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The Contender
Con (against)

January/February LD Topic

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Voting Style: Open Point System: Select Winner
Started: 3/27/2017 Category: Politics
Updated: 2 years ago Status: Debating Period
Viewed: 1,780 times Debate No: 101418
Debate Rounds (5)
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The topic is Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech.

No new arguments in the final round
First round is for acceptance only

Good luck to my opponent!


I accept, and I look forward to an interesting debate.
Debate Round No. 1


I affirm that Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech.


Public college/university: a university that is predominantly funded by public means through a national or subnational government

Restrict: Put a limit on; keep under control.

Constitutionally protected speech: I will just post a link to the relevant exceptions to free speech as defined by the constitution/supreme court cases

Observation One: There are two actors implicated in the resolution. Public universities and their governing bodies, and the United States government.

I value morality defined by Merriam Webster as "conformity to ideals of right human conduct". 2 warrants:

1) Ought is an operative term in the resolution and thusly implies obligation since ought is defined as "to indicate duty or correctness" (Oxford Dictionary). The ought implied in the resolution is moral, not functional.

2) States (and thus public universities, who receive funding from states and often act on their behalf) are normatively understood to have moral obligations. Heindel 12’ “We commonly attribute to states and other institutional organizations moral duties and obligations. For example, it is widely held that the state has a moral duty to protect its citizens from external threats.

The standard is Rule Utiltarianism, defined as following a set of rules whose general application maximizes well being. 2 warrants:

1) Phenomenal introspection shows that morality requires the maximization of well-being. Sinahababu 12' "Moral feelings represent natural properties in virtue of shared phenomenal character, much as empathy represents how others feel. If moral feelings represent moral properties via this kind of empathic representation, the hedonic character of moral feelings lets them represent hedonic properties. Then the moral value of pleasure can be detected in introspection."

2) Rules can be justified on utilitarian grounds when case-by-case calculations lead to worse outcomes. Rawls

"Rules are pictured as defining a practice. Practices are set up for various reasons, but one of them is that in many areas of conduct each person's deciding what to do on utilitarian grounds case by case leads to confusion, and that the attempt to coordinate behavior by trying to foresee how others will act is bound to fail. As an alternative one realizes that what is required is the establishment of a practice, the specification of a new form of activity; and from this one sees that a practice necessarily involves the abdication of full liberty to act on utilitarian and prudential grounds. Rules define a practice and are themselves the subject of the utilitarian principle."

Thesis: Any unconstitutional speech restrictions on college campuses weaken the normative rule that free speech ought to be protected. This severely harms US citizens. Thus the aff burden:

Restricting constitutionally protected speech on college campuses is harmful

Contention One: Restricting Constitutionally Protected Speech anywhere is harmful on balance

A. Restrictions hamper search for truth, stem from epistemic arrogance

The search for truth is necessary to advance in all areas of life. Philosophical, scientific, theological, political, and all other aspects of life should be informed by relevant facts about what is or isn't true to achieve the best outcomes. Pinker 14'" First, free speech is the only way to acquire knowledge about the world. Perhaps the greatest discovery in human history — one that is logically prior to every other discovery — is that all of our traditional sources of belief are in fact generators of error and should be dsmissed as sources of knowledge. These include faith, revelation, dogma, authority, charisma, augury, prophesy, intuition, clairvoyance, conventional wisdom, and the warm glow of subjective certainty. Free speech was not just central to the development of knowledge in the history of humanity; it may be central to the development of knowledge in any intelligent species."

B. Spillover

Speech restrictions necessarily spillover because speech restrictions can never be narrowly targeted at one particular issue. Once it has been established that we can restrict speech for any perceived greater good, we have handed over authority to university administrators or the government to determine what speech is or isn't permissible. This has always led to spillover instead of narrowly tailored restrictions. Epstein 16 "The harm principle can never be extended to cover cases where one person takes offense at the speech or conduct of other individuals—which is why flag-burning, however distasteful to most people, nonetheless receives constitutional protection"That extension of the harm principle, if applied uniformly to all speech acts, means that anyone who takes offense gets the right to sanction, if not veto, the speech of others, at which point no one can speak at all."

