Happy American Independence Day!

Posted by: PetersSmith

As celebration of Independence Day, I decided to make a poll honoring what America does best: spreading freedom to other countries. So, what War Plan is your favorite? Which scenario do you find most interesting? Which one would have changed history? Oh, and if you don't celebrate Independence Day, you will. You all will.

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10 Total Votes
1

War Plan Rainbow (Pretty Much Everyone)

Japan had used the opportunity afforded by World War I to establish itself as a major power and a strategic rival in the Pacific Ocean. Following World War I, most American officials and planners considered a war with Japan to be highly likely. It w... as reverted when the civilian government temporarily halted the program of military expansion, which was not to resume until 1931. War Plan Orange was the longest and most-detailed of the colored plans. However, following the events in Europe in 1938 and 1939 (the Anschluss, Munich Agreement, German occupation of Czechoslovakia, and Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact), American war planners realized that the United States faced the possibility of war on multiple fronts against a coalition of enemies. To that end, the Joint Planning Board developed a new series of war plans, the "Rainbow" plans - the term being a play on the multiple "color" plans that had been drawn up previously. Rainbow 1 was a plan for a defensive war to protect the United States and the Western Hemisphere north of ten degrees [south] latitude. In such a war, the United States was assumed to be without major allies. Rainbow 2 was identical to Rainbow 1, except for assuming that the United States would be allied with France and the United Kingdom. Rainbow 3 was a repetition of the Orange plan, with the provision that the hemisphere defense would first be secured, as provided in Rainbow 1. Rainbow 4 was based on the same assumptions as Rainbow 1, but extended the American mission to include defense of the entire Western hemisphere. Rainbow 5, destined to be the basis for American strategy in World War II, assumed that the United States was allied with Britain and France and provided for offensive operations by American forces in Europe, Africa, or both. The assumptions and plans for Rainbow 5 were discussed extensively in the Plan Dog memo, which concluded ultimately that the United States would adhere to a Europe first strategy in World War II   more
5 votes
4 comments
2

War Plan Green (Mexico)

The theatre of war will include the Republic of Mexico, the Gulf of Mexico and Pacific Ocean bordering on Mexico, and the U.S. and Mexican border. The theatre of operations at the beginning of the war will consist of the U.S. and Mexican border, the...  Mexican ports occupied or blockaded by the Navy, and the territory occupied by the U.S. Expeditionary forces during their invasion. Eventually, the entire Republic of Mexico will be included in active operations looking to pacification and suppression of guerilla warfare. Forces required include the Regular Army and the National Guard, when called into the Service, and such members of the Organized Reserves as may be called to the services for an emergency. Forces would also include such units of the Navy as were considered sufficient to carry out the Navy Department's objectives, The nationa1 objectives - po1itica1 , economic, military - were to conduct a military and naval intervention in Mexico for the establishment of law and order from both an international and internal viewpoint. This involves a pacification of the country, the reorganization of the government and the modification of the laws of the country to insure the establishment of the rights of foreiqners in Mexico. The General Concept of Operations called for a naval blockade and immediate seizure of Mexican ports, along with the closure of the northern border by the Army. This would be followed by an invasion by the Army, of Mexico. The Army would occupy all or that portion of Mexico necessary to suppress querilla warfare and bandit operations. The First Phase would consist of the establishment, by the Navy, of a blockade and the capture by the Navy of Mazatlan, Manzanillo. Salina Cruz, Puerta Mexico, the Tampico-Tuxpam area. This phase also called for closure of northern t:crco'- by the Army and concentrate the expeditionary forces. In the Second Phase, an Army Expeditionary Force would relieve the Navy at Mazatlan and in the Tampico-Tuxpam area. An Army Expeditionarv Force would advance into the Monterey-Saltillo Area. An Army Expeditionary Force aided by the Navy would occuov Vera Cruz. This plan called for a total of four phases. President Wilson, on 20 April 1914 laid the matter before Congress, which subsequently "Resolved, That the President is justified in the employment of the armed forces of the United States to enforce his demand for unequivocal amends for affronts and indignities committed against the United States. Be it further Resolved, That the United States disclaim any hostility to the Mexican people or any purpose to make war upon them.   more
2 votes
1 comment
3

War Plan Black (Germany)

One of the United States color-coded war plans, War Plan Black was the name of an American military plan to fight Germany in the early 20th century. The best-known version was conceived as a contingency plan during World War I in case France fell an... d the Germans attempted to seize French possessions in the Caribbean or to launch an attack on the eastern seaboard. The United States was to plant mines and have submarines on patrol at sites Germany might seize for a foothold in the Caribbean. The plan was revised in 1916 to concentrate the main US naval fleet in New England, and from there defend the US from the German navy. Following Germany's defeat, the plan lost importance   more
1 vote
0 comments
4

War Plan Red (Canada)

Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Red was a war plan created by the United States Army and Navy in the late 1920s and early 1930s to estimate the requirements for a hypothetical war with Great Britain. War Plan Red discussed the potential for fight... ing a war with Britain and its Empire and outlined those steps necessary to defend the Atlantic coast against any attempted mainland invasion of the United States. It further discussed fighting a two-front war with both Japan and Britain simultaneously. War Plan Red was not operationalized and did not have presidential or Congressional approval. Only the Congress can declare war, and in this period of U.S. history, it made no war plans. President Herbert Hoover was known as a pacifist.War Plan Red was developed by the United States Army following the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference and approved in May 1930 by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy and updated in 1934–35. In 1939 on the outbreak of World War II and Britain's war against Nazi Germany, a decision was taken that no further planning was required but that the plan be retained. War Plan Red was not declassified until 1974   more
1 vote
1 comment
5

War Plan Red-Orange (the UK and Japan)

