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An Epistemological Model from Scratch

Chaosism
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12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
This is an experimental thread that's intended to provoke thought create a common ground for examination of one's beliefs beginning with the identification of necessary assumptions (epistemological axioms) and limitations of our knowledge and experiences. I would love to see collaborative input from multiple people, but I think the most important part of this exercise is to question everything in every possible way; both that which is inputted by yourself and by others. Almost all of our beliefs are built upon an already (implicitly) established conceptual model of reality. The aim of this exercise is to begin from a sort of "zero-point" which entails no assumptions, we can develop necessary epistemological axioms and examine the assumptions we currently rely on.

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.
SNP1
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12/14/2016 6:32:31 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:
The aim of this exercise is to begin from a sort of "zero-point" which entails no assumptions, we can develop necessary epistemological axioms and examine the assumptions we currently rely on.

Well, this can be interesting.

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

I think it is entirely deniable.

People who are blind are still, somehow, able to have "sight experiences", yet their sight is non-existent.
Deaf people are still, somehow, able to have "hearing experiences", yet their hearing is non-existent.
Etc.

So, when there is the non-existence of consciousness, who says that conscious experience cannot occur?
And if all senses are also wrong, then could it not be entirely possible that there exists literally nothing?
Not solipsism, but pure metaphysical nihilism.
#TheApatheticNihilistPartyofAmerica
#WarOnDDO
Devilry
Posts: 5,099
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12/14/2016 6:39:18 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
I think it's safe to assume that this thread is bad. And from that we can derive the entire world wherein this thread is bad.
: : : At 11/15/2016 6:22:17 PM, Greyparrot wrote:
: That's not racism. Thats economics.
Chaosism
Posts: 2,742
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12/14/2016 6:55:28 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 6:32:31 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:
The aim of this exercise is to begin from a sort of "zero-point" which entails no assumptions, we can develop necessary epistemological axioms and examine the assumptions we currently rely on.

Well, this can be interesting.

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

I think it is entirely deniable.

People who are blind are still, somehow, able to have "sight experiences", yet their sight is non-existent.
Deaf people are still, somehow, able to have "hearing experiences", yet their hearing is non-existent.
Etc.

So, when there is the non-existence of consciousness, who says that conscious experience cannot occur?

Agreed, but perhaps I should have clarified that I didn't mean "sensation" quite as literally or defined as that (sight, hearing, etc.). I'm trying to start deeper than that. In relation to what you describe, the very occurrence of experience is what I'm referring to, regardless of the nature, origin, or truth of that experience.

However, I think this point will be very relevant later on (assuming that the thread actually progresses, of course).

And if all senses are also wrong, then could it not be entirely possible that there exists literally nothing?
Not solipsism, but pure metaphysical nihilism.

I think that the occurrence of experience, itself, attests that *something* "exists" in *some* sense, even if it's just that isolated experience, itself. I use the term, "exists", loosely because I plan to approach the meaning of this, later.
SNP1
Posts: 2,446
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12/14/2016 7:12:55 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 6:55:28 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 6:32:31 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:
The aim of this exercise is to begin from a sort of "zero-point" which entails no assumptions, we can develop necessary epistemological axioms and examine the assumptions we currently rely on.

Well, this can be interesting.

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

I think it is entirely deniable.

People who are blind are still, somehow, able to have "sight experiences", yet their sight is non-existent.
Deaf people are still, somehow, able to have "hearing experiences", yet their hearing is non-existent.
Etc.

So, when there is the non-existence of consciousness, who says that conscious experience cannot occur?

Agreed, but perhaps I should have clarified that I didn't mean "sensation" quite as literally or defined as that (sight, hearing, etc.). I'm trying to start deeper than that.

Ya, I was simply using those as analogies for when I brought up consciousness.
If conscious experience can "exist" with the absence of consciousness, and if those experiences can all be wrong, then what is to say that anything exists?

The experience itself, sure, but how can you actually know that?
Literal nothingness giving birth to the experience of everything?

In relation to what you describe, the very occurrence of experience is what I'm referring to, regardless of the nature, origin, or truth of that experience.

However, I think this point will be very relevant later on (assuming that the thread actually progresses, of course).

I hope it does, it can be interesting.

And if all senses are also wrong, then could it not be entirely possible that there exists literally nothing?
Not solipsism, but pure metaphysical nihilism.

I think that the occurrence of experience, itself, attests that *something* "exists" in *some* sense, even if it's just that isolated experience, itself. I use the term, "exists", loosely because I plan to approach the meaning of this, later.
#TheApatheticNihilistPartyofAmerica
#WarOnDDO
Benshapiro
Posts: 4,116
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12/14/2016 7:23:15 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:
This is an experimental thread that's intended to provoke thought create a common ground for examination of one's beliefs beginning with the identification of necessary assumptions (epistemological axioms) and limitations of our knowledge and experiences. I would love to see collaborative input from multiple people, but I think the most important part of this exercise is to question everything in every possible way; both that which is inputted by yourself and by others. Almost all of our beliefs are built upon an already (implicitly) established conceptual model of reality. The aim of this exercise is to begin from a sort of "zero-point" which entails no assumptions, we can develop necessary epistemological axioms and examine the assumptions we currently rely on.

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

Right. "Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am).

Parallel to this, we must presuppose logical absolutes (the law of non-contradiction, the law of identity, law of excluded middle) which grounds the coherence of the statement itself.
Chaosism
Posts: 2,742
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12/14/2016 8:01:33 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 7:12:55 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 6:55:28 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 6:32:31 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

I think it is entirely deniable.

People who are blind are still, somehow, able to have "sight experiences", yet their sight is non-existent.
Deaf people are still, somehow, able to have "hearing experiences", yet their hearing is non-existent.
Etc.

So, when there is the non-existence of consciousness, who says that conscious experience cannot occur?

Agreed, but perhaps I should have clarified that I didn't mean "sensation" quite as literally or defined as that (sight, hearing, etc.). I'm trying to start deeper than that.

Ya, I was simply using those as analogies for when I brought up consciousness.
If conscious experience can "exist" with the absence of consciousness, and if those experiences can all be wrong, then what is to say that anything exists?

I don't understand how this could be so. Consciousness is the sensation of experience, and so is tautological with conscious experience. We can't experience an absence of consciousness, so conclusions regarding such a state aren't verifiable in any way.

I suppose the bottom line is that the experience of consciousness is so (it exists/occurs). Can that statement still be deniable?

The experience itself, sure, but how can you actually know that?
Literal nothingness giving birth to the experience of everything?

Consciousness, itself, is an experience. Can it be deniable that consciousness, itself, exists?
Chaosism
Posts: 2,742
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12/14/2016 8:03:31 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 7:23:15 PM, Benshapiro wrote:
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

Right. "Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am).

Thoughts are a conscious experience, so some consciousness experience exists (labeled "I" or "me"). Right?

Parallel to this, we must presuppose logical absolutes (the law of non-contradiction, the law of identity, law of excluded middle) which grounds the coherence of the statement itself.

Justify this; why does the previous statement need to be coherent? Why must these presuppositions be necessary?
SNP1
Posts: 2,446
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12/14/2016 8:17:34 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 8:01:33 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 7:12:55 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 6:55:28 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 6:32:31 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

I think it is entirely deniable.

People who are blind are still, somehow, able to have "sight experiences", yet their sight is non-existent.
Deaf people are still, somehow, able to have "hearing experiences", yet their hearing is non-existent.
Etc.