C. The Purpose of the University

Free speech is inextricably tied to the very purpose of the university, the actor in this debate. Pinker 14' articulates again " A liberal education should make certain habits of rationality second nature. Educated people should be able to express complex ideas in clear writing and speech. They should appreciate that objective knowledge is a precious commodity, and know how to distinguish vetted fact from superstition, rumor, and unexamined conventional wisdom. They should be acutely aware of human fallibility, most notably their own, and appreciate that people who disagree with them are not necessarily stupid or evil. Accordingly, they should appreciate the value of trying to change minds by persuasion rather than intimidation or demagoguery."

D. Marginalized people

Restriction of speech on college campuses can easily lead to, and has lead to the silencing of marginalized voices. This reality stands in stark contast to the mistaken belief that speech restrictions can protect marginalized voices. If restrictions can be placed on speech, those restrictions would necessarily exist because of public consensus. If the consensus turns against marginalized people (as it often has) they will be the first to suffer from a lack of content neutrality with regard to speech. Gates 93' "Why would you entrust authority with enlarged powers of regulating the speech of unpopular minorities unless you were confident the unpopular minorities would be racists, not blacks? You don't go to the teacher to complain about the school bully unless you know the teacher is on your side. In a democratic society the only speech the government will be successful in censoring is that of the politically marginalized. Reverse the popular consensus (against blacks) and justifications for hate speech laws are turned on their head"

E. Negatation of Self-Ownership

Within the context of any debate, we perform certain actions that are self affirming. One of those is the exercise of rationality, free will, and use of our physical and mental faculties, all of this presupposes self ownership. Negating.. negates self ownership. This is a performative contradiction. Hoppe " Argumentation does not consist of free-floating propositions but is a form of action requiring the employment of scarce means; and that the means which a person demonstrates as preferring by engaging in propositional exchanges are those of private property. For one thing, no one could possibly propose anything, and no one could become convinced of any proposition by argumentative means, if a person’s right to make exclusive use of his physical body were not already presupposed. It is this recognition of each other’s mutually exclusive control over one’s own body which explains the distinctive character of propositional exchanges that, while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement"



Every college campus has a crazy preacher, the one who yells batsh1t insane things in the middle of campus. If you don't know this, meet Brother Dean.

Brother Dean goes to campuses across Arizona and yells things like "You deserve to be raped," "communist faggot," and so on. This is Pro's world:

People should be able to express their views, even sh1tty ones. I won't argue against that. But I will argue that how you say things is as important as what you say, and that schools should stop Brother Dean and similar people from expressing themselves in the ways they do. They should do this because this best respects people's rights.

Speech is an Action

"Speech" is both words and actions. Communicating words is only possible through an action (speaking, writing, yelling, etc.). I'm only arguing that some actions should be banned, including some acts of speech that are "constitutionally protected". I'll call them "speech-acts" (1), which is just a way of saying they're actions that go along with making speech. For example, Brother Dean's "You deserve rape" is words, but he aims those words at individuals and yells. Both are actions.

So, my definition of speech is "the words/images/gestures/etc. and associated actions used to communicate".

Speech and Harm

We forbid many speech-acts because they harm others--you can't set someone else on fire just to prove a point, no matter how good it is. But words have nothing to do with that. If you say, "By the light of this fire, I shine a light into the darkness of this world", and set yourself on fire, maybe the government shouldn't force you to put out the fire (that's done cruelly in Tibet). But if you say those words and set ME on fire, you've done me wrong. The words don't violate anyone's rights; the action does. The point is that we're not interested in banning words here. We want to moderate actions, and it's easy to tell the difference between the words and actions.

There are speech-acts that shouldn't be banned--say, if the "action" is speaking in public. But, we can ban actions that harm others. What's the principle that justifies that? The difference between the fire case and speaking in public is harm, or, infringement of other rights. This is the harm principle that Pro seems to accept: for a public school to ban speech, it must be harmful. His framework is more or less compatible with mine in this round, so I don't need to set out a complete rights theory now.

Instead, I'll show there's rights violated--or harm--in not banning some speech-acts. I'll explain what the harm is, and I'll explain a narrow rule that can be applied to fix it.

The harm is: Mental harm that is properly documented via scientific research (5 shows this is possible).

The rule is: Officials should forbid a speech-act that causes mental harm, if A) the harm greatly outweighs the harm we would do by preventing the speech (competing rights are more harmed than the right to free speech), or B) there is a less harmful (rights-infringing) but similarly effective way to convey the speech.