Another contingency war plan they developed was the RED-ORANGE PLAN, which hypothesized a two-theater war, seeking to win first in the Atlantic, against England, while fighting a holding battle in the Pacific, and then defeating Japan. When World Wa... r Two broke out, military and naval planners simply dusted off the old RED-ORANGE PLAN and substituted Germany for England in the Atlantic Theater. At the time of President Wilson's first inauguration, in 1913, the country faced two crises in foreign affairs. The first was the murder of Francisco Madero, Diaz' successor in Mexico. Wilson, who regarded Madero as his ideological counterpart, became the uncompromising opponent of Madero's murderer, Victoriano Huerta. At about the same time, the California state legislature passed the Alien Exclusion Act, which forbade Japanese nationals from owning or leasing land in that state. The Japanese government, which refused to believe that the Federal government could not overturn a state law, was incensed, and began to take advantage of what they saw as a convergence of interests with Mexico. In the spring and summer of 1913, Japan supplied arms to the Huerta government. Then, in May 1913, England recognized the Huerta government in order to secure a steady supply of Mexican oil to fuel the warships of the Royal Navy. These developments moved the Army-Navy Joint Planning Board to act. What the Board did was based upon the conclusion that the country could not defeat any hostile force landed on the west coast. One analysis read: "If 200,000 men of any first class hostile power should be landedon our Pacific Coast, we should have no course but to hand overto a foreign nation the rich empire west of the Rockies, with its cities, its harbors, and the wealth of its valleys and mountains." In the summer of 1913 the Joint Board dispatched a number of warships to Manila and the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii, thus following the example of the Navy Board in 1898, which began the deployment of the fleet in advance of a declaration of war or of a Presidential order. Wilson, however, was less inclined to provoke a war than McKinley. He countermanded the order and disbanded the Joint Board. The United States would not be like the European powers in letting military planning requirements drive the decision to wage war. The outbreak of the European war in the summer of 1914 initially seemed to confirm American assumptions that the rivalry among the European powers would keep them so preoccupied that none of them would be able to pose anythreat in the Americas. The dangers of war seemed to converge with the most immediate impact in Mexico. In December 1914, the captain of a Japanese warship visited Mexico City. Japan was aggrieved at the United States and had been preparing for war for over 3 years. In April 1915, the Japanese battle cruiser Asama was detected maneuvering off the coast of Baja California. The Hearst press, which had so effectively worked Americans into a war fever in 1898, screamed that the Japanese had been using naval bases in Baja California. In 1923, the Army draft of RED-ORANGE started with the statement, "Under existing conditions a coalition of RED and ORANGE is unlikely," and twelve years later the Director of Naval Intelligence, commenting on another draft plan, stated that a RED-ORANGE combination was "highly improbable" in the next decade, if at all. The broader strategy and the resources to carry it out, including defense construction and mobilization of reserves, was essentially the same. The main point to be learned here is that a theoretical planning construct does not make an enemy of a country. England made a strategic policy choice at the Washington Conference, deciding to cast its lot with the United States, and turned out to be a close ally by the late-1930s. But the RED-ORANGE PLAN stayed on the US Joint Army-Navy Board's agenda through 1939. The problems presented by a RED-ORANGE coalition, though highly theoretical, were more complicated. Here the American strategists had to face all the possibilities of an ORANGE and a RED war-seizure of American possessions in the western Pacific, violation of the Monroe Doctrine, attacks on the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and other places, and, finally, the invasion of the United States itself. Basically the problem was to prepare for a war in both oceans against the two great naval powers, Great Britain and Japan. As the planners viewed this problem, the strategic choices open to the United States were limited. Certainly the United State did not have the naval strength to conduct offensive operations simultaneously in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; she must adopt a strategic defensive on both fronts or else assume the strategic offensive in one theater while standing on the defensive in the other. The recommended solution to this problem-and it was only a recommended solution, for no joint war plan was ever adopted-was "to concentrate on obtaining a favorable decision" in the Atlantic and to stand on the defensive in the Pacific with minimum forces. This was based on the assumption that since the Atlantic enemy was the stronger and since the vital areas of the United States were located in the northeast, the main effort of the hostile coalition would be made there. For this reason, the initial effort of the United States, the planners argued, should be in the Atlantic. A strategic offensive-defensive in a two-front war, American strategists recognized, entailed serious disadvantages. It gave the hostile coalition freedom of action to attack at points of its own choosing, compelled the United States to be prepared to meet attacks practically everywhere, exposed all U.S. overseas possessions to capture, and imposed on the American people a restraint inconsistent with their traditions and spirit. Also it involved serious and humiliating defeats in the Pacific during the first phase of the war and the almost certain loss of outlying possessions in that region. But the strategic offensive-defensive had definite advantages. It enabled the United States to conduct operations in close proximity to its home bases and to force the enemy to fight at great distance from his own home bases at the end of a long line of communications. Moreover, the forces raised in the process of producing a favorable decision in the Atlantic would give the United States such a superiority over Japan that the Japanese might well negotiate rather than fight the United States alone. "It is not unreasonable to hope," the planners observed, "that the situation at the end of the struggle with RED may be such as to induce ORANGE to yield rather than face a war carried to the Western Pacific." This plan for a RED-ORANGE war was admittedly unrealistic in terms of the international situation during the 1920's and 1930's. The military planners knew this as well and better than most and often noted this fact in the draft plans they wrote   more
1 vote
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6

War Plan Yellow (China)

Dealt with war in China - specifically, the defense of Beijing and relief of Shanghai during the Second Sino-Japanese War.
0 votes
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7

War Plan Gold (France)

During the early decades of the 20th century, the United States Navy made plans to fight a host of potential enemies. Some of these future wars seemed inevitable, particularly that with Japan. Others depended on changes in current politics, but Navy...  planners wanted to be prepared just in case. One of these plans, labeled “Gold,” studied a potential naval war with France. The United States had stood alongside its “oldest ally” during the First World War, but in the years immediately afterwards the Navy looked at the potential for radical politicians to change France from friend to foe. Also, the peace negotiations which followed the war revealed deep underlying tensions between the Americans and their European allies; some of the more paranoid came to believe the next war would be between Europe and America   more
0 votes
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8