So, when there is the non-existence of consciousness, who says that conscious experience cannot occur?

Agreed, but perhaps I should have clarified that I didn't mean "sensation" quite as literally or defined as that (sight, hearing, etc.). I'm trying to start deeper than that.

Ya, I was simply using those as analogies for when I brought up consciousness.
If conscious experience can "exist" with the absence of consciousness, and if those experiences can all be wrong, then what is to say that anything exists?

I don't understand how this could be so. Consciousness is the sensation of experience, and so is tautological with conscious experience. We can't experience an absence of consciousness, so conclusions regarding such a state aren't verifiable in any way.

Yes, but that is why I made the analogy I did.
Blind people have no sight, yet can have sight experiences, even people who have been blind since birth.
Same with deaf people and hearing and so on.
I think that we can both agree that these people are not actually seeing thing, hearing things, whatever, but the thing is that these are, in a way, indistinguishable from the real thing.

And so who is to say that conscious experience requires consciousness, even if it isn't really conscious experience but something essentially indistinguishable?

I suppose the bottom line is that the experience of consciousness is so (it exists/occurs). Can that statement still be deniable?

I would say that the experience of consciousness is undeniable, but I do remember reading a paper that argued, almost convincingly, that even that could be denied. Sadly, I cannot find it right now.

The experience itself, sure, but how can you actually know that?
Literal nothingness giving birth to the experience of everything?

Consciousness, itself, is an experience. Can it be deniable that consciousness, itself, exists?
#TheApatheticNihilistPartyofAmerica
#WarOnDDO
Chaosism
Posts: 2,742
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12/14/2016 8:40:53 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 8:17:34 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:01:33 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 7:12:55 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 6:55:28 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 6:32:31 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

I think it is entirely deniable.

People who are blind are still, somehow, able to have "sight experiences", yet their sight is non-existent.
Deaf people are still, somehow, able to have "hearing experiences", yet their hearing is non-existent.
Etc.

So, when there is the non-existence of consciousness, who says that conscious experience cannot occur?

Agreed, but perhaps I should have clarified that I didn't mean "sensation" quite as literally or defined as that (sight, hearing, etc.). I'm trying to start deeper than that.

Ya, I was simply using those as analogies for when I brought up consciousness.
If conscious experience can "exist" with the absence of consciousness, and if those experiences can all be wrong, then what is to say that anything exists?

I don't understand how this could be so. Consciousness is the sensation of experience, and so is tautological with conscious experience. We can't experience an absence of consciousness, so conclusions regarding such a state aren't verifiable in any way.

Yes, but that is why I made the analogy I did.
Blind people have no sight, yet can have sight experiences, even people who have been blind since birth.
Same with deaf people and hearing and so on.
I think that we can both agree that these people are not actually seeing thing, hearing things, whatever, but the thing is that these are, in a way, indistinguishable from the real thing.

And so who is to say that conscious experience requires consciousness, even if it isn't really conscious experience but something essentially indistinguishable?

But the "real thing" is not relevent. It only matters that there is some kind of experience occurring. So, in regard to the analogy, yes, the person is having an experience that they've labeled as "sight". In the same sense, if conscious experience really is something else, it's still being consciously experienced regardless of what it is or what we label it.

My apologies if I'm just not grasping your point, properly...

I suppose the bottom line is that the experience of consciousness is so (it exists/occurs). Can that statement still be deniable?

I would say that the experience of consciousness is undeniable, but I do remember reading a paper that argued, almost convincingly, that even that could be denied. Sadly, I cannot find it right now.

I'd be quite interested in that if you do manage to find it, again.

The experience itself, sure, but how can you actually know that?
Literal nothingness giving birth to the experience of everything?

Consciousness, itself, is an experience. Can it be deniable that consciousness, itself, exists?
SNP1
Posts: 2,446
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12/14/2016 8:52:17 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 8:40:53 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:17:34 PM, SNP1 wrote:
Yes, but that is why I made the analogy I did.
Blind people have no sight, yet can have sight experiences, even people who have been blind since birth.
Same with deaf people and hearing and so on.
I think that we can both agree that these people are not actually seeing thing, hearing things, whatever, but the thing is that these are, in a way, indistinguishable from the real thing.

And so who is to say that conscious experience requires consciousness, even if it isn't really conscious experience but something essentially indistinguishable?

But the "real thing" is not relevent. It only matters that there is some kind of experience occurring. So, in regard to the analogy, yes, the person is having an experience that they've labeled as "sight". In the same sense, if conscious experience really is something else, it's still being consciously experienced regardless of what it is or what we label it.

My apologies if I'm just not grasping your point, properly...

Well, the main point is best made as an analogy.
Sight in humans, real sight, requires eyes.
Let's say that we take someone blind from birth and surgically remove their eyes. They can still have "Sight experience", but lack the crucial component for such (the eyes).
Let's take a deaf person, someone deaf from birth, and remove their ear drums, they can still have "hearing experiences" and, like with sight, lack the crucial component for such.
But these "sight experiences" and "hearing experiences" are not the same thing as truly having sight or truly hearing things, but are essentially indistinguishable to the agent these things are happening to.
And so the experience of consciousness may also not need any of the crucial components usually associated with it, and thus the only thing that can be said to exist is the experience of consciousness, not consciousness itself.

I suppose the bottom line is that the experience of consciousness is so (it exists/occurs). Can that statement still be deniable?

I would say that the experience of consciousness is undeniable, but I do remember reading a paper that argued, almost convincingly, that even that could be denied. Sadly, I cannot find it right now.

I'd be quite interested in that if you do manage to find it, again.

It is bothering me so much that I cannot find it, because it would be fun to argue for true metaphysical nihilism, even if I ultimately don't accept it.
#TheApatheticNihilistPartyofAmerica
#WarOnDDO
Benshapiro
Posts: 4,116
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12/14/2016 8:58:03 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 8:03:31 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 7:23:15 PM, Benshapiro wrote:
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

Right. "Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am).

Thoughts are a conscious experience, so some consciousness experience exists (labeled "I" or "me"). Right?

I think we're both in agreement that conscious experiences must exist. What does it mean to "exist" though?

Parallel to this, we must presuppose logical absolutes (the law of non-contradiction, the law of identity, law of excluded middle) which grounds the coherence of the statement itself.

Justify this; why does the previous statement need to be coherent? Why must these presuppositions be necessary?

I guess it needs to be coherent in order to translate our thoughts into understandable language - which is the purpose of having language in the first place. Statements presuppose the absolute truth of themselves. For example "all truth is subjective" would only be true if it was absolutely true, thus introducing a paradox. So, maybe our language can't be subject to incoherence (if it is supposed to convey some truth) but our own thoughts and experiences aren't. We can't think of a four-sided triangle though. If I were capable of imagining a four-sided triangle but couldn't convert this thought into language then this would show that *language* but not our thoughts are subject to the laws of logic. But I am not capable of imagining a 4-sided triangle. Thus, our thoughts and experiences are governed by them too. Rational discussion also presupppses absolute truth values and absolute truth values presuppose the fundamental validity of the laws of logic. So, by engaging in this discussion to find out what we're epistemically justified to believe, we're similtaneously conceding that rational discussion is posible (or at least we believe it is).
Chaosism
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12/14/2016 9:39:37 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 8:52:17 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:40:53 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:17:34 PM, SNP1 wrote:
Yes, but that is why I made the analogy I did.
Blind people have no sight, yet can have sight experiences, even people who have been blind since birth.
Same with deaf people and hearing and so on.
I think that we can both agree that these people are not actually seeing thing, hearing things, whatever, but the thing is that these are, in a way, indistinguishable from the real thing.

