" As I have stated, and as the article argues, as long as you begin with some ethical premise/presupposition, you can use factual information to derive coherent sets of moral decision-making."

That is false. One begins with a logical statement, derives a moral premise within reason, and concludes with an ethical conclusion.

Your claim that I've ever stated that one can simply take a statement of fact and immediately see within that statement a moral fact is false. I never claimed such a thing, and certainly not in this conversation, so you either misunderstood something or you're misrepresenting my argument. However, your interpretation of Hume is still off-mark.

The Fool: I could refute Hume flat out.

At 7/13/2012 8:19:50 AM, The_Fool_on_the_hill wrote:
The Fool: I could refute Hume flat out.

But?

Lol

At 7/13/2012 8:23:47 AM, Ren wrote:

At 7/13/2012 8:19:50 AM, The_Fool_on_the_hill wrote:
The Fool: I could refute Hume flat out.

But?

Lol

The Fool: its lengthy. And I am, tired.

The Fool: okay here is a hint. but I would rather start new thread ..

What is IS and what is not, does not exist.

This is my favorite argument. its so simple and yet so powerfull. Its by Parmidies.
I would even Call it THE LAW OF TRUTH. But because that sound so authoritive I would catch alot of flak and hate. But in my logical system it is the law of Truth. Its the most fundemental necessity for anything.

For even Truth=Truth. The equal sign is not and inference because denots that they are infact the same idea.

We can see quickly that to break that law, is where why a contradiction is always False. as in Truth=false is a to brake the law of truth.
Its to say what is=is not.

But I want you to pay close attention . . That even when I say (is not) that is a contradiction. because I am saying( it is the case) that (it is not the case. )
Another reason what we should avoid negative sentences.

It is also synonomous with 1=1. If you know your pythagoras well you know that 1 is not even technacally number. Nor 0
1 is the symbol of existence/truth. I am giving away some things I would want to save for publishing he. lol.

Anyways in relation to Hume. Ought is, if if wasen't it could not exist. Its a false dichotomy to say that Ought is not an Is or it wouldn't exist. But we do know what we mean when we say it. Therefore it represense and idea.

"Words" refer to 'idea' and then the has and 'object'.
So its a matter of deducing logically what what the object of the idea of 'Ought'

Its would take me a few moments to give that logical deduction. Give me a bit I will do it.

I agree that you should male a new thread. This seems legitimately interesting.

Couple of questions:

If you base truth on the value 1, how do you reconcile for concepts like the imaginary number i?

Would you say that your fundamental premise coincides with the concept of forms in any manifestation (analogous shadows or essential values/morphologies)?

At 7/13/2012 9:14:45 AM, Ren wrote:
I agree that you should male a new thread. This seems legitimately interesting.

Couple of questions:

If you base truth on the value 1, how do you reconcile for concepts like the imaginary number i?

Would you say that your fundamental premise coincides with the concept of forms in any manifestation (analogous shadows or essential values/morphologies)?

What is IS they are not imagninary the are appriori rules of thought. the trick is not get caught of in modern langauge. There even you imagination exist. So that is all we need.

At 7/13/2012 8:17:34 AM, Ren wrote:
In other words, I disagree with this:

" As I have stated, and as the article argues, as long as you begin with some ethical premise/presupposition, you can use factual information to derive coherent sets of moral decision-making."

That is false. One begins with a logical statement, derives a moral premise within reason, and concludes with an ethical conclusion.

Your claim that I've ever stated that one can simply take a statement of fact and immediately see within that statement a moral fact is false. I never claimed such a thing, and certainly not in this conversation, so you either misunderstood something or you're misrepresenting my argument. However, your interpretation of Hume is still off-mark.

I agree that there is probably some communication here, because you claim you can derive a moral premise from a logical statement without the aid of another ethical presuposition.

Yet you cite a paper that interprets Hume as claiming "ethical statements cannot be derived exclusively from positive statements" and that "ought cannot be derived exclusively from is."

When you say "logical statement" I assume you mean a positive statement or "matter of fact" as Hume would call it. If not, perhaps this is our area of miscommunication.

"Your claim that I've ever stated that one can simply take a statement of fact and immediately see within that statement a moral fact is false. I never claimed such a thing"

If this is true, then you are stating that you are creating a moral system that cannot be assigned a truth value without the previous assumption of a moral premise. Unless you appeal to pragmatism (which ultimately ends up begging the question as shown earlier), there is no means of establishing meta-ethical truth values when comparing one premise to another.

Btw, know that even at my most vitriolic, I thoroughly enjoy debating with you and hold no hard feelings whatsoever.