War Plan Orange (Japan)

War Plan Orange refers to a series of United States Joint Army and Navy Board war plans for dealing with a possible war with Japan during the years between the First and Second World Wars.Informal studies as early as 1906 covered a number of possibi... lities, from basing at Gibraltar or Singapore to "a quick trans-Atlantic dash" to the Pacific. The plan eventually adopted was conceived by Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers in 1911.The plan was formally adopted by the Joint Army and Navy Board beginning in 1924. Predating the Rainbow plans, which presumed the assistance of allies, Orange was predicated on the U.S. fighting Japan alone.As originally conceived, it anticipated a withholding of supplies from the Philippines and other US outposts in the Western Pacific, while the Pacific Fleet marshaled its strength at bases in California, and guarded against attacks on the Panama Canal. After mobilization, the Fleet would sail to the Western Pacific to relieve American forces in Guam and the Philippines. Afterwards, the fleet would sail North for a decisive battle against the Imperial Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet, and then blockade the Japanese home islands   more
0 votes
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9

War Plan Gray (Central America)

War Plan Gray was a plan for the United States to invade the Azores Islands in 1940-41. Gray is one of the many color-coded war plans created in the early 20th century. On 22 May 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt directed the U.S. Army and Navy ... to draft an official plan to occupy the Portuguese Azores. Approved by the Joint Board on 29 May, War Plan Gray called for a landing force of 28,000 troops, one half Marine and one half Army.While motions were made to prepare for this invasion, a shifting of focus halted War Plan Gray and the Azores were never invaded. This was mainly credited to intelligence sources producing evidence making it highly unlikely that Nazi Germany would invade Francoist Spain and the Portuguese Estado Novo, both pro-fascist states. With Germany turning its attention to Russia, this eased American fears concerning the Azores, resulting in the suspension of War Plan Gray, letting the US focus their time and forces elsewhere   more
0 votes
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10

War Plan Brown (Philippines)

Comprising almost 7,100 known islands and islets, the Philippine Archipelago lies approximately 500 miles off the Asiatic mainland and extends 1,150 miles almost due north and south from Formosa to Borneo. Strategically situated in the geographic he... art of the Far East, the Islands are centrally located in relation to Japan, China, Burma, French Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies. They lie athwart the trade routes leading from Japan and China through the South China Sea to southeast Asia and the rich supplies of oil and minerals in the Indies. Vital areas in Japan and along the Chinese coast are within quick striking distance by sea and air of the Philippines. Over 5,000 miles from Honolulu and 7,000 miles from San Francisco, Manila, the chief city and capital of the Islands, is only 1,800 miles from Tokyo. Formosa and Hong Kong are less than 700 miles distant, Singapore 1,500 miles, and Truk in the Caroline Islands 2,100 miles. By the mid-1930's the American military planners had finally concluded that Japan could be defeated only in a long, costly war, in which the Philippines would early be lost, and in which American offensive operations would take the form of a "progressive movement" through the mandated islands, beginning with the Marshalls and Carolines, to establish "a secure line of communications to the Western Pacific." After the passage of the Philippine Independence Act (Tydings-McDuffie bill) in 1934, the belief gained ground in the War Department that the United states should not run the risk nor incur the obligation of fighting the Japanese in the western Pacific. When the question finally came up in the fall of 1931, the Army planners took the position that the United States should no longer remain liable for a fruitless attempt to defend and relieve the Philippines and the costly attempt to retake them   more
0 votes
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11

War Plan Tan (Cuba)

War Plan Tan covered operations against Cuba. Alfred Thayer Mahan, writing in Naval strategy compared and contrasted, argued strenuously for the strategic importance of Cuba to the United States. The United States has a long ocean frontier, broken ... at Mexico by the interposition of land, as the French maritime frontier is broken at the Pyrenees; yet the coast lines, like the French, possess a certain maritime continuity, in that ships can pass from end to end by sea. In such cases, it may be said without exaggeration that an ocean frontier is continuous. The United States has one frontier which is strictly continuous, by land as by water, from the coast of Maine to the Rio Grande. There are in it, by natural division, three principal parts: the Atlantic, the Gulf, and the Straits of Florida. While the peninsula of Florida did not rank very high in the industrial interests of the nation in the early years of the 20th Century, a superior hostile fleet securely based in the Straits of Florida could effectively control intercourse by water between the two flanks. It would possess central position; and in virtue of that central position, its superiority need not be over the whole United States navy, should that be divided on each side of the central position. It was this condition which made Cuba for the first century of America's national existence a consideration of the first importance in our international relations. It flanked national communications, commercial and military. To avert further European colonization or control entirely, and European intermeddling as far as possible, summed up American policy. Extension of national control had for its chief motive the exclusion of European influences, by preoccupying the ground; of which preoccupation Louisiana and the Floridas afford successive instances. This tradition passed on to Cuba; it would have been impossible for the United States to acquiesce in the transfer of the island to a strong naval state. Even Jefferson regarded as desirable to include it within US schemes of national extension, averse though he was to any acquisition that might induce a naval establishment. Cuba and Puerto Rico, in the hands of one state, as they then were, would make military access to the Isthmus in time of war dependent, for the United States, upon an extreme circuit, at least as wide as through the Anegada Passage; after which the rest of the road to the Isthmus is more or less flanked throughout by the position of the two islands. In short, the possession, or military control, of Cuba and Puerto Rico, or even of Cuba alone, by an enemy of naval force equal to the United States, would be an absolute bar to American influence at the Isthmus. Granting adequate naval force, the occupation of Cuba alone gives command of the Yucatan and Windward Passages, and thereby, through the inert barrier of Haiti, extends control over all the northern entrances to the Caribbean as far as the Mona Passage   more
0 votes
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12

War Plan Indigo (Iceland)