And so who is to say that conscious experience requires consciousness, even if it isn't really conscious experience but something essentially indistinguishable?

But the "real thing" is not relevent. It only matters that there is some kind of experience occurring. So, in regard to the analogy, yes, the person is having an experience that they've labeled as "sight". In the same sense, if conscious experience really is something else, it's still being consciously experienced regardless of what it is or what we label it.

My apologies if I'm just not grasping your point, properly...

Well, the main point is best made as an analogy.
Sight in humans, real sight, requires eyes.
Let's say that we take someone blind from birth and surgically remove their eyes. They can still have "Sight experience", but lack the crucial component for such (the eyes).
Let's take a deaf person, someone deaf from birth, and remove their ear drums, they can still have "hearing experiences" and, like with sight, lack the crucial component for such.
But these "sight experiences" and "hearing experiences" are not the same thing as truly having sight or truly hearing things, but are essentially indistinguishable to the agent these things are happening to.
And so the experience of consciousness may also not need any of the crucial components usually associated with it, and thus the only thing that can be said to exist is the experience of consciousness, not consciousness itself.

OK, I gotchya. The difference is that in the analogy, the entity associated with sight is already established, whereas the entity associated with consciousness is not. Essentially, regarding consciousness, we're pointing at whatever is responsible and defining that as "consciousness". So, whatever that may be, experiences make us aware of it in the same sense that sight would never be recognized without the existence of light (i.e. nothing to stimulate or cause an experience).
difference
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12/14/2016 9:43:20 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 8:01:33 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 7:12:55 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 6:55:28 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 6:32:31 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

I think it is entirely deniable.

People who are blind are still, somehow, able to have "sight experiences", yet their sight is non-existent.
Deaf people are still, somehow, able to have "hearing experiences", yet their hearing is non-existent.
Etc.

So, when there is the non-existence of consciousness, who says that conscious experience cannot occur?

Agreed, but perhaps I should have clarified that I didn't mean "sensation" quite as literally or defined as that (sight, hearing, etc.). I'm trying to start deeper than that.

Ya, I was simply using those as analogies for when I brought up consciousness.
If conscious experience can "exist" with the absence of consciousness, and if those experiences can all be wrong, then what is to say that anything exists?

I don't understand how this could be so. Consciousness is the sensation of experience, and so is tautological with conscious experience. We can't experience an absence of consciousness, so conclusions regarding such a state aren't verifiable in any way.

I suppose the bottom line is that the experience of consciousness is so (it exists/occurs). Can that statement still be deniable?

The experience itself, sure, but how can you actually know that?
Literal nothingness giving birth to the experience of everything?

Consciousness, itself, is an experience. Can it be deniable that consciousness, itself, exists?

Maybe I'm confused about what is meant by experience so far, but would you really call consciousness itself an experience?

I don't know if a subject of experience is being assumed yet or if it is only being used for analogy, but if it is being assumed, you could say it has experiences of sight or sound, but when you call consciousness an experience too, what is it that has the experience of consciousness?
Philosophy101
Posts: 2,065
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12/14/2016 9:53:47 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 9:39:37 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:52:17 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:40:53 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:17:34 PM, SNP1 wrote:
Yes, but that is why I made the analogy I did.
Blind people have no sight, yet can have sight experiences, even people who have been blind since birth.
Same with deaf people and hearing and so on.
I think that we can both agree that these people are not actually seeing thing, hearing things, whatever, but the thing is that these are, in a way, indistinguishable from the real thing.

And so who is to say that conscious experience requires consciousness, even if it isn't really conscious experience but something essentially indistinguishable?

But the "real thing" is not relevent. It only matters that there is some kind of experience occurring. So, in regard to the analogy, yes, the person is having an experience that they've labeled as "sight". In the same sense, if conscious experience really is something else, it's still being consciously experienced regardless of what it is or what we label it.

Yes, but on saying we can hallucinate you are giving up there is something real, a nonhallucination. If we begin with all our senses could be wrong either: a) there is something to be wrong about or b) our senses are telling us something true. Consider an evil demon (Descartes famous example) deceiving us in everything: there is one thing he cannot deceive us about, namely himself: we could figure out we were being decieved, if he went through all this trouble, and discover the culprit for our beliefs is indeed this demon. So a) we have conscious experience (at least I do if you don't) and (b) we have conscious experience of something no matter how far it is removed from reality, if indeed there is a reality (which there almost surely must be).

My apologies if I'm just not grasping your point, properly...

Well, the main point is best made as an analogy.
Sight in humans, real sight, requires eyes.
Let's say that we take someone blind from birth and surgically remove their eyes. They can still have "Sight experience", but lack the crucial component for such (the eyes).
Let's take a deaf person, someone deaf from birth, and remove their ear drums, they can still have "hearing experiences" and, like with sight, lack the crucial component for such.
But these "sight experiences" and "hearing experiences" are not the same thing as truly having sight or truly hearing things, but are essentially indistinguishable to the agent these things are happening to.
And so the experience of consciousness may also not need any of the crucial components usually associated with it, and thus the only thing that can be said to exist is the experience of consciousness, not consciousness itself.

OK, I gotchya. The difference is that in the analogy, the entity associated with sight is already established, whereas the entity associated with consciousness is not. Essentially, regarding consciousness, we're pointing at whatever is responsible and defining that as "consciousness". So, whatever that may be, experiences make us aware of it in the same sense that sight would never be recognized without the existence of light (i.e. nothing to stimulate or cause an experience).
Chaosism
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12/15/2016 1:41:35 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 8:58:03 PM, Benshapiro wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:03:31 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 7:23:15 PM, Benshapiro wrote:
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

Right. "Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am).

Thoughts are a conscious experience, so some consciousness experience exists (labeled "I" or "me"). Right?

I think we're both in agreement that conscious experiences must exist. What does it mean to "exist" though?

"Exist" in this context would mean "is the case" or "is occurring". Your experience of an optical illusion, for example, exists regardless of its correlation with reality.

Parallel to this, we must presuppose logical absolutes (the law of non-contradiction, the law of identity, law of excluded middle) which grounds the coherence of the statement itself.

Justify this; why does the previous statement need to be coherent? Why must these presuppositions be necessary?

I guess it needs to be coherent in order to translate our thoughts into understandable language - which is the purpose of having language in the first place. Statements presuppose the absolute truth of themselves. For example "all truth is subjective" would only be true if it was absolutely true, thus introducing a paradox. So, maybe our language can't be subject to incoherence (if it is supposed to convey some truth) but our own thoughts and experiences aren't. We can't think of a four-sided triangle though. If I were capable of imagining a four-sided triangle but couldn't convert this thought into language then this would show that *language* but not our thoughts are subject to the laws of logic. But I am not capable of imagining a 4-sided triangle. Thus, our thoughts and experiences are governed by them too. Rational discussion also presupppses absolute truth values and absolute truth values presuppose the fundamental validity of the laws of logic. So, by engaging in this discussion to find out what we're epistemically justified to believe, we're similtaneously conceding that rational discussion is posible (or at least we believe it is).