Mental harm from speech obviously exists. Emotional abuse is called emotional abuse for a reason, and we rightly don't allow people to inflict that. Why do we pretend that private speech can harm, but public speech can't? One answer is that we don't pretend at all; we just value speech more. But that's insanity. We don't value speech because it's speech; we value it because we benefit from using it. If a law stops me from saying "239+433=349384929834", I'm not wronged because there was no value in making the statement in the first place. The philosopher Ronald Dworkin described rights, for instance, as "trumps" that prevent the government from doing something to someone if it's only justified by utilitarian calculations. But, he also noted that securing rights "makes the Government's job of securing the general benefit more difficult . . . and it would be a frivolous and wrongful practice unless it served some point" (6). Whether we talk about rules, rights, or principles, the same point applies.

We'll apply this to the case of Brother Dean. Let's say studies are done that show those exposed to his speech-acts are 30% more likely to have a panic attack within a day. Universities, in response, tell him he must modify the speech-act. He can hold up his signs, but he can't yell. Following this, studies show a much smaller increase in the rate of panic attacks after exposure to him.

Brother Dean is not restricted in terms of his ability to express his views. He can't yell, but this has little effect, if any, on his ability to achieve his purpose. Intuition tells us that preventing yelling is completely reasonable--if a student yells in a class with a professor, that professor should kick the student out. Why apply different standards 5 steps away from the classroom?

tl;dr We can and should restrict speech without causing harm/infringing upon rights, and while preventing both, in a narrowly-tailored way.

Going Deep--Restricting Speech for the Same Reasons We Have It

Plus, we sometimes want to prohibit speech-acts where no direct harm is done. The obvious case is Citizens United v. FEC. In that case, "The United States Supreme Court held . . . that freedom of speech prohibited the government from restricting independent political expenditures by a nonprofit corporation. The principles articulated . . . have also been extended to for-profit corporations, labor unions and other associations" (2). The overwhelming majority of people in a NYTimes poll called bullsh1t (3).

What's in the people's self-interest is what's in the people's self-interest. If we're interested in maximizing well-being or protecting rights, we can't follow the Constitution and let money run wild. This is true even though we can't clearly see any harm. Why? We appeal to an underlying principle. In an OpEd about Citizens United, Ellen Weintraub writes, "We should make sure that the voices of citizens are not being drowned out by corporate money. American billionaires already have an outsize influence on our elections. Let’s not cede yet more power to foreign elites" (7). If money is speech, this is an appeal to something deeper--the future of American democracy.

These "deep" appeals come from all political stances. For instance, your average conservative might argue that it's nice to take in refugees, but their political stances will destroy the current political fabric of the US.

We can make a "deep" appeal against some speech at colleges in spite of the Constitution. In fact, we could make thousands, but I'll just present two.

1. Speech is a nonviolent tactic, and the point of speech is therefore to peacefully resolve disputes. Confrontational tactics like yelling or blocking freeways run contrary to this principle, and should be prohibited.

2. It is important to observe the Constitution as the Framers intended it. Money is not speech, and therefore we must forbid organizations that are given university funds from participating in political activities (yes, this is a real controversy[1].pdf).

You may agree with one and disagree with the other--what matters is that these deep appeals go behind speech to its justification to decide what speech may be banned. I'll make a more substantial deep appeal in Round 2, and fill in the missing parts of my framework.

Back to you, Pro.


1. See also the three kinds of speech-acts: "the act of saying something, what one does in saying it, and what one does by saying it"





6. Dworkin, "Taking Rights Seriously" as published in Taking Rights Seriously, pg. 198.

Debate Round No. 2


In this round I will be attacking my opponents arguments and making extensions where necessary, good debate so far Solon. I will say that since we didn't make official rules about what each round will be designated as, its okay that neg didn't respond to my arguments last round. If he fails to do this round, however, any arguments not addressed should be considered drops.

Opponents case:

I wholeheartedly accept the consequences of my "world" where sometimes people are allowed to express unpalatable views and do so in a similarly unpalatable way. I will extend my Contention one subpoint A, B, and D arguments here since they are all applicable, here's why:

A) We cannot know what is objectively "good" or "bad" speech without making objective determinations that we are not suited to make since no one has a monopoly on truth. Neg's advocacy thusly stems from epistemic arrogance that hampers the search for truth, clear and identifiable harm there. Pinker articulates how all of the sources we use to acquire knowledge are erroneous, on that basis we cannot objectively identify harms, especially when the harm is entirely based on a reaction to something.