Indigo is the color on the electromagnetic spectrum between about 420 and 450 nm in wavelength, placing it between blue and violet. Indigo is a color that the human eye is not very sensitive to so people do not see it very well. It's frequency is be... tween blue and violet, both of which humans see better. Although all the blues in a rainbow do contain some red, there is no place in the rainbow where a deep enough blue combine with enough red to make indigo. Early in the European conflict both the British and the Germans had recognized what the Vikings had demonstrated ten centuries before, namely, that Iceland was an important steppingstone between Europe and the New World. Hitler several times toyed with the idea of a descent upon the island and laid preliminary plans for it; but to forestall such a move British troops, soon joined by a Canadian force, had landed in Iceland on 10 May 1940. Icelandic annoyance with the British and Canadian garrison, and British losses in the war, which made a withdrawal of the Iceland garrison seem desirable, plus American concern for the Atlantic sea lanes, combined to bring Iceland within the American defense orbit. Taking a pessimistic view of England's chances of survival the Icelandic Government had, as early as mid-July of 1940, approached the Department of State concerning the possibility of Iceland's coming under the aegis of the Monroe Doctrine and in September and December the question was again raised. In Iceland it was apparently expected that a simple declaration by the United States to the effect that Iceland lay within the western hemisphere, and therefore within range of the Monroe Doctrine, would make the presence of foreign troops unnecessary. If a garrison was required, it was thought that American troops, being those of a nonbelligerent power, would not draw German attacks. And once Iceland was accepted as part of the "Monroe Doctrine Area" it was hoped that a favorable trade agreement could be arranged with the United States. On 11 February 1941 Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson informed the Secretary of State that the War Department shared the latter's views that the United States should "neither discourage nor encourage an approach to this Government by the Government of Iceland." By the early spring of 1941 the British position in the Mediterranean had become extremely precarious. Weakened by the withdrawal of some 50,000 troops to Greece and surprised by greatly reinforced German and Italian forces, Britain's Army of the Nile was driven back, with serious losses, across the African deserts to the Egyptian border. Disaster in Greece, following hard upon the rout in North Africa, added 11,000 dead and missing to the casualties of the African campaign. There was thus a pressing need for the 20,000 or so British troops tied down in Iceland. Meanwhile the Battle of the Atlantic had taken a critical turn when, in March, German U-boats moved westward into the unprotected gap between the Canadian and British escort areas. Shipping losses mounted steeply. Although the Royal Navy immediately established a patrol and escort staging base in Iceland, a dangerous gap in the ocean defenses remained. American concern in the protection of the North Atlantic sea lanes, and in the defense of Iceland as well, had been acknowledged in the Anglo-American (ABC) staff conversations of March 1941. Although Britain, in her own interest and on her own initiative, had already committed herself to both tasks, they were recognized as matters of mutual responsibility in the final staff report, the so-called ABC-1 agreement. Britain, it was decided, would provide a garrison for Iceland as long as the United States remained a nonbelligerent; should the United States be forced into the war against the Axis Powers, American troops would then relieve the British garrison. By admitting and accepting this measure of responsibility, however conditional it was, the United States laid itself open to an appeal for assistance whenever Britain should find the defense of Iceland too burdensome. If the United States, instead of awaiting formal entry into the war, was to undertake immediately the responsibility it had accepted for relieving the British troops in Iceland, then British losses in North Africa and Greece could be to some extent replaced without undue strain on British manpower. Iceland, no less than Britain, was anxious to have the British garrison depart. Intensely nationalistic, proud of their ancient civilization, the Icelanders chafed under the "protective custody" in which they found themselves placed. As long as Canadian troops made up a large part of the garrison force, they had felt that a wholly British contingent would be preferable, but when the Canadians were later replaced by British troops most Icelanders seemed to find their lot no more bearable. As the scope of Germany's aerial blitzkrieg widened, the people of Iceland grew more uneasy; for to be "defended" by one of the belligerent powers, they felt, was an open invitation to attack by the other. The Icelandic Government shared the apprehensions of the people and found further annoyance in Britain's control of Iceland's export trade. Washington's interest in Iceland had quickened as an outgrowth of the problem of placing American planes and supplies in the hands of the British and as part of the task of making the United States Navy's "neutrality patrol" more effective. On 10 April 1941 President Roosevelt decided to extend the neutrality patrol to the middle of the Atlantic, roughly to the 26th meridian. At the end of the month, the War Plans Division recommended that an Army survey party be sent to Iceland for the specific purpose of preparing detailed plans for its defense. That a declaration of war by Germany would follow the landing of American troops on Iceland, whether by invitation of the respective governments or not, was regarded by War Department planners as almost certain. The shifting tides of war and strategy had not only created a more urgent need elsewhere for the British troops that were in Iceland, they had also strengthened President Roosevelt's determination to ensure the safety of Britain's North Atlantic supply line. Declaring an unlimited national emergency, the President in a speech on 27 May 1941 promised all possible assistance in getting supplies to Britain. Two days later, in response to an inquiry made by the President not long before, Prime Minister Churchill informed Roosevelt that he would welcome the immediate relief of the British garrison in Iceland. On the strength of Secretary Stimson's request in the War Council meeting of 3 June, the War Department had hastily