OK, before this can be addressed, let's look at the experiences we are subject to prior to addressing the dynamics of the language we use to describe them. Here, you are depending on the word, "truth", but what does that mean? How do you determine "truth" and how do you know that a square triangle can't exist, in the sense that contradicts can't be true? In the sense of your experiences, for instance, if your sense of sight tells you that an image on a paper has depth but your sense of touch reports flatness, how do you determine that they aren't both true?
Chaosism
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12/15/2016 1:42:02 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 9:43:20 PM, difference wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:01:33 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 7:12:55 PM, SNP1 wrote:

The experience itself, sure, but how can you actually know that?
Literal nothingness giving birth to the experience of everything?

Consciousness, itself, is an experience. Can it be deniable that consciousness, itself, exists?

Maybe I'm confused about what is meant by experience so far, but would you really call consciousness itself an experience?

I don't know if a subject of experience is being assumed yet or if it is only being used for analogy, but if it is being assumed, you could say it has experiences of sight or sound, but when you call consciousness an experience too, what is it that has the experience of consciousness?

Perhaps a better way to put it would be the awareness of or the sum of experiences. I would imagine (speculative) that an "empty" consciousness without any kind of stimuli would be inert and unable to recognize itself, which may rule it out as an experience, in of and itself. Though, we haven't gotten to the nature of the experiences, yet, just the sensations. I think you're right in your correction.
Chaosism
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12/15/2016 1:42:24 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 9:53:47 PM, Philosophy101 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 9:39:37 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:52:17 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:40:53 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:17:34 PM, SNP1 wrote:
Yes, but that is why I made the analogy I did.
Blind people have no sight, yet can have sight experiences, even people who have been blind since birth.
Same with deaf people and hearing and so on.
I think that we can both agree that these people are not actually seeing thing, hearing things, whatever, but the thing is that these are, in a way, indistinguishable from the real thing.

And so who is to say that conscious experience requires consciousness, even if it isn't really conscious experience but something essentially indistinguishable?

But the "real thing" is not relevent. It only matters that there is some kind of experience occurring. So, in regard to the analogy, yes, the person is having an experience that they've labeled as "sight". In the same sense, if conscious experience really is something else, it's still being consciously experienced regardless of what it is or what we label it.

Yes, but on saying we can hallucinate you are giving up there is something real, a nonhallucination. If we begin with all our senses could be wrong either: a) there is something to be wrong about or b) our senses are telling us something true. Consider an evil demon (Descartes famous example) deceiving us in everything: there is one thing he cannot deceive us about, namely himself: we could figure out we were being decieved, if he went through all this trouble, and discover the culprit for our beliefs is indeed this demon. So a) we have conscious experience (at least I do if you don't) and (b) we have conscious experience of something no matter how far it is removed from reality, if indeed there is a reality (which there almost surely must be).

Yes, Solipsism, basically. So, what means we you have of determining whether an experience is accurately representative of whatever the source of the experience is or even if there is a source at all? Without direct access to that source as a means of comparison, we cannot determine whether an experience of it is equivalent to its nature. In any case, the experiences, themselves, can be said to be "real", much like you really experience the visual distortion of an optical illusion.
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12/15/2016 6:04:56 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/15/2016 1:42:24 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 9:53:47 PM, Philosophy101 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 9:39:37 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:52:17 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:40:53 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:17:34 PM, SNP1 wrote:
Yes, but that is why I made the analogy I did.
Blind people have no sight, yet can have sight experiences, even people who have been blind since birth.
Same with deaf people and hearing and so on.
I think that we can both agree that these people are not actually seeing thing, hearing things, whatever, but the thing is that these are, in a way, indistinguishable from the real thing.

And so who is to say that conscious experience requires consciousness, even if it isn't really conscious experience but something essentially indistinguishable?

But the "real thing" is not relevent. It only matters that there is some kind of experience occurring. So, in regard to the analogy, yes, the person is having an experience that they've labeled as "sight". In the same sense, if conscious experience really is something else, it's still being consciously experienced regardless of what it is or what we label it.

Yes, but on saying we can hallucinate you are giving up there is something real, a nonhallucination. If we begin with all our senses could be wrong either: a) there is something to be wrong about or b) our senses are telling us something true. Consider an evil demon (Descartes famous example) deceiving us in everything: there is one thing he cannot deceive us about, namely himself: we could figure out we were being decieved, if he went through all this trouble, and discover the culprit for our beliefs is indeed this demon. So a) we have conscious experience (at least I do if you don't) and (b) we have conscious experience of something no matter how far it is removed from reality, if indeed there is a reality (which there almost surely must be).

Yes, Solipsism, basically. So, what means we you have of determining whether an experience is accurately representative of whatever the source of the experience is or even if there is a source at all? Without direct access to that source as a means of comparison, we cannot determine whether an experience of it is equivalent to its nature. In any case, the experiences, themselves, can be said to be "real", much like you really experience the visual distortion of an optical illusion.

Every experience has a source, no matter how buried; in philosophical talk I call in trickle down reality. Experiences are real in the everyday sense; we generally can rely on our senses to truely depict the world. However, if we are having a hallucination we can be sure of that a) we are having a hallucination and b) the hallucination has some aspect of reality to it no matter how small. In an EG world our senses are completely decieved with the same two stipulations. There has to be some real world and our senses have to be able to get to it somehow.
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12/15/2016 6:27:21 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/15/2016 6:04:56 PM, Philosophy101 wrote:
At 12/15/2016 1:42:24 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 9:53:47 PM, Philosophy101 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 9:39:37 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:52:17 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:40:53 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:17:34 PM, SNP1 wrote:
Yes, but that is why I made the analogy I did.
Blind people have no sight, yet can have sight experiences, even people who have been blind since birth.
Same with deaf people and hearing and so on.
I think that we can both agree that these people are not actually seeing thing, hearing things, whatever, but the thing is that these are, in a way, indistinguishable from the real thing.

And so who is to say that conscious experience requires consciousness, even if it isn't really conscious experience but something essentially indistinguishable?

But the "real thing" is not relevent. It only matters that there is some kind of experience occurring. So, in regard to the analogy, yes, the person is having an experience that they've labeled as "sight". In the same sense, if conscious experience really is something else, it's still being consciously experienced regardless of what it is or what we label it.

Yes, but on saying we can hallucinate you are giving up there is something real, a nonhallucination. If we begin with all our senses could be wrong either: a) there is something to be wrong about or b) our senses are telling us something true. Consider an evil demon (Descartes famous example) deceiving us in everything: there is one thing he cannot deceive us about, namely himself: we could figure out we were being decieved, if he went through all this trouble, and discover the culprit for our beliefs is indeed this demon. So a) we have conscious experience (at least I do if you don't) and (b) we have conscious experience of something no matter how far it is removed from reality, if indeed there is a reality (which there almost surely must be).

Yes, Solipsism, basically. So, what means we you have of determining whether an experience is accurately representative of whatever the source of the experience is or even if there is a source at all? Without direct access to that source as a means of comparison, we cannot determine whether an experience of it is equivalent to its nature. In any case, the experiences, themselves, can be said to be "real", much like you really experience the visual distortion of an optical illusion.

Every experience has a source, no matter how buried; in philosophical talk I call in trickle down reality. Experiences are real in the everyday sense; we generally can rely on our senses to truely depict the world. However, if we are having a hallucination we can be sure of that a) we are having a hallucination and b) the hallucination has some aspect of reality to it no matter how small. In an EG world our senses are completely decieved with the same two stipulations. There has to be some real world and our senses have to be able to get to it somehow.