B) Speech restrictions can never be narrowly tailored and thus necessarily spillover. I will hit on this more when addressing my opponents other arguments but there is no identifiable, objective harm associated with speech, that means that the offended get an unmitigated right to veto the speaker. Epstein argues that allowing the harm principle to apply to speech acts leads to a right of the offended to veto anything that offends them. This leads to spillover. The harm is an unclear status as to what our rights are which leads to tyranny.

D) Speech restrictions against brother dean and those like him only work if there is a consensus against that type of speech, because once we allow the restriction of rights such restriction is subject to popular opinion in a republic. If the consensus turns against marginalized people and in favor of brother dean, will be turned against them to oppress them further. Gates argues that if the popular consensus turns against marginalized groups, they will be stripped of the only right they would have to respond to persecution, the right to free speech. Harm is the oppression of marginalized people which is a turn to the aff.

Response to Speech is an action:

I acknowledge that speech is an action, its just an action that ought to be given special protection when compared to other actions.

Response to speech and harm:

I am fine with banning the actions described in the first paragraph, such as setting individuals on fire. That is clearly not protected under the constitution and thus outside of the advocacy I am asked to take up. I don't accept my opponents rule (which looks something like a Utilitarian rule as described in my framework) because restricting any constitutionally protected speech necessarily results in the 5 harms I give in my constructive. This is because failing to conform to the affirmative thesis leads to empirically verified consequences that cause harms that outweigh the negative harms, I will discuss this more shortly. Essentially, all 5 of my harms stem from restricting any constitutionally protected speech, so negs advocacy has to inherently accept those harms even if his restrictions are narrowly tailored.

Neg then goes on to claim that only speech that produces value should be protected per his Dworkin card, the issue is we can once again extend my Contention one subpoint A that any speech restriction extends from epistemic arrogance. To prove that certain speech has no value the neg would have to establish a realist epistemology that establishes some sort of objective value in the first place. He gives no criteria for what is or isn't objectively valuable and thus his first argument that speech with no value doesn't need protection is lost because he gives no criteria for what is or isn't valuable speech and doesn't justify a realist conception of value in the first place. My opponents logic here essentially says that if enough people react strongly to speech on college campuses, they get to veto that indivdual's right to speak. He claims later on that intuition tells us that certain speech acts (like yelling) aren't valuable but I will address that further down.

Neg brings back the example of Brother Dean to illustrate how his rule would operate in the real world by saying that if it is empirically verifiable that Brother Dean's yelling causes harm, we ought to restrict that speech act. Here I am going to cross apply my spillover argument (subpoint B) because this sort of veto power based on emotional reactions to speech is exactly what Epstein condemns. I contend that if we can determine what speech ought to be restricted based on what my opponent deems to be a sufficient number of people reacting negatively to said speech, then we truly have no right to free speech at all. Free speech is supposed to protect us against the tyranny of the majority and allow us to express unpopular views however we choose.

Partial permutation:

I will point out that in extreme cases where expression does such things as "disturbing the peace" that there are constitutionally permitted restrictions of such speech. These are time, place, and manner restrictions that allow content neutral restrictions on speech. So if, for example, yelling near a classroom during class time resulted in disturbances to a learning environment, the university could impose a content neutral restriction that would make it so no one could protest during that time. This eliminates the efficacy of neg's arguments in a lot of ways because I could concede his arguments that certain speech-acts should be restricted within the context of content neutrality while still fulfilling my own advocacy. The only point of contention at this point would be if my opponent either A) Thought these restrictions should fall under a lower standard than intermediate scrutiny (that is how content neutral restrictions are evaluated now) or B) Thought these restrictions should be content based.