resumed the long-dormant preparations for sending a survey party to Iceland, although the head of the War Plans Division and some of his subordinates were opposed to the idea of an Iceland expedition. From that point planning had to proceed on the basis of the two known factors: that approximately 30,000 troops would be required, and that either the 1st or 5th Division would provide the nucleus of the force. In the absence of other data the chief consideration governing the strength and composition of the proposed Iceland garrison was that it must be comparable to the British units for the relief of which the American force was intended. In the preliminary planning and the discussions that took place during this first week in June 1941, the 1st Division was scheduled for the job in lieu of the 5th. The shift of units apparently was made with some misgivings, for the 1st Division was the best equipped infantry division in the Army, the only one that approached a state of readiness for combat involving landings on a hostile shore. Harbor conditions and the lack of facilities at Reykjavik were recognized as the real limitation. The problem, simply stated, was to place in Iceland, as soon as possible, nearly 30,000 men with 231,554 ship tons of equipment, weapons, and supplies, and to provide thereafter some 25,000 tons of shipping each month for maintenance. Legal restrictions prohibited the National Guard, members of the Reserve, and men drafted under the Selective Service Act from serving outside the Western Hemisphere and limited their terms of military service to a period of twelve months. For purposes of naval defense the President had placed the Atlantic frontier of the western world, quite arbitrarily, along the 26th meridian, which excluded the whole of Iceland. On 07 June 1941, General Marshall informed the War Plans Division that the Iceland preparations should be based upon using the 5th Division with a Marine Corps unit for the first wave of the force. Substituting the 5th Division for the more indispensable 1st Division as the basic component of the force and that thus the latter division would once more be available for the role originally assigned to it in the war plans. The new timetable, submitted to the War Department on 16 June, tentatively provided for three convoys sailing at ten-day intervals, beginning 20 August 1941, each carrying 8,500 men. Planningn challenges were: first, the lack of harbor facilities at Reykjavik and the outports, which would impose limitations on shipping; second, the availability of housing, which was conditioned upon the British evacuating their Nissen huts; and third, the onset of winter gales and snow after late September, which established a deadline for the operation. On 01 July 1941, the Army-Navy Joint Planning Committee finally completed and submitted to the Joint Board the basic directive for the Iceland operation. Given the short title INDIGO, it was intended to be the definitive joint plan to which all subsequent planning should conform. Unfortunately it emerged stillborn. The plan failed to survive a policy decision taken the very same day, a decision that was partly the culmination of the War Department's approach to the problem and partly the result of the President's fears that the proposed garrison was inadequate. Heretofore the confusion and the vacillation and the irreconcilable plans had generally arisen over a question of method, of how to transport to Iceland by a definite date a specified number of men with a given amount of supplies and equipment. But the tendency to approach a solution by changing the terms of the proposition gradually developed, and the more pronounced this tendency became, the larger grew the area susceptible to dispute and revision. Shuffling the supply requirements had necessitated several changes in the plan before the INDIGO directive finally established a convoy schedule by cutting back the bulk of reserves to a 90-day level, by setting a 200,000-ton limit on cargo, and by making a corresponding reduction in the number of cargo transports. It was primarily President Roosevelt's doubt whether there were enough British troops in Iceland which led, paradoxically, to the reduction in size of the American force sent there in 1941. Informed of his views, the British Foreign Office in late June gave a definite pledge that no troops would be withdrawn until both the United States and Britain were satisfied that the defenses of Iceland were secure. The invitation from Iceland to take over the task of defense, its acceptance by the President, the orders for the marines to resume their voyage (they had been held in Newfoundland for three days in expectation of the Icelandic request), and the decision that the Army would reinforce the British, not relieve them, all came on the same day, 01 July 1941. The claim was not then made, as it was soon afterward, that the legal restrictions themselves caused the original INDIGO plan to be abandoned; and as for the effect of Congressional controversy over lifting them, if the President had already made up his mind to ask for their removal when he made the Iceland decision on 1 July the War Plans Division had apparently been kept uninformed of his intentions. But the release of the Chief of Staff's biennial report on the morning of Thursday, 3 July, opened the question to public discussion. Immediately the leaders of isolationist opinion let loose a barrage of criticism against General Marshall's recommendation that the twelve-month limitation on the length of service be removed. On 07 July 1941, Presidential Secretary Stephen Early dropped a guarded hint to the press that a message to Congress asking an extension of the twelve-month limit of service was to be expected. It was almost completely overshadowed by the announcement, simultaneously made, that the marines had landed in Iceland. The Second Echelon was ready to depart by 4 September, almost exactly three months after the decision to launch the operation had been made. As an ad hoc operational plan the original INDIGO plan was not sufficiently general to accommodate itself to changes in basic conditions; and in its character of a directive it was so detailed as to lack precision. But what effect these failings had, and what the effect would have been had the planning been faultless, is a matter of conjecture; for the INDIGO directives were drawn up in accordance with, and changed to conform to, the projected operations. Thus GHQ was not given, for its Theater of Operations Plan, a clear-cut definition of the limits within which the operations were to be conducted   more
0 votes
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13