Typically, your (b) is one of my two necessary assumptions to progress with an epistemological model, but I'm questioning whether it's actually necessary, lately. Of course, this isn't to say that our experiences are hallucinations, but is a suggestion to disregard and abandon trying to identify the true nature of our experiences.

Before I go on, what would your opinion be on my second assumption: consistency is indicative of truth? Basically, that consistency between experiences more likely yields truth. I feel that this assumption is necessary because if the truth is inconsistent, we can't learn it anyway, and so the only practical option is to accept this assumption.
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12/15/2016 8:15:46 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/15/2016 6:27:21 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/15/2016 6:04:56 PM, Philosophy101 wrote:
At 12/15/2016 1:42:24 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 9:53:47 PM, Philosophy101 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 9:39:37 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:52:17 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:40:53 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:17:34 PM, SNP1 wrote:
Yes, but that is why I made the analogy I did.
Blind people have no sight, yet can have sight experiences, even people who have been blind since birth.
Same with deaf people and hearing and so on.
I think that we can both agree that these people are not actually seeing thing, hearing things, whatever, but the thing is that these are, in a way, indistinguishable from the real thing.

And so who is to say that conscious experience requires consciousness, even if it isn't really conscious experience but something essentially indistinguishable?

But the "real thing" is not relevent. It only matters that there is some kind of experience occurring. So, in regard to the analogy, yes, the person is having an experience that they've labeled as "sight". In the same sense, if conscious experience really is something else, it's still being consciously experienced regardless of what it is or what we label it.

Yes, but on saying we can hallucinate you are giving up there is something real, a nonhallucination. If we begin with all our senses could be wrong either: a) there is something to be wrong about or b) our senses are telling us something true. Consider an evil demon (Descartes famous example) deceiving us in everything: there is one thing he cannot deceive us about, namely himself: we could figure out we were being decieved, if he went through all this trouble, and discover the culprit for our beliefs is indeed this demon. So a) we have conscious experience (at least I do if you don't) and (b) we have conscious experience of something no matter how far it is removed from reality, if indeed there is a reality (which there almost surely must be).

Yes, Solipsism, basically. So, what means we you have of determining whether an experience is accurately representative of whatever the source of the experience is or even if there is a source at all? Without direct access to that source as a means of comparison, we cannot determine whether an experience of it is equivalent to its nature. In any case, the experiences, themselves, can be said to be "real", much like you really experience the visual distortion of an optical illusion.

Every experience has a source, no matter how buried; in philosophical talk I call in trickle down reality. Experiences are real in the everyday sense; we generally can rely on our senses to truely depict the world. However, if we are having a hallucination we can be sure of that a) we are having a hallucination and b) the hallucination has some aspect of reality to it no matter how small. In an EG world our senses are completely decieved with the same two stipulations. There has to be some real world and our senses have to be able to get to it somehow.

Typically, your (b) is one of my two necessary assumptions to progress with an epistemological model, but I'm questioning whether it's actually necessary, lately. Of course, this isn't to say that our experiences are hallucinations, but is a suggestion to disregard and abandon trying to identify the true nature of our experiences.

Before I go on, what would your opinion be on my second assumption: consistency is indicative of truth? Basically, that consistency between experiences more likely yields truth. I feel that this assumption is necessary because if the truth is inconsistent, we can't learn it anyway, and so the only practical option is to accept this assumption.

I think the truth assumption is more metaphysical than epistemological. But along those lines I believe a casaul relationship is more important than a consistent casaul relationship. Perhaps with a consistent casaul relationship there are deeper truths. I think this universe shows an extremely high degree of consistency, we can measure clocks by quartz crystals (not to mention cesium atoms) and our calendar by rotations around the sun. So the regularity of our universe is striking.

Skepticism is common in epistemology where people believe there is no way to get at knowledge. I prefer a slightly more refined we can't know we know anything. But there seems to be truth that what we experience is genuine experience, whether it reflects an actual world or not. I think it's interesting to point out we generally stipulate a "real" world in which we are agents who can learn things from it. If we cannot get at this world through our senses, then what are you and me doing right now?
Chaosism
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12/15/2016 9:04:45 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/15/2016 8:15:46 PM, Philosophy101 wrote:
At 12/15/2016 6:27:21 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/15/2016 6:04:56 PM, Philosophy101 wrote:
At 12/15/2016 1:42:24 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 9:53:47 PM, Philosophy101 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 9:39:37 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:52:17 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 8:40:53 PM, Chaosism wrote:
But the "real thing" is not relevent. It only matters that there is some kind of experience occurring. So, in regard to the analogy, yes, the person is having an experience that they've labeled as "sight". In the same sense, if conscious experience really is something else, it's still being consciously experienced regardless of what it is or what we label it.

Yes, but on saying we can hallucinate you are giving up there is something real, a nonhallucination. If we begin with all our senses could be wrong either: a) there is something to be wrong about or b) our senses are telling us something true. Consider an evil demon (Descartes famous example) deceiving us in everything: there is one thing he cannot deceive us about, namely himself: we could figure out we were being decieved, if he went through all this trouble, and discover the culprit for our beliefs is indeed this demon. So a) we have conscious experience (at least I do if you don't) and (b) we have conscious experience of something no matter how far it is removed from reality, if indeed there is a reality (which there almost surely must be).

Yes, Solipsism, basically. So, what means we you have of determining whether an experience is accurately representative of whatever the source of the experience is or even if there is a source at all? Without direct access to that source as a means of comparison, we cannot determine whether an experience of it is equivalent to its nature. In any case, the experiences, themselves, can be said to be "real", much like you really experience the visual distortion of an optical illusion.

Every experience has a source, no matter how buried; in philosophical talk I call in trickle down reality. Experiences are real in the everyday sense; we generally can rely on our senses to truely depict the world. However, if we are having a hallucination we can be sure of that a) we are having a hallucination and b) the hallucination has some aspect of reality to it no matter how small. In an EG world our senses are completely decieved with the same two stipulations. There has to be some real world and our senses have to be able to get to it somehow.

Typically, your (b) is one of my two necessary assumptions to progress with an epistemological model, but I'm questioning whether it's actually necessary, lately. Of course, this isn't to say that our experiences are hallucinations, but is a suggestion to disregard and abandon trying to identify the true nature of our experiences.

Before I go on, what would your opinion be on my second assumption: consistency is indicative of truth? Basically, that consistency between experiences more likely yields truth. I feel that this assumption is necessary because if the truth is inconsistent, we can't learn it anyway, and so the only practical option is to accept this assumption.

I think the truth assumption is more metaphysical than epistemological. But along those lines I believe a casaul relationship is more important than a consistent casaul relationship. Perhaps with a consistent casaul relationship there are deeper truths. I think this universe shows an extremely high degree of consistency, we can measure clocks by quartz crystals (not to mention cesium atoms) and our calendar by rotations around the sun. So the regularity of our universe is striking.

Yes, the universe we experience is very consistent, and constitutes the basis of what we define as "real". To illustrate, when two modes of our sensory experience are incongruous (e.g. an optical illusion), we immediate recognize a problem and something must be not real. Similarly, if an experience is not verifiable by other entities (i.e. hallucinations) then we tend to discard the experience as not real. In this sense, we only really deem experiences "unreal" if they appear inconsistent.