Response to going deep--Restricting speech for the same reasons we have it

Opponents argument regarding Citizens United is nontopical since it doesn't apply to speech on college campuses. I disagree with his arguments there but see no need to give it a long and in depth reply. It seems like the primary argument that emanates from that is his "deep appeal" argument. Here the Neg has two points where he states that we should restrict speech when it runs up against its purpose. The first is that speech is nonviolent and thus speech-acts that could result in or cause violence ought to be restricted. He brings up yelling and blocking freeways. I will extend my permutation argument for blocking freeways, and I will agree with him that yelling in certain areas can and ought to be restricted if it is a content neutral restriction. Content neutral restrictions that pass immediate scrutiny are constitutionally protected and thus fall under the affirmative advocacy. He then argues that universities should not be able to engage in political activities because money isn't speech (sort of bringing in FEC). I will agree with him that universities shouldn't be able to participate in political activities if they are publicly funded (those are the unversities specified in the resolution) and that does't violate the constitution. I disagree that organizations given funds shouldn't be allowed to participate in political activity so long as the university distributes the funds in a neutral and objective manner. Neg gives no warrant here as to why there is a quantifiable harm in allowing university organizations to engage in political activity.

New sources

Back to you neg




My stance again: words must be free from regulation; only associated actions may be regulated.

This renders Pro’s “Restrictions hamper search for truth” worthless. I agree with his Pinker quote; it has nothing to do with my case. I’m only talking about speech-acts that harm; plus, Pro presents no evidence that my own stance hampers the search for truth. Pro’s “Purpose of the University” and “Marginalized Voices" arguments are similarly neutralized. Pro didn’t expand on “epistemic arrogance” until R3, so I’ll deal with every case of that (including my “numbers” example) in R4.

The way I define speech is not the way everyone defines speech. Given that actions are part of speech, there are reasonable restrictions, like the fire example Pro doesn’t contest. Pro says it’s irrelevant because setting someone on fire is “not protected by the constitution”, but this misses the point--it’s good to ban some speech-acts--which Pro never contests.

I repeat: Pro conceded that banning certain speech-acts is good. If I show that the principle that justifies this supports more extensive bans, I win.

This leaves two of Pro’s points:

1. To argue, we must accept that we have a “right to make exclusive use of [our] physical body”; arguing against free speech is a “performative contradiction”

2. Speech restrictions always restrict speech that should be allowed, because restrictions for “the greater good” give university officials discretion to restrict speech.

Performative Contradiction is a Pastry with Seinfeld Between the River, Vote Con

#1 is word salad. “A performative contradiction arises when the propositional content of a statement contradicts the presuppositions of asserting it” (1). So, Pro is saying that

A. We must accept that we own ourselves to make an argument, and that

B. Arguing against Pro’s stance denies this.

Two reasons that’s wrong:

1. Even a Wiki article rebuts it: “. . . argumentation ethics conflates the ontological concept of control of one's self with the ethical concept of self-ownership . . . just as someone [may] control one's self, that does not give rise to why another ought to refrain from physically interfering with that control” (2). Hoppe is right that we must have control of ourselves to argue (if you’re a puppet, you’re not really doing the arguing), but the right to self-ownership is different. You can accept you’re not a puppet AND accept that you have no right to set someone on fire even if it’s speech.

2. Hoppe’s “argumentation” is not my “speech”. Hoppe calls arguing an action. I give you freedom to argue anything you like; I just keep you from hurting people. Arguing is a speech-act; it is not all speech-acts. Even if you accept Pro’s point, it only applies to cases of argumentation. Actions like yelling or calling someone a “f*ggot” are NOT this.


I don’t allow arbitrary restrictions. Recall: “Officials should forbid a speech-act that causes mental harm, if A) the harm greatly outweighs the harm we would do by preventing the speech . . . or B) there is a less harmful . . . but similarly effective way to convey the speech.” Can this wrongfully restrict speech?

No. Say someone wants to protest abortion on campus. An official wants to stop them and says A doesn’t apply. B, however, means that they must show that a less harmful way to convey the speech exists, and must permit the act if they cannot. But the official is bad, and only cares about stopping pro-life speech. What stops them from keeping speakers in an empty corner of campus and burning the signs?

The mental harm requirement. For the official to do this, they must show that mental harm from the proposed protest exists. If A doesn’t apply, B must be applied in a way that would address the harm shown. This can’t be done in ways that don’t address the harm, because only speech-acts that mentally harm can be prohibited. If chants harm, but signs don’t, you can ban the chants, but you can’t ban the signs. Discretion is impossible.

This leaves us with “mental harm”. That’s addressed in “Snyder v. Phelps” below.