War Plan Purple (South America)

Invasion of the South American republics.
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14

War Plan Violet (Latin America)

War Plan Violet covered Latin America. By the mid-1800s, the Monroe Doctrine, combined with ideas of Manifest Destiny, provided precedent and support for U.S. expansion on the American continent. In the late 1800s, U.S. economic and military power e... nabled it to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine's greatest extension came with Theodore Roosevelt's Corollary, which inverted the original meaning of the doctrine and came to justify unilateral U.S. intervention in Latin America. In his December 2, 1823, address to Congress, President James Monroe articulated United States' policy on the new political order developing in the rest of the Americas and the role of Europe in the Western Hemisphere. The statement, known as the Monroe Doctrine, was little noted by the Great Powers of Europe, but eventually became a longstanding tenet of U.S. foreign policy. Monroe and his Secretary of State John Quincy Adams drew upon a foundation of American diplomatic ideals such as disentanglement from European affairs and defense of neutral rights as expressed in Washington's Farewell Address and Madison's stated rationale for waging the War of 1812. The three main concepts of the doctrine--separate spheres of influence for the Americas and Europe, non-colonization, and non-intervention--were designed to signify a clear break between the New World and the autocratic realm of Europe. Monroe's administration forewarned the imperial European powers against interfering in the affairs of the newly independent Latin American states or potential United States territories. While Americans generally objected to European colonies in the New World, they also desired to increase United States influence and trading ties throughout the region to their south. European mercantilism posed the greatest obstacle to economic expansion. In particular, Americans feared that Spain and France might reassert colonialism over the Latin American peoples who had just overthrown European rule. The British also had a strong interest in ensuring the demise of Spanish colonialism, with all the trade restrictions mercantilism imposed As Monroe stated: "The American continents . Are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." Monroe outlined two separate spheres of influence: the Americas and Europe. The independent lands of the Western Hemisphere would be solely the United States' domain. In exchange, the United States pledged to avoid involvement in the political affairs of Europe, such as the ongoing Greek struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire, and not to interfere in the existing European colonies already in the Americas. Violet, the fourth color of the spectrum, might be said to result from the union of the American colors of red, white, and blue. Violets and lavenders can easily be mixed with the primary colors blue and red. However, violet as a single wavelength is a perceptible part of the rainbow. Certain cells in the eye respond to certain range of wavelengths of light (nominally -- red, green, and blue). However, There is no sharp wavelength cutoff where "red" ends and "green" begins. That varies from person to person and many other factors -- physical, psychological, and physiological. The classic experiment being saturation or "fatigue" where if you stare at a certain color for a minute and then quickly shift your eyes to a white surface you will see the complementary color of the original. In the case of "blue" there is no sharp cutoff wavelength where "blue" ends and the ultraviolet wavelengths begin. The "blue" cones are still sensitive to electromagnetic radiation that is refered to as "violet". The President and his military advisers in conferences on 16 May 1940 agreed that, for the time being, the bulk of the United States Fleet should remain in the Pacific and, in consequence, that the Army should have primary responsibility for air operations in the Atlantic area and along the east coast of South America. Should France fall, they anticipated that Germany might secure immediate and free access to French African possessions. German air forces would then be in a position to launch a direct attack on South America, and should Germany also acquire the British and French Fleets it might be able to launch a ground force across the South Atlantic as well. In view of these alarming prospects, the Department of State hastily made the necessary arrangements for military staff conversations with the Latin American nations in order to plan measures for the common defense, secure the use of bases, and obtain other military assistance for operations of United States forces. The War Plans Division on 22 May 1940 summarized what it termed the "imminently probable complications of today's situation." These it considered to be a Nazi-inspired revolution in Brazil, similarly inspired disorders in Mexico, Japanese hostilities against the United States in the Far East, a decisive Allied defeat in Europe followed by German aggression against the Western Hemisphere, or "all combined." The President and his military advisers were particularly concerned over the possibilities of Nazi intervention in Brazil. Prompted in part by reports received through the British Admiralty on 24 May 1940 that the Nazis might be preparing to send an expeditionary force toward Brazil, President Roosevelt on the following day directed the Army and Navy to prepare a joint plan for sending an American force to forestall any such German move. The planning staffs hurriedly prepared a plan, with the code name POT OF GOLD, over the weekend of 25-27 May. It provided for the emergency movement of a large expeditionary force to Brazilian coastal points from Belém to Rio de Janeiro and for sending the first ten thousand men by plane to northeastern Brazil as soon as an Axis move or pro-Axis movement occurred. Of course the United States Government had no intention of putting the POT OF GOLD plan into effect either in whole or part except in extreme emergency and after consultation with Brazil. The services realized only too well that its execution would revive Latin American fears of Yankee imperialism; the Army, as the War Plans Division had pointed out on 22 May, had no units that were really ready for expeditionary force use; the Army Air Corps was certainly not equipped to carry out the contemplated air movement, and existing airfields on the route to Brazil were wholly inadequate to handle an air movement of this sort even if the equipment had been available; finally, the plan would have required the transfer of a substantial portion of the United States Fleet from the Pacific, a step strongly opposed by the Navy. Since they did not know the real scope and direction of German intentions, American military planners in May 1940 had to base their calculations on the known capabilities of the German war machine and on the unpredictability of the Nazi Fuehrer. The course of subsequent events and later revelations were to make emergency schemes such as the POT OF GOLD plan seem somewhat excessive, to say the least. But, as President Roosevelt had repeatedly observed since early 1939, the long-range threat was very real, and an immediate German victory over Britain as well as France would have made it very present. Speaking confidentially to a group of businessmen on 23 May, the President said that the defeat of France and Britain would eliminate a buffer that for decades had protected the United States and its way of life. "The buffer," he continued, "has been the British Fleet and the French Army." If they were removed, the American system would be directly and immediately menaced by a Nazi-dominated Europe. The new joint RAINBOW 4 plan was based on assumptions that clearly indicated the dire forebodings of Army and Navy officers at the end of May. It assumed that, after the defeat of Britain and France, the United States would be faced by a hostile German-Italian-Japanese coalition. Its combined naval power, bolstered by portions of the British and French Fleets, would considerably exceed that of the United States. Japan would proclaim its absolute hegemony in the Far East, and might seize the Philippines and Guam. Germany and Italy would occupy all British and French territory in Africa, and also Iceland. In Latin America, the Germans and Italians would use every means to stir antagonism toward the United States, and they might succeed in establishing pro-Axis governments in strategically located countries. Canada; remaining technically at war with Germany, would occupy Newfoundland, and the United States would have to join with Canada in the defense of Newfoundland and Greenland. Nevertheless, a considerable interval would probably elapse after the British and French collapse before the United States would be drawn openly into war. The United States planned to counter these threats initially by occupying key British, French, Dutch, and Danish possessions in the Western Hemisphere claimed by Germany and Italy as the spoils of war. Thereafter, its armed forces must be disposed along the Atlantic front of the hemisphere so as to prevent any lodgment by Axis military forces. In the Pacific, every effort would have to be made to avoid open hostilities with Japan; if they began, the United States should base its defense on Oahu and Alaska. The major portion of the United States Fleet would have to be withdrawn from the Pacific and concentrated in the Caribbean area. Though the original RAINBOW 4 concept had contemplated defense of the entire Western Hemisphere, the armed forces of the United States for the time being would have to confine their operations to North America and the northern part of South America (approximately within RAINBOW 1 limits), extending their operations southward only as additional forces became available. While maintaining a defensive position in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, the nation would have to increase its military power as rapidly as possible, with the eventual objective of limited offensive action   more
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15