Looking at the problem of solipsism, I was contemplating whether the true nature of reality is even useful knowledge. What's more important is developing a method of predicting experiences that result from calculated interactions with the experienced world. This is similar to how a scientific model is intended to simulate reality in the sense that it can be utilized to calculate a result which can be analogously applied to the real world. As long as the model functions and produces results, it doesn't matter if our depiction isn't truly accurate, like how particles appear in reality versus how we depict them in the atomic model.

Using this, our application of the label "real" is applied as a description of consistency and not a statement relating the nature of the source of the experiences. Solipsism is no longer an issue since "true" knowledge isn't actually useful, anyway. To put it analogously, imagine you're standing on one side of a free-standing wall and cannot experience anything on the other side. You have a baseball, toss it over the wall, and it comes right back. You repeat this many times and it happens again, predictably, every time. Regardless of what's actually on the other side of the wall, be it a trampoline-like mechanism or another person, you've acquired a means of achieving a desired outcome through specific interactions. The predictability is what's useful, not the knowledge of what's behind the wall.

Skepticism is common in epistemology where people believe there is no way to get at knowledge. I prefer a slightly more refined we can't know we know anything. But there seems to be truth that what we experience is genuine experience, whether it reflects an actual world or not. I think it's interesting to point out we generally stipulate a "real" world in which we are agents who can learn things from it. If we cannot get at this world through our senses, then what are you and me doing right now?

Regarding the statement, "we can't know we know anything", if you don't know that you know, do you really know? I mean, knowledge is typically characterized by confidence, not just accuracy. Perhaps I'm just not understanding this as intended, though.

Right, we assume that other sentient minds exist not because we can detect their sentience, but because those entities display the qualities and properties that we, as a verifiable sentient being, exhibits. It's analogous reasoning: I have properties p, r, s, t, and u, and entity x exhibits p, r, s, and t, so it's reasonable to assume that it also has property u despite it being unverifiable. Between you and I, we're interacting with experiences which are conceptually modeled as another mind, but as far as I can tell, this is merely an assumption, ultimately.

BTW - thank you for this exchange, so far, and my apologies if I come across as philosophically naive. ;P I'm just thinking out loud, here.
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12/15/2016 11:34:49 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/15/2016 9:04:45 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/15/2016 8:15:46 PM, Philosophy101 wrote

Yes, the universe we experience is very consistent, and constitutes the basis of what we define as "real". To illustrate, when two modes of our sensory experience are incongruous (e.g. an optical illusion), we immediate recognize a problem and something must be not real. Similarly, if an experience is not verifiable by other entities (i.e. hallucinations) then we tend to discard the experience as not real. In this sense, we only really deem experiences "unreal" if they appear inconsistent.

Exactly, reality is the wAy it is and we believe we can get at through the senses, when our senses decieved us instead of postulating something wrong with the world, we assume something is off with our senses.

Looking at the problem of solipsism, I was contemplating whether the true nature of reality is even useful knowledge. What's more important is developing a method of predicting experiences that result from calculated interactions with the experienced world. This is similar to how a scientific model is intended to simulate reality in the sense that it can be utilized to calculate a result which can be analogously applied to the real world. As long as the model functions and produces results, it doesn't matter if our depiction isn't truly accurate, like how particles appear in reality versus how we depict them in the atomic model.

Using this, our application of the label "real" is applied as a description of consistency and not a statement relating the nature of the source of the experiences. Solipsism is no longer an issue since "true" knowledge isn't actually useful, anyway. To put it analogously, imagine you're standing on one side of a free-standing wall and cannot experience anything on the other side. You have a baseball, toss it over the wall, and it comes right back. You repeat this many times and it happens again, predictably, every time. Regardless of what's actually on the other side of the wall, be it a trampoline-like mechanism or another person, you've acquired a means of achieving a desired outcome through specific interactions. The predictability is what's useful, not the knowledge of what's behind the wall.

Right, we may want to know what's behind that wall, it could be someone else over there wondering the same thing. This is a good account of the senses; there does almost seem a barrier to us and the real world. Perhaps the barrier is extent to a smaller or larger degree; although some have posited there is no barrier and we experiemce reality directly.

Skepticism is common in epistemology where people believe there is no way to get at knowledge. I prefer a slightly more refined we can't know we know anything. But there seems to be truth that what we experience is genuine experience, whether it reflects an actual world or not. I think it's interesting to point out we generally stipulate a "real" world in which we are agents who can learn things from it. If we cannot get at this world through our senses, then what are you and me doing right now?

Regarding the statement, "we can't know we know anything", if you don't know that you know, do you really know? I mean, knowledge is typically characterized by confidence, not just accuracy. Perhaps I'm just not understanding this as intended, though.

You can know the truth, and believe you know it, as opposed to accidentally getting at the truth; however, one can never be certain their knowledge accurately correlates to the universe. On the one hand one can believe something with a high degree of certainty; but actually getting to certainty is foolhardy.

Right, we assume that other sentient minds exist not because we can detect their sentience, but because those entities display the qualities and properties that we, as a verifiable sentient being, exhibits. It's analogous reasoning: I have properties p, r, s, t, and u, and entity x exhibits p, r, s, and t, so it's reasonable to assume that it also has property u despite it being unverifiable. Between you and I, we're interacting with experiences which are conceptually modeled as another mind, but as far as I can tell, this is merely an assumption, ultimately.

Perhaps it is an assumption, but it is a worthwhile assumption. For instance you could be a computer program with no conscious experience; however my assumption that you are not affects the way I interact with you. If I believe there is nothing to your words, then I would probably not merit you with the same courtesies given to another being who has consciousness like myself.

BTW - thank you for this exchange, so far, and my apologies if I come across as philosophically naive. ;P I'm just thinking out loud, here.

Naw, you're good.
Chaosism
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12/16/2016 2:52:19 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/15/2016 11:34:49 PM, Philosophy101 wrote:
At 12/15/2016 9:04:45 PM, Chaosism wrote:

Yes, the universe we experience is very consistent, and constitutes the basis of what we define as "real". To illustrate, when two modes of our sensory experience are incongruous (e.g. an optical illusion), we immediate recognize a problem and something must be not real. Similarly, if an experience is not verifiable by other entities (i.e. hallucinations) then we tend to discard the experience as not real. In this sense, we only really deem experiences "unreal" if they appear inconsistent.

Exactly, reality is the wAy it is and we believe we can get at through the senses, when our senses decieved us instead of postulating something wrong with the world, we assume something is off with our senses.

Right, we questions our senses before our reasoning, and we usually deem that one of the two conflicting experiences is true while the other false. It'd be like seeing two different answers given to an advanced calculus problem in the back of a text book; the contradiction leads us to believe that one of them is wrong, but we wouldn't have considered that possibility, otherwise. Heck, it's even possible that both of them are wrong, but that's usually not considered.

Looking at the problem of solipsism, I was contemplating whether the true nature of reality is even useful knowledge. What's more important is developing a method of predicting experiences that result from calculated interactions with the experienced world. This is similar to how a scientific model is intended to simulate reality in the sense that it can be utilized to calculate a result which can be analogously applied to the real world. As long as the model functions and produces results, it doesn't matter if our depiction isn't truly accurate, like how particles appear in reality versus how we depict them in the atomic model.