Pro values overall happiness, but attacks my case for things that have nothing to do with that, e.g. “Gates argues that if the popular consensus turns against marginalized groups, they will be stripped of the . . . right to free speech”. In Pro’s framework, this is wonderful if it serves the general interest. Pro needs to show that the things he calls harms of my position harm the general interest, and he doesn’t. He might say a general rule prohibits this, but I can respond to any rule “do x” he makes with “do x, unless y” and the problem is solved.

I can rebut his implied “Don’t restrict any constitutional speech” with a better rule by his own framework: “Don’t restrict any constitutional speech, unless [insert my rule here]” Pro’s aside that restrictions weaken the “normative rule” that we need to protect free speech makes no sense in this light, because to really maximize utility, the rule must be “do x, unless a, b, c, etc.”

Now, more of my case.

Snyder v. Phelps

Snyder’s son was killed in Iraq. His funeral was picketed by religious extremists. They held up signs like “Thank God for Dead Soldiers”; “Expert witnesses testified that Snyder’s emotional anguish had resulted in severe depression and had exacerbated pre-existing health conditions” (3). SCOTUS found that the case turned on “whether that speech is of public or private concern”, and kept Westboro off the hook.

The lone dissenter, Alito, sums up the problem: “The Court now holds that the First Amendment protected respondents’ right to brutalize Mr. Snyder.” His dissent is a good read:

Apply my rule. Major depression is narrow, leaves no room for discretion (either you have it or you don’t), and is a clear-cut harm. Harms of the same nature on college campuses, when shown, ought to be prohibited. Pro says this is the same as giving a veto power to anyone who reacts strongly to speech, but that’s ridiculous--panic attacks (and depression) are clinical disorders; they’re not conscious choices made by tyrants.

Major depression is not the only mental harm that could result in an acceptable rule. But it’s a rule; I’ve worded it this way to avoid the tangential “spillover” dispute.

This is content-neutral--while the harms might result partly from a combination of content and how it’s expressed, the rule only deals with empirically verifiable harm; it’s a shift from the current question of “is the content public or private?” to “does the holistic act harm?”.

Deep Theory

The point about Citizens United was that free speech isn’t a goal; it’s a means to an end. Just like Weintraub wrote that the “money as speech” interpretation gives us too much speech at the cost of democracy, so we balance the competing rights and see CU as bad in the balance. This “balance” is the deep theory.

Dworkin writes that in interpretation, we classify something into a practice and establish a framework about the goal of it, and observe what best fits the goal (134-5). E.g. for a constitutional question, we ask, “What’s the purpose of the Constitution?”. These interpretations have correct conclusions once purpose is established (188).

The resolution is a constitutional question. The Constitution is meant to protect our rights. It does this because a government “has no moral power . . . unless . . . its policies treat [citizens’] fates as equally important and respect their individual responsibilities . . .”, so, “All political rights are derivative from that fundamental one” (330). We should restrict harmful speech because not doing so denies equal concern for the victims.

Choose my framework because it provides a coherent account of our system and a way to reason to the ideal, unlike Pro’s. More on this next round.

I reserve the right to rebut anything I missed in Pro's R3.





Justice for Hedgehogs, Ronald Dworkin

Debate Round No. 3
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Debate Round No. 4
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Debate Round No. 5
24 comments have been posted on this debate. Showing 1 through 10 records.
Posted by SolonKR 2 years ago
Shab, your last comment was oddly prescient :/
Posted by ShabShoral 2 years ago
Actually, you both lose.
Posted by Objectivity 2 years ago
Posted by ShabShoral 2 years ago
"The standard is Rule Utiltarianism"

*7 points to con*
Posted by Objectivity 2 years ago
Or maybe to spice things up I will take neg next time and you can argue for aff, haha.
Posted by Objectivity 2 years ago
I am definitely interested in picking that up over PM, finding the thread and replying again or creating a new one. Just don't want to give up too much of my hand for this particular debate. I might also be interested in debating this again and I will just take a different angle next time if you'd be interested
Posted by FourTrouble 2 years ago
But yeah I was looking through the recent court cases when I hit upon that, reminded me of our discussion in the forum.
Posted by Objectivity 2 years ago
I'll take your word for it since you know far more about law than I do haha.
Posted by FourTrouble 2 years ago
It's not really that minimalistic, it's how most appellate decisions go, in that when a lower court gets the law wrong, the appellate court will reverse them on the bad law and then remand for the lower court to apply the right law.
Posted by SolonKR 2 years ago
Very interesting indeed. Thanks for the info.
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