War Plan White (the United States)

Civil disorder is a term that generally refers to groups of people purposely choosing not to observe a law, regulation, or rule, usually in order to bring attention to their cause, concern, or agenda. Civil disorders are any public disturbance invol... ving acts of violence by assemblages of three or more persons, which cause an immediate danger of or results in damage or injury to the property or person of any other individual. Civil disorders can take the form of small gatherings or large groups blocking or impeding access to a building, or disrupting normal activities by generating noise and intimidating people. They can range from a peaceful sit-in to a full-scale riot in which a mob burns or otherwise destroys property and terrorizes individuals. Even in its more passive forms, a group that blocks roadways, sidewalks, or buildings interferes with public order. Throughout this country's history, incidents that disrupted the public peace have figured prominently. The Constitutional guarantees allow for ample expression of protest and dissent, and in many cases collide with the Preamble's requirementof the government "to ensure domestic tranquility." When Sir William Blackstone wrote his famous Commentaries on the Laws of England in the mid-18th century, he defined freedom of speech as the lack of prior restraint. By that he meant that the government could not stop someone from saying or publishing what he believed, but once a person had uttered those remarks, he could be punished if the type of speech was forbidden. The English, like the ancient Greeks, had established legal restrictions on three types of speech - sedition (criticism of the government), defamation (criticism of individuals), and blasphemy (criticism of religion) - each of which they called "libels." Of these three, the one that is most important in terms of political liberty is seditious libel, because ruling elites in Blackstone's era believed that any criticism of government or of its officials, even if true, subverted public order by undermining confidence in the government. In America, the colonists established truth as a defense to the charge of seditious libel. One could still be charged if one criticized the government or its officials, but now a defendant could present evidence of the truth of the statements, and it would be up to a jury to determine their validity. The early American republic maintained careful neutrality between warring France and Britain. Federalists, suspicious of the Republicans' friendship with the French, won congressional passage of the Sedition Act in 1798. The statute criminalized criticism of the American government. The Sedition Act made it a crime for American citizens to "print, utter, or publish . . . Any false, scandalous, and malicious writing" about the Government. At that time, the government was in the hands of the pro-British Federalists, while much of the criticism leveled at that party came from certain Republican newspapers and legislators. Federalists defended the Act as necessary to the defense of the United States. The law was expressly designed to suppress any and all political opposition to Federalist leadership and policies. Republican-dominated Southern legislatures bitterly attacked the constitutionality and desirability of the Sedition Act, not for the limits it placed on speech, but for the fact that it increased federal power over the states. The story of the Sedition Act casts serious doubt on the notion that the founding fathers intended the First Amendment to be a libertarian statement designed to protect every speaker and every utterance. The Alien Act laws raised the residency requirements for citizenship from 5 to 14 years, authorized the President to deport aliens, and permitted their arrest, imprisonment, and deportation during wartime. The laws were directed against Democratic-Republicans, the party typically favored by new citizens. The Regular Army's role in quelling civil unrest during the first eighty-nine years of the Republic was sporadic. During this period some American citizens opposed a standing Army. This resistance was based on the intrinsic fear that the Army would be utilized by the government to tyrannize its people. A standing Army, according Robert Coakley, "could be the instrument only of a monarchy, not a democratic state." Despite the concern on the part of many Americans for one hundred years after the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, the U.S. Army did not usurp power or turn out to be putty in the hands of potentially malicious presidents to harass their opponents or suppress dissidents. During this period federal troops quelled civil unrest during the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, Fries' Rebellion in 1799, Dorr's Rebellion in 1842, at the Kansas Border in 1854, during the Mormon Troubles in 1857-58, and quelled the unrest at Harper's Ferry and captured John Brown in 1859. This long history of assisting civil authorities enforce the nation's laws included the 1863 New York City Draft riots. In the post-Reconstruction era, the Army was heavily involved in quelling violence associated with labor disputes and enforcing court injunctions against striking union workers. The Army's intervention in the railroad strikes of 1877, the labor disputes at the Coeur d'Alene Mines in Idaho in 1892, and the Pullman strikes of 1894, created the most turbulence within the officer corps. The predominant problem that existed during this period was clarity of instructions and policies. According to Jerry Cooper, "officers wished they could have avoided involvement in riot duty because of the lack of defined policy and law." Policy decisions that should have been made at the federal level were left vague or unanswered leading local or state authorities in charge. Invariably, their decision supported management's position and pitted soldiers against strikers. During the eleven year period between 1885 and 1895 military forces were mobilized 328 times for riot duty; 118 involved labor conflicts. During the twentieth century the Army's role in quelling civil disturbances was both more frequent and more diverse. The Regular Army suppressed civil unrest at the Nevada gold mines in 1907; at the Colorado coal mines in 1913 and 1914; at the Winston-Salem, North Carolina, riots in 1918; at the Washington, DC, riots in 1919; at the Omaha, Nebraska, riots in 1919; at the West Virginia mines in 1921; and thwarted the activities of Army veterans during the Bonus March in Washington, in 1932. During the American Civil War of 1861-1865, there were a few minor regulations aimed at sedition, but not until the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 did the real debate over the meaning of the First Amendment Speech Clause begin. In the late 1940s the government prosecuted leaders of the American Communist Party for advocating the forceful overthrow of the government and conspiring to spread this doctrine. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, which since the 1920s had seemed to take an ever more speech-protective view of the First Amendment, now apparently reversed itself. Though admitting that American communists posed little clear and present danger, the Court ruled their words represented a "bad tendency" that could prove subversive of the social order. Under 18 USC Sec. 2383. Rebellion or insurrection "Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States." Under 18 USC Sec. 2384. Seditious conspiracy "If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both." Between 1902 and 1921 there were 51 emergencies other than war for which Regular Army troops had been used. Some of these emergencies were relatively uuimportant. Others were of considerable importance. Whatever the magnitude of the need, due to the existence and training of this regular force, troops were instantly available. Neither would the hick of available troops have eliminated the emergency. From June, 1915, to June, 1917, there were received in the War Department approximately 400 requests from different States and individuals for Federal troops   more
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16