Using this, our application of the label "real" is applied as a description of consistency and not a statement relating the nature of the source of the experiences. Solipsism is no longer an issue since "true" knowledge isn't actually useful, anyway. To put it analogously, imagine you're standing on one side of a free-standing wall and cannot experience anything on the other side. You have a baseball, toss it over the wall, and it comes right back. You repeat this many times and it happens again, predictably, every time. Regardless of what's actually on the other side of the wall, be it a trampoline-like mechanism or another person, you've acquired a means of achieving a desired outcome through specific interactions. The predictability is what's useful, not the knowledge of what's behind the wall.

Right, we may want to know what's behind that wall, it could be someone else over there wondering the same thing. This is a good account of the senses; there does almost seem a barrier to us and the real world. Perhaps the barrier is extent to a smaller or larger degree; although some have posited there is no barrier and we experiemce reality directly.

Even if no barrier existed and naive realism was true, how could one know this? The 'Evil Demon' scenario is still fully applicable. Even a supposed omniscient God cannot know this for certain; suppose a "God's God" created God to believe that He was the extent of existence and knew everything, but made it impossible for Him to know about His creator. These two scenarios "God" and "God's God" are indistinguishable.

Regarding the statement, "we can't know we know anything", if you don't know that you know, do you really know? I mean, knowledge is typically characterized by confidence, not just accuracy. Perhaps I'm just not understanding this as intended, though.

You can know the truth, and believe you know it, as opposed to accidentally getting at the truth; however, one can never be certain their knowledge accurately correlates to the universe. On the one hand one can believe something with a high degree of certainty; but actually getting to certainty is foolhardy.

Certainty, as a feeling, is an inevitable result of the human psyche, though. That's how we deem things "knowledge" because if we're not certain, then we retreat to belief. Aren't you certain that if you drop something, it'll succumb to the effects of gravity? Is that knowledge? Personally, I almost never use the word "know" in non-casual context.

Right, we assume that other sentient minds exist not because we can detect their sentience, but because those entities display the qualities and properties that we, as a verifiable sentient being, exhibits. It's analogous reasoning: I have properties p, r, s, t, and u, and entity x exhibits p, r, s, and t, so it's reasonable to assume that it also has property u despite it being unverifiable. Between you and I, we're interacting with experiences which are conceptually modeled as another mind, but as far as I can tell, this is merely an assumption, ultimately.

Perhaps it is an assumption, but it is a worthwhile assumption. For instance you could be a computer program with no conscious experience; however my assumption that you are not affects the way I interact with you. If I believe there is nothing to your words, then I would probably not merit you with the same courtesies given to another being who has consciousness like myself.

I don't think consciousness is the core reason as to why one provide courtesy to another entity. This is a psychology experiment (expressed in an unrefined manner) that I would love to see: imagine, as a test subject (setting aside issues with the Hawthorn Effect), you are told that a machine is in the other room and you are tasked to destroy it. The first group would have to destroy some mundane piece of equipment, which should be no problem. The second group would be tasked to destroy a piece of mundane equipment that has an audio component that asks and pleads not to be destroyed. The third group would have to destroy a piece of equipment with the likeness of a human child accompanied with the same audio component.

In actuality, all of these are just mechanical entities, but the results of the experiment should be pretty predictable. So, despite a subject's knowledge that a child-like being is just a machine and nothing more, what percentage of the subjects would hesitate or outright refuse to destroy it? Such would suggest that the courtesy we extend to other entities is rooted in our own empathy and cognitions rather than what's actually the case.
Welfare-Worker
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12/16/2016 4:03:26 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/14/2016 6:32:31 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:
The aim of this exercise is to begin from a sort of "zero-point" which entails no assumptions, we can develop necessary epistemological axioms and examine the assumptions we currently rely on.

Well, this can be interesting.

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

I think it is entirely deniable.

People who are blind are still, somehow, able to have "sight experiences", yet their sight is non-existent.
Deaf people are still, somehow, able to have "hearing experiences", yet their hearing is non-existent.
Etc.

So, when there is the non-existence of consciousness, who says that conscious experience cannot occur?
And if all senses are also wrong, then could it not be entirely possible that there exists literally nothing?
Not solipsism, but pure metaphysical nihilism.
So as I understand your position, I could have an eating experience without nourishment, a drinking experience without fluids, a walking experience without legs, and a dying experience without death.
Do I have it correct?
SNP1
Posts: 2,446
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12/16/2016 5:13:29 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/16/2016 4:03:26 PM, Welfare-Worker wrote:
At 12/14/2016 6:32:31 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:
The aim of this exercise is to begin from a sort of "zero-point" which entails no assumptions, we can develop necessary epistemological axioms and examine the assumptions we currently rely on.

Well, this can be interesting.

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

I think it is entirely deniable.

People who are blind are still, somehow, able to have "sight experiences", yet their sight is non-existent.
Deaf people are still, somehow, able to have "hearing experiences", yet their hearing is non-existent.
Etc.

So, when there is the non-existence of consciousness, who says that conscious experience cannot occur?
And if all senses are also wrong, then could it not be entirely possible that there exists literally nothing?
Not solipsism, but pure metaphysical nihilism.
So as I understand your position, I could have an eating experience without nourishment, a drinking experience without fluids, a walking experience without legs, and a dying experience without death.
Do I have it correct?

Hypothetically, yes, but it is important to remember that the experience of actually eating and the experience of eating without nourishment would be identical to the one experiencing it, but still are different things.
#TheApatheticNihilistPartyofAmerica
#WarOnDDO
Welfare-Worker
Posts: 1,678
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12/16/2016 5:41:41 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/16/2016 5:13:29 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/16/2016 4:03:26 PM, Welfare-Worker wrote:
At 12/14/2016 6:32:31 PM, SNP1 wrote:
At 12/14/2016 3:22:54 PM, Chaosism wrote:
The aim of this exercise is to begin from a sort of "zero-point" which entails no assumptions, we can develop necessary epistemological axioms and examine the assumptions we currently rely on.

Well, this can be interesting.

To begin, I shall issue the proposition, "some sensation of experience occurs". This alludes to there being "something rather than nothing" in the most basic sense that *something* is going on. I don't think this one is deniable.

I think it is entirely deniable.

People who are blind are still, somehow, able to have "sight experiences", yet their sight is non-existent.
Deaf people are still, somehow, able to have "hearing experiences", yet their hearing is non-existent.
Etc.

So, when there is the non-existence of consciousness, who says that conscious experience cannot occur?
And if all senses are also wrong, then could it not be entirely possible that there exists literally nothing?
Not solipsism, but pure metaphysical nihilism.
So as I understand your position, I could have an eating experience without nourishment, a drinking experience without fluids, a walking experience without legs, and a dying experience without death.
Do I have it correct?

Hypothetically, yes, but it is important to remember that the experience of actually eating and the experience of eating without nourishment would be identical to the one experiencing it, but still are different things.

Well, yes. That is what I was wondering about. Were you equating a mental process with a physical process.
The difference you mention I assume is that the one 'eating without nourishment' could suffer malnutrition, well before the one 'eating with nourishment'.
It seems to me there is a distinct difference beyond that.
Are experiences in the mind truly the same as experiences through the body?
You seem to say they are, I am not convinced. I suppose I could say that although uncommon, it could happen.

I am thinking of a golfer, who improves his swing through repeated swings, improving over time. Could a golfer who only swings mentally, have the same improvement in his skills? I would think not.
Philosophy101
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12/16/2016 11:51:18 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/16/2016 2:52:19 PM, Chaosism wrote:
At 12/15/2016 11:34:49 PM, Philosophy101 wrote:
At 12/15/2016 9:04:45 PM, Chaosism wrote:

Yes, the universe we experience is very consistent, and constitutes the basis of what we define as "real". To illustrate, when two modes of our sensory experience are incongruous (e.g. an optical illusion), we immediate recognize a problem and something must be not real. Similarly, if an experience is not verifiable by other entities (i.e. hallucinations) then we tend to discard the experience as not real. In this sense, we only really deem experiences "unreal" if they appear inconsistent.

Exactly, reality is the wAy it is and we believe we can get at through the senses, when our senses decieved us instead of postulating something wrong with the world, we assume something is off with our senses.

Right, we questions our senses before our reasoning, and we usually deem that one of the two conflicting experiences is true while the other false. It'd be like seeing two different answers given to an advanced calculus problem in the back of a text book; the contradiction leads us to believe that one of them is wrong, but we wouldn't have considered that possibility, otherwise. Heck, it's even possible that both of them are wrong, but that's usually not considered.

Looking at the problem of solipsism, I was contemplating whether the true nature of reality is even useful knowledge. What's more important is developing a method of predicting experiences that result from calculated interactions with the experienced world. This is similar to how a scientific model is intended to simulate reality in the sense that it can be utilized to calculate a result which can be analogously applied to the real world. As long as the model functions and produces results, it doesn't matter if our depiction isn't truly accurate, like how particles appear in reality versus how we depict them in the atomic model.

Using this, our application of the label "real" is applied as a description of consistency and not a statement relating the nature of the source of the experiences. Solipsism is no longer an issue since "true" knowledge isn't actually useful, anyway. To put it analogously, imagine you're standing on one side of a free-standing wall and cannot experience anything on the other side. You have a baseball, toss it over the wall, and it comes right back. You repeat this many times and it happens again, predictably, every time. Regardless of what's actually on the other side of the wall, be it a trampoline-like mechanism or another person, you've acquired a means of achieving a desired outcome through specific interactions. The predictability is what's useful, not the knowledge of what's behind the wall.

Right, we may want to know what's behind that wall, it could be someone else over there wondering the same thing. This is a good account of the senses; there does almost seem a barrier to us and the real world. Perhaps the barrier is extent to a smaller or larger degree; although some have posited there is no barrier and we experiemce reality directly.

Even if no barrier existed and naive realism was true, how could one know this? The 'Evil Demon' scenario is still fully applicable. Even a supposed omniscient God cannot know this for certain; suppose a "God's God" created God to believe that He was the extent of existence and knew everything, but made it impossible for Him to know about His creator. These two scenarios "God" and "God's God" are indistinguishable.

Regarding the statement, "we can't know we know anything", if you don't know that you know, do you really know? I mean, knowledge is typically characterized by confidence, not just accuracy. Perhaps I'm just not understanding this as intended, though.

You can know the truth, and believe you know it, as opposed to accidentally getting at the truth; however, one can never be certain their knowledge accurately correlates to the universe. On the one hand one can believe something with a high degree of certainty; but actually getting to certainty is foolhardy.

Certainty, as a feeling, is an inevitable result of the human psyche, though. That's how we deem things "knowledge" because if we're not certain, then we retreat to belief. Aren't you certain that if you drop something, it'll succumb to the effects of gravity? Is that knowledge? Personally, I almost never use the word "know" in non-casual context.

I believe we can know that gravity exists, but we cannot know we know it because we could always be wrong natter how certain we are. For instance we could say that it is gravity causing things to fall to earth, then we discover boson x that is really responsible for the effects of gravity. Then we may be certain we know, but discover boson y that is really responsible for the effects of gravity. The reason we cannot be certain is we haven't discovered all there is to know. So while people were certain we lived in a geocentric universe, they turned out to be wrong.

Right, we assume that other sentient minds exist not because we can detect their sentience, but because those entities display the qualities and properties that we, as a verifiable sentient being, exhibits. It's analogous reasoning: I have properties p, r, s, t, and u, and entity x exhibits p, r, s, and t, so it's reasonable to assume that it also has property u despite it being unverifiable. Between you and I, we're interacting with experiences which are conceptually modeled as another mind, but as far as I can tell, this is merely an assumption, ultimately.

Perhaps it is an assumption, but it is a worthwhile assumption. For instance you could be a computer program with no conscious experience; however my assumption that you are not affects the way I interact with you. If I believe there is nothing to your words, then I would probably not merit you with the same courtesies given to another being who has consciousness like myself.

I don't think consciousness is the core reason as to why one provide courtesy to another entity. This is a psychology experiment (expressed in an unrefined manner) that I would love to see: imagine, as a test subject (setting aside issues with the Hawthorn Effect), you are told that a machine is in the other room and you are tasked to destroy it. The first group would have to destroy some mundane piece of equipment, which should be no problem. The second group would be tasked to destroy a piece of mundane equipment that has an audio component that asks and pleads not to be destroyed. The third group would have to destroy a piece of equipment with the likeness of a human child accompanied with the same audio component.

In actuality, all of these are just mechanical entities, but the results of the experiment should be pretty predictable. So, despite a subject's knowledge that a child-like being is just a machine and nothing more, what percentage of the subjects would hesitate or outright refuse to destroy it? Such would suggest that the courtesy we extend to other entities is rooted in our own empathy and cognitions rather than what's actually the case.

I agree psychologically we may think this way, but morally we are not obligated to think this way. For instance in the trolley problem, if the decision was to run over 100 childlike, talking dolls or one human, we would be morally obligated to switch to the dolls. The reason for this is the dolls do not experience anything while the human does.
keithprosser
Posts: 8,122
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12/17/2016 5:16:42 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/16/2016 11:51:18 PM, Philosophy101 wrote:

I agree psychologically we may think this way, but morally we are not obligated to think this way. For instance in the trolley problem, if the decision was to run over 100 childlike, talking dolls or one human, we would be morally obligated to switch to the dolls. The reason for this is the dolls do not experience anything while the human does.

Suppose the dolls were highly advanced AI robots that passed the Turing and Voight-Kampff tests and the human was in a coma or vegetative state? Is the criteria of 'being able to experience' the correct one to apply in that case?
Philosophy101
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12/17/2016 9:41:04 PM
Posted: 3 years ago
At 12/17/2016 5:16:42 PM, keithprosser wrote:
At 12/16/2016 11:51:18 PM, Philosophy101 wrote:

I agree psychologically we may think this way, but morally we are not obligated to think this way. For instance in the trolley problem, if the decision was to run over 100 childlike, talking dolls or one human, we would be morally obligated to switch to the dolls. The reason for this is the dolls do not experience anything while the human does.

Suppose the dolls were highly advanced AI robots that passed the Turing and Voight-Kampff tests and the human was in a coma or vegetative state? Is the criteria of 'being able to experience' the correct one to apply in that case?

If the dolls were conscious I would say we would have to keep that into consideration. As for the person in the vegetative state (I don't know what this person is doing on the tracks) it might also have to be taken into consideration. If I had to choose between truly conscious robots (who have first person experience) and a human body without consciousness I would choose the robots over the person. I do have to admit this doesn't sound right, but that has more to do with the thought the human still has some aspect of embodiment in the vegetative body.

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