War Plan Citron (Brazil)

Invasion and annexation of Brazil.
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17

War Plan Garnet (New Zealand)

Planned invasion of New Zealand.
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18

War Plan Olive (Spain)

Invasion of Spain.
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19

War Plan Silver (Italy)

The War Plan Silver set based on Woodrow Wilson's very serious threat to go to war with Italy in May 1919, plus revised versions of most of those originally seen in Plan Black.
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20

War Plan Lemon (Portugal)

Invasion of Portugal.
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21

War Plan Pink (Soviet Union)

Operation Unthinkable was a code name of two related plans of a conflict between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Both were ordered by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1945 and developed by the British Armed Forces' Joint Planning...  Staff at the end of World War II in Europe. The first of the two assumed a surprise attack on the Soviet forces stationed in Germany in order to "impose the will of the Western Allies" on the Soviets and force Joseph Stalin to honour the agreements in regards to the future of Central Europe. When the odds were judged "fanciful", the original plan was abandoned. The code name was used instead for a defensive scenario, in which the British were to defend against a Soviet drive towards the North Sea and the Atlantic following the withdrawal of the American forces from the continent. The study became the first Cold War-era contingency plan for war with the Soviet Union. Both plans were highly secret at the time of their creation and it was not until 1998 that they were made public   more
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22

War Plan Emerald (Ireland)

Invasion of Ireland. Ireland, at the time a free state within the British Empire, was named "Emerald".
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(Maximum 900 words)
reece says2015-07-04T16:47:21.3628458-05:00
Aim high, fall fast.
reece says2015-07-04T16:52:04.4302893-05:00
@PetersSmith Some of these countries on here have more freedom than American lol. *cough cough* New Zealand has ranked with the highest level of freedom.
reece says2015-07-04T16:52:33.5107759-05:00
Is*
PetersSmith says2015-07-04T16:54:49.4803917-05:00
Reece: It also spawned you, which knocks it down to about the level of Ethiopia.
reece says2015-07-04T17:01:04.4034732-05:00
@PetersSmith So America is going to invade New Zealand all because of me? Do you think i should take that as a compliment?
PetersSmith says2015-07-04T17:01:27.4172647-05:00
Reece: Where did you even get that from? I was talking about how "good" your country is.
reece says2015-07-04T17:04:14.6335314-05:00
@PetersSmith I know, Obviously their jealous.
PetersSmith says2015-07-04T17:04:52.8542664-05:00
Reece: Have you even been to America?
reece says2015-07-04T17:05:57.5799111-05:00
@PetersSmith Have you ever been to New Zealand?
PetersSmith says2015-07-04T17:09:42.2086308-05:00
Reece: I didn't think so. Actually go to the country before saying so many "bad" things about it. And you saying "have you ever been to New Zealand?" is typical coming from you, because you had no other response. I never denounced New Zealand to the astronomical extent that you hate on Americans and the country itself You're the one who goes on almost every poll about America and rants on how "evil" and "terrible" it is.
reece says2015-07-04T17:12:25.0825197-05:00
@PetersSmith I had no intention of taking you seriously.
Pretzelz says2015-07-04T18:02:20.1168456-05:00
I don't think america is particularly good at spreading freedom.
Varrack says2015-07-04T19:51:24.2178512-05:00
It's funny how all the anti-Americans I've talked to have never even been to America. They also don't have any serious arguments which is why no one takes them seriously. Anyways, Happy 4th!
reece says2015-07-04T21:35:17.3875892-05:00
@Varrack What is required for someone to be anti-American for you? Am i anti-American? If so, Is it because i don't conform to the idea of America being the greatest nation in the world?
PetersSmith says2015-07-04T21:36:11.4259892-05:00
Reece: You insult and make fun of Americans and the United States all the time.
reece says2015-07-04T21:44:42.8233719-05:00
@PetersSmith So what? You can insult and make fun of New Zealand if you want. I won't call you an anti-kiwi. Calling someone an anti-American for criticism is stupid.
PetersSmith says2015-07-04T21:47:10.6406161-05:00
Reece: It's uncalled for and strong criticism. I think it's fairly clear you hate the United States almost as much as you hate religion (eh, maybe about 1/4).
reece says2015-07-04T21:52:11.3040004-05:00
@PetersSmith You're generalizing my beliefs.
58539672 says2015-07-04T22:29:49.2955865-05:00
@reece Based on how much you complain about both, I think you generalized your own beliefs. The only time we ever hear from you is if it pertains to either religion or america. And even if their is another topic your on, their is a strong possibility you will bring one of those topics up as quickly as possible.
Varrack says2015-07-04T23:31:51.3115337-05:00
@reece - Let me be clear. You contribute nothing to this site, besides leaving one or two-sentence remarks about how irrational religion is or how bad America is as a country. When someone criticizes the same thing over and over, they are soon looked upon as being anti-that thing. The points you make are very skimpy and unconvincing. So yes, it is you who is generalizing your own beliefs as well as giving yourself a poor reputation.
reece says2015-07-04T23:44:27.9164903-05:00
You can find anything if you look hard enough.
PetersSmith says2015-07-04T23:45:21.0249120-05:00
Reece: You should have stayed gone.
Varrack says2015-07-04T23:45:50.4812871-05:00
And once again you drop everything I say. That's not surprising though.
reece says2015-07-04T23:52:45.3030592-05:00
@Varrack read what i said again.
reece says2015-07-04T23:55:29.8174613-05:00
@Varrack Obviously you don't put much thought into what i say.
tajshar2k says2015-07-05T08:47:24.7350410-05:00
@varrack I already added him to the troll list, so we don't need to argue with him seriously anymore.
TeaLoverTicTac says2015-07-05T12:16:19.6066082-05:00
I love quizzes on this site.

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